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PREFACE

Christian Democracy has attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention. Whereas 
studies of Social Democracy could easily fill a small library, monographs on the 
Christian inspired movements of Western Europe would probably scarcily stuff an 
entire book-shelf. Given the political importance of Christian Democracy such lack of 
concern with the phenomenon is quite perplexing. In the course of my studies I have 
noticed that occupying oneself with Christian Democracy out of intellectual curiosity 
tends to titillate skepticism on the side of those who never seriously thought about the 
topic. One has frequently doubted my ’real’ motives. Every time I presented my work 
somebody felt obliged to ask whether I was perhaps religious myself. Apparently, it 
is difficult to imagine that Christian Democracy can be an intriguing object of study 
in itself. One does not have to believe in the Christian Democratic project in order to 
study it, just as one does not have to be a fool to study madness. The most cordial 
reaction I ever got was when someone praised my courage to tackle the topic, probably 
contending that masochism is a prerequisite for martyrdom. One can envisage that 
explaining my thesis as one relating Christian Democracy and the welfare state has not 
been an easy matter either. The possibility of the connection seems to be excluded. 
Christian Democracy inhibits a happy life for all, that is common wisdom. But how do 
we know? Let us wait with value judgements until knowledge permits us tc assess the 
movement’s shortcomings properly.
Fortunately, the academic entourage of the European University Institute has 
provided me with an intellectual environment where my attempt to make sense of 
Christian Democracy and the welfare state was more than encouraged. Here I have 
come across very little prejudice. The Institute’s openness and its international 
character have given me a unique opportunity for carrying out this study. I am grateful 
to the Dutch Ministry of Education and the European Community for providing me 
with the grants that allowed me to write this dissertation and survive financially.
If altruism and generosity have lost much of their content in contemporary 
personal relationships, my supervisor and friend, Gosta Esping-Andersen, has certainly 
made a great effort to refresh the genuine meaning of the concepts (and note that - 
unlike charity- altruism does not imply the submission of the recipient to the 
benefactor). His influence on this study is unmistakable and I do not regret it for a 
moment. It is certainly not a ’bad idea’ to ask under what conditions some do and some
don’t. I thoroughly disagree with him on only one minor detail. The first rule of 
sociology is ’everything took longer’.
The initial idea for this study was conceived when I was at the political science 
department of the University of Amsterdam. I wish to thank Uwe Becker for making 
me aware of the fact that Dutch exceptionalism may be as much due to the peculiarities 
of this nation as to the hidden assumptions of theories of the welfare state. He taught 
me the importance of a critical spirit. The collaboration with Dietmar Braun has 
contributed much to my understanding of Christian Democracy and the original 
research proposal was a direct result of a seminar on Christian Democracy that we held 
in 1986-1987.
During my stay in Florence, I participated in several seminars where I was 
given the opportunity to present the preliminary results of my research. I wish to thank 
all the participants for their efforts to read and comment upon my usually too wordy 
papers. If you read this work carefully you will certainly recognize bits and pieces of 
your own remarks. My friend Zina Assimakopoulou deserves special mention. 
Together we found out how tedious empirical research can be.
Bep and Corry, my parents, have contributed to this work in their own peculiar 
manner. I’ll show my gratitude on one of the few occasions that we will all be back 
in the Netherlands. Of course I should also thank my wife, Inger Stokkink, but I 
already did that yesterday and today, and I will do so again tomorrow.
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CAPITALISM: 
AN INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1

2"In order to overcome today’s widespread individualistic mentality, 
what is required is a concrete commitment to solidarity and charity, 
beginning in the family with the mutual support of husband and wife 
and the care which the different generations give to one another" 
(Centesimus Annus)
Christian Democracy fosters a distinctive welfare state regime. This is perhaps the 
shortest way of summarizing the central thesis of this dissertation. The aim of the study 
is to contribute to our knowledge of the phenomenon of Christian Democracy as well 
as to our understanding of the manner in which this movement has shaped the societal 
configuration of market, state and family. This double object of the study is a 
consequence of trying to clarify a relationship. Yet, there is a more substantial reason 
for it, too. What I claim is that what is distinctive about Christian Democracy is 
distinctive about the Christian Democratic welfare state regime. It is the theory and 
practice of social capitalism that not only distinguishes this movement from other 
political actors (notably Social Democracy), but also to a large extent explains the 
specific character of the welfare state regime of nations such as Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands. Parallel to the Social Democratization of capitalism in the Nordic 
countries, one might disclose a form of ’Christian Democratization’ of capitalism in 
nations on the European continent.
I use the term ’social capitalism’ to denote Christian Democracy’s project and 
practice of social reform. As with the notion ’welfare capitalism’ it refers to a specific 
institutional arrangement of social intervention. In this sense it is my idiosyncratic 
adaptation of Hartwich’s (1970) and Schmidt’s (1985) use of the term0. Social 
capitalism synthesizes a basic commitment to capitalist market relations and a readiness 
to correct its detrimental effects. Social policy is primarily conceived of as a safety-net. 
It intercepts those who are in imminent danger of being crushed by the logic of the 
market. There exist three recognized sub-systems of society. First, the imperfect 
market, which can only be marginally altered and for which collective arrangements
1) Nanetti (1988) is another author who uses the term explicitly. She, however, sees social capitalism 
as a phase of the Italian welfare state in which public policies are formulated for the creation, support 
and pervasive distribution of private wealth by sub-national governments.
of care must be created. Secondly, the state, which is the institution through which 
funds are transferred to those who need assistance to help themselves. Third, the 
family, which is the atomic unit to which social rights are attached. Social capitalism 
differs from the Liberal model in that it refuses to view the individual as the 
elementary unit of society and in that it accords the state an extensive role as 
’subsidizer’ of deficiency -both of the market and of the family. It contrasts with the 
Social Democratic model in that the state cannot and should not intervene (or only 
modestly so) in the market mechanism itself and in that it is reluctant to attach rights 
to citizens as citizens. Social capitalism, then, is the specific arrangement of market, 
state and family by which resources produced in the private economy are channeled to 
families that fail to secure their means of income themselves. Under what conditions 
and to what extent Christian Democracy explains this phenomenon is the leading 
question of this study.
This dissertation is not on the welfare state, but on a specific type of welfare 
state regime. I do not simply defend the thesis that Christian Democracy is related to 
welfare statism as such. The use of the particle ’the’ is generally a misnomer. There 
are welfare states and only a few of these fundamentally comprise the aims of solidarity 
and universalism. Nevertheless, the idea of ’the’ welfare state is so firmly established 
that it seems difficult to think of a plurality of forms rather than of a variance in 
’effort’. It is such a preconception that makes one argue that "the fully, generalized, 
comprehensive welfare state most closely embodies institutionalized solidarity" 
(Baldwin 1990: 29). The very vocabulary (’fully’, ’generalized’) reveals the shared 
fixation of so many a study in the field on the Social Democratic model. As a result, 
other specimens automatically tend to become ’less’ rather than distinctive as measured«
against such a Social Democratic archetype.
Still, my view on the political determinants of welfare statism and on the 
manner in which to single out Christian Democracy as an explanatory variable is 
strongly influenced by the Social Democratic paradigm. My use of the very concept 
of social policy or welfare state regime as a nation’s specific pattern of state, market 
and family illustrates my indebtedness to recent elaborations and improvements of the 
model (Esping-Andersen 1985b; 1987; 1990). I have come to realize that studying the 
qualitative differences in the social policy arrangements of nations may be a fruitful
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way for analyzing the political economies of these nations and their social and political 
determinants. Besides, it may teach us something about the nature of political 
movements.
It has become increasingly clear, however, that the Social Democratic bias - 
although perhaps particularly apt for the Scandinavian experience- has inhibited a 
thorough understanding of the welfare state regimes of continental Europe. As I will 
show in the following pages the inability of dealing with ’exceptional cases’ has as 
much to do with the Social Democratic bias and the exclusive focus on social spending 
as with the mistaken a priori interpretation of Christian Democracy as a bourgeois, 
conservative or centre party. True, one should be careful not to discard the social 
interpretation of the welfare state completely and replace it by, say, a state-centred 
approach, or worse, by a Christian Democratic bias in the research. I do not want to 
overstate my case and I fully agree with Baldwin that what is needed is "a refinement, 
not an abandonment, of a social interpretation of social policy (...). If an account of 
welfare policy in terms of its societal bases is to be worth pursuing, it must develop 
a logic of social interest with a broader applicability, both temporally and geographical­
ly. The search for the social bases of the welfare state is far from over” (Baldwin 
1990: 49).
This dissertation has a much narrower scope. I do not claim in any sense to 
analyze the social bases of the welfare state, let alone that I would attempt to explain 
why and when some nations adapted solidaristic policies, where and when others did 
not. My aim is to specify the character and political determinants of what Esping- 
Andersen (1990) has called the conservative and corporatist-statist regimes of 
continental Europe, but which I prefer to refer to as the cluster of social capitalism. 
I try to do this by clarifying Christian Democracy as a distinctive political movement 
and by studying the relative role of Christian Democracy in the shaping of this welfare 
state regime.
An Outline
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What is distinctive about Christian Democracy and social capitalism? This is the subject 
matter of the first part in which I make a case for the existence of a distinctively 
Christian Democratic (although mainly Catholic) theory and practice of social 
capitalism. This part offers reflections of a more theoretical nature and evaluates the 
history of political and social ideas of organized religion within the present framework.
The first chapter of Part I (Chapter 2) considers two possible objections against 
the thesis of Christian Democratic distinctiveness. The strongest argument against my 
conjecture would be that there is nothing particular about Christian Democracy at all. 
One variety of this claim holds that Christian Democracy is a pragmatic and 
opportunistic movement of which the political party in particular lacks a well-defined 
ideology. There are two main replies to this assertion. First, critics of the thesis of 
distinctiveness tend to underestimate the difficulty of delineating the centre of politics. 
The second reply holds that even if it were possible to define the political centre 
unambiguously, then the claim of Christian Democratic distinctiveness could still be 
defended. For the middle position searched by Christian Democracy is inspired by 
distinct principles, such as integration, accommodation, reconciliation, pluralism, and 
’subsidiarity’.
A second, more significant, objection to the distinctiveness-thesis holds that 
Christian Democracy is a catch-all party and that electoral competition forces it to 
optimize votes. I shall argue that the catch-all thesis has only limited analytical value 
for Christian Democracy because of the peculiarity of religion as an electoral 
mobilizer.
The second chapter of Part I (Chapter 3) broadly deals with the question 
whether Christianity can be argued to be related to the (or a) welfare state at all. The 
answer is a conditional yes and I elaborate three arguments. The first argument states 
that modem Western society is shaped by its own religious heritage. Christianity is 
intimately interwoven with the constitution and character of modem industrial society 
and therefore with welfare capitalism. The second argument is a specification of the 
first and holds that there are certain foundational values embodied in the welfare state 
that originally derive from Christian ethics. The Christian origins of these ethical
precepts may have become imperceptible, but their content is still operative, although 
not in all nations with the same vigor and impact.
These arguments are of a too generic nature to be able to establish dis­
tinctiveness and one must therefore be more precise. Elaborating the idea of a 
’theological dimension’ of social policy, the third argument holds that charity (with its 
one-sided emphasis on the Christian obligation to give) as a Christian maxim became 
crystallized in social capitalism through the social Catholic reformulation of charity as 
social justice. Drawing upon a discussion of Weber’s thesis on the association between 
the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism and appreciating the insights of the 
debate this thesis provoked, I formulate a hypothesis about the decisive difference 
between Protestantism and Catholicism with respect to their attitude towards capitalism 
and reform. I argue that Catholicism (the social movements of this creed in particular) 
has been successful in formulating a social critique of capitalism, which largely 
founded the model of social capitalism.
The thesis on the social Catholic reformulation of charity as social justice and 
Catholicism’s foundational theory of social capitalism make the problematic of the 
dissertation more specific in three ways. First, it restricts the generic association 
between Christianity and the welfare state to a possible correlation between welfare 
capitalism and a particular form of organized religion. Second, such a confinement 
suggests that there is not so much a general linkage between religion and the welfare 
state but rather between religion (here Catholicism) and a specific version of the 
welfare state. In other words, the thesis becomes more precise on the side of the 
dependent variable, too. Third, and this is a corollary of the first two, the thesis is 
more distinct in that it ultimately directs the focal point of the research to a limited 
number of nations.
In the third chapter of the first part (Chapter 4) I deal with the origins of 
Christian Democracy and social capitalism and I treat these as two aspects of the same 
history. Modem Christian Democracy springs from two main sources. Political 
Catholicism is the first historical ancestor to be mentioned. It must be understood as 
an effect of the problematic relationship between the Catholic church and the state in 
the nineteenth century. The main reason for political action was the attempt to redefine 
the relationship between the Catholic church and the Liberal constitutional state. The
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French Revolution of 1789 accelerated the already ongoing process of secularization 
and the social and political position of the church was severely weakened. Political 
Catholicism addresses the changing role and status of the church after the French 
Revolution in nineteenth-century Europe.
The second origin of Christian Democracy, social Catholicism, may be 
introduced in a similar way as political Catholicism. Here the main reason for action 
resulted from the problematic liaison between the capitalist mode of production and the 
Catholic church. Its essence consisted of what may be defined as two interrelated 
problems of ordering. First, social Catholicism relates to the ordering of the church as 
a social institution into modem industrial society. It is an attempt to update the 
organizational momentum of the Catholic church in society. Secondly, social 
Catholicism is also the attempt to integrate the working class into the church, or - 
reformulated in a slightly different way- it is the attempt to integrate the working class 
or ’the poor’ as Christian citizens into modem industrial society. It is here that one 
finds the attempt to redefine charity as social justice as well as the foundation of the 
theory of social capitalism. The transformation of charity into a theory of social 
capitalism was part of a political strategy to ’conserve’ workers as workers within the 
religious community and the religious community within bourgeois, secular society. An 
important finding is that whereas social Catholics throughout Europe (and in Germany 
in particular) succeeded in translating the medieval heritage into a more or less 
workable conception of social policy under capitalist conditions, the Vatican ideologues 
largely failed to do so. The official Roman Catholic social doctrine is interpreted along 
these lines.
The origins of Christian Democracy and social capitalism can be defined more 
precisely as follows: Christian Democracy is the result of a historical coincidence of 
Liberal political Catholicism and social Catholicism. The theory of social capitalism 
functioned as the cement of this construction. The chapter concentrates on the manner 
in which political Catholicism has come to terms with democracy and the manner in 
which social Catholicism has successfully defined and refined a social critique of 
capitalism that facilitated a specific version of state intervention in the market on behalf 
of the family.
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I am primarily concerned with those countries where Catholicism can be 
expected to have had a profound political influence. Either directly, through its social 
and political movements (as in Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic, in pre- 
Fascist Italy, in Belgium and the Netherlands, in France and Austria) or, more 
indirectly, as the main driving force behind the establishment of the Christian 
Democratic movements of Western Europe in the post-World War II era. Post-war 
Christian Democracy, of course, is to a certain extent also characterized by its attempt 
to transcend the borders of denominations and to accept inter-Confessionalism as an 
organizational principle.
Part II of the dissertation deals with Christian Democracy and welfare 
capitalism in a more empirical manner. The leading questions structuring this part are: 
to what extent can a social capitalist welfare state regime be identified empirically and 
under what conditions and to what extent does Christian Democracy explain the social 
capitalist welfare state regimes of continental Europe? The first chapter of this part 
(Chapter 5) presents a constructed type of social capitalism as Christian Democracy’s 
welfare project, as can be derived from the analysis of the theoretical and practical 
development of political and social Catholicism in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as well as from official Papal social documents. Such a constructed type is of 
course an abstraction from reality, but working with it has two main advantages. First, 
it symplifies the contraposition to and comparison with other well established models, 
notably the Social Democratic model. It makes clear what is distinctive about social 
capitalism. Secondly, one might be able to detect the deviations from the constructed 
type in the social policy practice of Christian Democracy in the post-1945 period. It 
is a matter of empirical research to establish the extent to which Christian Democrats 
have been successful in carrying out their proposals and the conditions under which this 
was done. The constructed type allows for a better understanding of cross-national 
variation among the nations where Christian Democracy has been a salient political 
actor, too. To put it differently, the double task of this study is to make plausible the 
uniqueness of the social capitalist cluster while keeping an open eye for the variation 
among the nations that make it up.
In this chapter I suggest five main propositions. These concern 1) the 
conditional recognition of capitalism; 2) the scope and limits of state intervention; 3)
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a specific theory of class; 4) a no less unequivocal notion of inequality; and 5) the idea 
of the just wage and the role of the family in economy and social policy.
The second chapter (Chapter 6) of this part evaluates the explanatory efforts 
of the various ’schools’ that have come out of the decades long and still continuing 
debate on the welfare state. In general, I am not particularly satisfied with the manner 
in which the vast body of literature has treated the relative role of Christian Democracy 
in the shaping of distributional regimes. The main ’schools’ have only dealt with the 
matter marginally, if at all. The Christian Democratic welfare state appears a residual 
of mainstream social scientific analysis.
Probably the best established research agenda on the political determinants of 
the welfare state and the candidate most likely to be of direct relevance for the present 
argument are those studies that can be grouped under the heading of the Social 
Democratic model. The leading hypothesis of the model is that "the bulk of the 
observable variation in welfare state emergence and growth in the western nations can 
be accounted for by the strength -especially in government- of social democratic labour 
movements’' (Shalev 1983a: 316).
The interesting finding is that it was out of this Social Democratic model that 
the first attempts evolved to question the relative role of Christian Democracy (or 
Catholicism) in the shaping of welfare regimes. This is because time and again, 
inexplicable exceptions to the rule of Social Democratic working class strength were 
found in the empirical analyses and these exceptions invariably concerned countries like 
Belgium, the Netherlands and sometimes Germany or even Italy. Additional 
explanations had to be sought and were often found by hypothesizing the influence of 
a variable representing ’Catholicism*. Yet, a serious reflection upon the possibly 
distinctive influence of Catholicism or Christian Democracy cm the welfare state has 
been conspicuously absent. Partly this may have to do with a serious flaw of many an 
inquiry: the theoretically unsatisfactory conceptualization of the welfare state in terms 
of social spending. One must seriously doubt whether such an operationalization is able 
to clarify the institutional configuration of welfare statism at all. In fact, the spotlight 
on spending often conceals relevant qualitative differences both in structure and in 
outcome. It has also led to a misspecification of the political impact of Christian 
Democracy. What really matters in the present context is the extent to which Christian
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Democracy can be hypothesized to determine variation in the qualitative arrangements 
between market, state and family.
Another weakness specific to the Social Democratic model is the application of 
a presupposition that is theoretically untenable and empirically problematic, namely the 
equation of working class power and Social Democratic power. It is this fundamental 
assumption that makes it so difficult to consider the relative and independent role of 
Christian Democracy. Christian Democracy can only take the role of ’filtering’ labour 
demands, which would otherwise be Social Democratic in nature. Labour appears to 
have ’autonomous’ social-policy needs that would normally lead to Social Democratic 
power mobilization concentrating around the goals of solidarity, equality and 
universalism, unless these demands are ’filtered’ and ’interpreted’ (and implicitly 
assumed to be ’distorted’) by other movements, notably Christian Democracy. A 
hypothesis on the relative importance of Christian Democracy versus Social Democracy 
in shaping certain characteristics of welfare arrangements is very hard to formulate 
within the vocabulary of the Social Democratic paradigm.
The fact that in history it frequently occurred that wage earners organized 
themselves in Social Democratic or Socialist movements cannot be taken to constitute 
the normal course of working class mobilization. The thesis is that this historical 
regularity of Social Democratic mobilization is not a standard from which, for 
example, Christian Democratic political forces of wage labour would be a ’deviation’. 
A Socialist or Social Democratic labour movement is not a priori to be valued higher 
than its Christian Democratic counterparts in its social capacities (see Van Kersbergen 
and Becker 1988). What is central is the conceptualization of the power of wage 
earners other than in terms of Social Democratic mobilization and the effect of the 
Christian rather than Social Democratization of capitalism. Christian Democracy 
organizes the very conflict between wage-labour and capital within the movement and 
thereby structures the politics of the antagonism in a different manner. As I will argue, 
Christian Democracy is the -sometimes perhaps precarious- embodiment of societal 
accommodation. The incapacity to view Christian Democracy partly as an articulation 
of labour demands, too, is by and large the reason for its recurrent misspecification. 
To a certain extent the inability to make sense of the Christian Democratization of 
capitalism is therefore an effect of a misunderstanding of the movement. Drawing upon
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the results of the first part of the dissertation, the main independent variable of the 
study (Christian Democracy) is thus specified.
The third chapter of part II (Chapter 7) embarks upon a cross-national analysis 
of welfare state regime data on 18 OECD-countries, concentrating on the social 
capitalist cluster. Here I offer a specification of the five propositions of Chapter 5 and 
formulate four complexes of hypotheses that can be tested against available data. These 
hypotheses concern (1) anti-capitalism and social reform; (2) subsidiarity and its 
expected consequences; (3) class and the reproduction of natural inequality; (4) the 
relative importance of the family in the wage-tax-benefit structure of distributional 
regimes and the position of women in particular. I show that the central thesis of this 
dissertation is plausible when subjected to empirical testing in that the major hypotheses 
derived from this thesis cannot be rejected. I also find that among the social capitalist 
nations of main interest considerable variation exists as to the various indicators I 
construct. A more detailed analysis of these nations is called for.
The third part of this study, therefore, offers an account of the political histories 
of the welfare states of Germany (Chapter 9), Italy (Chapter 10) and the Netherlands 
(Chapter 11) and the relative role of Christian Democracy in shaping the respective 
regimes. In particular, I clarify the conditions under which post-war Christian 
Democracy came to power and the extent to which these conditions explain the 
heterogeneity of social capitalism in these nations. Dealing with Christian Democracy, 
the focus on structural and contingent conditions assumes a specific meaning. I claim 
in Chapter 2 that the distinguishing features of Christian Democracy imply that the 
movement -although centering around a common core- is always in principle (by virtue 
and by necessity of the self imposed political position) ’bipolar’ (or rather ’multi­
dimensional’), ’flexible* and in possession of a highly developed capacity to adapt in 
its attempt to formulate a compromise of antagonistic interests. Christian Democracy 
as the embodiment of societal accommodation renders definite statements as to precise 
historical social capitalist compromises complicated. Studying the conditions is vital for 
understanding the specific historical character of a Christian Democratic movement and 
therefore of any historically specific variant of social capitalism. Christian Democracies 
have a common social theory around which they fluctuate in social and political 
practice.
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The choice of the countries can be further justified as follows. Italy is a relevant 
case, because it is -as opposed to Germany and the Netherlands- the only nation where 
Catholicism has been the religion of the majority of the population and where Christian 
Democracy is exclusively Catholic in nature. Germany and the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, are both variations of what Martin (1978) has called the 60-40 proportion 
of religions. In these countries Catholicism constitutes a large and significant minority. 
However, in Germany Christian Democracy was established almost immediately after 
the war as an inter-Confessional movement, integrating Protestantism, too, whereas the 
Dutch Christian inspired forces remained divided into three major Confessional parties 
until the mid-1970s. The possible consequences of these similarities and differences are 
studied.
Part II and Part III of this study mainly focus on the first decade or so after the Second 
World War as the most apt manner for advancing the argument. Let me briefly justify 
this choice. The period until roughly 1960 can be described as the phase of the ’post­
war settlements’ of welfare state regimes (Berben et al. 1986). It was in these years 
that the foundational decisions were taken as to the configuration of market, state and 
family in the countries of main interest. I would defend the position that a thorough 
understanding of the conditions under which both Christian Democracy and social 
capitalism emerged and took shape is indispensable for an account of the logic of 
expansion of the regime and of the historical fate of the political movement. One could, 
for instance, claim that institutional arrangements -once in place- tend to develop a 
certain resistance to fundamental change and ’mature’ according to their own 
institutional logic. Such settlements, in other words, may become structurally inert. 
Subsequent expansion may be incremental in the sense that it follows the structural 
prerequisites of the initial foundation. The implication of this is that if one looks at the 
contemporary regime of social capitalism some of its basic features may still exist or 
their modifications would have to be explained with reference to their origins.
An account solely in terms of structural inertia or incrementalist logic, however, 
is not entirely satisfactory, because it accords too abstract a capacity to endure to 
structural features of societal arrangements and underestimates the importance of 
societal actors and struggles. Besides, a theory of structural inertia alone would meet
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definite limits in an attempt to account for transformations that do occur. No doubt, 
contemporary social capitalism is the product of its own history, but history is made 
by societal and political actors continuously shaping and reshaping the conditions of 
their own survival. Giddens’ (e.g. 1979; 1984) concept of the ’duality of structure’ as 
the medium and outcome of action2* seems to capture the problem quite precisely in 
theory, but does not solve the problem for the researcher. Perhaps one way out of the 
’perennial dilemma’ of structure versus action (Lukes 1977; see also Barbalet 1987; 
Ward 1987) might consist in analytically distinguishing the structural properties of 
social capitalism and viewing these, in turn, as potential power resources for Christian 
Democratic power. Christian Democracy, involved in the constitution and structuration 
of social capitalism develops an interest in the preservation of some and the 
transformation of other structural characteristics as preconditions for its own 
endurance. In other words, one could look upon the structural properties of social 
capitalism as a form of investment of power resources (Korpi 1985). The extent to 
which the movements are successful in producing a plurality of independent power 
moments determines the capacity to endure under unfavourable conditions.
The advantage of such a view is that it allows for the conceptualization of 
power in relational terms and in terms of enabling properties. Power, then, is the 
ability of an actor to control outcomes over issues that affect interests (Lukes 1986)3>. 
It is an ability within the context of structured relations with other actors who have 
analogous but not identical abilities. Power is fundamentally a dispositional concept 
(Morriss 1987). The element of conduct can be appreciated as follows. Social and 
political actors, as purposive and intentional agents -whether collective or not- mobilize 
and utilize, exploit and manipulate, consume and sometimes exhaust, apply or save,
13
2) The main point of the concept is that structural features of social systems are part and parcel of 
action. It is because of the continuous (inter)action of social actors that structural properties are produced 
and reproduced. Structure, then, refers to the rules and resources of action. Giddens distinguishes 
between material and non-material resources, the former deriving from human domination over nature, 
the latter form the domination of some actors over others (see for an overview of the central concepts 
of the theory of structuration, Giddens 1984: 373-77).
3) The concept of interests is critical to Lukes’ (1974) definition of the three-dimensional view. I 
agree that including a notion of interests in the definition of power is necessary for otherwise power 
would refer to any ability in the social realm. To identify or to ascribe power involves the identification 
of interests. The elaboration of ’real interests’, however, remains problematic. See for a critical 
assessment, Bradshaw 1976, and Lukes’ reply (1976).
resources in order to increase their ability to control interests and thus to enhance their 
capacity to survive.
Social capitalism and Christian Democracy are to a certain extent mutually 
dependent entities. The structural properties of social capitalism can be viewed as both 
the outcome and the resources (or medium) of Christian Democratic power mobiliza­
tion. A corollary is that the possible transformation of social capitalism -say under 
conditions of increasing secularization, individualization, sociostructural change, 
increasing strength of political contenders- may erode some of the invested power 
resources of Christian Democracy. In the chapters on Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, I therefore occasionally advance the argument beyond the confines of the 
period of post-war settlements to address these issues empirically and historically. 
Nevertheless, the focus remains on the period until 1960.
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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND DISTINCTIVENESS: 
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
CHAPTER 2

The central thesis of the dissertation first hinges on the argument of distinctiveness of 
Christian Democracy vis-à-vis Social Democracy (and -to a lesser extent- Liberalism). 
In this chapter I reflect upon Christian Democratic idiosyncracy. The postulate is that 
Christian Democracy possesses its own political ideology, follows its own political 
strategies, and affects the configuration of market, state and family in its own peculiar 
manner. I shall argue that what is commonly viewed as the movement’s main defect - 
its pragmatism, opportunism- is actually its major strength. Such criticisms are the 
effect of the movement’s main ideological properties, which are incarnated in the core 
of the idea of social capitalism.
I should first deal, then, with the reverse of my presumption, namely that 
Christian Democracy is not in any sense particular; that it is fundamentally a movement 
without a well-defined system of beliefs. The political party would normally go for ’the 
average’ in politics and would always seek to establish itself in the middle of the 
political and ideological spectrum. In short, it is a party for the ’Mittelstand’ in every 
sense. My response to these claims is twofold. First, it is not at all clear what 
constitutes the centre of politics. Such a centre, if it exists at all, is not a trans- 
historical datum, but a contingent outcome of the cleavage structure of a society and 
of political struggle. Moreover, Christian Democracy itself is one of the factors 
continuously shaping and restructuring the centre of politics. This leads me to the 
second reply. Perhaps one could come up with a consistent demarcation of the centre. 
This, however, would not necessarily make Christian Democracy an amorphous and 
nebulous lot. For the middle position explored by Christian Democracy is animated by 
a particular set of axioms that guide political action. The core concepts of its political 
theory are integration, reconciliation, accommodation, pluralism, and ’subsidiarity’. 
What these conceptions have in common is perhaps not a lucid substance, but a method 
that makes substance to a certain extent dependent on historical circumstances.
Conceivably a stronger objection to the distinctiveness-thesis would be that 
Christian Democracy is a catch-all party, which deliberately dilutes its ideological 
heritage in order to maximize votes. The reply to this objection would be that 
Kirchheimer’s (1966, originally 1957) formulation of the catch-all thesis has only 
limited analytical value for Christian Democracy. If Christian Democracy is not just 
a political party but -more realistically- can be viewed as a political movement, then
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it is not just the logic of electoral competition that determines political agency. 
Furthermore, religion can be argued to be the vehicle by which Christian Democracy 
has been able to acquire cross-class support for its model of social capitalism. Religion 
has been the means by which it has managed to avoid a dilemma which Przeworski 
(1985) has investigated as the electoral trade-off of Social Democracy. Both objections 
to the distinctiveness thesis deserve a more detailed discussion.
Objection 1: Christian Democracy as a Party o f the Centre
Students of Christian Democracy tend to agree about a proclivity of their object of 
analysis ’to be in between’ something, to occupy some position ’in the middle’, to 
inhabit some abstractly defined political ’centre’. The use of vague phraseology is 
intentional, because it is not at all clear what constitutes or defines the ’centre’ or the 
’middle’.
As early as 1948 it was argued that within the political constellation of Western 
Europe a third political force was developing (Almond 1948). By this term the parties 
and movements of the moderate centre were understood. To the right of the third force 
there were the Conservative Nationalists and to the left were the Communist parties 
that "carry out the orders of Moscow and the comintem" (Almond 1948: 30). It was 
considered to be to the American interest "in both a moral and expediential sense to 
govern its foreign policy so as to foster these movements of the centre" (Almond 1948: 
31)l). Of the various movements that made up the third political force in Western 
Europe the ’Christian parties’ were viewed as the largest and most important. Within 
this relatively new political phenomenon of Christian Democracy, however, five 
ideological colours could be detected: 1) the Authoritarians, 2) the Conservatives, 3) 
the Traditionalists, 4) the ’pure’ Catholic Democrats and Moderate Collectivist, and 5) 
the Catholic Revolutionaries. On this account, therefore, Christian Democracy 
constituted a party system on its own, uniting the whole political spectrum from the 
(moderate) Left to the (non-extreme) Right under the heading of ’Christian’ and 
democracy.
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1) In the third part of this treatise I show the relevance of this American ’nourishing* of the ’centre*.
Christian Democracy is "no more than a manifestation of the eternal search for 
a middle way between Liberalism and collectivism, between capitalism and Com­
munism, -with a bias (...) in favour of capitalism and Liberalism" (Irving 1979: xviii). 
Christian Democratic movements and parties seem "only soundings of the time and 
change with historical changes. There is nothing like program in the sense of 
Communist Manifesto, based as it is on belief in a foreseeable historical process" 
(Maier 1969: 10). Christian Democracy rather aims at "the self- assertion and 
preservation of Christian values in any of the constantly changing and therefore 
unforeseeable historical situations; in this sense it is more reactive than active" (Maier 
1969: 10). The encyclical letters of the Popes -as far as they contain any guidance for 
social and political action-, for instance, are inherently vague and formulated in 
general, even abstract and philosophical terms. They contain no practical political 
program, nor do they inspire to direct political action. And what is more, they are 
meant to be like this (Camp 1969). "The foundations of its politics in natural law offers 
Christian Democracy precisely that broad basis, which permits it to have as many 
variations in the structures of its everyday politics as there are national and Confes­
sional forms of Christian parties" (Maier 1969: 11). It is a movement operating in the 
centre and it seems to have no basic theory of its own; rather it prefers to plagiarize 
elements of Liberal, Conservative and Socialist thought at will in order to blend these 
into a hotchpotch of ideology. Christian Democracy and Conservatism may not be 
identical, but they do share the conviction that private property constitutes an inviolable 
right, Communism is an abhorrent movement, and the state should be confined and 
’ carefully watched in its interventionist zeal. "But Christian Democrats reject the tenets 
of nineteenth-century Liberalism: they accept the necessity for the state to protect the 
weak in society and to guide the economy, and they favour concertation, i.e., 
consultation between government, industry, the trade unions and other interest groups" 
(Irving 1979: xxi).
It seems clear where Christian Democratic ’originality’ lies: "The parties, 
especially, draw material from all the comers of the political universe, and criticize and 
rework it into a pattern in which each element finds its place in the perspective of the 
rest" (Fogarty 1974: 18). Liberal individualism appears as Personalism in the Christian 
Democratic discourse. The self in the theory of Personalism is something more than
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an individual, because its metaphysics not only accounts for the individual in his social 
ambience, but also stresses religious aspects as indispensable and manifest facets of the 
inextricable human identity. Socialist or Social Democratic collectivism surfaces as the 
Christian Democratic philosophy of solidarism, emphasizing that the collectivity exists 
to assist and complete the person rather than the other way around. Collectivism is also 
transformed into a specific version of pluralism, which holds that society consists of 
a multiplicity of institutions of which the state is only one, albeit portentous 
arrangement. Conservative Traditionalism emerges in the Christian Democratic political 
theory as "an appreciation of the time factor, of the difficulties of successful change, 
and of the importance of smooth, continuous development. But they (Christian 
Democrats) are convinced also of man’s right and duty to advance towards mastering 
his environment by the power of his reason and will. They will stoutly deny that they 
are ’Traditionalist’, in the sense of being particularly attached to the shape of things 
as it now is or once was" (Fogarty 1974: 18).
Christian Democratic parties conceive of themselves as ’popular’ or ’people’s’ 
parties, in a specific ideological, anti-Liberal sense. They would rather address a 
people organized in associations and professions than atomic and therefore superficial 
individuals (Mayeur 1980: 7). Perhaps ’Bourgeois’, Conservative, and Christian 
Democratic movements are interchangeable entities (e.g. Van Veen 1983). In that case 
one would hardly have to question the possible differences between these movements. 
And yet the self-identification of Christian Democracy as basically operating in the 
centre of the political spectrum seems to a large extent justified (Von Beyme 1985a: 
96). The only problem is that too much success causes Christian Democracy to absorb 
what is to their right, hence ceasing to be a party of the ’middle’.
All theorists, therefore, tend to have in common some spatial metaphor for 
depicting Christian Democracy as occupying a conditional centre of the party system 
or of the politico-ideological spectrum in general. Christian Democracy is epitomized 
as ’middle’, ’centre’, ’popular’, ’people’s’, or -as Fogarty (1974) phrases it- 
personalist, not individualist; pluralist, not collectivist; conservative, not traditionalist. 
Ail adjectives appear to point into one direction. Christian Democracy cannot be 
defined as a movement with a well-defined, fully-fledged ideology. It cannot be pinned 
down to some point at a right-left continuum either, but rather monopolizes some grey,
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happy medium. Unlike Liberalism and Socialism, Christian Democracy appears to lack 
a political and social theory of its own. It is habitually defined in negative terms; it is 
Socialist nor Liberal, but shares some elements of both political movements. It 
carefully maneuvers between the Scylla and Charybdis of capitalism and Socialism, 
between the devil and the deep sea. And yet it steers by the compass of social doctrine. 
"All Christian Democrats began with a belief that a middle way could be found 
between capitalism and Socialism in the spirit of the Catholic social doctrine and the 
social encyclicals" (Von Beyme 1985a: 94).
So, the blazoned middle way of Christian Democracy does appear to be based on 
distinctive principles of political navigation (Irving 1979: xviii). First, there are 
’Christian principles’ comprising an adherence to elementary human rights. Secondly, 
the commitment to Liberal democracy and Liberal democratic values belongs to the 
Christian Democratic package. Finally, integration or societal accommodation is a 
central element of Christian Democracy’s distinctive principles "in the dual sense of 
a commitment to class reconciliation (...) and to transnational reconciliation (...)" 
(Irving 1979: xviii/xix).
Integration, class-compromise, accommodation and pluralism are indeed key 
concepts for a definition of Christian Democracy. It is precisely the continuous attempt 
of integration and reconciliation of a plurality of societal groups with opposed interests 
that makes Christian Democracy distinctive. "Christian Trade Unions like to think of 
themselves as pursuing with equal vigour the defense of class interest and an ideal of 
inter-class collaboration (...). And in the same way the Christian employers’, business 
middle class and farmer’s organizations criticize their neutral opposite numbers for 
being ’Liberal’ in the Manchester school sense; as tending, that is, to be one-sidedly 
interested in the pursuit of profit" (Fogarty 1974: 18).
Christian Democracy is therefore best understood as a specific political 
expression of (class) antagonisms within capitalist industrial society. At a generic level, 
the movement of Christian Democracy typically organizes itself as a political 
articulation of class- and other cleavages. The basic assumption on which it is founded 
refers to the conviction that different societal interests can and therefore should be 
accommodated. Christian Democracy holds that a feasible solution for potentially
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explosive cleavages is possible, even under the contentious conditions present in 
advanced capitalist democracies. There exists the underlying confidence of eventually 
being able to transcend the antagonistic relationships between social groups, strata and 
classes. The ultimate aim is to transform society into some form of cooperative, 
Christian-inspired social fabric in which all layers of society are at their right place (a 
just ordering of society), know that they are at their proper position (political self- 
consciousness), agree to be where they are (full political identity) and get what they are 
entitled to (distributive justice). Nevertheless, one will look in vain for any blueprint 
of the Good Society.
Christian Democracy, in other words, voices, codifies and (re) structures 
societal conflict within itself in its attempt to arbitrate and accommodate societal 
cacophony. Socialism and Liberalism, on the other hand, -at least on the Christian 
Democratic interpretation- tend to be the political articulations of poles of societal 
difference, disagreement and conflict. Class reconciliation and cooperation lie at the 
heart of what makes Christian Democracy a distinctive political movement. It may turn 
the movement into an uneasy coalition of opposed societal interests, but it does define 
its differentia specifica. It seems useful, then, to consider some implications of this 
premise.
Christian Democratic politics is perhaps most frequently criticized for its 
pragmatism and opportunism and the Italian version methodically comports as the 
exemplification of this. However justified this criticism may be, it is important to 
understand the background of this tendency of making hay while the sun shines. Both 
pragmatism and opportunism are effects of the above indicated characteristics of 
integration, reconciliation, accommodation and pluralism. The differentia specifica of 
Christian Democracy implies that the movement is always in principle (by virtue and 
by necessity of the self imposed political position) 'bipolar* (or rather ’multi­
dimensional’), ’flexible’ and in possession of a highly developed capacity to adapt in 
its attempt to formulate a compromise of antagonistic interests. It is in this sense the 
embodiment of societal accommodation, or at least ventures to become so. It is this 
feature that makes the phenomenon so hard to grasp, because it is not at all clear which 
precise compromise might hold at what time. Besides, internally the movement is 
sectioned into factions or wings. The central concepts of the Christian Democratic
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ideology not only and typically reflect bipolarity, multi-dimensionality and flexibility, 
but moreover facilitate the coexistence of such a plurality of views and interests. It is 
the movement’s main strong point.
If there exists a bias in favour of capitalism within the Christian Democratic 
political doctrine, as Irving (1979) argues, this inclination must be understood as a 
structural-conjunctural outcome and not as an eternal characteristic. There is no 
principle ground that would inhibit, for example, a more ’labour-bias’ -given the 
structural constraints of a capitalist mode of production- within Christian Democratic 
practice. It all depends on the actual balance of power within the movement and -as far 
the movement mirrors society- within the national community. Whatever the bias, a 
plurality of interests will always be present. In fact, such an account is important for 
understanding the differences between the various Christian Democratic movements of 
Western Europe. Variation among Christian Democracies most likely results from the 
variation in the structuring of the accommodation of interests within the movements. 
A corollary of this is that an analysis of the conditions under which actual Christian 
Democracies operate is imperative.
It is difficult to understand Christian Democracy as an attempt to formulate a 
middle way between Liberalism and Socialism, unless one can unambiguously state 
what actually constitutes the middle or the centre of the political spectrum. The middle, 
however, is contingent upon political conditions and therefore upon the political process 
itself as well as upon the manner in which one visualizes or imagines political space 
theoretically. In what Sartori (1976: 334) has called the spatial archetype (i.e. the Left- 
Right continuum) one might in principle be able to find a point in a one-dimensional 
flat space, which denotes such a middle. When one imagines ideological or political 
space in more than one dimension the problem of the middle becomes immediately 
acute. The religious factor, of course, complicates matters for uni-dimensionality.
A four-dimensional portrayal of political space (e.g., 4 intersecting lines 
representing dimensions of political cleavages: Sartori 1976: 336) would clearly 
illustrate the point. The only real middle point, of course, is where all lines intersect. 
However, such a point refers to a theoretical possibility rather than to a conceivable 
position for a political movement, because it assumes an arithmetical average on all 
dimensions. It is more likely to find various positions on the different dimensions so
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that a single middle position cannot be defined. This makes the actual centre of the 
political system cleavage- and issue-dependent. For the present purposes it is sufficient 
to argue that nothing is specified by defining Christian Democracy as occupying the 
centre, because the question is which centre on what issue and under what conditions. 
This, in turn, assumes precise knowledge of the distinctive ideological stance of 
Christian Democracy on certain issues, a possibility that the theorists of Christian 
Democracy as a middle of the road movement would have to refute.
One might argue that in the act of voting people are forced to squeeze multi­
dimensionality to the least distance solution, that is "to vote for the party (candidate) 
perceived as closest, on the Left-Right spectrum, to his self-assigned location on the 
same spectrum" (Sartori 1976: 338/339). The voter is different from the politically 
active citizen. That, no doubt, is the case. Still, the religious dimension cannot be 
squeezed, although some compression might be imaginable.
If both the religious and the Left-Right dimensions in the cleavage structure of 
a society are equally important, political space cannot be squeezed to uni-dimen­
sionality. If the religious dimension is the main cleavage political movements of the 
Left and of the Right may tend to approach each other on the religious dimension. 
However, the gap separating the religiously motivated party on the one hand, and the 
political Right and Left on the other hand would widen consequently. In this case there 
is compression of the Left-Right dimension and a certain reduction of multi-dimen- 
sionality, but an increasing relevance of the religious dimension. If the Left-Right 
dimension is dominant the religiously inspired party is likely to approach this 
dimension and could become the centre of the political spectrum. Christian Democracy 
would be unspecific. But since the religious dimension is irrelevant, there will be no 
Christian Democracy (Sartori 1976).
There are still other theoretical possibilities. If Christian Democracy occupies 
a position between Conservatism and Socialism one might expect Liberal elements to 
enter as tools of distinction (such as the emphasis on individual rights, the importance 
of incentives). If, on the other hand, Christian Democracy is positioned between 
Conservatism and Liberalism more Social Democratic features might distinguish the 
movement. However, the most realistic and most frequent middle or centre position of 
Christian Democracy is where the movement takes over the position of Conservatism
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and establishes itself somewhere between Socialism and Liberalism. In such situations 
Christian Democracy is most likely to be the alternate partner of both extremes of the 
political spectrum.
The conclusion of this perhaps somewhat abstract discussion is that the first 
objection against the thesis of distinctiveness can be rejected, because it is difficult to 
delineate what constitutes the centre and because -even if it were possible to do so in 
an unambiguous manner- a centre-position of Christian Democracy appears to be based 
upon distinctive principles.
Objection 2: Christian Democracy as a Catch-all Party
The second objection against viewing Christian Democracy as a distinctive political 
phenomenon concerns the thesis that the movement is a ’catch-all party’. My reply 
would be that at least until the 1970s Christian Democracy cannot be considered to be 
a Catch-all party in Kirchheimer’s sense.
The concept of the catch-all party (’Allerweltspartei’, ’People’s party’, ’soziale 
Querschnittpartei’, ’soziale Omnibus’) is widely held to be applicable to Christian 
Democratic parties in particular. In fact, Christian Democratic parties have readily 
labelled themselves as ’people’s parties’ in their attempt to oppose the character of 
class-based parties. In this sense, the concept of ’people’s party’ has functioned 
politically as a means to underline what was the self-perceived crucial difference 
between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy. Christian Democratic parties 
appeal to the people and the movement is a home for all specific layers, groups and 
classes®.
As a social scientific concept for analyzing the post-war development of the 
Western European party systems the catch-all party entered the discussion in the mid­
sixties, whereas the Downsian ’multi-policy party’ can be considered as the ancestor 
of Kirchheimer’s ’Allerweltspartei’ (See Mintzel 1984). The publication of Kirch­
heimer’s classical statement on the changing Western European party systems (1966)
25
2) Swedish Social Democracy of course managed to formulate something similar in its theory of the 
’people’s home’ of the 1930s.
triggered of a debate among social and political scientists that led to -still existing- 
controversies3'.
A catch-all party is a democratic party which developed from a traditional and 
pre-war mass integration party into a so-called real people’s party. This new type of 
party gave up its old aim of integrating the masses (or specific layers of the mass of 
the people) into the political system and into bourgeois society in order to replace it by 
the sole aim of winning as many votes as possible during the electoral competition with 
other, similar, parties. The ’Allerweltspartei’ sacrificed the ideological heritage of the 
past to attract the new voters of the present. It disposed of its revolutionary elan, 
accepted the existing social, economic and political order, and became a party of 
(moderate) reform. Because the catch-all party is in (or is trying to get into) 
government, adjustment and moderation of political views are fundamental conditions.
In contrast to the mass integration parties of the pre-war period the catch-all 
party is not founded upon a social class or a religious part of the population of a 
society. It typically and explicitly de-emphasizes class or denomination and appeals to 
the electorate as a whole. The mass integration parties were simply compelled to 
change "under conditions of spreading secular and mass-consumer-goods orientation, 
with shifting and less obtrusive class lines" (Kirchheimer 1966: 190). Such a party is 
an effect of the increasing electoral competition. It is a "competitive phenomenon. A 
party is apt to accommodate to its competitor’s successful style because of hope of 
benefits or fear of losses on election day" (Kirchheimer 1966: 188). Maximization of 
the vote is an effect of the growing intensity of electoral competition.
The political program with which the ’Allerweltspartei’ typically enters the 
political and electoral competition is general and frequently vague. It does not contain 
many (if any) concrete and far-reaching, let alone innovative, policy proposals. At most 
it offers the voter an ’order of preferences’. It behaves very similar to consumption 
commodities on the market. The image of the ’Allerweltspartei’ must be inculcated in 
’millions of minds’ just like any other famous trade mark. The meaning and presence 
of ideology as an electoral vehicle declines, a thesis of course fully in line with the
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3) A number of attempts has been made to test Kirchheimer’s historical statements, hypotheses and 
predictions empirically. Most of these endeavours faced immense methodological obstacles. This is 
mainly due to the complexity of the catch-all argument (see Tarrow 1969; Rose and Urwin 1976; 
Zuckennan and Lichbach 1977; Wolinetz 1979; Dittrich 1983; Schmidt 1985).
’end of ideology’-argument. It sacrifices a fully-fledged ideological framework for the 
sake of potentially better electoral results.
The rise of the catch-all party was the result of complex socio-structural 
changes. The increasing pressure of the political competition was effected by (1) the 
ongoing secularization that moderated significant religious cleavages within societies, 
(2) the rise of mass consumption and the increasing importance of the mass media, 
which are assumed to have harmonizing and equalizing influences, (3) the emergence 
of the new middle class, and (4) the growth of the welfare state, which provided social 
security for virtually all members of society. These changes taken together moderated 
traditional conflicts of interests. The socio-structural changes of the post-war societies 
also altered the general political outlook of the citizens, who turned away from 
’ideological points of view’ (see Schmidt 1985: 378).
The catch-all thesis as originally formulated by Kirchheimer has only limited 
analytical value when it comes to its application to Christian Democracy as a post-war 
political phenomenon. There are two arguments to underpin this assertion and to reply 
to the second objection to the thesis of distinctiveness. First, Christian Democracy is 
not simply a political party, but a political movement. This implies, that in much the 
same manner in which Social Democracy must be interpreted with reference to the 
Social Democratic labour movement as a whole, Christian Democratic parties cannot 
be properly analyzed outside the context of the Christian Democratic movement as a 
whole. Christian Democratic parties are to a large extent the political representatives 
or counterparts of associated societal organizations and institutions. Talking about 
Christian Democracy without taking into account the infrastructure of societal power 
makes of the party a head too big for its body. This, in turn, implies that Christian 
Democratic parties do not only face the logic of (electoral) competition, but have to 
deal with organizational and institutional logics as well. The Christian Democratic 
parties have always -but especially in the first decade or so after the Second World 
War- relied on their societal organizations. The central institution of the church, of 
course, has frequently intervened in electoral politics by strongly recommending which 
party to vote for and which certainly not to support or be associated with (under 
penalty of excommunication, for example). In addition, the church has been an 
important transmitter of the political message, not only via sermons, but also by
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activating the religious organizational infrastructure. This dependence on the societal 
framework of power has decreased the pressure to dilute ideology considerably.
Secondly, one has to be cautious in interpreting the role of religion or 
Confession as an electoral magnet. Religion as a political factor is very much like the 
real magnet: it has the disposition to attract and to repel. Strictly speaking, having 
religion as an electoral asset means that Christian Democratic parties can never become 
full-blown catch-all parties. It was Kirchheimer himself who pointed to this corollary: 
"In some instances the catch-all performance meets definite limits in the traditional 
framework of society. The all-pervasive denominational background of the Italian 
Democratic Cristiana means from the outset that the party cannot successfully appeal 
to the anti-clerical elements of the population" (Kirchheimer 1966: 185). And what is 
more, "Christian Democratic ideology by definition excludes the non-believer, or at 
least the seriously non-believing voter. It pays for the ties of religious solidarity and 
the advantages of supporting organizations by repelling (...) voters" (Kirchheimer 
1966: 187).
A Dilemma for Christian Democracy?
This line of reasoning is correct in so far as it stresses the repelling effect religion may 
have if employed instrumentally in electoral competition. It excludes the possibility of 
Christian Democracy being a catch-all party in Kirchheimer’s sense. However, it 
appears to point to an important dilemma for Christian Democratic politics. Appealing 
to religion or Confession may result in scaring away non-religious voters or voters with 
an avowedly other Confession. In a country where, say, 30 to 40 percent of the 
population is a claimed member of the Catholic church, a party that exclusively tries 
to mobilize the Catholic voters qua Catholics can never hope to win a parliamentary 
majority. Broadening the attractiveness to non-religious voters or to members of 
different creeds runs the risk of weakening the Catholic support. What one comes 
across here is, of course, a type of Przeworskian dilemma. Paraphrasing Przeworski 
(1985:106) the resulting trade-off could be formulated as follows: when Christian 
Democratic parties direct their efforts to mobilizing the support of non-religious allies 
they find it increasingly difficult to recruit and maintain the support of the religiously
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inspired voters. This dilemma would be primarily relevant under conditions of the 
continuing salience of religion as an electoral mobilizer, that is under conditions of 
marginal or constrained secularization. It implies that if Christian Democratic parties 
can be argued to be catch-all parties at all, the thesis would only gain significance in 
the late 1960s, early 1970s, when the process of secularization started to affect political 
affiliation in a profound way and church-membership as a political mobilizer was 
gradually substituted by a much more vague inspiration by Christian morality.
However, this is only one, limited way of scrutinizing the possible effect of 
religious appeal under the constraints of the logic of electoral competition. It focuses, 
so to speak, exclusively on the negative pole of the magnet of electoral appeal. This 
one-sided attention tends to obscure the positive pole: religion as a vehicle of general 
political appeal. Christian Democracy has always had strong integrative capacities by 
virtue of its (religiously inspired) political ideology. Precisely because Christian 
Democracy possessed ’religion’ as a catalyst of political articulation it was able to 
avoid the dilemma and associate electoral trade-off, which has haunted Social 
Democracy. Heidenheimer (1960: 10) is right when he argues that "Christian 
democracy has achieved prominence and power in post-war Europe as one of the two 
mass political movements which have inherited control of parliamentary systems by 
virtue of their ability to adapt them to the requirements of advanced industrial 
democratic societies. Like its great rival, Social Democracy, it owes its present position 
of power to the fact that it concerned itself at an early stage with the social condition 
of the masses and that it provided leadership and organization for the large social 
groups who, without it, could not avail themselves of the rewards of political 
democracy". The main difference between Social Democracy and Christian Democracy 
with respect to the topic of political democracy and electoral competition is of course 
that the former’s vehicle for mass support was the appeal to class as a principal base 
for political articulation, while the latter employed religious appeal to cut through class- 
cleavages. The dilemma as well as the potential political attraction arising from this 
cross-class appeal by means of religion is an interesting question that appears to be of 
a radically different nature than the questions that have historically troubled Social 
Democracy.
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Let me reminisce Przeworski’s analysis (1985) of the dilemma of Social 
Democracy. According to him Social Democracy faced three important choices in its 
career as a political movement: (1) whether to seek the advancement of socialism 
within the existing institutions of the capitalist society or outside of them; (2) whether 
to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely 
on multi- or even non-class support; and (3) whether to seek reforms, partial 
improvements, or to direct all efforts and energies to the complete abolition of 
capitalism.
The second choice turns out to be a dilemma which resulted in an electoral 
trade-off. The dilemma of Social Democracy stems from the fact that the working class 
in capitalist society is ’doomed’ to remain a minority of the population, whereas 
political democracy implies majority rule. To gain electoral influence Social 
Democracy as a working class party has to seek support from members of other 
classes. "The choice between class purity and broad support must be lived continually 
by Social Democratic parties because when they attempt to increase their electoral 
support beyond the working class these parties reduce their capacity to mobilize 
workers" (Przeworski 1985: 28).
There exists an electoral trade-off between appealing to the masses and 
recruiting workers. There are two reasons why such a trade-off is likely to occur. The 
first reason is that "(...) by broadening their appeal to the middle classes Socialist 
parties dilute the general ideological salience of class and, consequently, weaken the 
power of class as a cause of the political behaviour of workers. When political parties 
do not mobilize individuals as workers, but as the masses, the people, the nation, the 
poor, or simply as citizens, the people who are men or women, young or old, believers 
or non-religious, city- or country-dwellers, in addition to being workers, are less likely 
to identify themselves as class members, and eventually less likely to vote as workers 
(...). As socialists become parties like other parties, workers tum into voters like other 
voters" (Przeworski 1985: 105). The second reason is found in the loss of the ability 
to enforce collective discipline on workers by broadening the electoral appeal 
(Przeworski 1985: 106).
Social Democracy cannot win either way. The situation appears radically 
different for Christian ¡Democracy. For what seems cataclysmic for Social Democracy
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appears beneficent for Christian Democracy. And what is a trade-off in Social 
Democratic politics involves a pay-off for Christian Democracy. Diluting the 
ideological salience of class is precisely what Christian Democracy would have to do 
to make class-compromise and reconciliation possible. By stressing the inter-class 
character of the movement Christian Democracy manages to attract voters by appealing 
to catholicity understood in its broadest sense.
Let Social Democracy be "(...) a movement that seeks to build class unity and 
mobilize power via national legislation" (Esping-Andersen 1985: 10), then Christian 
Democracy would be defined as a political movement that seeks to establish cross-class 
compromise via a policy-mix, which gives capitalism a human face and social policy 
a capitalist criterion and foundation. Christian Democracy’s choice or problem, 
therefore, has never been whether to seek support exclusively in one class or to rely 
on multi- or even non-class forces, but rather how to formulate and implement a 
feasible compromise between the various layers of society. Yet, as I will argue in the 
subsequent chapters, Christian Democracy had to deal with the problem of reform 
under capitalism and of parliamentarism in a comparable manner as Social Democracy.
Social Capitalism, Religion and Cross-Class Appeal
In an interesting paper, Manfred Schmidt (1985) has made plausible that, first of all, 
real, complete, and fully developed ’Allerweltsparteien’ do not exist anywhere in 
Europe. Conservative, Liberal, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties 
still differ considerably when looking at their social base, their programs, and their 
political practice. Nevertheless, some of the major Western European parties have been 
affected by the catch-all virus in the sense that they do show signs of an ’Allerweltspa- 
rtei’. Most of these parties have appealed to voters from various social layers. They 
do cut -in their electoral appeal and in their social composition- across class and 
religion. The various social layers and religions are, however, not at all equally, but 
rather asymmetrically distributed among the parties. Secondly, the parties of Western 
Europe have converged ideologically. The trend of ideological convergence rests upon 
two distinct and opposite developments. Bourgeois parties have shifted to the Left with 
regard to economic and social policy, whereas Social Democratic parties have
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approached the bourgeois movements on the issues of religion, foreign policy and 
(inter-) national security. Thirdly, the ideological convergence of the major parties has 
generally shifted the very nexus of politics to the Left. The ’embourgeoisement’ of the 
Social Democratic movements has been matched by the Social Democratization of the 
Bourgeois parties. Finally, many parties have adopted and followed a catch-all strategy. 
Social Democratic parties have generally been less successful in gaining electoral 
support than Christian Democratic parties. The argument is that the transformation of 
the Western European party systems has only taken place in a limited number of 
countries and that the catch-all thesis is of restricted theoretical and empirical 
relevance. On top of this, the transformation of the party systems that did occur has 
been incomplete.
The conclusion is that the catch-all thesis as it was originally formulated by 
Kirchheimer is difficult to maintain. The argument, however, can be developed in a 
somewhat different direction. Questions on the nature and contents of government 
policies in Western democracies can be rephrased in a ’catch-all way’: to what extent 
do different parties in government pursue different policies? Or to what extent do the 
contents of policies converge under the regime of different parties4)?
Although the Christian Democratic parties of continental Western Europe are 
in several respects very close to Kirchheimer’s ideal, the finding is that these parties 
have distinctive profiles within their pragmatic and reformist tradition. Under 
conditions of economic prosperity Christian Democratic parties produce what is called 
a ’Christian Democratic surplus’ in social and economic intervention by the state, 
which comes very near the ’surplus’ produced by Social Democracy (Schmidt 1985: 
389)5). In social policy Christian Democracy can be a ’big spender’, too. In this sense 
it is more akin to Social Democracy than to Conservatism or Liberalism. Christian 
Democrats readily intervene in the economy, in spite of their political rhetoric which
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4) Schmidt himself has done two valuable studies on the difference between 'bourgeois’ or Christian 
Democratic and Social Democratic parties in terms of policies pursued. One on Germany and the 
differences between the ’Lander’ (1980) and one cross-national comparison (1982). Obviously, I would 
rather make a distinction between ’bourgeois’ parties and Christian Democracy.
5) See for an elaboration of the concept of ’surplus’, Keman (1988) and for a short discussion of this 
study, chapter 6.
sometimes appears to prescribe the opposite. Full employment, too, belongs to the 
social and economic goals of Christian Democracy.
However, behind this façade of a high level of social expenditure -which could 
easily compete with the Social Democratic level- lies a qualitatively important 
difference with Social Democracy. Christian Democratic governments tend to combine 
a high level of social and economic intervention with axiomatic pre-conditions that are 
tailored to market dynamics, the upholding of incentives and the growth or strength­
ening of private property (Schmidt 1985 : 390). It is here that the catch-all thesis 
becomes relevant for understanding this mix of welfare state and capitalist economy. 
The logic of electoral competition forces Christian Democratic parties to moderate the 
conflicts between capital and labour in order to attract voters from the ranks of workers 
more easily. At the same time these parties try to stabilize other social and cultural 
cleavages that are beneficial to them. Christian Democrats tend to choose those issues, 
which appear to be particularly apt to mitigate traditional socio-economic cleavages and 
keep constant socio-cultural lines of conflict (Schmidt 1985: 390). It is because of this 
logic that Christian Democratic parties formulate and implement a social and economic 
policy, which on the one hand can stimulate the formation of property for workers and 
employers, and on the other hand is able to reinforce status differentials.
Christian Democracy has its own model of social policy, which significantly and 
systematically differs from both the Liberal and the Social Democratic model of social 
policy. The concept of ’social capitalism’ is adopted from Hartwich (1970) in order to 
describe this Christian Democratic model of welfare state development, a notion that 
I, in my turn, have assumed and that I am giving my own interpretation in this study.
This central thesis can now be elaborated in the light of the discussion of 
Przeworskian dilemmas and of what I have argued establishes the facet of dis­
tinctiveness of Christian Democracy: the continuous attempt of integration and 
reconciliation of a plurality of societal groups. Social capitalism was the model with 
which Christian Democracy tried to establish cross-class appeal and ’religion’ was its 
vehicle. Religion as the vehicle for mobilizing support for social capitalism did not risk 
particularism and the consequent trade-off tendencies, both at the level of societal 
organization and of electoral competition. Religious appeal is in principle universal in 
the sense that it appeals to all people that share a common religion or Confession,
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whether they are capitalists or workers, men or women, old or young, living in the 
country-side or in a town, black or white. Religion cuts through class and unites social 
cleavages, a fundamental condition for the establishment of social capitalism.
The dilemma for Christian Democracy is different from the one that Social 
Democracy faced. Christian Democrats find it easier to cope with the class dilemma. 
Although they appear to face the same dilemma as Social Democrats, resulting from 
the need to create a broad social base as support consisting of various social and 
economic groups, religion helps to ’solve’ this dilemma.
The logic of electoral competition determines the nature of (the contents of the 
policy of) Christian Democracy in a specific way. This logic forces Christian 
Democracy as a ’Mittelstandspartei’ to attempt to moderate societal cleavages -and in 
particular the antagonism between labour and capital- in order to attract voters from 
all social layers and especially from the working class. At the same time Christian 
Democracy tries to stabilize the political and ideological importance of religious 
cleavages as well as other conflicts that appear to have beneficial effects on Christian 
Democratic support. The strategy of Christian Democracy goes through policy. It is 
the Christian Democratic model of social capitalism that must be understood as an 
attempt to ’build bridges’ between the various social, economic and cultural groups 
within a society. At the same time this model allows for a reinforcement of oc­
cupational, economic and social status differentials. In contrast to the Social 
Democratic model of welfare state development, Christian Democracy’s model cannot 
be understood as an attempt to create universal solidarity, but rather as a means to 
moderate societal cleavages while reinforcing social groups and group identities. Social 
capitalism tries to catch the best of both worlds rather than ’all*. Crucial is the attempt 
to dilute the salience of class as the basis of political articulation and mobilization.
To sum up, Christian Democracy is confronted with two dilemmas, and 
attempts to solve the one with the other: 1) a dilemma comparable with the one for 
Social Democracy of needing to have the support of more classes while -in seeking this 
cross-class support- risking the declining support of one of them; and 2) using Christian 
ideological appeal (appeal to Confession or the Christian religion) in order to establish 
this cross-class compromise while risking -in doing so- losing the non-religious 
support. Religious or Confessional appeal may be interpreted as a means to establish
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cross-class support for the model of social capitalism by diluting the general ideological 
salience of class, while upholding societal differences. Doing this, however, may have 
the effect of scaring away the non-religious vote, especially in periods where the 
general ideological and political salience of religion is declining. Social capitalism has 
been the model through which Christian Democracy has tried to integrate labour 
demands into the formulation and implementation of social and economic policy 
without scaring away the support of the bourgeois political forces, and through which 
it has tried -in a more general sense- to build bridges between various social, economic 
and cultural groups and layers within society. Religion has been a powerful and crucial 
vehicle for establishing cross-class support for social capitalism under the constraints 
of the logic of electoral competition.
Although the objections against the distinctiveness-thesis must be taken seriously, they 
fail to convince. Both the argument of the political centre and the catch-all-thesis do 
not unambiguously show that Christian Democracy is an indistinct political movement. 
Both arguments end up concluding that the Christian Democratic political position is 
based upon distinctive principles and offers a distinctive policy-mix. Apparently, there 
is something peculiar about Christian Democracy.
A Preliminary Analysis o f Christian Democratic Ideology
In this section a preliminary overview of some basic characteristics of the Christian 
Democratic ideology is presented®. The survey mainly serves as a set-up for my 
reconstruction of the specific meaning of social capitalism in the subsequent chapters. 
Perhaps the appropriate manner for clarifying the central ideological precepts of 
Christian Democratic political thought and practice consists of highlighting what I 
believe are the foremost ideological differences with Social Democratic political theory.
Faith or belief in God and politics do not coincide according to Christian Democratic 
ideology. Forms of political Christianity are ostracized. There exists no linear, direct
35
6) Here I mainly make use of the seminal work of one of the few students of Christian Democracy 
as a social movement (Fogaity 1974).
and compulsive link between Christianity (or Christian principles) and practical choices 
in the realm of politics. At first sight, this seems to exclude the very possibility of 
Christian Democracy. Looking somewhat closer, however, it turns out to be an 
essential and logical condition for any form of Christian inspired politics that views 
itself as democratic. For political Christianity would be intolerant: a church, which 
claims to possess absolute and comprehensive knowledge of Divine Revelation would 
be unable to accept other churches or ways of thought as equal. Therefore, commit­
ment to democracy would be impossible, since democracy implies (at least ideally) 
religious liberty, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, speech, assembly and of 
the press and freedom of action75.
Like Christian faith and politics, state and society do not coincide in basic 
Christian Democratic doctrine. State (politics) and society are separate entities. They 
are parts of a larger and comprehensive organic totality. The state serves the Public 
Good and protects the legal order. This implies that the state should create the 
circumstances under which the citizens can attain their personal ends. Intervention by 
the state is justified whenever the Public Good is threatened by, for example, large 
scale poverty or by the absence of the necessary solidarity -or rather harmony- between 
various social groups. As soon as the circumstances are improved as a result of state 
intervention, the state has to retreat and withhold further intervention. In this sense 
state interference is always temporary and ought not to drift to permanent politicization. 
The state in Christian Democratic political doctrine appears to have a wide competence 
and it extends "not only to such classic functions of defense or justice, but also to what 
they (Christian Democrats) would argue as the legitimate implications of the idea of 
the Welfare State; policy for production and employment, for social security and 
assistance, for housing and town planning, for education, scientific research and the 
arts. No Christian Democratic party, for example, denies, that it is the State’s 
responsibility to set the controls of the economic system and guide its operations”
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7) In this context it is interesting to note that Christian Democracy represented a suspect political
movement to the American analytical mind in the period immediately after the Second World War, for
Almond, for instance, observes: ‘Americans find it difficult to trust a political movement which is based
on religious Confession, and particularly on Catholicism, which still holds in principle to its universal
and exclusive claims, and which has been, and in certain countries, still is identified with anti-democratic
movements* (Almond 1948: 31).
(Fogarty 1974: 89). To be questioned, however, is the extent to which Christian 
Democracy shares with Social Democracy a commitment to full employment, as is 
suggested here by Fogarty and also mentioned by Schmidt (1985). The ideal state is 
a welfare state in the sense "that it is ready to step in, call for a public account and 
enforce the necessary action in any field where the welfare of the people seems to be 
neglected. But its responsibility consists in defining and enforcing the responsibility of 
others -individuals or social groups- rather than providing services itself" (Fogarty 
1974: 91). This is an important point and leads to the expectation that public services 
in Christian Democratic welfare states might not assume a comparable importance as 
for instance social insurance and public assistance. An institutional commitment to full 
employment appears to be at odds with the tenet of the enforcement of responsibility.
Although in particular in Catholic social and political doctrine the state is 
viewed as the highest corporate body, it does not in any sense imply a centralist view 
on politics. For every organ in society has its own and indispensable function. The 
principle of ’subsidiarity’ guarantees the supplementary and ’helping’ intervention of 
the state, but also sets limits to such interference with the affairs of other bodies 
Where exactly the limits of state intervention are to be sought remains unclear and is 
made contingent upon the conditions under which a state functions.
The political theory inspired by the religious inclination of the Reformed 
churches -at least in the Netherlands- has a comparable principle, which is called the 
’sovereignty in one’s own circle’ (see chapter 11). Although in some respects the 
Protestant and Catholic conceptions of state regulation come down to very much the 
same thing, the Protestant doctrine of ’sovereignty’ limits state interference somewhat 
more. In this context one can find two other conceptions, which cover both mentioned 
principles: autonomization and horizontal pluralism. The doctrine of ’horizontal 
pluralism’ has a double connotation. It is both meant to describe the means of 
protecting the sovereign sphere of smaller social groups, and to prevent the state from 
becoming ’overloaded’ with demands from the lower and smaller social groups.
Vertical pluralism is another disposition of Christian Democracy and it refers 
to the way in which ideologies cut vertically through all the layers and groups in 
society. It could be understood as the Christian Democratic way of defining tolerance. 
"Different ’spiritual families’ (...) -Catholics, Protestants, Marxists, ’humanist’, or
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whoever they may be- should on the principle of ’vertical’ pluralism be permitted and 
enabled to follow their own way of life, even when they are in a minority in a nation 
or groups as a whole (...)• It reduces conflict, since it allows everyone, without 
discrimination or loss to himself, to build up a set of associations which fits his own 
ideals" (Fogarty 1974: 42). The Dutch system of ’pillarization’ appears to be the 
prototype of such ’vertical* pluralism.
A first tentative conclusion on the difference between the ideologies of Christian 
Democracy and Social Democracy can now be formulated. For Social Democracy state 
intervention is not limited by a comparable principle as ’subsidiarity’. The emphasis 
on the primacy of politics is much stronger here. The goal of intervention is social 
reform according to the norms of equality, freedom and solidarity. Social Democracy 
instrumentalizes the state in order to eliminate inequality, which is seen as an inherent 
characteristic of the capitalist system of production. The function of the state is 
perceived as a permanent reform capacity. There is a general conviction of the 
possibility of politics (Ringen 1987). Social Democracy, too, recognizes limits to state 
intervention as far as the idea of market conformity of Keynesian economics is 
concerned. Intervention ought not to rule out the market, but the state should intervene 
where the market shows imperfections and violates the principles of equality, freedom 
and solidarity. Yet, the market should be replaced whenever it generates disfavourable 
distributional outcomes.
Christian Democratic politics is antithetical to the historical materialist view of man and 
society, where class struggle is the motor of society. Christian Democratic politics is 
always founded upon some notion of harmony between all members, groups, or classes 
of society, illustrated by the concepts of integration, class-compromise, accommodation 
and pluralism. Christian Democrats define capitalism (or *the system of production 
through private firms’) as an organic division of labour. Various social groups and 
classes have their own specific and indispensable role in the division of labour and 
mellifluous cooperation between classes is not only possible, but on the contrary, 
necessary and ’natural*. Property relations are founded upon Natural Right and, 
therefore, not only ought not be changed, but cannot be altered. In Rerum Novarum
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(1891), for instance, four interrelated arguments are provided in favour of the Natural 
Right character of private property: 1) Man is rational, therefore he saves for the 
future; 2) Man has a right to the fruits of his labour. These ’fruits’ become his private 
property; 3) Private property has always existed; 4) Man (!) needs private property to 
be able to look after his family in his function as pater familias.
In Quadragesimo Anno (1931) a (Thomist) distinction is elaborated between 
private property and its use. It is the function of the state to control how and where 
private property is used. If and only if necessity demands intervention can it be argued 
to be legitimate. Natural Right, furthermore, implies the obligation of cooperation 
between labour and capital. The organic character of the economic order should reflect 
itself in the integration of labour and capital in public affairs through the so-called 
’industrial groups* or ’statutory industry councils’. These councils are supposed to 
contribute to the abolition of class struggle. If labour is to be integrated, the working 
class needs organizations. "One of the main foundations of security, as the Christian 
movements see it, is to belong to a class of people like oneself, and to know that this 
class is organized and indispensable enough to be a power in the land" (Fogarty 1974: 
77). In order to be able to perform the ’natural functions’ within the organic body of 
society it is necessary to organize as a class. The ’respect’ of employers for the 
working class must be enforced by the strength of organization.
Labour also must be integrated into society as such: the ’redemption’ of the 
proletariat by the acquisition of property, by fighting unemployment, by developing 
labour law and by co-determination in firms. Christian Democratic unions, although 
stating that industrial collaboration will often be difficult, have always emphasized 
common interests and the joint responsibility of management and workers. This should 
eventually be reflected in joint control of the firm. "For only full industrial democracy, 
with not merely a consultative but a decisive voice for all, can provide full opportunity 
for the ’promotion of the working class’, the widest chance for workers to take their 
responsibility and develop their power to lead" (Fogarty 1974: 65). Christian 
Democratic parties have initiated and implemented laws regulating co-determination in 
firms through so called Work Councils in the late forties and early fifties all over 
Western Europe: in France 1945-1946; in Austria from 1947; in Belgium from 1948;
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in Holland from 1950; in Germany from 1951/1952 (see Fogarty 1974: 66; Irving 
1979: 43-51).
This 'Weltanschauung' in terms of a possible because necessary ’fellowship’ in 
an ordered society has contributed to the view of Christian Democracy being nothing 
but the middle of the road between Socialism and Liberalism. The Christian 
Democratic notion of solidarity as harmony is an intrinsic part of the idea of 
Personalism. It refers to a manifestation of social justice, which rather than balance 
between rights and duties, fundamentally underscores a moral obligation to help the 
’weak’, ’poor’, ’lower strata’, or whoever may be in need of help. Furthermore, social 
justice appears not to refer to the relations between individuals, but instead to the 
relations between social groups. It is a specific class theory of distributive justice and 
in this sense differs fundamentally from the Social Democratic conception of justice.
The above explained bipolarity of basic Christian Democratic ideology is 
present as well, although maybe in a slightly different way. The principle of 
subsidiarity regulates in abstract and general terms the possibilities and limits of state 
intervention. The requirements of social justice dictate the duty of social policy. In 
practice principles of market efficiency and the idea of social (distributive) justice 
produce a perennial dilemma of agency. This runs the risk of a friction between the 
insistence on subsidiarity and the principle of social justice as a moral obligation.
A second tentative conclusion on the difference between Social Democratic and 
Christian Democratic ideology can be formulated here. Social Democracy sees existing 
property relations as the root cause of inequality, injustice and class struggle. The 
property relations themselves might be the object of change. Unlike the Christian 
Democrats the Social Democrats strive for a shift in power from capital to labour, 
resulting in a shift from profit to labour income. The economic relationship between 
various social groups, as Social Democracy sees it, is a permanent societal struggle. 
Property rights are not defined by Natural Law, but are considered to be the result of 
a historical development. Therefore property relations can in principle be transformed 
by political action. The end of a ’good’ economic order is the Good Society in which 
every individual has an equal opportunity to a reasonable existence and to work and 
welfare. Unions are central rather because of their ability to promote working class
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power than because of their function within the organic totality. Solidarity is a central 
notion of Social Democratic ideology. Solidarity between people is emphasized as 
founded upon material and formal equality. Asymmetrical power relations require 
intervention by the state.
The concept of man (’Menschenbild’) in Christian Democratic political thought is 
shaped according to the model of Personalism. Man as an individual can only unfold 
his potentiality partially and in an incomplete manner. Man, therefore, is compelled to 
cooperate and hence he is a principally social being. "Personalism as distinct from 
individualism, is held by Christian Democrats to imply a certain ’solidarist’ conception 
of the individual’s responsibility to and for the society around him, and, following from 
this, a ’federalist’ or ’pluralist’ ideal of the structure of society and the processes which 
go on within it" (Fogarty 1974: 29). Personalism has the following consequences for 
practical policy: 1) all social action should be oriented to enable personalities to form 
themselves along certain ideal lines, to acquire certain basic characteristics and social 
and technical skills; 2) these ideal personalities should be grouped in a pluralist social 
structure, in which room is left for the free though socially responsible development 
of groups of all shapes and sizes, from the family as the cornerstone of society to the 
international community of nations; 3) the social structure should be glued together by 
and function through sanctions (political, economic, or social) and mechanisms 
(competition, direction, consultation) combined as to maintain its Personalist and 
pluralist character (see Fogarty 1974: 29).
The family is the first and central social group in which individuals become 
personalities. The family (in particular the nuclear family) is an indispensable organ 
in the body of society. Like the state, the family exists by virtue of ’natural necessity’. 
Within the nuclear family lies the seed of society as a whole. The role division between 
man and woman is natural. Christian Democrats see themselves as the special 
upholders of the family’s needs and rights. With respect to social policy, the position 
of the family within Christian Democratic ideology needs careful inquiry, for it can 
easily lead to misunderstanding. Fogarty is right when he emphasizes that "Christian 
Democrats think in terms not so much of providing families with services, particularly 
state services, as of ensuring them, through a modification of the wage system, the
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income with which to provide services for themselves, on their own or through co­
operation with others. All of them support strongly the idea of a family living wage" 
(1974: 49). Family allowances, then, become a means to supplement the possibly 
inadequate family living wages and relatively high replacement rates in the benefit 
structure of a society are to assist families in times of misfortune.
This stress on providing income rather than services to the family is a function 
of the Christian Democratic ideology of the family and its role in the organic division 
of the societal body. Christian Democrats do not merely try "to ensure the family 
justice but to increase its responsibility and independence. The family is by all means 
’the cornerstone of society’ (...)" (Fogarty 1974: 50).
A final tentative conclusion on the difference between Christian Democratic and Social 
Democratic ideology addresses these topics. The performance of work (the application 
of labour power) is for Social ¡Democrats the manner in which man unfolds his 
personality. Man is rational and solidarity springs from his responsibility towards 
mankind. Social Democracy has a philosophy that strongly suggests social action: 
existing social inequality implies a commitment to change in order to arrive at the state 
of equality and freedom for all. This search for change, this commitment to reform, 
establishes man as a political being. As a political being man needs organization in 
order to be able to (co-) decide (parliamentary democracy and political participation).
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FROM CHARITY TO JUSTICE: ON THE SPIRIT OF 
SOCIAL CAPITALISM
CHAPTER 3

Can Christianity be argued to be related to the welfare state at all? This is a 
particularly pressing and interesting problem since a strong counter argument holds that 
the Christian denominations, and Catholicism in particular, have always stressed the 
centrality of charity. Charity, given its one-sided stress on the Christian obligation to 
give, in turn, is viewed as opposed to the central characteristic of the welfare state: the 
granting of social rights. In such a view solidarity marks the true welfare state. "Social 
solidarity is justice defined in terms of rights" (Baldwin 1990: 31). The justice of today 
indeed appears to be the charity of yesterday. The problem posed is therefore one of 
the transition from charity to social justice.
How did charity become social justice? Why did Christian obligations turn into 
social rights? Why did solidarity take compassion’s place? One line of thought, most 
recently and most impressively represented by Baldwin, is that solidarity is nothing but 
"the outcome of a generalized and reciprocal self-interest" (Baldwin 1990: 299) carried 
out by collectivized risk categories which only rarely correspond completely with social 
classes. Religiously inspired forces have had nothing to do with the transition at all. 
On the contrary, on this account the transition from charity to social justice was 
accomplished by those social actors who managed to shake off the religious heritage 
of charity. The argument to be developed here is not so much that this is a mistaken 
view, but rather that it only tells part of the story. In particular, it appears to disregard 
the manner in which religiously inspired social and political actors themselves have 
tried to come to terms with the rightful claim to assistance. In addition, it informs us 
nothing about the possible direct relationship between Christianity and the welfare state 
and the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism with respect to this 
association. The thesis of this chapter is that charity as a Christian maxim became 
crystallized in the -or better a peculiar type of- welfare state through the social Catholic 
reformulation of charity as social (distributional) justice.
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Secularization and the Development o f the Welfare State 
One-Dimensional Secularization
Let me, however, begin by considering the claim that secularization (as a correlate of 
industrialization and urbanization or as a phenomenon of modernization) rather than 
religion per se lies at the heart of the development of the welfare state. The decline of 
religion and the rise of the secular nation-state -as a consequence of the surrender of 
the church to the state or as a result of the retreat of the church to the ’private’ realm- 
are the long-term historical processes that really matter. On this account, religion is not 
in any sense directly, but at most indirectly associated with the collectivization of social 
care, namely only insofar as Protestantism can be argued to be a major step towards 
secularization. Protestantism represents "an immense shrinkage in the scope of the 
sacred in reality (...)" and "(...) divested itself as much as possible from the three most 
ancient and most powerful concomitants of the sacred -mystery, miracle, and magic" 
(Berger 1990: 111). The process of secularization as an important condition for the 
emergence of the welfare state paradoxically goes through the Protestant revolution of 
religion.
Secularization in this perspective is primarily taken to refer to the decline of the 
categorical impact of religion on human conduct. Secularization mainly takes the form 
of a "growing tendency of mankind to do without religion" (Chadwick 1975: 17) and 
it concerns the increasing powerlessness of organized religion in temporal affairs 
coupled with the decreasing plausibility of the religious interpretation of the world 
(Martin 1978: 12). It is the "(...) process by which sectors of society and culture are 
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols" and it "manifests 
itself in the evacuation by the Christian churches of areas previously under their control 
or influence -as in the separation of church and state, or in the expropriation of church 
lands, or in the emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority". But it is more 
than this, "it affects the totality of cultural life and of ideation (...)" and of conscious­
ness itself (Berger 1990: 107). Berger’s argument is that "Protestantism served as the 
historically decisive prelude to secularization" and that this potency is not so much a
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unique feature of Protestantism but goes back to certain elements in the Biblical 
tradition (Berger 1990: 113).
Protestantism caused a qualitative change in church-state relationships which in 
turn facilitated the construction of the welfare state. Such is perhaps the central causal 
theory in its naked representation of the manner in which religious change is related 
to the development of the welfare state. In his elaboration of Rokkan’s macro-model 
of European history, Flora argues that the emergence of the welfare state is above all 
associated with the growth of mass democracies. The developmental thesis is that "the 
evolution of welfare states since the late 19th century may be seen as a second step and 
final triumph of the modem Western European state" (Flora 1983: 25). Religion has 
influenced the transformation of traditional societies into mass democracies and this 
process affected the institutional arrangements of modem welfare states. The main 
generalization of the Rokkan macro-model is that "the Protestant nationalization of the 
territorial culture in the North favoured the mobilization of voice ’from below’: the 
early development of literacy encouraged the mobilization of lower strata into mass 
politics, and the incorporation of the church into the state apparatus reduced one 
potential source of conflict and produced a clear-cut focus for the opposition of the 
dominated population. By contrast, the supra-territorial influence of the Catholic 
Church favoured a mobilization ’from above’: the late development of literacy retarded 
spontaneous mass mobilization and the conflicts over the control over the educational 
system led to efforts by the church to mobilize against the state" (Flora 1983: 22).
Implicit in this account lies the hypothesis that those nations in which the 
Reformation had a lasting impact and in which an intimate state-church relationship 
gradually developed, the conditions for the collectivization and nationalization of 
welfare services were most favourable, the more so as the decline of religion facilitated 
the growing political salience of class (see for a critical account, Stephens 1979b). In 
those nations in which Catholicism continued to be a considerable social factor, the 
conflict between state and church inhibited or at least severely retarded the emergence 
of a welfare state. This contrast between the Protestant and the Catholic nations 
(largely identified by their physical distance from Rome) explains the qualitative 
differences between the welfare states found in these nations. These differences concern 
the degree of ’stateness’ (the level of centralization; the level of state-church
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integration; the degree of state intervention in the economy) and the degree of 
institutional coherence (universalism versus fragmentation)0. Apparently, the ideal 
type of the welfare state refers to a historical combination of universalism and stateness 
and is taken to comprise the following characteristics: political centralization, 
nationalization of the church, cultural homogeneity, advanced (democratic) agriculture, 
lack of, or at least, limited absolutism, smooth democratization and a limited division 
of state and society. The ideal-type of welfare state development is found in Europe’s 
periphery, that is in Scandinavia, where the physical distance from Rome is greatest.
In an important article Heidenheimer (1983) focused on the relationship between 
religion and secularization patterns on the one hand and the westward spread of the 
welfare state on the other. His article is in the form of two imaginary dialogues, the 
first between Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, taking place in 1904, and the second 
between Emst Reweb and Max Schroeltt, the modem impersonations of the two great 
sociologists. The birth of the welfare state is dated 1883, the year of the introduction 
of sickness insurance in Bismarckian Germany. The question to Weber and Troeltsch 
is "whether the spread of social insurance is at all related to the religious ethos 
prevalent in different countries and if so, how do the different branches of Christianity 
compare in the degree to which they have welcomed or opposed this trend?" 
(Heidenheimer 1983: 6). In the Weberian perspective it could be expected that adoption 
of social insurance occurred in an early stage because both doctrine and the intimate 
relationship between state and church were favourable to "paternalist welfare schemes" 
(Heidenheimer 1983: 8). Catholic countries are expected to be laggards because 
Catholicism inhibits economic development. On the account of Troeltsch, on the other 
hand, there is a crucial difference between Calvinist and Lutheran countries, the latter 
probably more willing to accept social insurance as a tolerable intervention, the former, 
because of the association with Liberal capitalism, probably even more slowly in their 
adaptations than the Catholic nations.
Secularization patterns affect national experiences by altering the velocity with 
which social insurance schemes are introduced. In the Weberian perspective
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1) These reflections are taken from a lecture by Peter Flora to the second European School of 
Historical and Comparative Sociological Research on Social Policy, Sociological Institute, University of 
Amsterdam, november 27th, 1990. Caution is required, for my notes may not be accurate and therefore 
may not precisely reflect the views of Flora.
secularization is assumed to accelerate the development of the welfare state because it 
is viewed as a concluding phase of Western rationalization. For the present purposes, 
however, the most interesting account of the association between secularization and the 
development of the welfare state is the Troeltschian interpretation, where secularization 
is seen as a multi-dimensional process. Protestantism may lead to ’internal’ and 
’external’ secularization. "Thus while some functions, like education, may be laicized 
by transferring them out of the religious arena, religious involvement may be kept from 
declining, partly by new sect foundings and partly by having the churches adapt by 
pursuing other ancillary functions. This approach allows one to deal with grafting of 
Christian values onto secular structures and processes, as well as with the possible 
reversibility of certain secularization structures'’ (Heidenheimer 1983: 9).
The manner in which the causal link between Protestantism, secularization and 
the development of the welfare state is interpreted, is largely convincing. The claim to 
general applicability, however, might appear exaggerated. The proposal of viewing 
secularization as a multi-dimensional process provides the clue for a better understan­
ding because it shows that the one-dimensional view of secularization leaves two issues 
undecided. First, it has little to say about the possibly distinct relationship between 
Catholicism and the welfare state, other than that Catholicism is probably a retarding 
factor -an uninformative statement. And second, it seems to disregard what might very 
well be other important features or dimensions of secularization. I shall deal with the 
last issue first.
The Condensation of Morality
One could study secularization from another angle and suggest that it also represents 
the condensation or transference of religious morality into secular ethics. Secularization 
may be looked upon as comprising a transformation of religious contents into worldly 
substance; Christian values are increasingly represented in secular terms. One cannot 
view secularization solely as a process of religious diminution or as the dwindling of 
the presence of the church in society. It should also be taken to refer to a process of 
assimilation and translation of a basically religious system of values into a secular 
ethic. What is at stake here is the adjustment of religious idealism to worldly affairs
and interests. Socialist theory, for instance, has incorporated religious sentiments which 
provided its critique of capitalism with an ethical foundation (see Janowitz 1976: 20-22) 
and many of its leaders with agitational qualities or even charismatic appeal. In other 
words, one way of thinking of the transformation of religious values is understanding 
it as a process of absorption by, assimilation to, or perhaps even complete transfor­
mation into, a worldly ethical system.
As a consequence of this process of transformation, the original Christian 
content of some of the central values of worldly belief-systems are increasingly difficult 
to discern. Christian values, in a way, condensate in their secular state. This aspect of 
secularization makes the open religious influence on politics vanish and supplants it by 
a "diffuse moralism throughout society" (Mead 1983: 52/53). Modem Western society 
is still continuously shaped by its own religious heritage, but in a manner which is 
increasingly imperceptible. In other words, "there may not only be secularization of 
consciousness within the traditional religious institutions but also a continuation of 
more or less traditional motifs of religious consciousness outside their previous 
institutional contexts" (Berger 1990: 109). Phrased like this, however, we end up with 
the thesis that Christianity is intimately interwoven with the character of modem 
industrial society and therefore with welfare capitalism. Such an assertion might 
perhaps be true, but at the same time trivializes the proposed association as indistinct, 
because in this sense Christianity is affiliated with almost every feature of modem 
society. We are left with the banality of pantheism.
To be more specific, one could ask which crucial values embodied in social 
policy one can think of as basically originating in Christian ethics. One argument is 
that the materialization of religious values has culminated in what might be called a 
form of implicit Christianity (Kaufmann 1988). The idea of fundamental and universal 
human rights can be traced back to the Christian principle of the equality of all human 
beings before God on the basis of the creation of man in God’s image (’Gotteseb- 
enbildlichkeit’, Kaufmann 1988: 74) and Redemption by Jesus Christ. This universal 
ethic of Christianity is embodied in the increasing opportunities to take part in the 
institutions of society (inclusion). The materialization of this ethical element in the 
institutions of the welfare state has by now lost its Christian component, but is still
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operational. The welfare state, one might say, is an implicitly Christian form of 
societal inclusion.
One could also think of social policy as fundamentally comprising a theological 
dimension (Mead 1983), in the sense that the Christian obligation to give accords a 
religious sentiment to the public provision of benefits. Formally, the distinction 
between state and church, for instance, may be clear, but substantially traditional 
religious values affect social policy. This theological dimension of social policy 
becomes visible when governments try to cut social spending. The difficulty to 
substantially do so may have to do with "a theological imbalance: it is simply much 
easier to justify giving things to the needy than not giving them in the light of the 
religious ideas that, directly or indirectly, have shaped Western notions of the social 
good. Policy-makers may not think of themselves as religious, but they are products 
of a culture which for centuries has respected Biblical images of what it means to do 
good to others" (Mead 1983: 54). Whatever the strength of the rational, analytical 
arguments in favour of restraint, "none of these answers the religious case for welfare 
or collectivism on its own ground. A policy of restraint, whatever its other merits, 
must still be culpable in terms of a moral tradition commanding unlimited provision for 
the poor" (Mead 1983: 54)2>.
On the Spirit o f Social Capitalism
Charity, as the expression of the foundational Christian value of brotherly love, can 
indeed be viewed as according a theological dimension to social policy. Charity is an 
example of the manner in which an openly religious precept was converted into a form 
of implicit Christianity. Now, at first sight, such claims seem counterintuitive, for 
charity is routinely viewed as antithetical to the welfare state. Charity, it is argued,
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2) Such * specification appears to make sense empirically and may account for some of the 
fundamentally moral discourses on social policy in terms of obligations, responsibility and care in 
relation to retrenchment policies. As argued elsewhere (Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988: 495) and 
elaborated in chapter 11, the extraordinary political influence of the church and religion in general in the 
Netherlands and the presence of an almost religiously inclined Social Democratic movement, for 
instance, favoured the predominance of a paternalist Christian conception of social policy in which 
notions such as 'caring for the weak’, ’victims of unemployment’, the ’caring society’ and the like still 
play a major ideological role.
refers to the religiously inspired obligation to give; the welfare state is essentially a 
matter of secular rights. Yet, I hold that there is a way in which charity as a Christian 
maxim became crystallized in a version of the welfare state, namely through the social 
Catholic reformulation of charity as social justice and through Catholic politics.
The argument in favour of this claim is somewhat complex and begins by the 
conjecture that Protestantism and Catholicism differ fundamentally in their appraisal 
of capitalism. For reasons of exposition I first shortly summarize the path of the 
argumentation and then present the detailed analysis. Unlike ascetic Protestantism, 
which has adopted its theology to capitalism gradually in such a way that this religion 
became eventually its prime moral apologist, Catholicism has not only systematically 
refused to accept capitalism at a comparable pace, but in fact refused to do so 
unconditionally. Worldly economic activity on the Catholic account became the object 
of a socio-religious critique rather than the appropriate place to seek proof of grace. 
Catholic social theory has always been strongly infused with anti-capitalist ingredients. 
For this reason one might expect a more direct affiliation between Catholicism and the 
origins of the welfare state35. One of the main reasons for these divergent roads of 
accommodation to capitalism may be found in the contrast between Protestantism’s 
association with the spirit of capitalism and Catholicism’s connection with what I 
heuristically call the ’spirit of social capitalism’.
The Weber Thesis
The obvious starting point for the analysis is Max Weber’s ’The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism’. In this pièce de résistance of classical sociology Weber shows 
that Catholics and Protestants differ systematically through their religious belief
51
3) If one would except that the inauguration of social legislation in Germany marks the institutional 
birth of the welfare state, than Catholicism was there as its midwife. Bismarcldan social policy was 
implemented with support of the Catholics and Conservatives and against the Socialist will. The Catholics 
*(...) deliberately choose an incrementalist strategy of social reform (...)" and ’held a position in the 
political struggle that was neither Liberal nor Socialist nor Conservative (...) they were the unique party 
that was able to cooperate with all of these tendencies in one or another respect. Hence their ‘central’ 
and integrative role in the political game of the German Reich" (Kaufmann 1983: 9; see also Kaufmann 
1988: 81-86).
systems in their respective attitudes towards economic life. They diverge in their 
association with the ’spirit’ of capitalism.
The ’spirit’ of capitalism is not merely a specific attitude towards the making 
of profit or a way of making one’s way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The moral 
attitudes of the ’spirit’ (honesty, punctuality, industry, frugality) in first instance appear 
to serve the purpose of making money; they may be seen in terms of pure utilitaria­
nism. However, "the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more 
money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is 
above all completely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture. 
It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from the point of view of the 
happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and 
absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as 
the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of what we should 
call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naïve point of view, is evidently as 
definitively a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under 
capitalistic influence. At the same time it expresses a type of feeling which is closely 
connected with certain religious ideas" (Weber 1976: 53).
This ethic, then, is religiously induced. Making money in order to make money 
is the expression of virtue and proficiency in a ’calling’. The idea of a calling 
constitutes an irrational element in the otherwise rational spirit of capitalism. A 
fundamental difference between Protestantism and Catholicism concerns the former’s 
peculiar notion of the ’calling’. The ’calling’ has the connotation of a task set by God. 
It refers to a life-task, a certain field in which to work. The religious significance of 
daily life is the fulfillment of the duty in the world set by God.
The moral justification of worldly affairs was one of the most important 
consequences of the Reformation. It differs fundamentally from the retreat from 
worldly life as embodied in medieval monasticism, but also from what Weber calls the 
Liberal utilitarian compromise with the world that the Jesuits came up with. The 
Lutheran interpretation of the ’calling’, however, is still largely traditionalistic. Above 
all it meant that an individual should remain in the position in which God had wanted 
him to be. Worldly activity should take place within the limits of the calling. As a
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consequence, the ethical effect of the introduction of the conception of the calling was 
largely and for the time being negative: it merely accorded a more prominent place to 
worldly affairs. This negative consequence was transformed by Calvinism into a 
positive worldly ethic. Both Lutheranism and Catholicism abominate Calvinism alike 
precisely because of the latter’s ethical peculiarities. The difference between 
Lutheranism and Catholicism on the one hand and Calvinism on the other lies to a 
large extent in their dissimilar views on the relationship between the religious life and 
earthly activity.
The pursuit of material gain and worldly goods as an end in itself was as such 
never an ethical value to any of the Calvinists. There is no direct association between 
the Calvinist doctrine and the spirit of capitalism. The cultural consequences of the 
Reformation were often unforeseen and unintended consequences of the actions of the 
reformers. It is therefore ultimately the practical ethics of the ascetic branches of 
Protestantism that matter.
Nevertheless, since dogma is important for understanding the psychology of the 
pious believer the teaching of Calvin is crucial for understanding the association 
between the ethic and the spirit. The most characteristic dogma of Calvinism was the 
idea of predestination. It meant that some people were predestined to everlasting life, 
others to everlasting death. And what is more, nothing could be done to influence 
God’s eternal decision. Calvin took Luther’s teaching on this to its logical conclusion, 
stressing predestination and the complete transcendence of God.
Only a part of humanity is saved, the rest is damned. Where Catholicism 
assumes that fate is to a certain extent contingent, Calvinism denies every form of 
influence on God’s decrees. Eternity cannot be altered. In addition, God cannot be 
reached nor understood. The grace of God cannot be attained nor lost. Yet, He did 
decide upon the eternal fate of every single individual and steers the universe even in 
its smallest parts. God has become truly transcendental.
A crucial step concerns the transition from theology to practical ethics, the 
psychology of the believer, and the prominence of ’proof. In all its splendid horror 
it is one of the most ’beautiful’ fragments of Weber’s essay and I will quote it at 
length. The fragment is clearly meant to highlight the contrast between Calvinism and 
Catholicism. "In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all have had one
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consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent 
consistency. That was a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single 
individual. In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important 
thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a 
destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him. No 
priest, for the chosen one can understand the word of God only in his own heart. No 
sacraments, for though the sacraments had been ordained by God for the increase of 
His glory, and must hence be scrupulously observed, they are not means to the 
attainment of grace, but only the subjective externa subsidia of faith. No church, for 
though it was held that extra ecclesiam nulla salus in the sense that whoever kept away 
from the true Church could never belong to God’s chosen band, nevertheless the 
membership of the external Church included the doomed. They should belong to it and 
be subjected to its discipline, not in order thus to attain salvation, that is impossible, 
but because, for the Glory of God, they too must be forced to obey his commandments. 
Finally, even no God. For even Christ had died only for the elect, for whose benefit 
God had decreed His martyrdom from eternity" (Weber 1976: 104).
The individual was truly alone, knowing a decision had been made about his 
personal destiny, but unaware as to its contents. The conclusion of the exposition of 
the Calvinist creed is that the complete elimination of salvation through the church and 
the sacraments constituted the absolutely decisive difference from Catholicism. This 
process is called the "elimination of magic from the world" (Weber 1976: 105)4).
There were no means left for attaining the grace of God, not even the magical 
ones. The inner isolation of the individual produced the characteristic negative attitude 
of Calvinists towards the sensuous and emotional elements of religion. These are of no 
use for the attainment of eternal grace and only can lead to "sentimental illusions and 
idolatrous superstitions" (Weber 1976: 106). The individual’s isolation led also to a 
pessimistically inclined individualism. There is only trust in God. Not even friends
54
4) 'Entzauberung der Welt* literally means the disenchantment of the world and as such can be 
viewed as an important condition of the process of secularization. One of the conclusions of Thomas' 
(1984: 786) study on ’Religion and the Decline of Magic’, for instance, comes very near Weber’s thesis. 
He argues that *it was the abandonment of magic which made possible the upsurge of technology, not 
the other way round (...). The technological primacy of Western civilization (...) owes a sizable debt 
to the fact that in Europe recourse to magic was to prove less ineradicable than in other parts of the 
world".
should be trusted. Only God should be your confident. Another important difference 
between Calvinism and Catholicism is found when this attitude towards life is believed 
to be connected with the quiet disappearance of the private confession -so important in 
the religious practice of Catholicism- from all the regions where Calvinism fully 
developed. The importance of this event is found in the fact that "the means to a 
periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin was done away with" (Weber 1976: 
106).
For individuals tormented in such a way by the uncertainty over their personal 
predestined destiny sooner or later the question must arise ’am I one of the elect?’ This 
problem of the uncertainty about the state of grace became the dominant issue within 
the Calvinist faith. In particular, practical pastoral work was confronted by the 
psychological suffering that the combined doctrines of predestination and the 
transcendence of God caused. Quite unlike the practice of Catholic priests of course, 
the Calvinist pastoral advice first of all consisted of prescribing self-confidence as 
confidence in one’s faith and fate. Secondly, an active outlook towards the world was 
considered the best means to reinforce certainty about one’s fate. Success in worldly 
affairs could be taken as a sign of election. The Calvinist, in a sense, almost creates 
his own salvation, or, as would be more accurate, the conviction of it. God only helps 
those who help themselves to be certain. Salvation, however, can never, as in 
Catholicism, be attained by the accumulation of good works.
The Calvinist thesis of proof of grace is in fact the reversion of the doctrine of 
salvation by good works. Interestingly enough, fatalism would be the only logical 
consequence of the idea of predestination (Weber 1976: 232, fh 66). But there is a 
difference between what is the logical and what is the practical result. The concept of 
proof engenders precisely the opposite through the psychological mechanisms of 
loneliness, fear and uncertainty.
The Calvinist creed is opposed to the medieval asceticism for the latter implied 
a retreat from the world. The same ascetic ideals now had to be pursued in worldly 
occupations. Calvinism added something positive to the negative worldly asceticism of 
Lutheranism, namely the idea of having to prove one’s faith by means of worldly 
activity. Calvinism, unlike Lutheranism and Catholicism, forced men and women into 
a methodical quality of ethical conduct which led to a thoroughgoing Christianization
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of the whole life. This seeking of proof of grace, of the certainty to be among the 
chosen, is the last decisive step in the argument about the religious foundations of 
worldly asceticism. The quintessence is that this inner-worldly asceticism of Calvinism 
is associated with the spirit of capitalism.
Hard labour was first of all preached as an approved ascetic technique. 
Moreover, hard work became the real purpose of life, whereas the unwillingness to 
work was considered to be the sign of imperfect or even lack of grace. So, the 
centrality of the concept of the calling was decisive. However, God does not just 
provide every single individual with a personal calling in the sense of a life-task, a 
station in life which they have to abide. For the calling is not a fate, but a Divine 
commandment. And this is equally valid for the poor as for the rich, because the latter, 
too, have to obey God’s commandments.
Outside a calling human accomplishments are said to be casual and irregular. 
A calling produces the systematic and methodical behaviour demanded by inner-worldly 
asceticism. The modem division of labour, so different from the guild system of 
medieval times, was legitimized and supported by the emphasis on the ascetic 
significance of a calling. The making of a profit by an entrepreneur was evaluated in 
very much the same way.
This type of asceticism was primarily and strongly opposed to spontaneous 
enjoyment of life. It prescribed restricted consumption of luxury goods in particular. 
Nevertheless, at the same time the traditionalistic ethics surrounding the acquisition of 
goods were done away with. Quite paradoxically, the pursuit of riches for one’s own 
sake was still condemned. Asceticism disapproved of the pursuit of material gain as an 
end in itself. But more importantly: "the religious valuation of restless, continuous, 
systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the 
same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have 
been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life 
which we have here called the spirit of capitalism" (Weber 1976: 172).
The result of a restriction of consumption in combination with the ethical 
approval if not encouragement of acquisitive behaviour obviously was accumulation of 
capital through saving. In this sense, the accumulation of productive capital can be 
interpreted as an effect of the restraints upon consumption. The inner-worldly
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asceticism of the Puritan favoured the rational bourgeois economic life. This Puritan 
ethical logic, in short, is the cause of the modern rational capitalist attitude towards 
economic life, that is the spirit of capitalism.
It is of course true, that virtually all Christian denominations in some way or 
another stress the importance of a life of hard labour as increasing the glory of God5). 
For the present purposes, however, one of the important conclusions is that ascetic 
Protestantism, as opposed to Catholicism, perhaps not produced, but at least deepened 
this conviction and created a force which was decisive for its effectiveness.
Early Critics of the Weber Thesis
Some of Weber’s early critics felt that they were obliged to defend their religions 
against the way the sociologist portrayed Protestantism or Catholicism. The Protestant 
critic typically protested that his religion could not be held to be the sole responsible 
for the vices and misery of modem times. The Catholic critic argued that Catholicism, 
too, had contributed to progress. So, as early as 1933, H. M. Robertson complained 
that "many writers have taken advantage of an unpopularity of capitalism in the 
twentieth century to employ them in attacks on Calvinism" (1973: 59, originally 1933). 
The controversy over Weber’s famous thesis was therefore initially influenced by its 
"avowedly partisan nature" (Marshall 1982: 10). The Catholic historian in particular 
became the adversary of Weber because of the latter’s representation of Catholicism 
as primarily retarding economic progress (see Giddens 1976:9; see also Tawney 1975, 
originally 1926; Brodrick 1934).
Two arguments present in the early stage of the debate are particularly 
interesting, for they directly deal with the relationship between Catholic doctrine and 
the ’spirit of capitalism’ (Sombart 1959, originally 1913; Fanfani 1935). It is equally
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5) On the other hand, Eder (forthcoming) identifies three sources of the modem work ethic of which 
the Calvinist is only one. Lutheranism is defined as a primarily inwardly looking search for proof. 
"Calvinists (...) have become virtuosi of outer-worldly activity; the Lutherans have become virtuosi of 
self-observation and self-interpretation. Both cultural traditions have contributed to the modern work 
ethic. The first produced the work ethic based on rational motivation. The second produced a mere 
instrumentalist work ethic, one treating work as a sphere of mere necessity to which we are subject”. 
The work ethic of rural groups stems mainly from the Catholic creed, which had as its model the 
collective labour discipline of monasticism.
interesting as astonishing, however, to note that there are entirely opposed opinions 
considering the role of Catholicism. The first claim is that it was Catholicism and not 
Protestantism (in its Puritan form) that was most beneficial to capitalist growth. If any 
religion is to be held responsible for the middle class (bourgeois) values as such, it 
must be Catholicism, because these values existed long before the Reformation and 
were adhered to by Scholasticism. Acquisitiveness was not a Puritan invention, for 
Puritan preachers were against the making of money as an end in itself, unless it served 
the purpose of increasing the glory of God (Sombart 1959).
The second claim, by contrast, is that the Catholic ethos has always been anti- 
capitalistic, that Catholicism has opposed the establishment of capitalism and that 
insofar as Catholicism did promote capitalism this must be interpreted as an unintended 
consequence of doctrine, that is as accident not design. The point is historical rather 
than theoretical. Catholicism has simply lost the battle against capitalism. The church 
has continuously tried to hinder the establishment of the modem economic system. 
From the time that it was evident that capitalism would be the victor of the battle the 
anti-capitalist ethos of Catholicism lost much of its influence. A renewed attempt to 
recapture some power in economic and social matters marked the birth of social 
Catholicism (Fanfani 1935: 146). Catholicism’s anti-capitalism, in other words, was 
gradually translated from a reformist theology into a critical theory of capitalism.
These conflicting viewpoints can be synthesized if one accepts 1) that both 
religions have gradually adapted to modem capitalism, however in different ways and 
at a different pace; 2) that accordingly there exists a fundamental difference between 
traditionalist and modem Catholic social thought (Rerum Novarum marking the 
transition) and early and later Protestant doctrine; and 3) that modem Catholic social 
thought in particular has blended pro- and contra-capitalist elements in a ’spirit’ of 
social capitalism.
The most promising line of thought, then, holds that the spirit of capitalism did 
not spring from any religious inspiration whatsoever, but rather must be interpreted as 
a result of specific material conditions (Robertson 1973). The chicken-and-the-egg- 
discussion implied in this view, however, is irrelevant for the present purposes, the 
crucial point being the introduction of some notion of development and change. The 
idea of the ’calling’ was originally employed as a means to combat capitalism and not
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to support it. The concept only gradually changed its meaning. Weber is accused of 
anachronism. He did not notice "the change in the conception of the ’calling’ from an 
antidote against covetous ambition to a comfortable doctrine suitable for a commercial 
people" (Robertson 1973: 64). The causal connection between religion and spirit has 
to be turned upside down. The spirit of capitalism was responsible for a gradual 
modification of the middle class Puritan doctrine of a calling (Robertson 1973: 72).
Catholicism, too, has been favourable to capitalism very much in the same 
manner as in which the later Puritans can be said to have been. The Jansenists as well 
as -to a lesser extent maybe- the Jesuits employed doctrines not unlike the doctrine of 
the calling and with the same practical effect. Catholic doctrine strikingly resembles 
the connotation of the calling, and therefore "it might just as easily be claimed for 
Catholicism as for Puritanism that it made a demand for a worldly asceticism of 
rational toil" (Robertson 1973: 71). Catholicism cannot be said to have been decidedly 
influenced by Protestantism in this respect, for the capitalist spirit already existed 
before the Reformation.
Both Protestants and Catholics spoke with an ambiguous voice. On the one hand 
they stressed elements favouring capitalism and on the other hand they pointed to the 
dangers of riches6). Why, then, did Weber maintain that in the case of Calvinism as 
opposed to the case of Catholicism the pro-capitalist elements gained momentum? 
There appears to be no answer to this question because "(...) as a rule the Calvinistic 
contribution to the capitalist spirit was the same as that of the Jansenists or stricter 
school of Catholics, consisting of the encouragement of industry, thrift, order and 
honesty; while the Jesuits went further and favoured enterprise, freedom of speculation 
and the expansion of trade as a social benefit. It would not be difficult to claim that the 
religion which favoured the spirit of capitalism was Jesuitry, not Calvinism" (Robertson 
1973: 83).
Difficult or not, it appears not the right way to approach the problem. There 
exists a much more plausible explanation for the association between the churches and 
the spirit of capitalism. This explanation is that the Christian churches were forced to 
adapt to the spirit of capitalism, but did so in divergent manners. Returning to the
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6) Schama (1987), for instance, in his beautiful book on the Dutch civilization of the seventeenth 
century, tellingly refers to ’the embarrassment of riches’.
Weber thesis, one could hold that unlike ascetic Protestantism, which has adopted its 
theology to capitalism gradually in such a way that this religion became eventually its 
prime moral apologist, Catholicism has not only systematically refused to accept 
capitalism at a comparable pace, but in fact refused to do so unconditionally. This, 
then, is the fundamental proposition of the present discussion: Protestantism 
accommodated early and completely to capitalism; Catholicism later and in a more 
fragmentary and incomplete way. This to my mind partly explains the character of the 
early debate and the inconsistency in the argumentation of the criticism from the 
Catholic side. Both positions can be supported, for yes, Catholicism did not solely 
constitute a retarding force for economic progress; and yes, Catholicism has always 
provided a critique of capitalism. However, one should make a distinction between 
traditionalist Catholicism and modem social Catholicism. In the latter the retarding 
element (for instance the doctrine on usury) has been translated into a positive critique 
of capitalism and contains basically the Catholic version of reformist policies under 
capitalist conditions.
Protestantism’s choice in favour of capitalism was facilitated by the fact that it 
originated as an anti-traditionalistic force in the first place. It was fundamentally 
opposing Catholic traditional power and Catholicism, as a result, was forced to defend 
traditionalism. Catholicism, then, became so firmly associated with the old order that 
it remained for a long time a vigorous anti-modernist church. It struggled well into the 
twentieth century against all varieties of modernism, be it the enlightenment as such, 
capitalism, Liberalism, democracy or Socialism. The battle against capitalism was just 
one, albeit central, element in this struggle against modernity. The Roman Catholic 
church eventually had no choice than to accommodate to capitalism, which it only 
gradually and conditionally accepted. At the same time Catholicism’s medieval social 
ideas were revitalized as a strategy for formulating a solution for the social question, 
which capitalism was producing next to its material gains. Now, how could one best 
understand this process of accommodation?
I think one way of approaching the problem is by studying one of the most 
striking differences between ascetic Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in some 
more detail. This regards the decidedly divergent manners in which these religions 
control what has been called the ’salvation panic’. This ’panic’ established a permanent
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feature of the life of the Calvinist believer for which no relief was possible. As a 
consequence of predestination and the complete transcendence of God, there existed no 
course or conduct to secure salvation. Psychologically induced, diffused through 
pastoral work and with distinct practical effects, the salvation panic did not lead to the 
logical conclusion of fatalism, but -mediated through the idea of the possibility of proof 
of grace in a worldly calling- to the unintended consequence of inner-worldly 
asceticism. This inner-worldly asceticism, in turn, is directly associated with the spirit 
of capitalism. The complete elimination of salvation through the church and the 
sacraments constituted the decisive difference between ascetic Protestantism and 
Catholicism.
The Catholic had many more possibilities of dealing with and acting upon 
uncertainty over personal destiny. The Catholic believer could always try to seek 
compensation for imperfection or for sinful behaviour through the church and the 
priest. Surely, in order to correct imperfection something had to be done in order to 
show repentance and good will. The pious believer in his weakest moments could at 
least show the intention of improving upon imperfection, of bettering the sinful life, 
of correcting weakness and of compensating for shortcoming. Forgiveness of sins, 
absolution and even eternal salvation could be reached by an accumulation of good 
works. The Catholic creed allowed the salvation panic to be transformed from a 
permanent feature of daily life into a momentary discomfort of religious practice. In 
Catholicism a number of different ways of dealing with the crisis of Divine recognition 
could be found.
The accumulation of good works as a medium of personal religious relief by 
means of the material relief of others constitutes the core of 'the spirit of social 
capitalism’. Let me illustrate this with the official church teaching on private property. 
Private property as such was never condemned. Only certain forms of its anti-social 
use could be seen as sinful. Any form of surplus lawfully gained, for instance, gave 
the proprietor the opportunity to do good. The surplus enabled the rich man to give 
alms as a Christian duty. The problem of private property was not of an economic 
nature at all, but "there was an ethico-religious problem, which fluctuated between the 
radicalism of the claims of love and the natural claims of the necessity of earning a 
living" (Troeltsch 1931: 116).
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The glorification of the poor, too, has to be interpreted as primarily possessing 
the disposition to increase the rich man’s ability to do good and consequently through 
the accumulation of good works to attain salvation. Protestants have fundamentally 
different views on poverty than Catholics. Whereas the former regard being poor as 
a state to be avoided because it is taken as proving damnation, the latter considers 
poverty as an opportunity to do good, and the act itself of doing good is ’infused’ by 
the duties of neighbourly love. The poor themselves, however, occupy a special place 
in the Gospel, for Jesus’ message was mainly that poverty facilitates salvation. Charity, 
then, assumes its importance in this context of achieving forgiveness of committed sins 
through the accumulation of good works to the benefit of those who are privileged to 
suffer. These are the central components of the spirit of social capitalism which 
addresses the rich and the poor alike.
Charity
Charity, of course, has been a central element of Christianity ever since Jesus preached 
the Gospel. The Christian tradition of charity goes in fact back to striking features of 
the communal tradition of Judaism where welfare arrangements were elaborated. Early 
Christian communities imitated these services. The early Christian communities were 
based on the religious communism of love. It was "a communism which regarded the 
pooling of possessions as a proof of love and of the religious spirit of sacrifice. It was 
a communism composed solely of consumers, a communism based upon the assumption 
that its members will continue to earn their living by private enterprise, in order to be 
able to practice generosity and sacrifice. Above all, it has no theory of equality at all, 
whether it be the absolute equality of sharing possessions, or the relative equality of 
the contributions of the various members to the life of the whole according to merit and 
service" (Troeltsch 1931: 62).
This communism of love was not a fundamental idea of Christianity, but rather 
an effect, the real fundamental concept being the salvation of souls. Charity in pre- 
Thomist Catholicism, as an extension of the communism of love, was religious rather 
than social policy. Its aim was not the relief of poverty nor the improvement of a social 
order which produced suffering. Instead, charity was to show the spirit of love. Relief
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was seen as the effect of the spirit of love, which in turn could be taken as a sign of 
the Divine origin of the principle. "Poverty is still highly honoured, as a method by 
which we reach the knowledge of God; indeed, it is often voluntarily induced by giving 
away all one’s possessions. At the same time, the relief of distress extends no farther 
than securing the minimum of existence. The spirit of restraint and simplicity of life 
are not to be given up; rather this spirit ought to be encouraged both in those who give 
and in those who receive. Both almsgiving and the method of charity ought to be 
regulated by this standard. It is only the emphasis laid on the religious nature of this 
love as the revelation of a spirit, combined with the exaltation of poverty, which 
explains the fact that this charitable activity very soon, and quite naturally -as the 
earlier ethic of love shrank into one of ’good works’- was able to merge itself in 
ascetic achievements, whose aim was no longer the welfare of others but the salvation 
of one’s own soul" (Troeltsch 1931: 135).
Relief as the result of the spirit of love was limited to voluntary initiatives. The 
logic of charity could not be imposed upon the institutions of public authority, although 
the state could support the private initiative. Such an attitude excluded in principle an 
active stance in matters of social policy and reform of society. This was not so much 
the result of short-sightedness, but the consequence of the idea of the spirit of love. In 
the early centuries of Christianity the church was indeed able to provide relief at a 
large scale. In later periods this became increasingly difficult. Structural reform of 
society did not belong to the vocabulary of the church, since the world was the place 
where Satan ruled. So, when misery increased and charity decreased in effectiveness, 
the conclusion was reached that it was a punishment from God.
Form the outset, charity was an intra-communal affair, that is, an aspect of the 
love of communism in the strictest sense. As a result of the differentiation of society, 
however, charity’s function and place changed. Relations of charity lost their personal 
character. Almsgiving was regulated by institutions and mediated by the religious 
hierarchy. "In this atmosphere the whole practice of charity was changed from being 
a means of help to others into a practice of ascetic self-denial, into ’good works’ which 
acquire merit for oneself and for others, into penances for sin, and into a means of 
mitigating the fires of purgatory" (Troeltsch 1931: 136). Charity lost its original 
meaning. And although the institutions of charity were vehicles of civilization, the
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original idea of making sacrifices for the sake of love disappeared. These ideas did not 
contain the solution for social problems. Alms could not assume the status of a right 
or a claim. They were fundamentally "a gift of love, to be received in love and 
humility" (Troeltsch 1931: 137). The religious duty or the religious means to discharge 
sin on the part of those who had a surplus was not matched by a rightful claim on the 
part of those who lacked a minimum of subsistence.
Such then was the position of the spirit of love and charity at the eve of the 
industrial and political revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
By that time charity was materialized in a large number of charities. It grew out to be 
a church-funded systematic relief arrangement for the poor, bereft of its personal and 
intra-communal character. Instead of the early communism of love, one might say, 
evolved the institutionalization of impersonal gifts. Almsgiving in this sense was well 
into the eighteenth century the main basis of assistance. Moreover, "alms were (...) 
regarded as constituting a form of graduated tax levied in favour of the poor from all 
those who, whether of noble birth or bourgeois, had any superfluity" (Groethuysen 
1968:142).
The theory behind charity and almsgiving concerned primarily the idea that the 
wealthy must buy their place in heaven by alms. Almsgiving was a means to salvation 
for the rich. "If the rich man can have some assurance of his eternal predestination, 
and some safeguard against this unhappy reprobation which envelopes him, it is 
through his alms. Oh, how many rich persons have safely reached the haven of 
salvation after treading the corrupt paths of the world for so many years! (...) It is true 
that you deserve the severest punishment, and my justice should descend upon you in 
a thousand cases; but you have set up a barrier which stops it -your alms", said 
Hyacinte de Montargan in 1768 (as cited by Groethuysen 1968: 144). The reflection 
upon the nature of poverty in the eighteenth century was conducted "in the shadow of 
a raging polemic involving on one side traditional charity and on the other a more 
secular and optimistic system of values to which the Enlightenment thinkers attached 
the term bienfaisance" (1982: 2).
The meaning and contents of charity and almsgiving in the period immediately 
preceding the industrial revolution comes well to the fore if one studies the critique of 
traditional charity by the Enlightenment. Christian charity had a denominational and
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sectarian character and was directed to the spiritual rather than the material or physical 
well-being of the poor. And what is more, "it also adjudged the terrestrial fate of the 
recipient as of lesser account than the salvation of the giver: almsgiving was a method 
of easing the charitable donor’s soul through the after life and the recipient was merely 
an incidental means to a lofty end" (Jones 1982: 2).
Charity, then, was too much dependent upon the good will (and fear) of the 
benefactors and not enough subject to methodical conduct. It did not posses the 
instruments for adequately reacting to the continuously changing conditions of the 
eighteenth century (see Jones 1982: 3). The institutions of charity were unable to make 
a distinction between the ’deserving’ and the ’undeserving’ poor. There existed no clear 
definition of the object of charity. From the handouts at the gate of the convent both 
groups could equally profit. The object of charity included the ’undeserving’ vagrants 
as well as the sick, the disabled, widows, orphans, and other ’deserving’ poor. Finally, 
charity was too much confined to the relief of the urban poor, whereas the agrarian 
areas were hardly reached7'.
Charity as a perennial characteristic of Christianity and as a means to relief the 
poor out of love was in serious crisis at the moment industrial capitalism was 
producing a new, even further alienated class of poor, the proletariat, and a secularized 
class of rich entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, the first attempts to deal with the new 
situation led the Vatican ideologues to search for a revitalization of the idea of charity. 
This is one of the reasons for the reemergence of Thomist philosophy as the official 
philosophy of Catholicism and of Thomas Aquinas as the undisputed authority and
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7) Fairchilds* study of poverty and charity in Aix-en-Provence shows that thousands of charitable 
institutions existed in Old Regime France which provided relief for virtually all types of needy poor one 
can thinlr of. ’The traditional charities of the Old Regime were the product of a certain set of 
circumstances associated with the France of the early seventeenth century -especially the religious 
attitudes of the counter-Reformation, with their emphasis on the Christian duty of charity and their 
concern for the moral reformation of the poor* (Fairchilds 1976: 160). And furthermore, *this was a 
transitional period in the history of public assistance. The religiously inspired private almsgiving of the 
Middle Ages had been repudiated as ineffective, but the modern principle that the state was responsible 
for the material welfare of its citizens had not yet been established. This would come only with the 
French Revolution (...). With the absence of both church and state from the field of aid to the poor, the 
resulting vacuum was filled by private local charities. These institutions were secular, although the 
donations they received were still religiously inspired* (Fairchilds 1976: ix/x).
official exponent of Catholic teaching8'. Another reason for the Thomist revival is that 
this philosophy was particularly apt to face modernity and the Enlightenment because 
the central concept of Thomist philosophy is reason. In this sense, it was it possible to 
encounter enlightened philosophy on its own grounds.
A Hypothesis
On the basis of these considerations the following hypothesis seems plausible: the 
’buying’ of salvation through almsgiving as charity was an important element of 
Christian social thought at the eve of the social, economic and political revolutions of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Charity is the crucial concept for understanding 
the accommodation of the medieval heritage to capitalism. In order to find the heart 
of ’social’ in the Catholic view of social capitalism, it makes sense to explore the 
tradition of charity somewhat further here. In particular the manner in which the 
religious inspiration behind the theory of almsgiving and charity became ’modernized’ 
strikes me as fundamental for understanding the emergence of a more or less coherent 
view on the possibilities and limits of social policy within capitalist constraints.
Catholicism has not been particularly acquiescent, nor for that matter quick, in 
its conditional acceptance of industrial capitalism -and I take the dates of publication 
of the two most important social encyclical letters as indicative for this: Rerum 
Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). The prevalence of the theory of 
charity in Catholic ideology may very well have thwarted and frustrated a more smooth 
and painless transition to a more moderate and workable view on modernity and 
industrial capitalism.
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8) Anthony Kenny (1976) in his introduction to a collection of critical essays on the philosophy of 
St. Thomas regrets this official recognition by the Roman Catholic Church as the greatest single obstacle 
to the appreciation of Aquinas as a philosopher. First of all, the ecclesiastical approval gives the non­
catholic reader the impression that the Summa Theologica is party-propaganda. Secondly, there is a large 
number of Thomists 'whose comprehension of Aquinas does not always keep pace with their enthusiasm* 
(Kenny 1976: 2). Thirdly, Thomas’ integrity as a philosopher may be at stake. He is accused of proving 
philosophically what the Catholic church already assumes as true. One must remember that "when 
official or semi-official Catholic teaching coincides with that of Aquinas it is often the case of the official 
teaching agreeing with Aquinas rather than Aquinas agreeing with the official teaching* (Kenny 1976: 
2/3; see also Kenny’s book on Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher, Kenny 1980).
Two questions spring to mind: what is it in charity that may be considered to 
be the cause of the long-term resistance against the acceptance of capitalism? And why 
was the concept and practice of charity in need of modification in the first place? I try 
to provide an answer by arguing that charity’s reliance on the Christian inspired 
obligation to give ultimately would have ended in futility under conditions of a 
secularizing, industrial capitalist world. The lack of a conception of rights correspon­
ding with the duties of charity resulted in a period of transition in which a new 
Catholic version of justice was being developed. First of all, it makes sense to study 
St. Thomas’ philosophy of charity as the starting point of further Catholic elaborations 
(the philosophical problem). Next, a conceptual analysis of the usage of ’charity’ in the 
English language serves as a problematization of charity (the conceptual problem). 
Then I will discuss an attempt within contemporary philosophy to show that the line 
between charity and justice is hard if not impossible to draw (the ethical problem). In 
the next chapter I present an analysis of the historical development of doctrine.
The Philosophical Problem: Thomas Aquinas on Charity
Thomas Aquinas (1978) devotes several sections of his Swnma Theologica (ST) to 
charity (ST, II,n, questions 23-46). First of all, it is argued that charity is friendship 
of a particular kind. Charity is defined as love combined with benevolence, i.e. the 
wish to do good. Friendship is twofold: love for the friend to whom friendship is given 
and the love for those good things which are desired for the friend. Charity is created 
’in the soul’, which means that "for us to perform the act of charity, there should be 
in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the 
act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure” (ST, II,II, Question 23, 
article 2, p. 484).
Charity is a special kind of virtue. Aquinas argues that the proper object of love 
is the good. As a consequence, there is a specific kind of love for every aspect of the 
good. "But the Divine good, in so far as it is the object of happiness, has a special 
aspect of good. And so the love of charity, which is the love of the good, is a special 
kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue" (ST, n ,n , Question 23, article 4, 
p. 486).
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Moreover, charity is argued to be a virtue more excellent than faith and hope, 
indeed, than all other virtues. Accordingly, no true virtue is possible without charity. 
In fact, charity is the form of virtue. Aquinas stresses the fact that charity is in the 
will, i.e. in the so called intellectual appetite (reason through which truth can be 
known) and not in the emotional appetite. It is poured into us by the Holy Ghost 
(infusion) and it has the disposition to grow. That charity can grow raises the question 
whether charity can be perfect on earth. St. Thomas answers that "With regard to the 
object, charity is perfect if the object is loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is 
lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, and therefore He is infinitely 
lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is finite. 
Consequently no creature’s charity can be perfect in this way (...). On the part of the 
person who loves, charity is perfect when he loves as much as he can" (ST,II,II, 
Question 24, article 8, p. 495).
According to the philosopher there are three possible ways of attaining perfect 
charity. The first one is in heaven and therefore of no relevance here. Second, there 
exists the perfection possible for a wayfarer, who tries to devote his time to God and 
Divine things. Thirdly, Aquinas sees the possibility of the one who has charity and who 
"gives his whole heart habitually, that is by neither thinking nor desiring anything 
contrary to the love of God" (id). Progress in life with respect of the perfection of 
charity is possible according to three stages. There are the beginners "in whom charity 
has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed", the proficient "whose chief aim is to 
strengthen their charity by adding to it" and the perfect "who desire to be dissolved and 
to be with Christ" (ST, n ,n , Question 24, article 9, p. 497).
Question 25 deals with the object of charity and holds first of all that the love 
of charity does not stop at God but extends to our neighbour. This is the crucial point. 
What is to be loved in our neighbour is God, "since what we ought to love in our 
neighbour is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that the act by which we love 
God, and by which we love our neighbour is specifically the same. Consequently the 
habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our 
neighbour" (ST, II,II, Question 25, article 1, p. 501).
The neighbour (and every human being should be considered to be a neighbour) 
can be a sinner. Should the Catholic then love a sinner as well out of charity? St.
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Thomas answers that "two things may be considered in the sinner, his nature and his 
guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for 
happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based (...); therefore we ought to love 
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. On the other hand, their guilt is 
opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Therefore (...) all sinners are to be 
hated (...). For it is a duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in 
him, his being a man capable of bliss" (ST, II,II, Question 25, article 6, p. 505).
In other words, the sinner is to be loved, not the sin. What about enemies? 
Remember the famous expression in Matthew 5.43-44: "Ye have heard that it hath 
been said, thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, 
love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray 
for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you". Or Proverbs 25.21 which 
holds: "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him 
water to drink"” .
Now Aquinas first of all argues that these fragments cannot possibly mean that 
an enemy is to be loved as an enemy. This would be ’perverse’ and not charity, for 
how could one love the evil character of another? Secondly, charity does require that 
we love our enemies, namely, "that in loving God and our neighbour, we should not 
exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbour in general". Thirdly, charity 
requires that "we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity 
were to occur" (ST, n,n, Question 25, article 8, p. 507).
Of particular importance for the present purposes are the so called external acts 
of charity: beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal correction. Beneficence simply means 
doing good to others. Almsdeeds is of more relevance here. The motive for almsgiving 
is to relieve one who is in need. Strictly speaking, then, almsgiving is an act of mercy. 
There exist seven corporal almsdeeds: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, 
to clothe the naked, the harbour the homeless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, 
to bury the dead. Likewise, there are seven spiritual almsdeeds: to instruct the 
ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to 
forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all.
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9) Vene 22: 'For thou shalt leap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord shall reward thee*
Which type of alms is to be preferred depends on the circumstances. In general, the 
spiritual alms are considered to be of higher quality. On the other hand, St Thomas 
straightforwardly argues, that "a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed" (ST, 
II,II, Question 32, article 3, p. 543).
Corporal almsdeeds may indeed have important spiritual effects. Apart from the 
direct effect upon the physical and therefore spiritual well-being of the one who is the 
object of the almsdeeds, the benefactor profits directly through God’s grace and 
because the one who receives will pray for his benefactor. Fraternal correction refers 
to the correction of a wrongdoer. With it "we drive out our brother’s evil, namely sin, 
the removal of which pertains to charity even more than the removal of an external 
loss, or of a bodily injury (...)" (ST, II,II, Question 33, article 1, p. 550).
I conclude this section on St. Thomas on charity, and again I would like to 
stress that these considerations are relevant since Scholastic philosophy constitutes the 
basic theory behind Catholic social doctrine since Leo XIII. For according to this Pope 
the philosophy of St. Thomas could provide Catholics with powerful arguments in 
defence of religious dogma, because the Scholastics in particular "(...) clearly and 
forcibly demonstrate the firm foundations of the faith, its Divine origin, its certain 
truth, the arguments that sustain it, the benefits it has conferred on the human race, and 
its perfect accord with reason, in a manner to satisfy completely minds open to 
persuasion, however unwilling and repugnant" (Aetemi Paths [1879], in Gilson 1954: 
48).
The Conceptual Problem: The Connotations of Charity
The Oxford English Dictionary (second edition, vol. Ill, 1989, 42-43) provides ten 
usages of the term charity. The first usage refers to the Christian love as God’s love 
to man, as man’s love of God and his neighbour, and as the Christian love of our 
fellow-men. It is clear that this first connotation roughly corresponds with St. Thomas’ 
philosophical elaboration of the concept and the usage within the language of the 
Roman Catholic Church as elaborated above. The second semantic content of the 
concept is, one might argue, the secularist version of the first and simply means love, 
kindness, affection and has in particular the connotation of generosity and of
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spontaneous goodness. In the third sense it refers to the morality of a person. It is a 
disposition to judge leniently, and hopefully of the character, aims, and destinies of 
others, to make allowance for their apparent faults and shortcomings.
In its fourth usage it expresses benevolence to one’s neighbour, in particular to 
the poor, as a feeling or disposition as well as in action: almsgiving. It applies also to 
the public provision for the relief of the poor, which has largely taken the place of the 
almsgiving of individuals. In this fourth connotation a first indication is found of how 
a Thomist conception of ’charity’ may have delayed the modernization of Catholic 
social doctrine. Is it not the case that if almsgiving is to give way to the public 
provision of relief, then some institutional arrangement is to coordinate the fund-raising 
and the subsequent distribution? One difficulty of updating the contents of charity, 
then, consists in the formidable task of designing and establishing new forms for the 
organization, regulation, coordination and eventually normalization of alternative ways 
of fund-raising. I suggest that this issue is looked at as the difficult road from 
almsgiving to taxation. It problematizes the function of the state as a collector and 
distributor of funds. The decline of almsgiving as the principal instrument of financing 
the assistance of the poor ultimately leads to the necessity of questioning the role of the 
state and the best form of government. It calls for a theory of state intervention and the 
proper object of social policy.
The fifth usage in the English language simply refers to that which is given in 
or out of charity, namely alms. The sixth meaning the Dictionary lists may be seen as 
the complement of the phenomenon I identified in the fourth usage: charity means a 
bequest, foundation or institution for the benefit of others, in particular the poor or 
helpless. It is worth quoting the description of the Dictionary of which the half-spoken 
critique in particular is to be noted: "The term (...) has received a very wide 
application; in general now including institutions, with all manner of objects, for the 
help of those who are unable to help themselves, maintained by settled funds or 
voluntary contributions; the uses and restrictions of the term are however very 
arbitrary, and vary entirely to fancy or the supposed needs of the moment; chief among 
the institutions are hospitals, asylums, foundations for educational purposes, and for 
the periodical distribution of alms”. The interesting contrast with the Protestant dictum 
that God only helps those who help themselves is also worth noting.
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The questions underlying the critical inclination in the description seem to me 
to be of the following kind: Who are the needy? Who has the power to define needs? 
What is the amount to be given to the poor? Is there a way of discriminating between 
the deserving and the undeserving poor? I infer from these considerations that part of 
the problem arising in the transformation of charity has to do with solving the problems 
of arbitration, accountability and responsibility.
The seventh usage signifies the refreshments dispensed in monastic establish­
ments, whereas the eighth and tenth connotations of ’charity’ are of no relevance for 
the present purposes. The ninth meaning, on the other hand, is particularly important 
and provides a content analysis of some phrases in which the term charity appears. 
’Cold as charity’ is taken to refer to the perfunctory, unfeeling manner in which acts 
of charity are often done, and public charities administered. There is an imperspicuity 
in this phrase, since superficially looking it seems unclear how the term cold ended up 
in the same phrase as charity, a term which had originally the connotation, if any, of 
warm-heartedness and love. I think this element can help to explain the sluggishness 
of Catholic doctrinal development when I elaborate this paradox here.
The historical critique on charity has always focused on the act of charity as the 
granting of a favour rather than the fulfillment of a right, and on the act of charity as 
patronage. Charity had the unpleasant effect of placing the recipient in a humble, 
submissive and obedient relationship to the benefactor. The recipient is dependent upon 
the benevolence of the one who has decided to give and in addition has to show 
gratitude. The decisive point is the lack of a right to charity on the part of the 
recipient; the recipient is passive. He or she cannot be considered to be a rightful 
claimant, that is, he or she cannot actively seek the fulfillment of a right to a benefit. 
In a sense, patronage is the reflection of the Thomist patriarchal and organic idea10*. 
The notion of patriarchy seems to be implied in the idea of organicism, because 
organicism stresses the multiplicity and inequality of the bodily parts. Mutual 
adjustment, therefore, is not given but becomes problematic. Higher members have the 
authority and the obligation to provide order and harmony. The model for this was the
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10) The concept of society as an organic whole itself was already formulated by Paul and expressed 
the idea that a community for worship (the Christian community) is "an organism which includes various 
stages or functions, an organism in which all the members, united by a strong sense of solidarity, share 
in the purpose and meaning of the whole' (Troeltsch 1931: 285).
order of the family with a dominant father and the willingly subordinating members of 
the family subject to his authority. The responsible father sacrificed himself for the 
care of his family, whereas the members of the family were obedient, hard-working, 
full of admiration and thankful10.
It looks as if there exists a tension between the need of the needy (who cannot 
claim a share of someone else’s surplus) and the obligation to give on the part of the 
rich (who may or may not decide to give to this rather than to that individual). In 
charity the emphasis is on the duty to give. In abstract terms I identified this earlier as 
a means to deal with the salvation panic. Through almsgiving a place in heaven could 
be bought. This one-sided italicization of the obligation to donate is matched by a 
minimalization of the right to receive. Ultimately charity lacks a concept of rights. 
From this stems the difficulty of including a conception of rights in the reformulation 
of Catholic social thought along the lines of charity.
The other interesting phrase in which charity appears states that 'charity begins 
at home’. This saying expresses the prior claims of the ties of the family, friendships 
and the neighbourhood to a man’s consideration. The fundamental issue in this case is 
the tension between the private and public provision of assistance, that is, between 
social care and public welfare. If it is the case that charity begins at home, what then 
can be defined as the role of the public sector (the state) in providing assistance to the 
poor? The primacy of politics seems to be excluded if it is assumed that the family or 
the neighbourhood is the first and foremost responsible provider of care. The question 
is what happens if such a social unit is unable to take care of its members? What if the 
family does not neatly behave along the lines of a sexual division of labour? What 
appears to be the issue here, is the need of redefining the precise configuration of the 
relationship between the market, the family and the state under the changing conditions 
of industrial capitalism. It can be expected that the official Roman Catholic ideological 
concepts coming out of this struggle for modernization typically reflect this abstract 
tension between the public and the private. This is exactly what one finds if one looks 
at such concepts as the just wage (tailored to the need of providing an income to a
73
11) One could perhaps view chanty as opposed to altruism. Altruism lacks the element of moral 
judgement and the notion of patriarchy (see Janowitz 1976: 22). Altruism as the expression of a religious 
sentiment has -like charity- the simultaneous effect of relief and self-relief. But unlike charity, altruism 
does not assume the moral inferiority of the object of the help or the gift.
family) and subsidiarity (the very concept expressing the tension between private and 
public, or for that matter, between the social and the political).
I conclude the analysis of the concept of charity in its various usages in 
everyday English by reformulating the hypothesis on charity and the attempt to update 
Catholic social philosophy. If it is the case -as Thomas Aquinas argues- that charity 
belongs to the realm of virtues and if it is the case that there exists the obligation to 
give which is not matched by a right to receive, then the fundamental issue that 
Catholics have had to address was the following: charity as a vehicle for social 
solidarity or harmony under industrial capitalist conditions lacked the fundamental 
concept of rights. Charity contrasts in this sense with justice if the idea is accepted that 
justice is fundamentally a matter of rights. Consequently, the central difficulty for 
Catholic social thought must have resulted from the attempt to go from charity to 
justice. In other words, the modernization of the medieval heritage of Catholic social 
doctrine can be seen as a shift away from the emphasis on the obligation to give in the 
direction of incorporating the idea that the poor or the helpless had a right to be 
assisted. Another, more crude way of making the same point would be to say that the 
history of social Catholicism could be looked at as a development from alms to 
benefits.
The Ethical Problem: Charity as an Imbalance of Duties and Rights
In ethical theory the distinction between charity and justice is considered to be 
essential. In a thought-provoking article, however, Allen Buchanan (1987) has argued 
that this distinction is of no importance for ethical theory at all. Arguments normally 
offered in defence of the thesis that the difference between charity and justice is 
fundamental are either false or unjustified, or they lead to the conclusion that the 
difference between the two concepts is very hard to draw.
At first sight, this thesis seems to contradict the conceptual considerations. On 
the other hand, if there exists a strong case for the near identity of charity and justice, 
this may provide some more clues for a better understanding of the manner in which 
social Catholicism has tried to transform its specific version of charity into justice.
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There are roughly four theses about the difference between charity and justice. 
These are: "(1) Duties of justice (...) are exclusively negative duties (duties to refrain 
from certain actions); duties of charity are generally positive duties (duties to render 
aid). (2) Duties of justice may be enforced; duties of charity may not. (3) Duties of 
justice are perfect duties; duties of charity are imperfect. (Perfect duties are 
determinate both with regard to the content of what is required and with regard to the 
identity of the individual who is the object of the duty; duties of charity are indeter­
minate in both senses: the kind and amount of aid, as well as the choice of a recipient 
are left to the discretion of the benefactor). (4) Justice is a matter of rights; charity is 
not (duties of justice have correlative rights; duties of charity do not), and what is 
one’s right is owed to one, the lack of which gives one justified grounds for complaint 
that one has been wronged" (Buchanan 1987: 558).
The main argument for rejecting the first thesis is that there is no theory 
available at present which could adequately and convincingly show the exclusive 
existence of negative rights. Harm to individuals can also be avoided by abstinence and 
prevention which suggests that there may in fact exist positive moral rights.
What may be the reason -as the second thesis holds- that duties of charity 
cannot be enforced? First of all, because the duties of charity do not have correlative 
rights, and secondly, because duties of charity are imperfect. One cannot determine the 
recipient nor the amount of aid. The attempt to enforce the duties of charity entails the 
danger of arbitrariness and misuse. Charity without rights -as I have already argued- 
causes problems of arbitration, accountability and responsibility. It accords power 
without responsibility. Is coercion then only justified if duties are matched by rights? 
Perhaps not. Enforcement is sometimes justified in order to provide for a collective 
good without necessarily presuming that there exists a right to the collective good. 
Charity can be considered as such a collective good. Therefore, duties of charity 
sometimes can be enforced.
This raises the interesting problem of coercion. Why is coercion in the context 
of charity a problem? One could agree that "without an effective enforcement 
mechanism, strictly voluntary compliance with duties to aid may founder due to the fact 
that a system of aid for the needy is a collective good" (Buchanan 1987: 564). The 
collective action problem of the free-rider immediately pops up. The idea is that the
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free-rider problem does not hinder successful collective action "if a sufficient number 
of people desire to provide for the needy rather than simply desiring that the needy be 
provided for" (Buchanan 1987: 565). But how come people to desire to provide for the 
needy? Buchanan’s answer is ambiguous and holds that this is an empirical issue as a 
result of which its solution is variable depending on the psychology of the individuals 
involved. Where aid or relief are collective goods there is no guaranteed voluntary way 
out of the dilemma of collective action. Therefore, "if it is so, and if enforcement is 
justified in any case, then it is not the case that enforcement of a duty to contribute is 
justified only where there is an antecedent moral right to a share of the good (...)" 
(Buchanan 1987: 566).
Let me at this point take the Catholic rather than the philosophical view on 
charity again into consideration. Did Catholics face the same dilemma of collective 
action? I would say no, that is, initially they did not. Collective goods problems can 
sometimes be overcome without having to rely on coercion, namely by moral 
persuasion. In the Christian case we have in fact a powerful alternative to direct 
coercion as the enforcement mechanism, namely fear for damnation. Charity refers to 
the duty of the rich to give to the poor a share of their surplus in order to gain 
salvation. Almsgiving was a means to salvation. Within the religious context charity 
did not pose a collective action problem, because the enforcement mechanism was not 
strictly voluntary; in fact, the fear of damnation was to a large extent psychologically 
compelling. However, under conditions of increasing secularization the mechanism of 
religious persuasion loses its impact and hence the collective action problem arises and 
so does the problem of coercion as a solution to this problem. O’Neill (1989: 225), on 
the other hand, argues that "modem Liberalism may have wiped charity off its ethical 
map not because it has lost its theological underpinnings but simply because it 
privileges rights over obligations, and there are no rights to charity". This may be valid 
in the case of Liberalism, since Liberalism has no theological framework. In the case 
of Catholicism, however, the conventional account of the marginalization of charity 
(O'Neill) is still relevant.
But what about the question why people desire to provide for the poor rather 
than desiring that the poor be provided for. The answer lies in the recognition of the 
fact that desiring the first is a religious virtue whereas desiring the second is the
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secularist version, which -stripped of its religious frame of reference- results in a 
problem of collective action. Catholics, therefore, have had to deal with the function 
of coercion versus religious persuasion precisely when the religiously induced 
obligation to give became problematic in a secularizing society that at the same time 
posed new and pressing social problems. I therefore cannot for the Christian case agree 
with the thesis that duties of charity may be enforced since coercion only comes in 
when duties of charity loose their religious significance and, by implication, become 
duties of justice. For those duties that are enforced through public authority become 
duties of justice, that is they have to be matched by correlative rights. Duties enforced 
by religious authority are duties of charity which lack the correlative rights. In the 
discussion of the non-rights based arguments for coercion this comes clearly to the 
surface.
There are two non-rights based arguments for enforcing duties of charity. The 
first one holds that even if institutions that enforce obligations are established, the 
duties involved remain duties of charity. The second argues -as I did- that once such 
arrangements exist the right to assistance is a logical conclusion. As Buchanan holds: 
"According to both interpretations, we begin by assuming the existence of a duty, but 
not a right, to aid; in the first we end up with no right to aid but only an enforceable 
duty of charity, while in the second we end up with a right to" (Buchanan 1987: 571).
From these considerations a third thesis on the difference between charity and 
justice can be formulated by arguing that if the first non-rights based argumentation 
were true, it follows that the thesis on duties of charity being imperfect is false. The 
first argumentation shows that institutional arrangements are able to eliminate 
indeterminacy as to recipient and amount. On the other hand, the second view does not 
contradict the thesis that duties of charity are imperfect. Duties of charity, being 
imperfect, become institutionalized and therefore duties of justice, being perfect. 
Buchanan does not particularly like this conclusion, because "even though the second 
way of construing the non-rights based arguments for enforced duties to aid is 
consistent with the thesis that duties of justice are perfect and those of charity are 
imperfect, there is a sense in which it also trivializes that thesis. For what those 
arguments show, on the second interpretation, is that the distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties is in no way a fundamental distinction in ethical theory, but,
77
rather, a shifting one which changes as our institutions change or as we move from one 
type of society to another" (Buchanan 1987: 570/571).
One may agree that this distinction is of no fundamental importance for ethical 
theory. Viewed from the perspective of social theory, however, I think the distinction 
reflects at the conceptual level a very real social historical genesis which may be 
summarized as the development form charity to a new concept of justice. The clues for 
this shift can be found precisely when we move from one society to another, in this 
case from a predominantly feudal and agrarian to a predominantly industrial capitalist 
and democratic society.
Two conclusions can be formulated if the idea that imperfect duties of charity 
can become perfect duties of justice through institutionalization is accepted. First, some 
moral rights may depend on the availability of institutional arrangements. Second, the 
justification of these rights require "contingent premises about the existence of certain 
social arrangements. Thus if there are such rights, no plausible ethical theory can be 
exclusively rights-based" (Buchanan 1987: 571). From the point of view of social 
theory the distinction between justice and charity is valuable because it reveals an 
important social phenomenon, namely that some rights may emerge as a more or less 
unintended by-product of the institutionalization of the duties of charity. It is obvious 
that for the present purposes this is an consequential conclusion. For if institutionally 
arranging the duties of charity may lead to the emergence of rights of justice it 
becomes of fundamental importance to understand which institutional arrangements give 
rise to which rights, and, for that matter, to what kind of claimants. It may even be the 
case that out of different conceptions about which duties are to be institutionalized, 
different types of institutions arise which, in turn, create different types of rights and 
ultimately lead to different conceptions of justice. The question then becomes whether 
Catholics have developed their own conception of rights and justice which systematical­
ly differs from the conceptions developed by Liberals and Socialists?
The objection to the fourth proposal to distinguish between charity and justice 
on the basis of the thesis that only duties of justice have correlative rights consists 
mainly of pointing to the complexity of the argument to be made in order to support 
this claim and that charity therefore becomes a derivative and purely theoretical affair 
(Buchanan 1987: 573). I am uncertain as to whether the fact that something is a
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derivative, theoretical statement can be taken to imply that it is impossible to defend 
such a statement. To cut this discussion short, however, it may suffice to point to the 
fact that thesis four is in fact a reformulation of thesis two in defence of the supposed 
fundamental difference between charity and justice in ethical theory.
Concluding Remarks
Charity, as argued, is religious rather than social policy. Its aim was not the relief of 
poverty nor the improvement of a social order which caused suffering. Instead, charity, 
although it was originally meant to show the spirit of love, increasingly derived its 
prominence from its function as provider of salvation. The theory behind charity and 
almsgiving concerned primarily the idea that the wealthy must buy their place in 
heaven with alms taken from their worldly surplus. But precisely because it is religious 
rather than social policy the concept was rendered problematic outside the religious 
context. Charity’s unbalanced reliance on the Christian inspired obligation to give 
ultimately ends in futility under conditions of a secularizing, industrial capitalist world. 
The religio-psychological mechanism of almsgiving is powerless when not fueled by 
insecurity as to one’s eternal fate. The lack of a conception of rights, corresponding 
to the duties of charity, resulted in a period of transition in which a new Catholic 
conception of social justice was worked out. Specifically, it was necessary to consider 
other mechanisms which could assure funds to be raised to assist the poor. Where the 
fear of damnation ceases to be psychologically compelling, and hence ’voluntary’ 
solutions fail to be an alternative, compulsion arises as a solution for what is basically 
a problem of collective action. However, coercion poses several problems, of which 
the most important are: the problem of the (best) institution for enforcing the obligation 
to give, the proper objects of ’taxation’ and relief, and the difficulty of legitimizing 
coercion of obligations which are not matched by correlative rights.
The guiding hypothesis for the next chapter is that the main problems of 
formulating a Catholic theory of social policy concerned the role of the state and the 
incorporation of a notion of rights. Catholicism eventually succeeded in solving these 
problems by according a prominent, yet peculiar role to the state in the relief of 
poverty and by formulating a conception of social justice which significantly departs
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from the conception of charity, but is still different from the Social Democratic idea 
of justice. The theme of the next chapter is that in the course of modernization social 
capitalism and Christian ¡Democracy originate.
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ON THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY 
AND SOCIAL CAPITALISM
CHAPTER 4

This chapter searches for the origins of Christian Democracy and social capitalism. It 
mainly offers a reconstruction of the doctrine of social capitalism as Christian 
Democracy’s political ideology. It is not in any sense an attempt to provide an analysis 
of Christian inspired social movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
nor of the social and political conditions under which these movements emerged. I 
concentrate on doctrinal developments as a procedure for arriving at a constructed type 
of social capitalism in the form of five main propositions, which is presented in the 
subsequent chapter.
Justifications and an Overview
Christian Democracy was defined as a political movement that -by appealing to 
religious affiliations- seeks to establish cross-class compromises via the policy-mix of 
social capitalism. If it is correct to view social capitalism as the core of Christian 
Democracy, then it is justified to speak of Christian Democracy rather than Christian 
Democracies and to treat cross-national variation as precisely that: variation around a 
common essence.
What accords unity to Christian Democracy is basic agreement over social 
policy0. Like the nature of Social Democracy is determined by the movement’s 
strategic choices -both in terms of ideology and policies pursued- (Esping-Andersen 
1985a; Przeworski 1985), social capitalism must be seen as the result of the critical 
decisions of Christian inspired social forces as to parliamentarism, cross-class politics 
and the gradual reform of capitalism.
The centrality of social policy in delineating what is meant by Christian 
Democracy has an interesting, yet paradoxical background, concerning the manner in 
which official Catholicism has dealt with modernity and with Liberalism in particular.
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1) "In the principles and practices of social policy, there is far-reaching unity in purpose to be 
discerned among Christian Democrats. This can be seen in the socio-political legislation of the Western 
European countries which for the most part can be traced back to the Christian Democratic parties. There 
can be no question of the importance of the Christian Democratic contributions to the security of the 
masses, the satisfaction of the socio-political demands of the class struggle, and the movement towards 
the social state* (Maier 1969: 12). Such a view probably overestimates the central role of Christian 
Democracy. The extent to which Christian Democracy has been a crucial actor in the shaping of a 
welfare state regime is a matter of empirical investigation. Nevertheless, the reference to social policy 
or social reform in a definition of Christian Democracy is not unreasonable.
The Holy See has started its struggle with Liberalism by increasingly emphasizing 
morality and the moral dimension of other spheres (e.g. the capitalist economy) as a 
consequence of the loss of temporal power (Bums 1990: 1135), the very reason for 
social action on the part of social Catholics throughout Europe. The Papacy attempted 
to define an exclusive area of power and ideology. For these reasons there exists the 
tendency to avoid questions of direct policy, "arguing instead that the church’s role is 
to teach a moral outlook that transcends historical particulars” (Bums 1990: 1135). The 
paradox is that an essential condition for the emergence of Christian Democracy 
concerned the church’s loss of temporal power. The constant factor of Christian 
Democracy which provides unity to the movement emerges when Leo XIII began "a 
slow, halting withdrawal of the church’s temporal claims” (Bums 1990: 1134) and at 
the same time started to codify and formulate what was in fact a new branch of 
doctrine, social doctrine. In other words, both Christian Democracy and social doctrine 
are an effect of this specific type of ’secularization’. It is only when the church is 
forced out of secular power that Christian Democracy becomes conceivable.
It is the basic unity around a more or less consistent social doctrine which 
allows me, by implication, to analyze the origins of Christian Democracy and of social 
capitalism at the same time. According to the present analysis the theory of social 
capitalism constitutes the nucleus of Christian Democracy as a political movement. I 
have come to view the origins of Christian Democracy and social capitalism as 
basically two sides of the same coin.
Another consideration or justification should be added. The emphasis in this 
chapter is mainly on Catholicism and Catholic social thought. The justification for this 
is rather simple and straightforward: Protestant influence on the genesis of Christian 
Democracy and the development of social capitalism has been small. In the preceding 
chapter I have already argued that -unlike ascetic Protestantism- Catholicism has 
refused to accept capitalism unconditionally. Catholic social theory has always been 
strongly infused with anti-capitalist ingredients. Some historically oriented studies have 
suggested that one can safely speak of the ”(...) minimal contribution of European 
Protestantism to the formation of Christian Democracy (...). It is (...) no exaggeration 
to say that before 1945 the idea and the movement of Christian Democracy in 
Continental Europe were limited to regions of Catholic prevalence" (Maier 1969: 5/6).
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The German Protestants, for instance, were much more preoccupied by the ’Ku- 
lturkampf (struggle over culture or civilization) than with the misery of the masses at 
the same time that German Catholics, although the main object of this ’Kampf, were 
already proposing social policy measures. Although Bismarck’s social laws may have 
followed flawlessly from the ideal of the Christian state founded on the identification 
of the Prussian state with (Lutheran) Protestantism, in Germany, too, Protestants hardly 
developed a workable social idea and their social movements remained relatively weak 
(Kaufmann 1988: 80).
Within Protestant circles "social reform failed to become a serious ecclesiastical 
issue either for orthodox, church-going Protestants or for those of more liberal 
persuasion" and the uncertainty "about the delicate balance between civil and 
ecclesiastical power effectively postponed the German Protestant effort to reach an 
understanding of modem social issues” (Shanahan 19S4: 416). It is the continuing 
emphasis on charity and the inability to reformulate charity in terms of duties and 
rights, which marks a fundamental difference with Catholicism. The latter, in turn, has 
struggled with its redefinition of charity from the 1860s onwards, while official 
Catholic social teaching failed to transcend its medieval legacy.
Modem Christian Democracy springs from two main sources: political Catholicism, 
which addresses the changing role and status of the church after the French Revolution 
in nineteenth-century Europe, and social Catholicism, which confronts the rise of 
industrial capitalism and the integration of the proletariat as Christian citizens into 
modem industrial society. Social Catholicism was politically indifferent in the sense 
that it did not address the constitutional state, but rather a changing society. And 
because social Catholicism explored the possibilities of societal power, it initially 
denied (democratic) politics. The transformation of charity into a consistent theory of 
social capitalism was mainly part of a political strategy to ’conserve* workers as 
religious workers, thus diluting the social and political meaning of class and 
introducing religion as a basis for the articulation of political identity.
The social Catholic attention for the situation of the working class sometimes 
leads to a confusion of social Catholicism with Christian Socialism. For reasons of 
substantive and conceptual clarity the term ’Christian Socialism’ should be reserved to
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denote those approaches within Catholicism which attempt to formulate some sort of 
compromise between Socialism (or Marxism) and the Christian faith, as for instance 
’Liberation Theology’ (Gutierrez 1971; see Berryman 1987; Levine 1988; Nitsch 
1986). Christian Socialism cannot be taken to refer to all Catholics who increasingly 
came to adhere social policy as a means to ’elevate’ the working class2*.
To accentuate the crucial difference between social Catholicism and Christian 
Socialism one could point to the fact that an important element of social Catholicism 
has always been its anti-Socialism. Murchland (1982) fails to recognize this when he 
argues that Wilhelm von Ketteler was the major figure among the Christian Socialists 
in Germany. He based his view mainly upon the fact that the bishop rejected 
Liberalism (Murchland 1982: 550, overlooking the equally important fact, that Ketteler 
saw Socialism as the heir of Liberalism and rejected both3). Surely, Ketteler was a 
social thinker, but he was certainly not a Socialist. Social Catholicism, then, denotes 
those attempts of Catholics to define and pursue policies that aim at the improvement 
of the position of the working class or the poor, while in principle accepting the 
capitalist mode of production.
Christian Democracy is the result of a historical coincidence of Liberal political 
Catholicism and social Catholicism (see also Maier 1969: 22). The theory of social 
capitalism functioned as the cement of this historical construction and can be considered 
to be the result of a successful attempt to redefine charity as social justice. Conse­
quently, it is essential to analyze the conditions and contents of this historical
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2) Murchland, for instance, quite accurately summarizes the essence of early social Catholicism, but 
typically confuses it with Christian Socialism, when he writes: 'Whatever its roots in the past, Christian 
Socialism was an essentially modem movement. It was a response to problems that issued from the rise 
of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. The primary aim of the Christian Socialists was always 
religious rather than political, more moral than economic. They strove to uphold Christian traditions in 
the new economic order and to defend the faith against atheism and secularization that often accompanied 
that order. They saw the abandonment of the Christian faith as the cause of the sufferings of the poor 
and of social upheavals. The centre focus of Christian Socialists was the plight of the workers under 
capitalism. Perhaps their greatest strength was to take a prophetic stand against very real abuses and bear 
Christian witness on behalf of those who were most victimized. The Christian Socialists (...) succeeded 
in uncovering long-neglected aspects of Christian social ideals and principles. Moreover, they made 
strenuous efforts to carry their message to the people* (Murchland 1982: 64). Below I will show that 
what actually happened in the historical development of social Catholicism is that it gradually became 
more socio-political than religious in its primary aims.
3) *(...) Socialism which in itself is one of the most frightful aberrations of the human mind, is 
perfectly justified if the principles of Liberalism ate true. It is only because Liberalism is false that 
Socialism cannot be justified* (Ketteler as cited in Hogan 1946: 182).
coincidence, concentrating on the manner in which Catholics have come to terms with 
democracy and clarifying the manner in which a social critique of capitalism was 
successfully defined and refined, leaving room for social policy and state intervention.
The Acceptance of Democracy and the Integration of the Working Class
It should be self-evident that the unconditional acceptance of democracy as the chief 
mechanism to organize, mediate and moderate societal and political conflict is the 
unquestionable and decisive prerequisite for any political movement claiming the 
adjective ’democratic’ in any legitimate manner. The acceptance of democratic 
principles by the Catholic church has been a long and laborious struggle with 
considerable variance across different regions and states in Europe and elsewhere 
(Moody 1953b: 10; Martin 1978).
There are roughly four views on the relationship between the Catholic tradition 
and democracy (see Sigmund 1987). The first, uncritical view holds that Catholicism 
is basically indifferent as to the form of government, the only condition being that it 
promote the common good. The second, more critical analysis argues that the church 
has always bolstered the regime which protected the church’s interests. The third 
argument states that a church that itself is authoritarian is hardly able to favour non­
authoritarian forms of government. Those rather sympathetic with the Catholic cause 
nowadays typically argue that indifference as to the technique of government has led 
to the acceptance of democracy (Sigmund 1987: 547).
The Liberal, laic and individualistic spirit of the French Revolution was the 
original foe of the church in the modem era (Irving 1979). The Popes stood for order, 
that is they stood for the order of the Old Regime. This "link with order, and stance 
against ’Liberalism’, was the curse which the Revolution bequeathed to the Popes" 
(Chadwick 1981: 610). Democracy and the arrogation of possessing the absolute truth 
do not go together very well. "The Holy See’s experience of freedom of the press was 
unhappy. Freedom to publish was freedom to publish error or immorality. They (the 
Popes) stood wholly upon the side of the numerous governments which wished to 
control presses and censor books in the interest of truth and morality (...)" (Chadwick 
1981: 610). Liberal freedom was therefore at first unacceptable for the Papacy.
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In Immortali Dei (1885) Leo XIII did not exclude democracy as a possible form 
of government, which may be read, as Moody (1953c: 69) suggests, as paving the way 
for the acceptance of democracy. One has to be a very sympathetic reader of the 
encyclical to accept this, for not more is said than "no one of the several forms of 
government is in itself condemned, inasmuch as none of them contains anything 
contrary to Catholic doctrine, and all of them are capable, if wisely and justly 
managed, to insure the welfare of the State" (Immortali Dei, in Gilson 1954: 177) It 
was not until 1944 that a more positive acceptance of democracy was proclaimed4*. 
The gradual permission was a corollary of the growth of the presence of the state. The 
central tenets of Natural Law, on the basis of which a certain endurance in time 
accords legitimacy to institutions, facilitated the acceptance of democracy. The general 
background was given by the experience of war and Fascism in Europe and was 
deepened by the geo-political dimension of allying the church to the west and the ’free 
world’ (Dorr 1983: 78), rather than to the atheist Communist regimes.
Although corporatism is rightly viewed as an intrinsic component of the 
Catholic tradition, its importance for the post-war development of Christian Democracy 
must not be overstated. In fact, I would argue that deliberately subduing the importance 
of corporatism (under Pius XII) was a precondition for the acceptance of democracy 
and for Christian Democracy as a democratic political movement. Historically, the 
Church’s plea for a reconstruction of capitalist society in corporadst fashion (other than 
the earlier Romantic and conservative vision) came at a time that practical experiments 
were taking place very near the Holy See, namely in Italy under Fascist Rule. In fact, 
Quadragesima Anno (1931, sections 91-94) gives a fairly detailed description of the 
Italian system in practice. The encyclical is articulate in why the experiment is to be 
judged positively. It facilitates the harmonious cooperation between the classes, 
suppresses Socialism and accords regulating power to corporatist institutions. The listed 
advantages of the system, however, are immediately followed by its likely drawback:
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4) In his Christmas Message of 1944 Pius XII stated: *So far-reaching and decisive has the activity 
of the state become in modem times that a democratic form of government is considered by many today 
to be a natural postulate of reason itself. Therefore, the demand for ’more and better democracy’ can 
only mean the demand that the citizen shall be increasingly in a position to hold his own personal 
opinion, express it, and to give effect to it in a manner consistent with the common good* (cited in 
Moody 1953c: 70; see also Maier 1969: 24).
the risk of omnipresence of the state, the stifling of private initiative and the gradual 
development of a politicized bureaucracy, which would benefit particularist political 
interest rather than the Public Good. Moreover, the successor of the ’corporatist’ Pope, 
Pius XII, hardly paid any attention to this aspect of Quadragesimo Anno. In fact, 
already in 1949 the official view was changed and corporatism was defined as an 
’opportunity missed’ (Dorr 1983: 81). In the post-war period it had become an 
anachronism and even politically dangerous to be associated with the idea of a 
corporate society. Therefore, the official sanction of corporatism died as soon as its 
implemented versions in Italy, Austria and Germany had proved to be so disastrous. 
"In large measure, its cause was guilt by association" (Williamson 1984: 23). Remnants 
or echoes, however, remained operative, although under different terms. Subsidiarity 
took over as a central concept.
Equally important, yet almost never appreciated as such, for Christian 
Democracy to come into being, is the rapprochement of church and workers. The 
criterion of democracy is rather obvious and straightforward. However, whether (and 
to what extent) the working class is integrated into and organized within the Christian 
Democratic movement determines not only its nature, but the very existence of 
Christian Democracy. Without the working class -or perhaps formulated more 
accurately- without substantial working class support, there exists no Christian 
Democracy. It was Pius XI (1922-1939) who precisely understood the importance of 
this point when he argued that "the greatest scandal of the nineteenth century was the 
fact that the church lost the working class" (cited in Camp 1969: 77). It may very well 
have been Christian Democracy’s greatest triumph that it managed to attach again parts 
of the working class, if not to the church, then at least to a political movement based 
upon Christian principles.
Summarizing the argument, I hold that one can begin to speak of Christian 
Democracy when the criteria of democracy and (the attempt of) class reconciliation and 
integration are met. Christian Democracy comes into being where Liberal political and 
social Catholicism meet. The accommodation to capitalism and democracy has not been 
an easy road because there has been a long and uneasy controversy between Liberal 
political Catholicism which came to adhere political democracy, and social Catholicism
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which had difficulties embracing democratic principles because of its ideology of the 
organic society and its corporatist rather than democratic stance.
Source 1: The Traditionalist Paradox
Christian democracy’s very first source is the French Revolution. The effects of this 
Revolution upon the status and position of the church -or Christendom in general- in 
modern society were tremendous. "The entire church had been profoundly shaken by 
the traumatic experience of the Revolution in which, for the first time in modem 
history, one of the greatest states in Europe had attempted to wipe out the influence of 
Christianity" (Camp 1969: 5).
The ultramontane and anti-individualistic counter-revolutionaries developed their 
own systematic social, political and historical critique of the Revolution. This critique 
is known as Traditionalism. The core of the theory of Traditionalism consists of the 
thesis that Divine truth is revealed in history. Institutions prove themselves as being 
willed by God because of their capacity to endure. To replace institutions with this 
capacity by revolution is to deny the will of God. Time is an important element in the 
evaluation of human institutions and both the Revolution and the Enlightenment were 
the targets of the Traditionalist attacks because they denied Divine truth in tradition.
The growing trend towards the type of political conservatism characteristic for 
Traditionalism after 1815 was facilitated first of all by the fact that both the monarchy 
and the church had been the main victims of the Revolution (Moody 1953d: 119f). 
Monarchists thus became the natural allies of the Catholics. Moreover, those were no 
secure times for the clergy. Clerics argued that only the strong state of the regime 
would be able to protect them from further persecution. The Bourbons, in turn, 
deliberately used religion in their attempts to strengthen their position, whereas many 
of the aristocrats became (again) Catholics, because they felt that the church would be 
supporting their cause. Traditionalism shares with Romanticism a longing for the past.
The political program of Traditionalism was defined as the 'contrary to 
revolution’ (De Maistre). Traditionalism mixed to a large extent ecclesiastical elements 
with political stances. Religion and the model of the church provided the basis for a 
reconstitution of a Christian society ruined by revolution (Maier 1969: 146). In
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Lamennais’ famous words: Réconstituer la société politique â l’aide de la société 
religieuse. The Revolution itself, however, could be reinterpreted as a satanic and 
messianic event at the same time. Revolt was seen as a human passion dictated by the 
devil. The Revolution was therefore satanic5*. However, since the Revolution was also 
the judgement of providence, it was also Divine and one could therefore have faith in 
it. Moreover, the confiscation of the properties of the church, the abolition of 
privileges and the imposition of the oath to the Civil Constitution on the Clergy in 1790 
provided the foundation for the renewal and regeneration of the church. The 
Traditionalists readily admitted that the clergy had been in need of reform and the 
Revolution had at least a purifying effect on the perverted part of the clergy and was 
therefore welcomed. Viewed in this way it might have been that "political revolution 
is only a secondary object of the great plan which is developing before our eyes with 
such terrible majesty" (De Maistre 1971: 59), but which perhaps could not be entirely 
understood by mortals.
The next object of Traditionalist criticism was the type of fanatical in­
dividualism, which had been linked with a total belief in reason and the correlate denial 
of Divine plan (Lively 1971: 5). Traditionalism developed its own concept of reason 
which was not individualistic, but a reason of the group. Reason is good for nothing 
and outside the realm of needs, knowledge becomes useless or doubtful. "Wherever the 
individual reason dominates, there can be nothing great, for everything great rests on 
a belief (...)" (De Maistre 1971: 110). According to Traditionalist theory "the common 
reason, like the common sense, was lodged in a superindividual being, manifested in 
tradition and expressed in language. The superindividual being was the Roman Catholic 
church, the authority of which was binding not only on its avowed members but on all 
men. The church alone had remained steadfast and unshaken in its dogma’s” (Boas 
1967: 154). There is only one truth and this truth is eternal. And because it is eternal,
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5) ’There is a satanic element in the French Revolution which distinguishes it from any other 
revolution known (...). Remember the great occasions 'Robespierre’s speech against the priesthood, the 
solemn apostasy of the priests, the desecration of objects of worship, the inauguration of the goddess of 
Reason, and the many outrageous acts by which the provinces tried to surpass Paris: these all leave the 
ordinary sphere of crimes and seem to belong to a different world (...). the neglect of, let alone scorn 
for, the great Being brings an irrevocable curse on the human works stained by it" (De Maistre, 1971: 
71, originally 1851/52).
it must be true. And because it is embodied in the church, the church is a Divine 
institution.
Papal infallibility was even defended before it became official Vatican doctrine. 
Furthermore, the power of the Papacy was considered sovereign over any temporal 
power (Maier 1969: 155). This ultramontanism was therefore not only a theological 
construction but -more importantly- also a political one. It was not a matter of solely 
restoring the position and the status of the Pope; it equally referred to the demarcation 
of absolute power. The spiritual power of the church, headed by the infallible Pope, 
was interpreted as a counterweight to the political pervasiveness of the revolutionary 
state.
Paradoxically, the logical completion of the Traditionalist argument (carried out 
by Lamennais) implied an approbation of a peculiar democratic point of view. It is this 
odd effect of extreme Traditionalism which led to its eventual condemnation by the 
church and marks the birth of Liberal Political Catholicism6’. Two elements can be 
distinguished which led to the espousal of a bizarre democratic point of view. First of 
all, the premise was that the Pope is the ruler of the church and the church is superior 
to the state. Therefore, the church is greater than the state. And if the state blocks the 
obedience to tradition revolt is not only legitimate but a duty. To be able to rise up 
against the state’s violation of the church’s eternal truth, however, freedom of speech, 
of the press and of education became mandatory (Boas 1967: 155; Buchheim 1963: 
46). The second element pertains to the Revolution interpreted as a Divine judgement. 
For if the Revolution were indeed such a Divine judgement one had to admit that the 
political forms that emerged from it, notably democracy, deserved a theological 
justification, too. Furthermore, the typical Traditionalist argument that "every good 
government is good when it has been established and has existed for a long time 
without being disputed" (De Maistre 1971: 142) could in a certain sense and in the 
long run be transformed into an argument in defence of some of the results of the 
Revolution.
The struggle over Traditionalism was a struggle over the re-orientation of the 
church. It created the need for a theological justification of a new position of the
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6) Gregory XVI in his encyclical letter Mirari Vos (1832) enjoined silence on Lamennais. In the 
encyclical Singulari Nos (1834) Lamennais was explicitly condemned (see Woodward 1963: 248-276).
church in modem, that is post-revolutionary, society. And this society was somewhere 
halfway between Christian and secular. Hence, the attempt to reconcile church and 
Revolution and even to promote an alliance between church and democracy. The 
Liberal political Catholicism, which was produced in the wake of this transition, was 
of a specific kind. It did not aim at political freedom as such, but on religious freedom. 
The Catholic church had to be free from the state. For this reason French Catholicism 
in its Traditionalist version eventually opted for a strengthening of the Church and a 
break with the Bourbons (Moody 1953d: 122). To free the church from the state, all 
bonds between the two had to be relaxed if not entirely broken. Most importantly, the 
concordat with Napoleon had to be abolished. It was in the strive for a complete 
separation of church and state that "Liberal Catholicism for the first time announces 
the claims of the church community in defiance of the state: demands for freedom of 
conscience, freedom of teaching, freedom of the press, and freedom of association" 
(Maier 1969: 193).
The Traditionalists, centred around the periodical of French Liberal Catholicism 
Avenir, gradually came to adopt a more progressive Liberalism, where the rights of the 
people were considered human rights and where the democratic principle of self- 
determination was fully accepted (Spencer 1973: 44). Criticism and attempts to silence 
the journal came from within France as well as from abroad7’. Liberal Catholicism’s 
stance in political matters was, no doubt, a thorn in the side of the conservative 
governments in Europe8’. The Liberal Catholics, however, were so confident as to the 
rightness of their crusade that they decided to submit their views to the Pope for an 
evaluation. This may have been a courageous decision, but it was also a risky one, 
because "the Holy See is perennially reluctant to judge any doctrine unless it must, and 
still more reluctant to give official approval to a minority that is out of favour both 
with its Government and its episcopate" (Spencer 1973: 46). And indeed, the reaction 
of the Pope was negative. The Pope referred to Lamennais as "cet homme dangereux
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7) 'From Austria, Prussia, and Russia -three of the powers who had asked for reforms in the papal 
government- came demands that Lamennais should be severely reprimanded" (Woodward 1963: 265).
8) Metternich intervened in Rome through his ambassador arguing that Liberal Catholicism 'defends 
the most subversive theories of the social order (...)* (as cited in Maier 1969: 195). This intervention 
of Metternich seems to have contributed considerably to the later condemnation of Avenir.
(qui) méritait bien d’être traduit devant le Tribunal du Saint Office" (as cited in 
Woodward 1963: 265). In the encyclical Mirari Vos (1832) Liberalism was condemned. 
It "declared to all patriarchs, archbishops and bishops that it was wicked to seek 
alliance with Liberal revolutionaries, wicked to defend liberty of conscience or to claim 
freedom of the press and of opinion" (Spencer 1973: 47)9).
In sum, the Traditionalist argument finally resulted in an espousal of 
democracy, but was followed by the condemnation of the Holy See. Liberal political 
Catholicism, then, marked the point where Catholic Traditionalism "becomes 
revolutionary, democracy having proved its durability (...). As democracy became 
more stable, the Traditionalist argument that time (the capacity to endure) is the 
measure of all historic events had to turn against its originators, forcing de facto 
recognition of the Revolution, to avoid which had been the very aim of Traditionalism" 
(Maier 1969: 198). That is the Traditionalist paradox.
Source 2: The Romantic Critique o f Capitalism
Romanticism started off as a literary reaction against the rationalist, eighteenth-century, 
neo-classicist aesthetics. Although perhaps prepared and anticipated by the works of 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Romanticism’s centre of gravity became Germany. 
The term ’Romanticism’ was launched by Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1823) and was at 
first and foremost an aesthetic critique of modernity (see Jones 1974).
On a more general level it was Romanticism’s anti-modernity which made it 
politically relevant, too. As a political critique it attacked the Enlightenment on its 
central assumptions and beliefs, in particular the ideas of rational solutions for human 
problems and the unshakable trust in progress. Yet, Romanticism cannot simply be 
equated with a reactionary stance in political matters. It had many varieties, although 
anti-modernity certainly was Romanticism’s basic strain: "In all cases the organization 
of life by the application of rational or scientific methods, any form of regimentation
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9) As a reaction to Lamennais* 'Paroles d’un croyant’ (1834) Gregory XVI is reported to have said 
that the book was 'false, calumnious, rash, leading to anarchy, contrary to the word of God, impious, 
scandalous, and erroneous* (as quoted in Jones 1974: 433; Woodward 1963: 273 quotes the Latin 
version of this string of insults).
or conscription of men for utilitarian and or organized happiness, was regarded as the 
philistine enemy" (Berlin 1979: 20).
The Conservative Romantic critique of the emerging industrial society was the 
starting point for social Catholicism. Like its aesthetic ancestor, political conservatism 
found its foremost Romantic expression in Germany. Although the main period of 
conservative Romanticism in Germany was somewhere between 1820 and 1848, its 
influence on the ideas and practice of social policy reaches well into the nineteenth 
century (Alexander 1953; Gomer 1986). Conservative Romanticism can be defined as 
the movement which strove for the restoration of the social order of the middle ages 
as an answer to the uncertainty, instability and vulnerability of modem times. The 
Romantic social critique was the first doctrine to more or less systematically pay 
attention to the problems related to the societal and economic change of the nineteenth 
century. Its object was the impoverished, although not yet quite proletarian, masses.
It wished to replace the contemporary 'atomized society’ by ’standische 
Gliederung’, that is by a society classified, arranged and divided by ’estate’ in order 
to restore the supposed unity of feudal society (Bowen 1971; Gomer 1986). This basic 
conviction resulted in an attempt to force upon the newly establishing industrial and 
social reality the order of bygone times (see Stegmann 1969: 336). In the Romantic’s 
eye the new spirit of rationalist individualism, the erosion of traditional bonds and the 
predominance of the pursuit of self-interest constituted the root cause of what gradually 
became known under the name ’social question’ or the ’workers question’ (A- 
rbeiterfrage)101.
The contents of political Romanticism varied considerably. There existed no 
such thing as a coherent set of ideas constituting a doctrine, because the single great 
mistake of the Romantics was that they reduced politics to aesthetics: "Every political 
activity (...) conflicts with the essentially aesthetic nature of the Romantic" (Schmitt 
1986: 158). The core of the political Romanticist ideology remained a contradiction: 
"the Romantic, in the organic passivity that belongs to his occasionalist structure, wants 
to be productive without becoming active" (Schmitt 1986: 159).
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10) Two personalities stand out in the German Romantic, conservative tradition: Adam Heinrich 
Muller (1779-1829) and Franz von Baader (1765-1841). These two political and social thinkers strongly 
influenced later conservatives like Karl frtir. von Vogelsang (1818-1890) and his pupil Franz Hitze 
(1851-1921).
Nevertheless, some binding elements can be distinguished. The Romantics were 
in favour of an organic order of society, in which the estates would be orderly arranged 
and in which these would function as equally vital parts of a body, that is as if they 
were part of a larger whole, a living organism, to which survival they would ail 
contribute. In such an ideal organic society, the corporation and the ’Gemeinschaft’ 
would alter the fate of the individual who was threatened in his very existence by free 
competition. Social problems would find a social, or rather communal, solution, 
without risking the power of the state to become omnipresent.
Romanticism -however contradictory this may sound- tended to be a mixture of 
reactionary and revolutionary ingredients. Any feasible and viable solution to the social 
question could only be achieved by transforming or revolutionizing the basic structures 
of society (Weiss 1977: 42). This central idea of radically transforming the foundations 
of modem society as a means to establish the idealized social and political bonds 
patterned upon the medieval example was upheld throughout the nineteenth century. 
Reactionary radicalism, however, alienated itself eventually from the more Liberal and 
progressive, if not ’enlightened’, social Catholics of the second half of the nineteenth 
century with its most prominent representative, the later bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm 
Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811-1877).
Before the 1860s, however, mainstream social thinking within Catholic circles 
in Germany was deeply conservative. These conservatives (and even Ketteler was 
initially amongst them) opposed all types of experiments with social policy to moderate 
the excesses of developing capitalism. The hard-core conservatives -unlike Ketteler and 
his followers who had objections of a more religious character- had rather peculiar 
reasons for opposing social policy within the boundaries of capitalism. Since the goal 
was the replacement of the economic and social order of Liberal capitalism by an 
organic society, social policy organized and implemented by the state within the limits 
of Liberal society could not but strengthen this objectionable order. The conservatives 
argued that social policy simply obstructed the smooth transition to an organic society 
(see Stegmann 1969: 387f).
The reactionary critique of capitalism loathed the evolving class struggle. 
Capitalism was feared to degenerate into a society in which two classes would bitterly
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fight each other10. The conservative reaction to capitalism was attacking it as a 
revolting social system. Capitalism, moreover, had brought about the equally appalling 
and objectionable idea of Socialism. As an alternative, the reorganization of the estates 
would produce the capacity to transcend the chaos of capitalism and would provide a 
viable barrier to the luring Socialism. Conservatives wanted "(...) ’Socialist’ bonds of 
societal forces, as opposed to the social decomposition of ’Liberalism’" and opted for 
"society to be constituted upon estates, as opposed to the amorphous Socialist popular 
state", while freedom and equality for the estates was preferred to "the wage slavery 
of Liberal capitalism" (Hitze, cited in Stegmann 1969: 388, my translation). The 
political ideal still prevalent among Conservatives in the 1880s in Germany was to 
return to the moral foundation of the early Christian era. At that time, however, 
mainstream Catholic thinking and practice was already based on a more progressive 
analysis of the ’social question’ as a religious and moral problem and on a better 
understanding of capitalism.
Source 3: Social Catholicism
Well into the second half of the nineteenth century German Catholics analyzed the 
social effects of modernization and industrialization as a problem of religion and 
morality. The disastrous social relationships were seen as an effect of a society that had 
given up its Christian values and had let ’egotism’ rule (see Gomer 1986: 159). The 
’social question’ was seen as a religious question. Since moral decadence and the de- 
Christianization of the masses were the cause of the social misery it was the task of the 
church to provide the solution through charity and pastoral care. This solution should 
consist in the renewal and deepening of the religious spirit. Charity should only come 
in to relieve the pain temporary; social policy could never be a solution, since the root 
of the problem lay in the absence of the right religious spirit and conviction1®.
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11) Vogelsang recognized ’exploiting employers, who strangle each other economically as a result 
of the raging international competition, and exploited workers, at whose material and moral expense this 
competition is being fought out” (cited in Stegmann 1969: 387, my translation).
12) ’Ketteler's total lack of interest in the law as an instrument to overcome social evils such as the 
poverty he recognized among the workers suggests the influence of the French school under Lamennais 
'(Hogan 1946: 70).
Typical for the account of the social question in religious and moral terms were 
the so-called journeymen’s societies (’Gesellenvereine’)13’, which were viewed as a 
kind of family in which the wandering and socially detached journeymen could feel at 
home, be morally uplifted, and enjoy some education. Originally, these organizations 
were so strongly tailored at moral and religious tasks, that they discouraged attention 
for strictly economic matters (Bowen 1971: 87), In spite of their patriarchical or 
paternalist constitution14’, the journeymen’s societies became successful (70,000 
members in 1879; Gomer 1986: 162).
The social question was mainly analyzed with the help of a religious and moral 
vocabulary: it was the result of apostasy and moral decadence. The proposed solution 
naturally reflected this perception. Only a return to Christianity would lead to 
improvement. The various alternative and competing solutions offered by politicians 
and economists were evaluated as of little value for curing social evil. In fact, the more 
impotent these ’worldly’ solutions proved themselves, the more powerful the doctrine 
of Christianity appeared. Social misery did not stem from outer needs, but from the 
inner spirit. Things would be easy to solve if only the religious persuasion were 
different. Two enormous aberrations of the spirit caused the illness of social 
relationships: insatiable hedonism and greed, and the narcissism which smashed up the 
love of one’s neighbour. These illnesses had infected the rich and the poor alike. 
Confronted with such inner decay social policy would simply prove powerless. 
Christianity, on the other hand, was precisely aiming at the root of the problem: the 
spiritual betterment of man (Stegmann 1969: 344)15).
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13) The name of Adolf Kolping (1813-1865), the father of the journeymen, in particular, is 
associated with these societies.
14) The societies were headed by a priest, who was assisted by a council of honour (‘Ehrenrat’) 
consisting of prominent citizens ('achtbare Burger’).
15) In spite of the basically religious and moral critique, the economic criticism of capitalism was 
not completely absent. As early as 1849 Ketteler, for instance, rejected the right of absolute ownership. 
In the footsteps of Aquinas, he argued that God was the only true owner of all things in the world. Man 
was just God’s caretaker on earth and therefore only entitled to the usufruct of God’s possessions. In this 
sense one should understand the following statement of Ketteler: *(...) the notorious statement property 
is theft! is not just a lie; in addition to being a lie it embraces a dreadful truth'' (cited in Stegmann 1969: 
382, my translation).
The endurance of this religio-moral conceptual framework in Germany can 
perhaps be explained by the following reasons. First of all, up until the 1860s the 
industrial revolution in Germany was only taking place at a rather slow pace. The 
social question was hardly a problem of the proletarianized industrial workers. It was 
rather a rural problem. Secondly, when the industrial revolution accelerated, German 
Catholics found themselves in the middle of the Kulturkampf. The Kulturkampf 
seriously weakened the position of the Catholic church within German society. The 
defensive position in which many Catholic politicians and ideologues were forced did 
not permit straightforward substantial alterations of the basic doctrines, however 
outworn the old dogma’s might have been. For any such substantial change would have 
been interpreted by the adherents of Bismarck as a sign of indulgence. Social doctrine 
became, in a sense, even an important weapon in the Kulturkampf (Gomer 1986: 164). 
After all, if the social question was a religious and moral problem which demanded 
religious solutions, then the church would be the natural institution to take up this 
enormous task. The church should not be weakened, but strengthened. In fact, the 
church should be granted a monopoly in social care.
However, by repeating this claim time and again during the Kulturkampf, it 
became increasingly difficult to get rid of this point of view -even when the religious 
definition of the social question was no longer politically useful nor theoretically 
tenable. Thus, "these tactics finally became a heavy burden on the Christian social 
movement, which -while referring to this argumentation- was accused of being nothing 
but the bait with which the workers were lured back into the church. And this church, 
moreover, did not even pay attention to the real interests of the proletariat, but, on the 
contrary, wished to uphold the unjust relationships at all costs" (Gomer 1986: 164, my 
translation). It was when the momentum of the Kulturkampf was relaxed, that a social 
Catholic reorientation became feasible.
The third reason for the endurance of the religious overtones in the conceptual 
framework and in practical social action may be found in the fact that the church as 
well as political and social Catholicism became increasingly involved in the competition
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with and struggle against Socialism16’. Although social Catholicism and Socialism 
shared a basic anti-Liberal and anti-capitalist attitude which could have facilitated a 
coalition between the two, this did not occur for the obvious reason that they had 
opposing views concerning the constitution of future society and the role of religion in 
it. The theoretical elements with which the social question was analyzed were no 
grounds for agreement either. In particular the ardent anti-religious attitude of the 
Socialists -the resignation of church membership was a condition for membership- 
could not possibly be reconciled with a movement which saw in de-Christianization and 
anti-clericalism the root cause of social misery (see Gomer 1986: 162). Collectivist 
solutions had too much a Socialist connotation.
It was Ketteler, however, who began to analyze the social question increasingly 
in terms of reformist social policies. Paradoxically, this reorientation presupposed the 
recognition of capitalism as an efficient and in principle ’just’ economic system, or at 
least as a fait accompli, and the role of the state in social policy as at least a 
possibility. Ketteler in many senses is the personification of the attempt of modernizing 
Catholic social thought. He embodies through his life and works the whole spectrum 
from charity and neighbourly love to the embrace of state aid and social policy as the 
means to moderate capitalism. In fact, ”(...) Ketteler represents the pivot not only of 
contemporary social and political Catholicism, but of integral Catholic Germany of the 
19th century" (Alexander 1953: 412).
Source 4: The 'Social Question' as a Socio-Economic Problem and an Object o f Social 
Policy
In a letter (January 1864) to Lasalle, Ketteler acknowledged for the first time that the 
social question was an economic question, too (see Hogan 1946: 100) and he took over 
Lasalle’s wage theory to analyze it as such. In the same year Ketteler published his
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16) In 1858 Peter Franz Reichensperger (1810*1892), one of the first leaders (together with his 
brother August) of German political Catholicism, added the anti-Socialist element to the religio-normative 
analysis of the social question, when he wrote: "bodily and spiritual misery are as old as mankind. What 
is new, however, is that hate, bitterness, anger and despair replace Christian patience in certain social 
circles. The poison of Socialism makes things ten times worse” (cited in Gomer 1986: 161, my 
translation).
famous ’Christianity and the Labour Question’, in which he rejected both Socialism and 
Liberalism. He argued that the material existence of the worker depended upon his 
wage. The wage was determined by the minimal necessities of life, that is the minimal 
amount of food, clothes and shelter which are necessary for survival. The wage of the 
worker was a commodity, whose price was determined by supply and demand. 
Ketteler, no doubt, echoed Lasalle (see Hogan 1946) when he wrote: "(...) the general 
tendency though is, like in the case of any commodity, the ’cheapness’ of production; 
the ’cheapness’ of production is here the limitation of the necessities of life; a downfall 
cannot fail to come about because of this rather mechanical and mathematical 
movement. Sometimes even the absolute minimum cannot be covered by the price of 
labour. Malnutrition and starvation of the workers and their families is the result" 
(cited in Stegmann 1969: 354, my translation).
Co-operative productive associations provided the solution for the labour 
problem. They would abolish the detachment of capital and labour and accordingly lead 
to the deproletarization of the workers. The worker in such a productive association 
would also be employer. He would therefore receive a double income: a wage and a 
share in the profit. If the wage would not suffice, the share in the profit could make 
up for the shortcoming. Apparently, the causes of the social misery and abuses were 
increasingly interpreted in socio-economic terms, although religious overtones were not 
completely absent. Most importantly, the argument was still that the state had no 
significant role in solving the social question.
The idea of productive associations is remarkable to the extent that it went 
already much further than the dominant practice of charity of the Catholics. For the 
concept of productive associations presupposed the acceptance of industrial production 
and was therefore a major step towards the recognition of capitalism as an economic 
system (see Gomer 1986: 162). There existed, however, a tremendous problem with 
the feasibility of the productive associations. These simply lacked capital to get started. 
In addition, on the Catholic account and unlike Lasalle’s view, the state was not 
accorded a function in providing capital for the associations. The Christian spirit was 
expected to be strong enough to provide the necessary resources. Still convinced of the 
force of charity and neighbourly love, Social Catholics hoped for the generosity of the 
faithful, rich Catholics to raise the capital.
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The almost complete failure of the productive associations in practice17) plus 
the implication that upon such miscarrying organizations a corporative society could 
not be built, were the elements contributing to a fundamental change within the view 
of German social Catholicism around 1866/1867. The majority abandoned its anti­
capitalism because it became more urgent to moderate capitalism's defects and to 
"search for suiting cures for every single excess and to let the workers enjoy as much 
as possible the goods and the blessings of the system" (Ketteler, cited in Stegmann 
1969: 383, my translation).
There are a number of reasons for this reorientation. I have already pointed to 
one reason, namely the impossibility of building a corporative social order upon the 
cooperative productive associations that were doomed to fail. Secondly, Natural Law 
tends to prohibit the glorification of a historically developed social and economic order 
as if it were the only possible, God given, societal order. The idealized pre-capitalist 
society was left behind as soon as it became clear that capitalism was a new historical 
order with a capacity to endure and feudalism and the guild system were not supra- 
historical forms. Thirdly, it became increasingly clear to German Catholics, that they 
simply lacked the power to put a halt to the capitalist advance. Eventually, one could 
not afford to pursue utopian ideals at a time when things increasingly got worse. 
Adaptation was called for if Catholicism was to remain a power in the land.
The main result of the reorientation was that the causal relationship between 
religious and moral degeneration and the industrial revolution was redefined. It became 
clear that "the miserable social relationships are the cause of the alienation of the 
workers from the church, and not quite the reverse" (Ketteler, cited in Gômer 1986: 
168, my translation). As a result, a new role for the state became feasible1*’. The 
church was to support public social policy, since Catholicism was not opposed to social 
and material progress.
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17) The faithful rich Catholic capitalists, of course, turned out to be not that generous and ’moved’ 
by Christian love after all.
18) *The state is (...) under obligation to contribute to the re-establishment of the rights of the 
labourer before the law. Labour is the man himself, an essential part of his personality. In a civilized 
land labour must therefore be protected by law. Where this does not obtain, where labour is considered 
a mere commodity and the capitalist can exploit the worker and slowly destroy his ability to work there 
exists in that land, despite all its allegations of civilization, a good beginning toward the most despicable 
barbarism* (Ketteler, as cited in Hogan 1946: 155).
In 1874 Ketteler was president of the national convention of Catholics 
(Katholikentag) which was primarily devoted to the formulation of demands for state 
intervention19’. The following proposals were formulated: legal protection against 
physical and financial exploitation; state administration of welfare arrangements for all 
classes of society; legislation to improve the industrial codes; labour legislation; self 
help; cherishing of the moral and religious life of the families of workers; and finally 
Christian charity (see Hogan 1946:208). The mix of modem and pre-modem elements 
in this program is striking. If one would read this list in reverse, i.e. by starting with 
the proposal of Christian charity, one can almost see the history of Catholic social 
thought in a nutshell, coming from charity, moralizing and self-help to labour 
legislation and social policy.
The German Centre Party took over this program and proposed what is known 
as the Labour Protection Bill of Clement von Galen (March 19, 1877). This proposal 
was almost identical with what Ketteler had defended some years before. German 
political and social Catholicism, therefore, had adopted quite an active position with 
regard to social policy in the 1870s. In fact, the eagerness to remedy capitalism 
through public social policy was such that factions within the Centre Party arose that 
wanted a discussion on "the limits to which the state should be restricted in framing 
new legislation for the workers" (Hogan 1946: 214). The more social policy became 
conceivable, the more the problem of the extent of state interference was raised20*.
Ketteler’s influence was considerable, not only on the political practice of 
German political Catholicism, but also -and perhaps in the end more importantly- on 
Papal social ideology. Rerum Norvarum, in particular, was inspired by him and Leo 
XIII mentioned this more than once (see Bowen 1971: 79). The Pope, in fact, called 
Ketteler his great predecessor. And for Germans who were familiar with Ketteler’s 
’The Labour Question and Christianity’ nothing original or new could be found in 
Rerum Norvarum (Hogan 1946: 237), whereas the similarity between the two
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19) According to Kaufmann (1988: 82) the demand for public social policy was characteristic for 
the ’Zentrum’ ever since its foundation, whereas Ketteler’s design for a political program of 1871 
already contained a systematic -although mainly corporatist- proposal for social policy.
20) Ketteler typically entered this discussion by starting to re-emphasize the idea of charity and 
neighbourly love again as, for example, in a piece called ’Religion and the National Welfare’ of 1878 
(Hogan 1946: 219/22).
documents -even in the use of words- was conspicuous (Hogan 1946: 238). However, 
the crucial difference between the two documents is that Rerum Norvarum completely 
failed to formulate a positive action program.
In the gradual development to the acceptability of social policy lies an 
interesting paradox very similar to the Social Democratic debate on parliamentarism 
and reformism. If it was agreed that moral and religious decay were not the cause but 
an effect of the excesses of capitalism, then social policy could come in to provide 
material relief. This, in turn, could have the beneficial effect of restoring the 
relationship between the church and the workers. However, in order to be able to 
accept practical social policy through the parliamentary vehicle as a means to improve 
the material position of the working class, capitalism itself had to be recognized as a 
more or less ’just’ economic system. The paradox, then, is that in order to improve 
morality and religion through social policy one had to accept the very system which 
had caused the misery in the first place. As a consequence, charity could not be but a 
part of the solution of the social question. The problem of social justice under capitalist 
conditions and of social policy was thus raised and the ’revolutionary’ corporatist 
theory was rendered problematic.
Gradually, and in spite of the resistance of conservative Catholics (see Stegmann 
1969: 390-92), reformist social Catholicism became the dominant current of German 
Catholicism. In Bowen’s words: " Meliorism, within the existing capitalist-individualist 
scheme of things, became the order of the day. Only a minority of Social Catholics and 
a still smaller proportion of the Centre continued to demand radical institutional 
changes (...)", that is a reconstruction along corporative lines. In fact, the conclusion 
is that “despite the tenacity with which corporatist doctrines persisted in German Social 
Catholicism (...) a corporative ’new ordering’ of society was never the program of a 
clear majority of the movement’s leaders after 1880. By 1890 only a handful of 
doctrinaires and a die-hard agrarian faction within the Centre were still actively 
promoting such a program (...). The doctrine has thus largely remained the expression 
of an ideal, and its central significance has continued to be primarily intellectual. But 
as a critique of atomistic individualism on the one hand and of state omnipotence on 
the other it has contributed in a not insignificant fashion to modem Catholic political 
and social thought" (Bowen 1971: 118).
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Source 5: The Papal Struggle for Social Justice Under Capitalism
The ’social doctrine’ or ’social teaching’ of the Catholic church is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. It simply did not exist as a separate body of theory before 1878. Since 
then it has gained an important place among official Vatican ideology and has 
functioned as a source of inspiration for social Catholics and Christian Democracy 
throughout Europe. The first question is why the Papacy became increasingly interested 
and active in formulating a social doctrine which could be distinguished from other 
dogma?
It might be that the church after an era of complete negation of the social 
question until the 1880s was badly in need of a "leader in the Vatican who could detect 
the disease and prescribe an effective remedy" (Camp 1969: 7) and that it was Pope 
Leo XIII who was well prepared "to give leadership to the church in its confrontation 
with the modem world" (Camp 1969: 11). But most probably, it was the economic 
crisis of the 1880s which not only worsened the conditions of the working class but 
also led to the greater magnetism of the radical, Marxist Socialist movement. The 
Socialist movement was for the main part anti-Christian and in the eyes of the clerics 
constituted a threat to the very existence of the Church. Consequently, the pressure on 
the Papacy to pay attention to the social question was greatly increased. The 
circumstances were so to speak begging for a gesture of the Church. Re rum Norvarum 
(1891) was a main attempt to keep workers as Catholics within the church. Social 
Catholics in Germany under the leadership of Bishop Von Ketteler had paved the way 
for the official Papal social ideology. The decisive difference between Leo XIII and his 
predecessors, who merely rejected all phenomena of modernism, was that this Pope 
argued that "modem society was not necessarily destructive of Catholic ideals (...)" 
(Camp 1969: 13). In addition, the Thomist revival within the Catholic ’intelligentsia’ 
stimulated the formulation of a new and modernized social doctrine.
Social doctrine originated as a new branch of Catholic doctrine as the result of 
the decline of the temporal power of the church (Bums 1990). The church started to 
centralize her control over morality and the moral dimensions of the economic realm 
in particular. Rome became the oracle of the moral dimension of social, economic and 
political life. The argument is that "the Papacy developed a perspective on social issues
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that opposed Liberalism with a neo-feudal worldview. Within that perspective, ’social 
doctrine’ became a distinct doctrinal category to address such issues. Popes avoided 
conflict with Liberal states by devaluing doctrine on social and political issues and 
making it vague enough to avoid specific policy commitments. Yet, by retaining pre­
capitalist, organic views of society, the papacy preserved for the church an indepen­
dence from Liberal ideologies" (Bums 1990: 1126).
These reasons, then, contributed to the appearance of a new body of doctrine, 
'social doctrine’. The industrial revolution and the victory of industrial capitalism 
constitute the incentive as a reaction to which a new doctrine was formulated. The 
timing of the emergence of the new branch of ideology can be explained by the 
economic crisis of the late seventies and early eighties of the last century, which made 
the social question all the more imperative, as well as by the success of the Socialist 
movement, which posed a political challenge in its anti-clericalism. The already 
available philosophy of St. Thomas could be drawn upon precisely because of the 
emphasis on reason as a foundation of faith, which provided the church with theoretical 
weapons to defend the faith against the attacks of rationalist philosophies. However, 
this revitalization of Thomist philosophy put the problem of charity and social justice 
in the centre of the Roman Catholic agenda.
Charity, as argued above, has a central place in the philosophy of Aquinas. 
Therefore, it can be expected that it has served as one of the starting points of the 
reformulation of medieval doctrine into a modem -be it neo-feudal- social doctrine. It 
can also be expected that signs can be found of a theoretical struggle to go from the 
basic contents of charity to a new Catholic conception of justice, drawing upon the 
social theories as formulated in Germany in particular.
Let me, for the sake of argument, illustrate the point by contrasting the words 
of Leo x m  and Pius XI. Throughout the first ’social encyclical’ explicitly addressing 
the conditions of the working class one can find clear signs of what might be defined 
as a theoretical endeavour to go from the basic contents of charity to a new conception 
of justice. In Rerum Norvarum (1891) the emphasis, however, remains on charity. It 
is not until the reign of Pius XI that the development of modem Catholic social theory 
away from the dominance of charity was further developed. By that time, however, 
Catholic parties had already an extended experience with social policy. Thus, Leo XIII
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argued: "True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for 
his own needs and those of his household; nor even to give away which is reasonably 
required to keep up becomingly his condition in life (...). But, when what necessity 
demands has been supplied and one’s standing fairly taken thought for, it becomes a 
duty to give to the indigent out of what remains over (...). It is a duty, not of justice 
(save in extreme cases), but of Christian charity, a duty not enforced by human law" 
{Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 217/218). And further: "The common Mother of 
rich and poor has aroused everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established 
congregations of religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so 
that hardly any kind of suffering could exist which was not afforded relief. At the 
present day many there are who (...) seek to blame and condemn the Church for such 
eminent charity. They would substitute in its stead a system of relief organized by the 
state. But no human expedients will ever make up for the devotedness and self-sacrifice 
of Christian charity" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 221/222).
Now, compare these statements with the words of Pius XI 46 years later in his 
encyclical against Communism: "A charity which deprives the workingman of the 
salary to which he has strict title in justice is not charity at all, but only its empty name 
and hollow semblance. The wage-eamer is not to receive as alms what is his due in 
justice. And let no one attempt with trifling charitable donations to exempt himself 
from the great duties imposed by justice" (Divini Redemptoris, in Camp 1969: 100).
The Object of a New Branch of Doctrine
Nevertheless, Rerum Norvarum is the first Papal document attempting to introduce 
other means than the duties of charity as relief for social misery. Apparently, Pope Leo 
XIII chose sides against such Catholics as the Belgian economist P6rin and his 
followers, some of whom argued that "the poverty of the masses was necessary so that 
the rich could have the opportunity to practice the duty of charity! The most effective 
weapon against Socialism, he (Leo XIII) came to say, was to eliminate poverty 
altogether, not merely (!) by the temporary expedient of charity, but by a permanent 
readjustment in the workers’ standard of living and their position in society" (Camp 
1969: 79). The question is whether the Pope offered an alternative.
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The first modification of charity, I would argue, was that instead of continuing 
to stress the duty to give Leo XIII started to emphasize the duty of employers to treat 
"their workers as brothers, giving them conditions of work as favorable as possible" 
(Camp 1969: 81). At the same time the working class had to be obedient and show 
respect for the employers. Reading the encyclical carefully shows that the emphasis 
remains on obligations rather than rights. Ultimately, the great social encyclical lacks 
a clear conception of rights, except where the right to private property is concerned.
The main fear the first social encyclical deals with concerns the danger of 
Socialism. The Papal program of social reform can be defined as the opposite of 
Socialism. In the generalization of private property rather than its socialization the 
solution to the social question was sought. "Leo XIII wanted the reverse (of Socialism) 
by means of higher salaries, and workers’ savings; ultimately he envisioned the 
’deproletarization’ of the working classes. Such a reform, he hoped, would redistribute 
the wealth more justly and would help the working class to identify itself with the 
capitalists instead of with the ideals of Socialism" (Camp 1969: 84). The lengthy 
rejection of Socialism facilitated a critique of capitalism that avoided the risk of an 
association of the Catholic view with Socialism (Dorr 1983: 14). The object of Rerum 
Norvarum is on the condition of the working class. Its real subject matter, however, 
is not the one-sided attention to labour but rather the "relative rights and mutual duties 
of the rich and of the poor, of capital and labour (...)" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 
1954: 206).
Private Property as Social Policy
The misery of the working class was caused by the erosion of the traditional bonds of 
religion and of the Guild society. Nothing that could protect the workers had come in 
their place. "Hence, by degree it has come to pass that working men have been 
surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed 
of unchecked competition. The mischief has been increased by rapacious usury (...) 
practiced by covetous and grasping men (...). The hiring of labour and the conduct of 
trade are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few; so that a small number of 
very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a
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yoke little better than that of slavery itself’ (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 
206/207).
The Socialist solution of socializing private property could not be a tenable 
solution. In the first place, the workers themselves will be the main victims of such a 
policy, for private property can be seen as wages under another form. "Socialists, 
therefore, by endeavouring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community 
at large, strike at the interest of every wage-eamer, since they would deprive him of 
the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of 
increasing his resources and of bettering his condition in life” (Rerum Norvarum, in 
Gilson 1954: 207).
In his defence of private property, Leo XIII appears to develop some elements 
of a Catholic conception of justice. Socializing is against justice, because every man 
has by nature the right to possess property as his own. Man is a rational being who 
through private property tries to take care for the future. Private property is in 
accordance with Natural Law. The conclusion is that "with reason (...) the common 
opinion of mankind, little effected by the few dissentients who have contended for the 
opposite view, has found in the careful study of nature, and in the laws of nature, the 
foundations of the division of property, and the practice of all ages has consecrated the 
principle of private ownership, as being pre-eminently in conformity with human 
nature, and as conducing in the most unmistakable manner to the peace and tranquility 
of human existence" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 210).
Private property is the adequate means for bettering the condition of the 
working class. This theory of private property as social policy must above all be 
interpreted as anti-Socialist in its propensity: "The first and most fundamental principle, 
therefore, if one would undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the 
inviolability of private property" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 213). The view 
of private property in Rerum Norvarum is atypical and is possibly its weakest part 
(Camp 1969). It was unusual because it did not seem to correspond with Thomist 
theory. The Scholastics typically argued that needs be provided for through the 
common labour of all. They never implied that it should be guaranteed that each could 
provide enough for himself (and his family). The Scholastic version of the theory of 
private property implicitly leaves room for charity by stressing the fruits of common
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labour instead of individual effort. The Pope’s version, on the other hand, seems to 
limit the possible role of charity. The basic weakness of this theory of property stems 
of course from the fact that it is hardly applicable to modem industrial society, and 
rather based on a view of society which was primarily agrarian, a society, that is, 
where proletarians would be able to buy a piece of land and become a small farmer and 
thus diminish the status of their labour power as a commodity.
The Doctrine of Inequality
The next step in Rerum Norvarum is as unusual and unexpected as the introduction of 
the doctrine of private property as social policy. For what is argued to be the best 
approach towards the betterment of the position of the proletariat is the recognition of 
the fact that inequality is the normal and natural condition in society. Suffering, 
furthermore, is the lot of humanity. This type of reasoning must be interpreted as an 
attempt to justify inequality and the resulting social misery rather than as a well 
reasoned account of the necessity of change. In fact, the Pope goes so far as to argue 
that only because inequality exists can society function properly.
A cryptic sentence, furthermore, holds that "Nothing is more useful than to look 
upon the world as it really is, and at the same time to seek elsewhere (...) for the 
solace to its troubles" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 214). On my interpretation 
this means that the world is at it is and cannot be changed fundamentally. It basically 
contains a call for escapism20. As such it shows the Pope’s deeply conservative view 
on the constitution of society and the possibilities of reform. Relief of worldly misery 
should above all be sought in the comfort religion provides and in the hope of a better 
life hereafter. The cryptic sentence may be taken to mean that one has to look upon the 
world "as inhabited by men whose natural inequalities necessarily beget social 
inequalities; it is to accept the fact that, ever since original sin, work has ceased to be 
a freely chosen delight; it is to become reconciled to the idea that, for the same reason, 
hardships, sufferings, and death will have no cessation or end so long as the world and
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21) In evaluating the difference between Rerum Norvarum and Quadragesimo Anno, Dorr (1983: 59) 
argues that ’there is a slight but noticeable shift in emphasis from a more ’escapist’ to a more ’worldly’ 
spirituality*.
mankind continue to exist; in short, it is not to turn the world into the fool’s paradise 
imagined by so many social reformers" (Gilson 1954: 200).
This theory of inequality originates in the theory of society as an organism. On 
the organic view of society, hands do the work and the heads provide direction. The 
class that performs manual labour are the poor and the class that directs are the rich. 
This division of society into classes was considered to be permanent, and, by 
implication, inequality was to be seen as a permanent feature and quality of human 
society. Such a theory of inequality as a perennial characteristic of society again brings 
in the concept of charity, because it excludes the rightful claim of the poor to a larger 
share of societal wealth22’.
If inequality was natural and therefore good and just, it was a mistake to think 
in terms of class struggle. For how can the members of one and the same body be at 
war among themselves? The greatest mistake was "(...) to take up with the notion that 
class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working men are 
intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view that 
the direct contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result 
of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it 
ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so 
that as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each needs the other: capital cannot 
do without labour, nor labour without capital" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 214). 
Only religion contained the ability to hold the two classes firmly and harmoniously 
together. Religion pointed to the mutual duties of justice.
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22) Dealing with the topic of property and Socialism, the Italian Bishop Bonomelli, for instance, 
wrote in 1886: "There always will be rich and poor, there always will be material inequality because 
such is a natural necessity. If that was not the case, where would be charity, the queen of ail virtues and 
fulfillment of the law of the Gospel? There have to be rich and poor, but in such a way that the rich 
improve a bit the lot of the poor and the poor accept the rich as their masters, their benefactors, their 
loving fathers; and rich and poor are held together by the sweet ties of Christian charity, which alone 
can give us the real and only possible equality. The head does not oppress the body upon which it rests 
but guides it and gives life to it, and the body does not rebel against the head but serves it, and through 
a harmonious relationship comes a shared well-being. The same thing happens in social life: you workers 
are the body and those of property, capital, and intelligence are the head* (as cited in Agócs 1988: 41).
The Imperfect Catholic Conception of Justice
Ill
On the Catholic interpretation of justice duties have no corresponding rights. The basic 
contradiction in Rerum Norvarum as the expression of the Catholic social theory, 
therefore, is found in the attempt to define a conception of justice while omitting a 
theory of correlative rights. In other words, the ’great social encyclical’ acknowledges 
only the right to private property. The attempt to go from charity to justice was not 
successful. Relief remained a matter of love.
Only duties of justice are defined. Among these the following bind the workers: 
"fully and faithfully to perform the work which has been freely and equitably agreed 
upon; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never 
to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder; 
and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with 
artful promises of great results, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless 
regrets and grievous loss" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 215). The duties of 
justice prescribed for capitalists are: "not to look upon their work people as their 
bondsmen, but to respect in every men his dignity as a person ennobled by Christian 
character. They are reminded that, according to natural reason and Christian 
philosophy, working for gain is creditable, not shameful, to a man, since it enables him 
to earn an honorable livelihood; but to misuse men as though they were things in the 
pursuit of gain, or to value them solely for their physical powers -that is truly shameful 
and inhuman. Again justice demands that, in dealing with the working man, religion 
and the good of his soul must be kept in mind. Hence, the employer is bound to see 
that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting 
influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home 
and family, or to squander his earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his 
work people beyond their strength, or employ them in work unsuited to their sex and 
age. His great and principal duty is to give every one what is just" (Rerum Norvarum, 
in Gilson 1954: 215). Reading this fragment hundred years after publication it strikes 
the reader that what now for the most part would be identified as rights of workers are 
formulated here as duties of capital and vice versa. Furthermore, the cause for the 
commodification of labour power (man as a thing) was found in the misuse the
employer made of the physical powers of workers rather than in the structural features 
of anonymous markets.
What is just remains obscure, and the question still is what is to be done when 
he who has the obligation to provide a just wage (however defined) fails to do so and 
he who is to receive such a wage has no rightful claim to it? The answer apparently 
is again charity. Employers are expected to obey the duties of charity, while the 
proletariat was not given any right to action to get what it was ’entitled’ to. The fear 
for revolution or the disruption of societal stability excluded such a possibility. The 
Pope "set up an ideal of harmony in society that was so exalted and perfect that it 
remained abstract and unreal" (Dorr 1983: 23). The conclusion, therefore, is that - 
unlike in the social theory and practice of German social Catholics- no progress was 
made in the attempt to update charity as a workable concept for reform and political 
action. Whenever the Pope used the vocabulary of ’rights and duties’ of capital and 
labour, he had only a vaguely modernized version of the duties of charity in mind and 
in fact only one right: the right to private property. Halfway the encyclical one is left 
where one started and the only thing that happened is that private property was 
defended, Socialism condemned, inequality praised, charity once more accentuated and 
no positive program of action formulated.
The Role of the State
In trying to formulate such a positive action program the relative roles of church and 
state are underlined. Although the church is defined as primarily interested in the 
spiritual well-being of the workers, the Catholic theory holds that "Christian morality, 
when adequately and completely practiced, leads of itself to temporal prosperity (...)” 
(Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 220). The church is said to have intervened with 
great success on behalf of the poor by organizing and supporting the organizations of 
charity. The claim is that in order to spare the poor the shame of begging the church 
has arranged their relief. Why, then, did the Pope find it necessary to write an 
encyclical on the misery of the working class if charity were indeed so successful? This 
contradiction plainly shows the failure of the Vatican ideologues to fully recognize the 
fact that charity under conditions of a secularizing capitalist society had become an
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anachronism. In this sense, the Pope in 1891 was theoretically at the level of German 
social Catholicism in the 1860s. He failed to integrate the major insights with regard 
to social policy and the rights of workers that Ketteler had already formulated in the 
early 1870s.
Surely, the social question is partly interpreted as the result of the failure of the 
obligations of charity. It is for this reason that the role of the state relative to the one 
of the church is being analyzed. The state’s role in the relief of the poor, however, 
could only be understood as derived from the imperfect obligation of the conception 
of justice. It is only because duties turn out to be not so binding as the church would 
want that the state acquires a role in the solution of the social question. Nevertheless, 
in a typical manner the function of the state is defined as the obligation "to make sure 
that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the 
commonwealth, shall be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private 
prosperity (...). Now a state chiefly prospers and thrives through moral rule, well- 
regulated family life, respect for religion and justice, the moderation and fair imposing 
of public taxes, the progress of the arts and of trade, the abundant yield of the land - 
through everything, in fact, which makes the citizen better and happier" (Rerum 
Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 222). The only reason why the state should work for the 
benefit of the poor is because it should work for the benefit of all classes of society.
The argument is continued with a sentence to that is easily (and often) 
misinterpreted: "Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best 
for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice -with that justice which is 
called distributive- toward each and every class alike" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 
1954: 223). At first sight distributive justice could be mistakenly taken to imply an 
important function of the state in the redistribution of wealth of society, let us say, a 
conception that seems very near the Social Democratic one. However, the fact that 
distribution has to be just to ’every class alike’ does not imply redistribution. On the 
contrary, it puts strict limits to the extent to which wealth can be transferred from one 
class to another. For given the doctrine of the natural inequality of society, distribution 
may never go so far as to mitigate class differences because it would be unjust. Justice, 
therefore, does not demand more than that the state takes care that workers are clothed, 
housed and fed so that "they find their life less hard and more endurable" (Rerum
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Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 224). Again, it has to be stressed that this role of the state 
is defined as a duty of the body politic, not as the right on the side of the working 
class. Poverty, then, becomes the effect of a double failure to perform a duty: of the 
rich to give alms and of the state to provide relief; poverty is not the lack of guarantees 
for the fulfillment of a right. There is no such thing as a rightful claim to relief.
State intervention is even further limited in that the smaller social units such as 
the family are not to be absorbed. The state should only come in "whenever the general 
interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can in no 
other way be met or prevented (...)" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 224/225), as 
in the case of strikes, the relaxation of family ties, the lack of time for the performance 
of religious duties, moral decay through the mixing of the sexes, too high burdens upon 
workers, and dangers for health. But the limits are strict, albeit dependent on the 
concrete cases: "the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required 
for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 
1954: 225). This is of course the doctrine of ’subsidiarity’ in its embryonal form. 
Fourty years later it was more clearly defined in Quadragesimo Anno: "Just as it is 
wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group what private enterprise 
and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance 
of right order, for a larger association to arrogate to itself functions that can be 
performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies" (cited in McOustra 1990: 45-6).
The Rudimentary Conception of a Right to Relief
With respect to the conception of rights and correlative duties there is a further 
ambiguity. Rights are to be defended religiously and the state has the duty to protect 
rights. In fact, Leo XIII argues that the poor and the badly off have a ’claim’ for 
special consideration: "The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and 
stand less in need of help from the state, whereas the mass of the poor have no 
resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance 
of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-eamers, since they mostly belong in 
the mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government" 
(Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 225-26). Although the word ’claim’ suggests that
114
a right to assistance exists, corresponding with a duty on the side of the state, such a 
right is nowhere defined.
This ambiguity is increased by the analysis of exploitation in terms of the 
passion of greed. Paradoxically, where this passion is intense, the first duty is to 
control the poor. Relief is of lesser importance, for "if all may justly strive to better 
their condition, neither justice nor the common good allows any individual to seize 
upon that which belongs to another, or, under the futile and shallow pretext of equality, 
to lay violent hands on other people’s possessions" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 
226). In case of a conflict between capital and labour, even if the cause of the conflict 
is exploitation, the first thing to make sure is that capital be protected by guaranteeing 
private property. The church feared most of all the revolutionary forces of society 
"whose main purpose is to stir up disorder and incite their fellows to acts of violence. 
The authority of the law should intervene to put restraint upon such firebrands, to save 
the working classes from being led astray by their maneuvers, and to protect lawful 
owners from spoliation” (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 226). There is no option 
for the poor left but "to put up with their sad situation" (Dorr 1983: 20).
Are there no positive rights for workers? Yes, the worker has the right to rest 
one day a week, Sunday, in order to pray, because "the rest from labour is not to be 
understood as mere giving away to idleness; much less must it be an occasion for 
spending money and vicious indulgence (...)" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 227). 
This right to Sunday rest is mainly motivated by the fact that religious practice can 
make a man forget the daily sorrow and to pay attention to God.
The worker, moreover, ought to receive a just wage (the vocabulary of rights 
is again avoided here). The free market wage-setting procedures of supply and demand 
were not accepted. Wages should not go beyond the level of the just wage, that is, a 
wage sufficient to provide for the need of the worker and his family23'. The anti- 
Liberal doctrine on the just wage is one of the more clear statements of Rerum 
Norvarum. "Let the working man and the employer make free agreements, and in 
particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate
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23) Quadragesimo Anno defuses more clearly the concept of a family wage, while at the same time 
holding that it is a disgrace if a woman is forced to work because of the inadequate income of her 
husband. As a result, she would only neglect her natural duty of caring for her children (Quadragesimo 
Anno, section 71).
of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, 
namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved 
wage-eamer. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder 
conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the 
victim of force and injustice" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 229/230).
Wage policy should come in as a rudimentary means of de-commodifying 
labour. The workers should become less dependent upon market wages. It is implied 
that the just wage should even be slightly more than just enough for the worker and is 
family in that it should also allow for some saving. For saving was seen as the proper 
means to acquire property and property as the suitable means to solve the social 
question. The role of the state, then, was not only to protect the private property of the 
capitalists, but also to promote deproletarization by stimulating workers to save.
The Solution of the Social Question
The solution of the social question on the Pope’s account, therefore, consists in making 
everybody a small proprietor. It reveals the Pope’s naive worldview which was 
basically still agrarian and feudal in outlook. It explained poverty in terms of the lack 
of morality. There is no account of the structural conditions of modem society, let 
alone a view on the difference between feudal and industrial society24’.
More specifically, the great social encyclical letter of Leo XIII lacks a theory 
of capitalism and therefore fails to offer a workable solution to the social question. The 
third way between capitalism and Socialism is simply: neither reform nor revolution. 
The basic mistake is the inability to understand the fundamental difference between 
private property as such and the private ownership of or control over the means of 
production, for the fundamental characteristic of capitalism is the separation of
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24) Camp has seen this weakness very well where he writes: 'The Pope also failed to make Rerum 
Norvarum relevant to modern property relationships. His neo-scholastic thesis was more applicable to 
a primitive agricultural community than to the complexities of an industrial economy. Those who relied 
on such an economy for their livelihoods were too interdependent to have a property right based upon 
the need for each to receive the product of his own labour. Holdings in a joint-stock corporation could 
not be justified by saying that the labour of the owner transformed these holdings into a part of himself. 
By being irrelevant to inherited riches, the incomes of the leisure class, and the holdings of the great 
capitalists, Rerum Norvarum simply failed to defend the types of private ownership most vigorously 
attacked by the Socialists* (Camp 1969: 56).
producers from their means of production. The section on the great and excellent things 
that will follow from the spread of private property shows the inability of the Catholic 
church to see the world as it really was: "If working people can be encouraged to look 
forward to obtaining a share in the land, the consequence will be that the gulf between 
vast wealth and sheer poverty will be bridged over, and the respective classes will be 
brought nearer to one another" (Rerum Norvarum, in Gilson 1954: 230/231).
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PART II
CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS

CHAPTER 5 
AN INTERLUDE IN FIVE PROPOSITIONS

Here I present a constructed type of social capitalism in five propositions. These 
propositions, in turn, serve as the foundation for the more specific hypotheses as 
developed and tested in chapter 7. Although the propositions are an abstraction from 
reality, they make easier the contraposition of social capitalism to other well established 
models, notably the Social Democratic model. It elucidates what is distinctive about 
social capitalism. In addition, it helps detecting possible deviations from the constructed 
type in the social policy practice of Christian Democracy in the post-1945 period in 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
But let me first elaborate the three tentative differences between Social Democracy and 
Christian Democracy of chapter 2. Given the results of the analysis so far, one might 
now recognize that these identified differences in fact pertain to the three sub-systems 
of society recognized by Christian Democracy: the market (private property in 
particular), the state and the family.
As to the state, Christian Democracy does not acknowledge the primacy of 
politics. All societal organs have their own autonomy. There can be no fundamental 
change of property relations in the name of equality; there can only be reparation of 
social costs. The state is not characterized by a permanent reform capacity, but at most 
by a temporary correction of the inadequacies produced by the market. In general, 
inequality is a natural phenomenon and is reproduced at other levels.
As to private property, Christian Democracy does not change its place and 
function, but embeds it in a moral framework. Reform is possible with regard to its 
use, not to its existence, except in extreme circumstances and when everything else 
fails. Property relations in society do not give rise to a permanent struggle of classes 
but are the foundation of the capacity of a permanent accommodation of conflicting 
interests. As such they produce harmony rather than conflict. Unions, nor employers, 
nor parties are class agents, but instruments in the establishment of society as an 
organism. Each has its place, each is indispensable, and all contribute to the Public 
Good. Intra-class solidarity, though useful in itself, is not what really matters; only 
inter-class harmony may establish the happiness of all.
As to the person and the family, Christian Democracy sees the latter as a 
precondition of the former. The human self is not primarily a political, but a social
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being. Man (in this case the male) through his labour is the centre of public life. 
Woman, through her work as mother and through her natural faculty to care, is the 
centre (but not the head) of the family. The family is the cornerstone of society. The 
state is the completion of the societal body in that it assists the lower organs to assist 
themselves. The church is the moral authority which accords the whole construction 
its stability.
Five Propositions on Social Capitalism
1. The identification of the source of social misery and poverty in the functioning of 
the capitalist market linked with a fundamental, yet conditional acceptance of capitalism 
represents the first element of social capitalism. Initially, the ’social question’ was seen 
as an effect of religious failure and moral decadence on the part of the poor 
themselves. Therefore, it was the task of the church and of the Christian inspired social 
actors to provide relief through charity and pastoral care. The solution consisted in a 
regeneration of Christianity. Vital for social capitalism was the development away from 
charity and neighbourly love towards an embrace of the state as an institution which 
could channel the necessary funds to the families in need. Under conditions of failing 
love on the side of the employers, the causal chain of analysis had to be reversed. It 
was capitalism that created social misery. Misery, in turn, generated moral decadence 
and apostasy. Using the state as a mechanism of subsidy would enhance the capacity 
of families to regenerate. Consequently, the Christian faith would re-enter the hearts 
of the grateful poor and the poor would return to the mother church.
For this causal analysis to take practical effect, however, capitalism had to be 
recognized as a nearly ’just’ economic system in principle. Acceptance of capitalism 
on the condition of social policy established the stipulation of social capitalism. 
Charity, therefore, could not be but a part of the solution of the social question. The 
problem of justice under capitalist conditions was thus intensified where secularization 
had rendered charity ineffective. Catholicism, therefore, was forced to accept 
capitalism because it aimed at its reform. Social Catholics (and the Pope) loathed the 
treatment of workers as commodities. A rudimentary idea of de-commodification, 
therefore, emerged with the conditional acceptance of capitalism. Since the family is
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the unit of society, which cannot be broken down into further smaller components, its 
dependence on the commodity form of the labour power of a husband was made 
contingent upon his remuneration being sufficient to allow his wife to perform her 
natural function at home.
2. The second element of social capitalism concerns the scope and limits of state 
intervention, which became problematic as a result of the ineffectiveness of charity. If 
religious fear was not enough to induce employers to act in charity and to give alms, 
another mechanism was to take the place of the queen of all virtues. The more social 
policy became conceivable as an alternative for failing Christian love, the more the 
problem of the extent of state intervention was raised. Consequently, Catholics in 
particular developed a peculiar theory of state intervention which constitutes the 
nucleus of social capitalism.
Its peculiarity lies in the emphasis on the duty of the state to act as a subsidizer 
of inadequacy. State intervention is limited in it that must not absorb the smaller social 
units, but should help these to such an extent that they can take over themselves.
The theory of ’subsidiarity’ -such a well chosen term- defines the range and boundary 
of public intervention. Subsidiarity is also a crucial parameter of what might be called 
community production; it is a way of generating Christian citizens rather than citizens. 
Subsidiarity allows organized religion still to appear as the generous donator and 
upholder of decent lives. Subsidiarity in this sense is a crucial aspect of community 
production and reproduction. Social capitalism does not generate social citizenship in 
terms of individual rights, but accords the state a special duty in upholding the 
capacities of persons in their social environment. It is a clever, but perhaps still 
ambiguous solution for the problem of defining social justice as a correlation between 
public duties and social rights.
One can expect Christian Democracy to promote what one might call a passive 
or reactive social policy. Such a practice would typically be eager to moderate the 
outcome of the logic of the imperfect market by transferring considerable sums of 
money to families in need, but would hesitate in changing the logic itself. In this sense, 
social capitalism is the perfect middle way between Socialist collectivism and Liberal 
residualism. Christian Democratic reformism is basically repair work. In its strongest
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formulation one might argue that a fundamental commitment to full employment cannot 
be a central goal of social capitalist arrangements. This, namely, presupposes too far- 
reaching interference. Full employment policy is not an intrinsic element of social 
capitalism; compensation for unemployment, of course, is.
Another effect of subsidiarity concerns the reluctance to transfer authority and 
control over policies entirely to the state. Privately governed, but publicly financed 
welfare arrangements would be the ideal. Such institutions would be intermediary 
organs with a function of their own. They ought not to be absorbed by the state, nor 
should they themselves absorb any lower organ. The corollary of self-government is 
self-responsibility. Financing through taxation appears contrary to the social capitalist 
plan, except in those cases where the ability of families is exhausted.
3. The third proposition on social capitalism concerns the specific theory of class and 
the idea of society as an organic whole of functionally differentiated members. Crucial 
is the implicit theory of inequality. On the organic view of society, classes are not 
antagonistic forces, but are mutually dependent entities. They are different, but equally 
important for the organic society as a whole. Inequality is a natural phenomenon that 
cannot and should not be altered. An extensive redistribution of societal wealth from 
one class to another disrupts the organism. One cannot transfer part of the brain, which 
thinks, plans and directs, to the hands that do the work. Social policy, therefore, 
cannot be expected to aim at establishing a more equal distribution of societal 
resources.
4. A fourth element of social capitalism follows from the theory of limited state 
intervention and the philosophy of natural inequality. It concerns the distinctively 
Catholic conception of justice, or better, the peculiar theory of distributive justice. 
Distributive justice on the Catholic account accords to each and every class what is its 
due. On this part, there appears to be no ambiguity as to rights and duties. Classes and 
vocational groups have a claim to what they are entitled to. Members of a class and of 
vocational groups, therefore, have a right to be treated in accordance with their status. 
The state has the duty to enforce these rightful claims. Social policy is not to alter 
status, but to reproduce it well into retired life.
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5. A fifth element of social capitalism and the final proposition of this interlude 
concerns the idea of private property as social policy. It primarily functions in 
opposition to the Socialist solution of socialization or nationalization. Although the 
theory of private property did initially play a role in the discussion on social policy, 
the theory of the just wage (or family-wage) gradually replaced it. A money-income 
ought to be sufficient for a man and his family. In addition, the acquisition of private 
property would presuppose a money-wage. Such a wage should not only be sufficient 
for a worker to provide for himself and for the needs of his family, but it should also 
allow him to put something aside. This is the background of the theory of the just 
wage. It addresses the family as well as the propensity to save. In other words, it 
stresses the need for the family to provide for the present and future of its members.
Benefits for adult male employees, therefore, ought to be characterized by a 
capacity to replace the family income at the level of the present status. It is not 
excluded that as an unintended consequence of this social capitalist regimes tend to 
become generous in their benefit structure, especially with regard to families. Benefits 
for women, on the other hand, can be expected either to be dependent on the income 
of the husband or at least to be lower than for an adult worker. In its extreme form, 
social security is sexually differentiated.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE WELFARE STATE

This chapter evaluates the explanatory efforts of the various ’schools’ that have come 
out of the decades long and still ongoing debate on the welfare state0. In particular, 
I try to establish to what extent the various theoretical approaches and empirical studies 
can make sense of the phenomenon of the Christian Democratization of capitalism. The 
argument is that, although generally the relative role of Christian Democracy in the 
shaping of welfare state regimes has been dealt with inadequately, important insights 
can nevertheless be adopted.
Industrialization, Economic Growth and Modernization
Theories which stress the causal primacy of industrialization and its correlates (e.g. 
economic growth, urbanization, demographic change) typically argue that the welfare 
state is largely the answer of society to the growing needs of its population. 
Industrialization creates the demand for welfare by destroying the traditional bonds of 
kinship, family ties, and the guilds, which were the main institutions providing social 
security. The development of industrial society (economic growth and its social and 
political correlates) at the same time creates the possibility of new forms of comprehen­
sive security: the welfare state. The further nations are on the scale of industrial 
development the more they are likely to advance social policies and the more they will 
tend to look like each other. In other words, industrialized nations have a disposition 
to converge. The prime explanatory problem of these theories concerns the very 
existence of, rather than the variance among, Western welfare states (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux 1965, originally 1958; Kerret al. 1973, originally 1964; Cutright 1965; Pryor 
1968; Rimlinger 1971; Jackman 1975; Wilensky 1975).
For theories that accord causal centrality to modernization (secularization being a 
correlate of this developmental process) more or less the same considerations are valid. 
The welfare state emerges here as an effect of modernization. It is one of the 
mechanisms restoring disrupted societal integration. The explanatory object typically 
involves the timing rather than the existence of social policy. Variance among nations
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1) Reviews are offered by Alber 1982; Shalev 1983a; 1983b; Uusitalo 1984; Wilensky et al. 1985; 
Therbora 1986b; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Henriksen 1987; Olsson 1987.
equals the difference of main events in the social policy history, understood as the 
effect of the rhythm and tempo of modernization (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981a; 
1981b; 1981c; Flora and Alber 1981; Alber 1982; Kohl 1983; Flora 1983; 1986; Alber 
1989).
One part of the thesis of modernization and industrialization concerns the 
enabling properties of development. Modernization, economic growth and in­
dustrialization allow for the extension of political redistribution. The other part refers 
to the identification of the constraining capacities of modernization. Industrialization 
creates new societal needs and demands which constitute functional requirements. 
These needs and demands engender a societal problem pressure to which states 
respond. Industrialization causes societal disruption at a large scale. Societal 
differentiation is the root cause of a modem problem of integration (Flora and Alber
1981).
It is obvious that for a welfare state to occur a certain level of economic 
development should have been reached and a specific problem pressure should have 
arisen. In order to redistribute societal wealth as a means for solving societal problems 
resources have to be available. Economic development and industrialization are 
preconditions for welfare state development.
Thus Wilensky (1975) argued that"(...) economic growth makes countries with 
contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy for constructing 
the floor below which no one sinks" (1975 : 27). Comparing 64 nations2’ on the 
association between welfare effort (operationalized as the proportion of the Gross 
Domestic Product, GDP, devoted to social expenditure) and the level of economic 
development, the age of the social security system and the proportion of aged in a 
society, he found that "over the long pull, economic level is the root cause of welfare- 
state development, but its effects are felt chiefly through demographic changes of the 
past century and the momentum of the programs themselves, once established" 
(Wilensky 1975: 47). The growth of the welfare state was argued to follow fundamen­
tally the same logic in all modernizing societies, regardless of culture and politics. The 
problem, however, was which factors could account for the observed variation in the
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2) A sample with a mixture of Liberal democratic states, totalitarian states, authoritarian and 
oligarchic regimes, and authoritarian populist governments.
level of social spending among nations with comparable economic structures and at 
similar levels of development.
The main contribution of the theories of industrialization and modernization 
concerns an elaboration of a point of reference of welfare state policies. The argument 
is in favour of an objective problem pressure of societal integration. Both industrial and 
modernization theories are fundamentally functional accounts. They assume that 
societal problem pressures emerge from the wide disruption created by development. 
The welfare state, in turn, is an automatic response to such disruption and all nations 
sharing the experience of modernization develop welfare states. It remains obscure how 
needs and demands create their own fulfillment. There is hardly any account of 
political intermediation. As theories of the differences between modem welfare states, 
moreover, they lack the analytical instruments because the main variables show no 
variation among the advanced industrial nations. Nevertheless, for the subsequent 
empirical analysis I adopt the insight that the level of economic development and the 
age-structure of a society may have independent effects on social spending in 
particular31.
Capitalism and the Welfare State
Let me turn to those attempts that try to make sense of the welfare state within a 
theoretical framework inspired by Marxist state theory (see Jessop 1982). Although 
academic Marxism was at once "revolutionary politics, secular religion, utopian 
phantasy, social theory, hard-headed analysis of capitalism, philosophy of history, 
scientific Socialism, and much else besides" (Mishra 1984: 65), its common 
characteristic is found in the attempt to offer a critical account of the welfare state 
under capitalist conditions. Such accounts are ultimately a critique of the logic of 
capitalism.
Marxist theories of the welfare state (Piven and Cloward 1972; O’Connor 1973; 
Ginsburg 1979; Gough 1979; Lenhardt and Offe 1984; see also Mishra 1984) -next to 
being predominantly theoretical rather than empirical in nature- share the functional
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3) See Pampel and Williamson (1989) for a recent statement on the relevance of demography.
reasoning of the industrialist and modernization theories and are in this respect 
strikingly similar to these approaches. Although it is admitted that the welfare state in 
some way or another embodies important improvements in the condition of wage labour 
within capitalism -that is warranting the (limited) possibility of reform- the welfare 
state is primarily analyzed as a capitalist state. As such it is said to perform first and 
foremost (or, if you like, ’in the last instance’) the function of assuring the profitability 
of capital. Welfare arrangements are secondary effects of this function. The mitigation 
of the harmful and oppressive character of capitalism is an accidental side-effect. Since 
all nations considered are capitalist nations, social policy is everywhere performing the 
same function. Political determinants are irrelevant, since the welfare state is a function 
of the logic of the capitalist economy.
Within this paradigm there is a general tendency to confuse effects and 
functions. Thus, when O’Connor (1973: 138) redefines the meaning of social insurance 
as mainly an insurance for capitalists and corporations to create stability and security 
among workers, which, in tum, would guarantee accumulation, he mistakenly holds 
this possible effect as its function. Gough’s (1979) very definition of the welfare state 
as the use of power to modify the reproduction of labour power and to maintain the 
non-working population in capitalist societies, determines this confusion of effects and 
functions. The transformation of non-wage-labourers into wage-labourers and their 
maintenance as such -as Lenhardt and Offe (1984) argue- may have been an important 
effect of social policy, but cannot be taken to explain its emergence and character.
The justified criticism on Marxist functionalism does not necessarily imply, 
however, that one has to abandon a critical analysis altogether. No doubt, social policy 
may have a legitimizing effect. But it is not because of this effect that states have social 
policies. Admittedly, the state might facilitate the accumulation of capital, but such a 
phenomenon is the explanandum not the explanans, let alone an account for cross- 
national variation. In short, Marxist functionalist theories point to the possibility of 
(unintended) effects of social policy that may (or may not) be beneficial for capitalism. 
Effects, however, cannot be taken to explain phenomena of which they are the effect, 
not even if one recognizes an unintended effect (see Elster 1989: 98/99).
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Social Democracy as a Model o f the Welfare State
Do political variables determine the variation in welfare state development, when 
economic or demographic variables have been controlled for? There are several 
approaches that have addressed this question. The ’simple democracy-thesis’ (see Myles 
1984) holds that political democracy is a sufficient explanation of the rise and effects 
of the welfare state. Elections are seen as the expression of the democratic class 
struggle. Because of the presence of a large number of workers in the electorate 
democratic politics is expected to have distributional effects in favour of welfare 
arrangements, since according to Downs (1960: 541) "in a democratic state, the 
division of resources between the public and private sector is roughly determined by 
the desires of the electorate"4’.
Probably the best established research agenda on the political determinants of 
the welfare state concerns those studies that can be grouped under the heading of the 
Social Democratic model (Hewitt 1977; Cameron 1978; Castles 1978; 1985; Korpi 
1978; 1983; Stephens 1979a; Esping-Andersen 1985a; 1985b; 1987; see for an 
overview Shalev 1983a; 1983b). The leading hypothesis of the model is that "the bulk 
of the observable variation in welfare state emergence and growth in the western 
nations can be accounted for by the strength -especially in government- of Social 
Democratic labour movements” (Shalev 1983a: 316).
One might argue that the Social Democratic model is a more political version 
of the Marxist account of the welfare state (Pampel and Williamson 1989: 38). This 
is only true to the extent that from the Marxist theoretical framework the assumption 
is taken that "the class division between capitalists and wage workers is the fundamen­
tal axis of power and of political struggles in industrialized capitalist democracies” 
(Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 140). However, the Social Democratic model differs 
fundamentally from the Marxist view in its evaluation of the political process. Where 
for Marxists the historical mission of the capitalist (welfare) state is to guarantee capital 
accumulation and perform the function of legitimation (thereby reducing politics to
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4) Stressing the role of interest groups the argument would be that 'the growth of the welfare state 
since 1945 represents less and less the influence of conceptualized goals -including class goals- and more 
and more the influence of the power of pressure-group politics reflecting the ordered segments of society 
(...)’ (Janowitz 1976: 75/76).
economics), the Social Democratic model starts from an open theory of capitalist 
society, in which the possibilities that democracy offers are incorporated. The Social 
Democratic model would therefore rather have to be understood as a qualitative 
refinement of the ’simple democracy’-thesis.
Four fundamental assumptions constitute the presumption of what Ringen (1987) 
has called the possibility of politics, that is the reform capacity of political intervention. 
The first assumption is that economic relations or outcomes can be altered by political 
mediation. Social Democratic political actors are convinced that "the shape of the 
reward system is open to modification through political action within the context of 
capitalist economies (Jackman 1975: 121). It is of fundamental importance that there 
are "representative-democratic structures, mass enfranchisement, competitive elections, 
or other less institutionalized means through which the populace can influence what its 
government does" (Skocpoland Amenta 1986: 136/137; see also Jackman 1975: 121). 
The second assumption is that democracy provides the labour movement with a chance 
"to displace class struggles from the industrial arena into the political arena and to use 
the democratic state as a nonmarket instrument for redistributing income and services 
away from the economically privileged" (Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 140). The third 
assumption is that socioeconomic policies can be effective within the context of a 
capitalist economy. In other words, there is "some notion of democratic accountability, 
where the political preferences of significant groups in the population (i.e. the working- 
class or the ’less-advantaged’) are in fact translated into meaningful policy changes" 
(Jackman 1975: 122) without decisively disrupting the capitalist economy (see also 
Castles 1978: 48). The fourth assumption is that reforming capitalism, although 
actually taking place within the structural constraints of the system, may nevertheless 
and ultimately will lead to the establishment of Socialism. Contemporary advanced 
welfare states are a stage between capitalism and Socialism. These assumptions have 
characterized to varying degrees the Social Democratic model of welfare state 
development.
Three weak points of the initial studies can be mentioned at the outset. The first 
is the underspecification of the causal mechanism. There exists a ’black box’ between 
class structure and class alliances on the one hand, and political demands and 
distributional outcomes on the other. Secondly, the conceptualization of the dependent
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variable in terms of social spending (or ’welfare effort’) reveals how close these studies 
still were to the framework of the thesis of industrial development and to Wilensky’s 
study in particular. The focus on spending put constraints on the capacity to open up 
the ’black box’. Finally, there is the problematic identification of the welfare state with 
egalitarian distributional regimes.
The Model
Hewitt’s seminal paper (1977) on the relative impact of democratic structures and 
Social Democratic possibilities set the stage of the debate. The mere presence of 
democratic structures could not sufficiendy explain gains in equality. Social Democratic 
experience appeared to be a necessary condition of egalitarian outcomes. The one to 
one correspondence between working class power and the welfare state generated the 
belief that a welfare statism could overcome the perennial dilemma between efficiency 
and equality.
Cameron (1978), on the other hand, analyzing interaction effects between the 
international economy and national political developments, found that Social 
Democracy may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a more equal 
distribution of resources. This approach added an international context to the cross­
national perspective. It allowed for the argument that open economies are exposed to 
such external pressures that they become highly vulnerable to external shocks and 
disturbances. The expansion of the public economy (that is, the extent to which nations 
exert control over the appropriation and allocation of resources) was interpreted as an 
attempt to moderate the vulnerability through social insurance, labour market policies, 
subsidies to firms, and increases in public employment. Open economies, therefore, 
tended to have expanded public economies and more egalitarian social structures3’.
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S) Probably the most challenging elaboration of the argument of world market dependence is found 
in the work of Katzenstein (1985). Small nations that are strongly dependent on world market fluctuations 
typically develop democratic corporatist structures as a way of moderating the negative effects of this 
dependency. Democratic corporatism is often found in conjunction with Social Democratic party 
dominance, but the strength of the Social Democratic labour movement is not a necessary condition for 
democratic corporatism. It is here that it became increasingly difficult to separate the neo-corporatist 
argument from the Social Democratic thesis.
Cameron’s argument is often mistakenly interpreted as a rejection of the Social 
Democracy-thesis. Yet, his argument was rather that the openness of an economy 
favours certain structural features of capitalist nations, which, in turn, support the 
power of labour. Small nations with open economies frequently have a high degree of 
industrial concentration. This tendency of concentration facilitates the creation and 
development of strong and unified organizations of workers and employers. In 
particular, the labour unions tend to be strong because of the existence of a homo­
geneous and concentrated labour force, which reinforces Leftist parties. As a result, 
the process of collective bargaining is decisively affected and tends to stimulate 
industrial or even economy-wide collective agreements. The powerful position of 
labour in nations with open economies and the egalitarian outcomes in these nations are 
the effect of interactions between international and national factors (see also Cameron 
1984; 1987).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of studies appeared which 
substantially elaborated the association between Social Democracy in power and the 
welfare state or its egalitarian distributional outcomes, emphasizing the Scandinavian 
experience in particular (Castles 1978; Korpi 1978; 1983; Stephens 1979a; Swank and 
Hicks 1984; 1985; Esping-Andersen 1985a). Within this tradition Social Democracy 
constituted the main actor and the Scandinavian countries the archetype of what 
happens when Social Democracy intervenes in the logic of capitalism. The argument 
was that"(...) in Sweden the basic prerequisite of capitalism, the internal competition 
among the wage-eamers, is now on the verge of being abolished. The grave-diggers 
of capitalism are thus still at work and the future of capitalism remains open" (Korpi 
1978: 4). The more power of the mass of the population is mobilized the more welfare 
arrangements will be produced and the higher the extent of equality will be. "A social 
order marked by inequality in rewards can be maintained only if it is supported by 
inequality in the distribution of power resources" (1978: 52). The underlying 
supposition becomes crystal-clear. Working-class or wage-eamer power mobilization 
is fundamentally conceptualized as ’naturally’ Social Democratic power mobilization. 
An amendment of the thesis proposed the weakness or fragmentation of the political 
Right as a necessary condition of Social Democratic hegemony in welfare politics 
(Castles 1978; 1985; see for a critical answer: Schmidt 1986).
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The fully developed Social Democratic model can be summarized as follows. 
The more the mass of the population is organized as wage-eamers within the Social 
Democratic movement, the higher the quality (universalism, solidarity, redistribution) 
of the welfare arrangements tends to be and, as a result, the higher the extent of 
equality. A developed welfare state, therefore, is evidence for a decisive shift in the 
balance of power in favour of the working class and its representative, Social 
Democracy. The distribution of power resources between the main social classes of 
capitalist society determine political intervention in the economy and the extent of 
inequality (Korpi 1978; 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985a; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 
1984; 1986). Swank and Hicks (1985) tested a number of competing explanatory 
hypotheses on social spending (transfers) and equality, such as level and rate of 
economic growth, the role of democratic institutions, political power of labour and 
capital, and increasing needs. They found that the most consistent explanation 
concerned class-based political actors. The degree of unionization significantly 
influenced transfer spending as did the presence of large monopoly-sector firms. In 
addition, the finding was that lower- and working class protest (demonstrations, strikes) 
positively propelled spending.
Some of the studies represent what might be defined as the optimistic Social 
Democratic view on the possibilities of reformism. The assumption was gradually 
added that the Social Democratic welfare state represented some intermediate stage 
between capitalism and socialism (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979a; Stephens and Stephens
1982). Socialism is about to arrive, although its coming is slow and gradual. Social 
Democratic reformism eventually leads to socialism (Stephens 1979a) and Sweden is 
the most likely candidate to first experience ’full socialism’6’.
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6) Tilton (1990), however, has recently argued that the dominant current of Social Democracy in 
Sweden is made up of a set of fundamental values (integrative democracy, the people’s home, the 
compatibility and complementarity of equality and efficiency, a socially controlled market economy, the 
expansion of the public sector as a strategy to extend freedom of choice) rather than a basic commitment 
to the transition to socialism. These values considerably shaped Social Democratic welfare policies in 
Sweden, consisting of integrated measures regarding full employment, universalist social policies, forms 
of industrial democracy, solidaristic wage policies, active labour market policy and collective capital 
formation. While the Swedish model of welfare statism cannot be applied in other nations, its 
fundamental values are worth exporting. See for an admiring Canadian observer who argues that Swedish 
Social Democracy should serve as an example for Social Democrats elsewhere, Milner 1989).
In what may be defined as the less optimistic version the welfare state is 
interpreted as both medium and outcome of Social Democratic power mobilization. 
Social Democratic class formation is fundamentally the mobilization of power. The 
conditions under which power can be mobilized are de-commodification of labour 
power, institutionalization of solidarity, the inclusion of allied classes, and the 
formation of class alliances. The state has a central role in the process of Social 
Democratic class formation, because the creation of solidarity depends on the success 
of reformist strategies. It is the conditions of power mobilization that make Social 
Democracy opt for a specific type of social policy which comprises the interrelated 
goals of (class) solidarity, de-commodification, and equality (Esping-Andersen 1985a).
The reformist policies of Social Democracy must therefore be characterized by 
certain qualities. Ideally, they provide a feasible alternative to individualism and 
corporatism. In addition, status differentials should be eliminated. Social citizenship is 
"the means by which Social Democracy can surmount the obstacles to its own 
formation; namely the problem of resource weakness among workers and the problem 
of internal differentiation and stratification in its natural political base" (Esping- 
Andersen 1985a: 34)7). De-commodification in particular is seen as the indispensable 
precondition for Social Democratic power mobilization and Socialist collective action. 
Labour power under capitalist conditions is a commodity and is therefore subject to the 
discipline of the market regime. This causes competition among workers and
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7) Apparently, the Social Democratic model is indebted to Marshall’s theory of citizenship (Marshall 
1977, originally 1964). As is well known Marshall distinguished three stages in the development of 
citizenship. First the establishment of civil citizenship, then political citizenship and finally social 
citizenship. He argued that ’the civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom 
(...)*; the political elements refers to ’the rights to participate in the exercise of political power’; and 
the social element concerns ’the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being 
according to the standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall 1977: 78). The development of the welfare 
state is therefore understood as the development from civil rights to social rights, covering more and 
more people. Luhmann’s political theory in the welfare state appears to be a systems-theoretical 
interpretation of Marshall’s theses. Luhmann defines a similar concept of increasing inclusion as ’the 
encompassing of the entire population in the performance of the individual function systems” (Luhmann 
1990: 34). In the functional framework the argument is that "the inequality of factual opportunities 
becomes a problem precisely because it is no longer supported by the differentation scheme of society 
but reproduced afiinctionaliy* l uhmann 1990: 35). And from very much the same developmental 
perspective as the theory of modernization he adds that ’the realization of the principle of inclusion in 
the functional domain of politics ultimately leads to the welfare state. The welfare state is the realization 
of political inclusion” (Luhmann 1990: 35).
undermines the sources of solidarity. The reduction of market dependence is a necessity 
(Esping-Andersen 1985a; Western 1989).
Equality, however, is not so much an independent Social Democratic goal, but 
"equalization of incomes and wealth was seen as a necessary precondition for the 
attainment of the other two aims. Solidaristic policies necessarily involve a major 
redistribution both on the finance side and on the benefit side. If greater homogeneity 
is a precondition for social and political unity, then a reduction of wealth differentials 
becomes an important task for Socialist policy" (Esping-Andersen 1985a: 148). This 
type of analysis made plausible that spending per se is not the issue, but that Social 
Democracy is related to a specific type of welfare state. It implied a considerable 
respecification of the dependent variable.
Under what conditions does Social Democracy actually promote welfare statism 
successfully? Social Democratic control matters even under conditions of economic 
crisis, if and only if additional conditions are met, such as consensual behavior within 
the party-system and within the socioeconomic context (neo-corporatism), and which 
ministries are actually controlled by Social Democracy (Keman 1988). On the basis of 
a typology of Social Democracy and the analysis of the surplus welfare state (the 
above-average policy-efforts in terms of political compensations and economic 
regulations concerning the welfare of the population), the Social Democratic model is 
redefined as follows: "the relationship between Social Democracy and the development 
toward a surplus welfare state appears to be best served by a combination of a 
gradualist type of Social Democracy, which is capable of developing sufficient 
working-class power to gain and retain party control in a dominant and enduring way" 
(Keman 1988: 276). Progress, then, was made on the side of the independent variable, 
too. Social Democracy is a variable rather than a historically and cross-nationally 
constant.
Criticism. Further Elaborations and Challenges
The Social Democratic model of welfare state development and equality has met a 
considerable amount of criticism. There are objections which basically concern the 
elaboration of the central theses and the operationalization of the strategic variables.
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The operationalization of the welfare state in terms of social spending may seriously 
hamper the understanding of the phenomenon and therefore of the mechanism creating 
patterns of equality (Esping-Andersen 1985a; 1985b; 1990). The assumption of a linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables is misconceived since it 
can only theorize (the quantitative) ’more or less’ welfare state development and is 
blind for the qualitative differences (Korpi 1989). Welfare states cluster according to 
qualitative characteristics, which have definite distributional outcomes (Esping- 
Andersen 1990). The Social Democratic welfare state is the only type which combines 
the elements of universalism and solidarity with a fundamental and stubborn 
commitment to full employment. Empirically the model has been criticized because of 
its inability to account for nations with degrees of equality similar to those found for 
the Scandinavian countries, but where Social Democracy is not the dominant political 
actor (e.g the Netherlands, see Skocpol/Amenta 1986). Historically, the model does not 
live up to the expectations for it fails to account for the origins of the welfare state. 
Early social legislation was often initiated despite Social Democratic resistance. 
Finally, theoretically, the model suffers from the presupposition that labour power or 
the power of the working class equals Social Democratic power. This has blinded 
theorists of the Social Democratic model for other forms of the organization of the 
power of the working class (e.g. Castles 1985).
Recent studies have attempted to overcome these basic weaknesses. These 
concern substantial, theoretical and empirical improvements (Korpi 1989; Esping- 
Andersen 1990; Castles and the ’family of nations project; Castles and Mitchell 1990), 
technical sophistication (Griffin et al. 1989; Hage et al. 1989; Korpi 1989; O’Connor 
1988; O’Connor and Brym 1988; Pampel and Williamson 1989), new directions in 
cross-national research on income inequality and poverty (the Luxembourg Income 
Study, see Smeeding et al. 1990; Mitchell 1990) and challenges to the very central 
claims of the Social Democratic model (De Swaan 1988; Baldwin 1990).
Using Worlds Bank Data on income distribution in advanced capitalist nations 
in the period 1975-80, Muller (1989) found evidence for a synthesis of the open 
economy, the labour strength and the party control variables as an explanation for 
cross-national variation in welfare state development and outcomes in terms of income 
inequality. However, while the analysis suggests that Social Democratic parties have
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implemented redistributive fiscal policies that have narrowed the gap between rich and 
poor, the organizational strength of the working class does not directly influence 
income distribution. But unionization and centralization do affect an egalitarian income 
distribution indirectly by providing the electoral basis for Social Democracy.
In their attempt to integrate insights from various theoretical frameworks 
(’needs’-based explanations, political variables, incrementalism) and contextualizing the 
analysis (varying economic climates, different time periods, the structuring of 
socioeconomic bargaining) Hicks, Swank and Ambuhl (1989) have found that only the 
previously attained level of welfare effort (welfare spending as a share of national 
income), changes in the rate of unemployment and the growth of GDP have consistent 
effects across contexts. In addition, their study suggested that Left governments 
responded to working class welfare demands irrespective of economic climate, but only 
when unions are strong. Strikes appear to have compelled these governments to 
increase their welfare effort only in the pre-1973 period. The overall conclusion is that 
Left parties can still control the welfare state under the condition of strong unioniza­
tion, but are severely constrained when this state is not present.
An attempt to reconcile inconsistent findings (e.g. concerning the influence of 
economic growth, demographic structure, political power of the working class) of the 
usually macro-sociological literature on the welfare state and equality was offered by 
O’connor (1988) and O’Connor and Brym (1988). The argument is that inconsistencies 
in the literature are mainly due to the divergent manner in which the strategic (both 
dependent and independent) variables are conceptualized and operationalized. Pampel 
and Williamson (1989), too, took up the task of submitting contrasting findings of two 
decades of literature to technically sophisticated methods of hypotheses testing, pooling 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Their findings dispute the Social Democratic 
model in particular (1989: 74), claiming that the struggle between capital and labour 
is not the dominant dynamic explaining the growth of welfare spending and equality. 
The demographic structure (percent aged) is the single most influential determinant of 
social spending.
The debate between several students of the welfare state over strategic variables, 
however, tends to slip into a predominantly technical squabble, confusing statistical 
techniques, methodology and substance. The debate between O’Connor and Pampel and
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Stryker (O’Connor and Brym 1988; Pampel and Stryker 1990; O’Connor 1990) over 
methodological issues is an example. For Pampel and Stryker (1990: 20) "method -in 
this case model specification as well as estimation technique- is inextricably intertwined 
with substance". With this statement one could easily agree, except for the fact that 
method is quite a bit more than technique. In her reply O’Connor (1990: 27) makes the 
reasonable argument that "a more fundamental methodological issue relates to the 
conceptualization and operationalization of variables". Unfortunately her conclusion is 
that undecided issues concerning welfare effort are "likely to be decided only with 
accumulation of research, the development of better statistical procedures and the 
availability of more extensive longitudinal data" (O’Connor 1990: 27). The more 
fundamental methodological issue, however, has to do with the necessity to relate 
findings of quantitative analyses back to the theoretical assumptions and rethink theory 
in order to decide what method might be best to tackle the renewed problematic. 
Contemplating the whole subject matter on a more fundamental might lead to the 
acknowledgement that operationalizing the welfare state solely in terms of spending is 
theoretically unsatisfactory.
To equate Social Democracy and the welfare state is a mistake. There is 
considerable variation on both the independent (Social Democracy) and the dependent 
(the welfare state and equality) variable. Titmuss (1974), of course, already argued that 
welfare states differ fundamentally as to their institutionalization of solidarity and 
equality. Only his ’institutional redistributive’ type comes anywhere near the Social 
Democratic ideal. Fumiss and Tilton (1977) offered a distinction between the social 
security state and the social welfare state, only the latter representing the Social 
Democratic ideal. Therbom (1986a; 1987) has stressed the vital criteria of social policy 
and a commitment to full employment. Without the commitment to full employment 
there is no Social Democratic welfare state. The way out of the ’black box’ would 
consist in a regeneration of welfare state theory (Therbom 1987: 239).
Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished between three welfare state regime types, 
of which the Social Democratic welfare state is only one variety. The characteristics 
of this regime concern its universalism and de-commodification as well as the inclusion 
of the middle class. Such a welfare state would "promote an equality of the highest 
standards, not an equality of minimal needs (...)" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27).
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The Liberal model, on the other hand, is characterized by means-tested 
assistance, modest social insurance schemes and modest universal transfers. "Benefits 
cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents. In 
this model, the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by 
traditional, Liberal work-ethic norms: it is one where the limits of welfare equal the 
marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules are therefore 
strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest. In turn, the state 
encourages the market, either passively -by guaranteeing only a minimum- or actively - 
by subsidizing private welfare schemes" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26/27). Such a 
Liberal regime typically upholds the commodity-character of labour power to a large 
extent, limits the scope of social rights and "erects an order of stratification that is 
blend of a relative equality of poverty among welfare-state recipients, market- 
differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the 
two" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27).
Another cluster is composed of the Conservative and corporatist-statist regimes 
of continental Europe. De-commodification can certainly be an element of social policy 
in these nations. The distinguishing characteristic lies rather in the highly status 
differentiating nature of social policy. "This corporatism was subsumed under a state 
edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as a provider of welfare; hence, private 
insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role. On the other 
hand, the state’s emphasis on upholding status differentials means that its redistributive 
impact is negligible" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27) and the defense of the traditional 
family is one of the comer stones of social policy.
But even three worlds of welfare capitalism appears to be not specific enough. 
Thus, Castles has initiated a promising international research agenda, titled the ’Family 
of Nations’ project. The leading research question is whether a contextualization of 
comparative public policy analysis in terms of ’family of nations’ -i.e countries with 
shared national attributes in terms of geographical, linguistic, legal and cultural 
experiences- contribute to a greater understanding of patterns of contemporary public 
policy outcomes in Western democratic nations (Castles 1990). By looking at both 
welfare expenditure and benefit equality and at characteristics of the tax systems 
Castles and Mitchell (1990) identify a fourth type of welfare regime which is
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characterized by high benefit equality and high levels of taxation, but low transfers (as 
a percentage of GDP). This group consists of such nations as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, in short the 'English speaking nations’, as well as 
Finland. This fourth world of welfare capitalism is a radical world in which "(...) the 
welfare goals of poverty amelioration and income equality are pursued through 
redistributive instruments rather than by high expenditure levels" (Castles and Mitchell 
1990: 16). The fourth group is basically a specification and correction of the Liberal 
cluster and the findings suggest that the radical cluster does seem to favour more 
egalitarian outcomes than the Liberal, residualist welfare states. What this all seems to 
add up to is the identification of qualitatively different types of welfare states on the 
basis of a Social Democratic counterfactual, found in the ideal type of Social 
Democratic welfare statism in Scandinavia and particularly Sweden.
Other critical accounts have addressed methodological issues. Thus Griffin et 
al. (1986; 1989) argue that the cross-sectional designs typical for the research being 
discussed here is "inappropriate if the questions addressed or the theories used are 
historical in scope" (Griffin et al. 1989: 46). Diverging results of studies can only 
sometimes be contributed to the use of different data-sets. The design substantially 
influences the outcomes, too. What has to be taken into account, particularly in cross­
national perspectives on labour movements and Social Democracy, is country-specific 
historical dynamics. The strong point is that a connection is established between a 
substantial discussion and methodological and purely technical issues. The substantive 
conclusion nevertheless offers a partial confirmation of the Social Democratic model 
(Griffin et al. 1989: 61).
Recently, several studies have challenged the heart of the Social Democratic 
thesis. The ’state-centered’ approach favours a more pronounced analytical focus on 
the autonomous role of state policies and state personnel in shaping welfare regimes. 
The central argument is that "states conceived as organizations claiming control over 
territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of 
the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society” (Skocpol 1985: 9). States 
are said to have ’capacities’ "to implement official goals, especially over the actual or 
potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioecono­
mic circumstances" (Skocpol 1985: 9). In their study of cross-national variation in the
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’Keynesian’ response to the Great Depression Weir and Skocpol (1985) demonstrate 
the relevance of structural features of states and policy legacies. The historical account 
offered is largely traditional. Economic crisis toppled established convictions on public 
finance and prepared the way for a more active engagement of the state in social policy 
and economic management. The actual implementation of Keynesianism depended on 
shifts in the balance of power towards organized labour and the capacity to construct 
social alliances in favour of deficit spending. There is enough evidence to assume that 
"political parties, even those historically formed as programmatic agents for working 
class interests, defined their goals in the 1930s in close relationship to existing policies 
and capacities of the states with which they were dealing" and that "political coalitions 
of social groups willing to support deficit-spending programs gained leverage only 
through state structures and came together -or broke apart- partially in response to the 
sequence and effects of state policies themselves" (Weir and Skocpol 1985: 148/149).
Such a ’state-centered’ focus certainly has the advantage of avoiding too strong 
a linear view on the dynamics of welfare state development and equality. Although 
studying autonomous state policies may clarify the logic of expansion of a specific 
welfare configuration, it has difficulties explaining the configuration itself. Such 
information would still be vital for understanding the autonomous logic of state 
policies. "The question that must be asked of state-centered explanations", Baldwin 
(1990: 47) rightly argues, "(...) is whether they have not abandoned the ambiguity of 
a larger question for the certainty of a smaller and less important one". It may very 
well be that ultimately "(...) larger social forces have nonetheless significantly 
determined the nature the legislation adopted" (Baldwin 1990: 47).
Both the study of Baldwin (1990) and De Swaan (1988) suggest that the 
egalitarian, solidaristic and universalist welfare statism has much less to do with 
working class power mobilization and Social Democratic political representation than 
the Social Democratic model would hold.
De Swaan’s study of the collectivization of care is more an exercise in collective 
action theory than a study of the welfare state per se. The explanatory problem 
concerns the question why and how collective social security arrangements emerged. 
The answer is provided by combining two theoretical perspectives: the historical 
sociological method as developed by Norbert Elias and an adapted version of welfare
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economics. In what De Swaan calls his sociogenetic framework a dynamic approach 
to dilemmas of collective action is possible. The dynamics of the collectivization of 
poor relief, health care and education "stem largely from the conflicts among elites 
over the creation of collective goods and the distribution among them" (De Swaan 
1988: 3). These elites were able to produce both a collectivity and a collective good 
as a result of fear. The development of the welfare state is interpreted as the history 
of disconnecting and solving dilemmas of collective action in the context of societal 
problem pressure as understood by elites.
De Swaan’s theory of the role of class and class conflict in the course of the 
collectivization of social security can be understood as rejecting the Social Democratic 
thesis of working class mobilization. It was the demise of the power of the petty 
bourgeoisie (farmers, small entrepreneurs and professionals) and the decline of private 
property accumulation rather than the growing power of the working class which 
explain the emergence of collective social security. This development was "much more 
than a history of class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, the development 
of social security is the result of a conflict between the petty bourgeoisie on the one 
hand, and varying coalitions of organized workers, large-scale employers and an 
activist, reformist regime of politicians and administrators in power. In this sense, 
social security is the result of a ’class struggle', but one with reversed alliances" (De 
Swaan 1988: 169). The main drawback of De Swaan’s study concerns the absence of 
an analysis of the Scandinavian countries, that is those universalist welfare state that 
have actually been built on a coalition of petty bourgeois forces (the farmers in 
particular) and the working class (Esping-Andersen 1985a) and include demands of the 
middle class (Goodin and Le Grand 1987).
Baldwin’s historical sociological study of the social origins of the European 
welfare state turns the Social Democratic account on its head. On the basis of a 
thorough analysis of historical sources he argues that the solidaristic, universalist and 
egalitarian welfare states originated in bourgeois rather than in working class power. 
His contribution to the debate is innovative for two reasons. First, he shows that while 
growing equality may be a characteristic of modem welfare states, it has not been its 
goal. The welfare state is more about reapportioning risks than about the redistribution 
of wealth. Equality refers to risk redistribution. Second, the theory of risk and
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distribution allows for a rejection of what Baldwin calls the social interpretation or 
laborist account of the development of the welfare state.
The main problem with the laborist approach has been its narrow focus on the 
working class as the only risk category. The critical insight is that class may, but rarely 
does, coincide with a risk category. The laborist view mistakenly assumes that welfare 
policies are explained in term of a victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie. 
Certain risks, of course, have tended to coincide with class. Occupational injuries and 
unemployment come with the position of an industrial worker. It is this coincidence 
that has founded the laborist interpretation. More often, however, risk categories cut 
through the cleavage of class, a fact that establishes the possibility of varying risk 
coalitions. The welfare state is a pooling of risk rather than resources (Baldwin 1990: 
19). The crucial claim is that what historically has determined the solidarity of social 
policy was not working class strength, but, on the contrary, the fact that "otherwise 
privileged groups discovered that they shared a common interest in reallocating risk 
with the disadvantaged" (Baldwin 1990: 292).
The Problem of Catholicism and Christian Democracy
Paradoxically enough, it was out of the debate on the Social Democratic model that the 
first attempts evolved to question the relative role of Christian Democracy (or 
Catholicism) in shaping welfare state regimes. The main background for this was that 
time and again inexplicable exceptions to the ’rule’ of Social Democratic working class 
strength were found in the empirical analyses and that these exceptions invariably 
concerned countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and sometimes Germany or even 
Italy. Additional explanations had to be sought and were often found by hypothesizing 
the influence of a variable representing ’Catholicism’.
Castles (1978) already showed that a strong Social Democratic theory of welfare 
state development could not be maintained, because, for instance, the Netherlands was 
found to score as high as the Scandinavian countries in terms of social spending. The 
answer to the problem of the Dutch and other exceptional cases was that "it suggests 
that the dominance of a Democratic Socialist party is not a necessary condition for such 
a welfare development" Castles 1978: 74). The explanation of the anomalies in terms
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of the relative weakness of the political Right, however, was not entirely convincing 
for the simple reason that Christian Democracy was dealt with in an ambiguous and 
inconsistent manner. In the case of the Netherlands the Confessional parties were not 
taken as belonging to the Right (hence the extremely low figure for the strength of the 
Right found in this country), whereas in Germany the Christian Democrats or in 
Austria the People’s Party were said to constitute the political Right, thus disregarding 
the political dimensions within these Christian Democratic political movements.
In his essay on the development of the welfare states in Australia and New 
Zealand Castles (1985) again took up this theme of ’anomalous’ cases. The relationship 
between the working-class and welfare state development was problematized and the 
important observation was made that working-class mobilization does not necessarily 
lead to Social Democratic power and from there to welfare statism. The social systems 
of Australia and New Zealand -in contrast to the residualist type of welfare state in the 
United States- are wage-eamers’ welfare states. The difference between the two models 
lies in "a strategy of creating a national minimum and (...) by the fact that the criterion 
of inclusion was status as a wage-eamer, rather than status as a citizen" (Castles 1985: 
103). The conclusion is that "the labour movement’s economic logic of egalitarian 
redistribution and the humanitarian urge to devote restricted resources to those most 
in need were outweighed by the electoral logic that limited welfare expenditure in 
general and restrained the generosity of benefits in general” (Castles 1985: 102).
Recently Castles and Mitchell (1990: 19) have offered the plausible proposition 
that in nations in which the main political cleavage is between Catholicism and Social 
Democracy "electoral competition between the people’s parties representing these 
diverse strands of social thought has involved competitive pressure for greater 
expenditure, but the Catholic input has prevented any substantial equalizing thrust". On 
my account, the main insight is that equating the strength of organized labour power 
with Social Democratic power is a mistake and is roughly the explanation for the 
existence of ’exceptional’ cases.
The assumption of the Social Democratic model is of course prominent in those studies 
that understand the reform potential of the welfare state fundamentally as facilitating 
the transition from capitalism to Socialism (Korpi 1978; 1983; Stephens 1979a).
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Working-class organization is the means by which capitalism can be transcended and 
Socialism established. Both democracy and the welfare state are fundamental structural 
changes of capitalist society largely brought about by working-class organizational 
strength (Stephens 1979a: 89). The experience with the welfare state is taken as 
evidence for the possibility of a parliamentary road to Socialism.
The crucial tenet is that the welfare state has improved the conditions of the 
working-class. The political economies of advanced capitalist democracies vary 
considerably due to the variance in the strength of organized labour. The main 
assumption, again, is that the natural way for the working-class to gain power is 
through organizations with a Social Democratic project. The question, whether this was 
historically the case is not posed.
This explains Stephen’s (1979) problematic finding that in some nations high 
levels of social spending are found in the absence of a strong Social Democratic labour 
movement. The proposed solution for inexplicable exceptions involved an attempt to 
scrutinize the influence of the number of Catholics in a country on the level of welfare 
spending. The reason for including such a variable was that "it seemed possible that 
anti-capitalist aspects of Catholic ideology -such as notions of fair wage or prohibitions 
of usury- as well as the generally positive attitude of the Catholic church towards 
welfare for the poor might encourage government welfare spending" (Stephens 1979a: 
100). As a result, the basic assumption of labour power equals Social Democratic 
power had to be relaxed, because "when the Catholics are a centre party and have a 
substantial base in the organized working class, particularly when they have a strong 
trade union central o f their own, then welfare state development will be encouraged by 
Catholic social and political forces." (Stephens 1979a: 100, my emphasis)8’. 
Apparently, working class mobilization in other than Social Democratic forms poses 
formidable theoretical obstacles within the Social Democratic framework. Exceptions 
are therefore more likely to result from theoretical anomalies than from empirical 
eccentricity.
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8) Catholicism can express its political strength also in another way, as for instance in the United 
Sûtes, ’where most Catholics are working class and where the trade unions are heavily Catholic’. As 
a result "the church has often been a major active supporter of the expansion of the welfare state* 
(Stephens 1979a: 101).
The existence of centre parties tends to violate the pure Social Democratic 
model, for "in some European nations (the Netherlands, for example), we find Catholic 
Confessional parties with strong organizational and political links with the working 
class which have backed quasi-Social Democratic welfare developments, although 
without the Social Democrats’ enthusiasm for the interventionist state as an end in 
itself" (Shalev 1983a: 327). From the very use of words one can deduct that 
Confessional parties are assumed to have no social policy program of their own. Theirs 
is a dependent quasi-Social Democratic policy performance. The proposition then has 
to become that "certain Catholic parties especially behave to some extent as Junctional 
equivalents to the Socialists" (Shalev 1983a: 337, my emphasis).
The question, however, is whether a theory of functional equivalence or, for 
that matter, functional equifinality, offers a sufficient reflection upon the possible 
independent influence of Catholicism or Christian Democracy on the welfare state. 
Partly the incapacity to deal with the association in a theoretically convincing way has 
to do with the unsatisfactory conceptualization of the welfare state in terms of social 
spending. Being functionally equivalent, then, simply means that other (Catholic, 
Confessional, Christian Democratic) parties spend at least as much as Social 
Democratic parties in government (see also Schmidt 1982; 1985; 1988). This is not to 
deny that these movements may actually be functionally equivalent as to social 
spending, but that such an argument is not sufficient for understanding Christian 
Democratic idiosyncracy. The "paradigmatically Dutch problem of high spending 
without Social Democratic dominance” (Shalev 1983a: 338) may have provoked a 
number of alternative explanations and the causal connection among these factors and 
their theoretical status may have remained obscure, but exceptionalism as such is only 
a problem within the framework of the ’paradigmatic’ Social Democratic model, partly 
arising out of the preoccupation with spending, partly as a result of equating labour 
power with Social Democracy.
It is doubtful whether an operationalization in terms of social spending could 
clarify what is distinctive about welfare states in an unambiguous manner. In fact, the 
spotlight on spending -although as such not irrelevant- conceals pertinent qualitative 
differences both in structure and in outcome. The operationalizations of the dependent 
variable in terms of levels of spending "obscure the presence of distinctly different
147
welfare-state regimes" (Esping-Andersen 1985b: 225). In other words, it does not 
provide any information about "the specific institutional arrangements adopted by 
societies in the pursuit of work and welfare" (Esping-Andersen 1987: 6)9>.
The preoccupation with spending has led to a misspecification of the political 
impact of Christian Democracy. I do not think that much is gained when one only 
holds that -under conditions of economic prosperity- Catholic political forces are 
functional equivalents to Social Democracy in terms of social spending. Or that 
Catholicism explains social spending even better than Social Democracy (Wilensky 
1981). Spending may be a useful starting point, but it is not the relevant only issue. 
What in addition should be looked at is the extent to which Christian Democracy 
determines the quality of the institutional arrangement between market, state and 
family, and not just the differences in the quantity of social spending.
Beyond the ’Black Box' o f Spending
The entire debate on the welfare state actually lacks a genuine interest in the welfare 
state itself (Esping-Andersen 1990). Studies have been preoccupied with other 
problems, like industrialization, power, or the contradictions of capitalism. Esping- 
Andersen’s (1990) general verdict on the literature is that "most of these studies claim 
to explain the welfare state. Yet their focus on spending is misleading. Expenditures 
are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states" (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 19). Welfare states should be analyzed in terms of the quality of social rights, 
their patterns of stratification and the way in which state, market and the family are 
interrelated. There does not exist any causal linearity between societal power and 
welfare statism. Welfare states cluster along qualitative and political dimensions.
Let me then tum to Esping-Andersen’s (1985b; 1990) theory of distributional 
regimes and pay special attention to his treatment of the Conservative and corporatist- 
statist regimes of continental Europe. My argument will be that the political explanation 
of Conservative regime is not entirely convincing. Not all variables involved in the
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9) It is largely for this reason that the study by Hage et al. (1989) is unsatisfactory. A 'contingency’ 
theory of the state is proposed under the assumption that many of the theoretical accounts of the 
emergence and growth of the welfare state have their own value for specific countries and particular 
periods. However, the focus on spending invalidates such progress.
analysis of the Conservative corporatist-etatist cluster appear to have been accurately 
chosen. The interpretation of the role of the state, for instance, in countries where 
Christian Democracy has been the dominant political force is ambiguous. It seems that 
the description is too much tailored to the German case and its tradition of monarchical 
Socialism.
The underlying criticism, however, pertains to what I have identified as the 
unreasoned presupposition of equating labour power and Social Democracy. Esping- 
Andersen makes the observation that dominant theories of working-class mobilization 
fail to explain the origins of social policy, because they are "essentially premised on 
the laborist, Socialist, or Social Democratic model of collective action, a model that 
was far from being dominant until well into the twentieth century" (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 109). The point is important and suggests that class reductionism is explicitly 
avoided since one "cannot assume that Socialism is the natural basis for wage-eamer 
mobilization" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 17). However, the analysis of class and labour 
mobilization still appears to suffer from the assumption of the Social Democratic 
model. It seems impossible to imagine any other form of labour power mobilization 
than one which stresses de-commodification, equality and solidarity, that is, the typical 
Social Democratic values. Apparently, the Liberal and Conservative clusters of welfare 
states are largely defined by emphasizing the elements in which they differ from the 
Social Democratic agglomeration. Therefore, the assumption of the welfare state as 
basically being the fruition of Social Democratic power mobilization is largely intact.
It is only in the context of this presumption that the thesis of wage-eamer mass 
movements converging around the Social Democratic model makes sense. In the course 
of the analyses, wage-eamers parties are equated with Leftist parties. And only in this 
way would it be possible to defend the thesis that the development of the welfare state 
is basically the "Social Democratization of the welfare state" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 
110). And if Social Democratization means "the capacity to substitute for the 
characteristics dominant in either a Liberal or Conservative regime, a comprehensive, 
universalistic, ’de-commodifying’, full employment welfare state" (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 110), the other regimes and their political determinants can never assume a 
theoretical status comparable to and at the same level of the Social Democratic model.
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In earlier analyses of distributional regimes the argument was that the welfare 
state is the result of working-class demands that "logically flow from the position in 
which wage earners find themselves; it is (...) the most likely outcome where wage- 
eamers are given a collective, political expression" (Esping-Andersen 1985b: 227). 
And "as individuals and collectivities, wage earners will logically strive to de- 
commodify their status" (Esping-Andersen 1985b: 228). The political stance that is 
inherent in the position of wage-eamers and which therefore appears as the ’logical’ 
consequence of power mobilization is the Social Democratic welfare state. "Social 
policy (...) becomes an arena for the accumulation of working-class power resources; 
the overriding principle is to substitute market exchange with social distribution and 
property rights with social rights. The ’Social Democratization’ of capitalism implies 
that social policy involves a four-pronged agenda: the de-commodification of society 
along soiidaristic principles; redistributive corrections of market-induced inequalities; 
and, above all, the institutionalization of sustained full employment" (Esping-Andersen 
1985b: 228).
The theory of the Social Democratization of capitalism ultimately leads to a 
return to a certain version of class reductionism and therefore to a misinterpretation of 
the political determination of the advanced welfare states in countries where Social 
Democracy was not the dominant political actor. The only political variable relevant 
in the explanation of distributional regimes is the strength of the labour movement and 
its political representative. But in this theory the labour movement can only be the 
Social Democratic labour movement and the political representative of the wage-eamers 
can only be the Social Democratic party. This is why it is argued that "the capacity of 
labour movements to substitute ’Social Democracy’ for either Liberalism or 
Conservatism is obviously related to their historical position of power" (Esping- 
Andersen 1985b: 233).
The main criticism, then, is that it is not an accident that a strong association 
between working-class power mobilization and the Social Democratization of capitalism 
is found if one assumes that working-class mobilization equals Social Democratic 
power mobilization. As a consequence of this the political determinants of the non- 
Social Democratic welfare regimes cannot be grasped adequately. This becomes 
especially clear when the analysis suggests that the Conservative nations form a semi-
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Social-Democratic cluster. Such a finding is typically conceptualized as an ’impurity’. 
In countries like Austria, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands "the labour 
movements’ mobilization strategies have been frustrated by the social Christian mass 
parties’ capacity to attract large sections of the wage earners on denominational 
grounds" (Esping-Andersen 1985b: 243). The problem lies in the theoretical inability 
to conceptualize Confessional mass parties in any other way than as "solid and unified 
bourgeois coalitions", albeit with substantial support from wage earners. Such a 
configuration of political power, then, may have "served to limit the terrain for labour 
parties to mobilize and to block their capacity to build stable governing alliances”, and 
it may also have "ensured that postwar social-policy expansion occurred within pre­
existing Conservative institutional parameters" (Esping-Andersen 1985b: 224), it does 
not clarify what Confessional mass parties -sometimes in coalition with a Social 
Democratic party- have actually produced.
It is this fundamental assumption of the basically Social Democratic essence of 
the position of wage-labour in capitalist societies which makes it so difficult to consider 
in a theoretically convincing way the relative and independent role of Christian 
Democracy. Confessional parties, for instance, can only take the role of ’filtering’ 
labour demands, which would otherwise be Social Democratic in nature. And what 
about the countries where Christian Democracy has been the dominant force? "In 
countries like the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Belgium, the Christian Democratic 
parties of the postwar era gained prominence in part because of their electoral success 
among workers; being capable of long-term governance, they have also been decisive 
in the interpretation of labour’s social-policy needs” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 111). In 
other words, labour has autonomous social-policy needs which would normally lead to 
Social Democratic power mobilization concentrating around the goals of solidarity, 
equality and universalism, unless these demands are ’filtered’ and ’interpreted’ (and 
implicitly assumed to be ’distorted’) by other movements, notably Christian Demo­
cracy.
Needed is a complete cancellation of the untenable assumption. The fact that in 
Western Europe the dominant pattern of the political mobilization of wage earners led 
to the formation of Social Democratic or Socialist movements cannot be taken to 
constitute the normal course of working-class mobilization. This historical regularity
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of Social Democratic mobilization is not a standard from which for example Christian 
Democratic political forces of wage labour would be a ’deviation’. A Socialist or Social 
Democratic labour movement is not a priori to be valued higher than its Christian 
Democratic counterparts in its reformist capacities (Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988). 
One needs to allow for the possibility of conceptualizing the power of wage earners in 
other forms than the Social Democratic mobilization. Perhaps one should think of a 
possible Christian rather than Social Democratization of capitalism. This is why it is 
crucial to understand Christian Democracy as fundamentally organizing the very 
conflict between wage-labour and capital within the movement itself. Christian 
Democracy structures the politics of the antagonism in a fundamentally different 
manner.
To a certain extent the inability to make sense of the Christian Democratization 
of capitalism is therefore an effect of the black box of Christian Democracy itself. If 
one looks in some more detail at Esping-Andersen’s more recent description of the 
Conservative and corporatist-statist regimes of continental Europe (Austria, France, 
Germany, and Italy), that is, at the regimes where religion is hypothesized to have 
played an influential role, a few interesting things can be noted. First of all, the Social 
Democratic bias appears much less dominant. De-commodification is now concep­
tualized as an element of social policy in these nations, too. The distinguishing 
characteristic is the highly status differentiating nature of social policy. The traditional 
(nuclear) family is the focus of social policy. "Social insurance typically excludes non­
working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. Day care, and similar 
family services, are conspicuously underdeveloped; the principle of ’subsidiarity’ serves 
to emphasize that the state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its 
members is exhausted" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Nevertheless, a second 
observation could be that the very word ’underdevelop’ can only make sense when one 
thinks of the Social Democratic welfare state as the ’developed’ version.
On Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 38) account, Conservatism rejected the 
commodity form of wage labour as "morally degrading, socially corrupting, atomizing, 
and anomic. Individuals are not meant to compete or struggle, but to subordinate self- 
interest to recognized authority and prevailing institutions". Conservatism provided 
three strategies to address the commodification of labour. The first was feudal
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paternalism where certain obligations to provide welfare come with the agreement to 
work for a money-wage. The second strategy concerned the model of the corporate 
societies. The tradition of etatism was a third Conservative strategy to deal with 
commodification and is best illustrated by the idea of ’monarchical Socialism’, that is 
"an absolutist model of paternal-authoritarian obligation for the welfare of its subjects" 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 40).
The main objection to this analysis, although a major advance in comparison 
with the traditional Social Democratic model, follows from the considerations in the 
first part of this dissertation. The notion ’Conservative’ appears to be used in too 
indiscriminate a manner. Conservatism may mean corporatism, Roman Catholic social 
theory, Fascism, etatism, and feudalism. On my account, the latter three would not be 
part of Christian Democratic policies, but -as I will argue in part three- constitute 
historical and structural conditions under which social capitalism took shape in 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. This can be elucidated by the theory of the 
stratification-effects of social policy. The argument here is that the varieties of 
Conservatism unite in their "loathing of the combined social leveling and class 
antagonisms brought about by capitalism. Be it in favour of strict hierarchy, 
corporatism, or of familialism, the unifying theme is that traditional status relations 
must be retained for the sake of social integration" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 58). This 
is certainly true in the case of etatist paternalism of the Bismarckian kind, but it is not 
Christian Democracy’s preference. In Germany, for instance, the Union parties 
inherited the social policy legacy of this nation and have adopted it on their own 
conditions (see Chapter 9).
Concluding Remarks
From the theories of industrialization and modernization one can learn the possible 
relevance of economic development and demography in the account of welfare state 
development. These factors, I would argue, would especially be critical when looking 
at social spending, either as independent variables or as ’controls’. It seems 
theoretically less clear, however, how enabling properties and ’needs’ of societies can
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be expected to have an autonomous influence on the qualitative characteristics of 
welfare regimes and account for subtle cross-national variation.
Social spending as an operationalization of the welfare state is for the discussed 
reasons not entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, it makes sense to look at spending as 
a way of analyzing the possible functional equivalence of Social Democracy and 
Christian Democracy and of testing hypotheses on competition or interaction between 
the two as suggested by Castles and Mitchell (1990). Spending, however, can only be 
the starting point of the analysis, for possible functional equiflnality cannot clarify 
social capitalist distinctiveness. In this respect, the theory of distributional regimes and 
the emphasis on the "the specific institutional arrangements adopted by societies in the 
pursuit of work and welfare" (Esping-Andersen 1987: 6) makes more sense.
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SOCIAL CAPITALISM AS A WELFARE STATE REGIME
CHAPTER 7

This chapter is devoted to the empirical analysis of the social capitalist welfare state 
regime0. The regime is appraised by highlighting -in cross-national perspective- those 
elements theoretically and historically identified as its cardinal traits. The leading 
question concerns the extent to which these properties of the regime can be attributed 
to the power of Christian Democracy. I should stress -perhaps superfluously- that the 
purpose of this chapter is not to explain welfare state development as such. My sole 
concern is with a particular type of welfare state, social capitalism, and its political 
determinant, Christian Democracy. Consequently, the operationalizations of the 
dependent variable are meant to serve one purpose: to identify the existence of a social 
capitalist welfare state regime and to test hypotheses about the relationship between the 
central aspects of social capitalism and Christian Democracy. All hypotheses are 
derived from the central thesis of this dissertation, that Christian Democracy fosters 
a distinctive welfare state regime.
Regression analysis is used for the testing of the hypotheses and rank-orders of 
nations are presented to illustrate the position of welfare regimes according to various 
indicators. The design for the regression is cross-sectional. For every equation or 
model I report second order tests for the violations of the regression assumptions. The 
results of the tests and of the analysis of the residuals are -if worth discussing- 
evaluated in the main text and always extensively reported in footnotes. The year 1960 
(approximately) is the most satisfactory date for the analysis. The main reason is that 
it was in the first decades after the Second World war that the foundational decisions 
were taken considering the institutional arrangements of economy, state and society.
Once in position, institutional arrangements tend to become inert in the sense that 
they are not very likely to change very rapidly due to conjunctural political incidents. 
The continuous debates on the need for institutional reforms in many a nation and their 
leitmotif 'simplification’ may illustrate the point. It is quite probable that certain 
qualitative characteristics remain similar over time. Nevertheless, it is also quite likely 
that systems expand rather than change under the influence of prolonged economic 
prosperity. Expansion may assume an autonomous logic. Economic growth enables the
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1) I would like to thanfr Hanld Sonnberger for his help with the technical details of the econometric 
procedures and for making me aware of the considerable errors in earlier drafts of this chapter. The 
remaining mistakes are of course my responsibility.
extension of social rights to previously excluded groups. The complicating factor is, 
that quantitative change at a certain stage may turn into a qualitative change. Increasing 
inclusion may turn a former selective scheme into a universal one. Both convergence 
and continuing, albeit decreasing, divergence of welfare states belong to the theoretical 
possibilities. In order to glance at these phenomena a date around 1980 serves as a 
point of reference, too2). A further expectation is that different types of welfare states 
perform in dissimilar ways under economic stress. In this context, one would be able 
to study the possible effects of certain properties of social capitalism (passivity, 
transfer-bias, labour market participation) under conditions of increasing demand on 
the state.
A Specification o f Hypotheses
In chapter 5 I presented a recapitulation of the model of social capitalism in five 
propositions, concerning the conditional recognition of capitalism (1); the scope and 
limits of state intervention (2); the specific theory of class (3) and inequality (4); and 
the idea of the just wage and the role of the family in economy and social policy (5). 
Here I present a reformulation of these propositions as hypotheses for the empirical 
analysis.
I. Anti-capitalism and social Reform; De-commodification
One of the key characteristics of capitalism is the commodity-form of labour power. 
Anti-capitalism -or better- the conditional acceptance of the capitalist production system 
and the implied readiness to reform leads one to expect that de-commodification is not 
an exclusive Social Democratic asset.
Hypothesis 1.1: With respect to de-commodification one will find no or hardly any 
significant difference between nations ruled by Social Democracy and those dominated 
by Christian Democracy, but a marked difference between these nations on the one
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2) The issue of convergence versus divergence, however, goes beyond the topic of this study.
hand, and the residualist welfare states on the other hand. Social Democracy and 
Christian Democracy are functionally equivalent as to de-commodification.
Hypothesis 1.2: However, founded on the idea that Christian Democracy tends to 
attach social rights to the family rather than to the individual, the de-commodification 
of families will be more pronounced in social capitalist regimes than in any other type 
of welfare state.
II. The Role of the State in the Configuration of State. Market and Family: Sub­
sidiarity and its Expected Consequences
The peculiar role accorded to the state is perhaps the fundamental distinctive feature 
of social capitalism and is designated by the theory of subsidiarity. State intervention 
is driven and demarcated by the conviction that -rather than acting as an institution on 
its own right- the state should create and enhance the conditions under which lower 
social bodies, the family in particular, are best able to perform their natural functions. 
The state assists so that the lower organs can help themselves.
Hypothesis n .l.a : Social capitalist welfare regimes tend to rely on cash-benefits in 
their social security schemes.
Hypothesis n.l.b: Social capitalist welfare regimes are passive welfare states with 
respect to labour market policy, in the sense that they devote more resources to passive 
measures of labour market policy (income maintenance, early retirement) than to active 
measures (training, employment services). This characteristic is particularly clear under 
conditions of declining economic prosperity.
Hypothesis H.2: Different types of configurations of market, state and family create 
different types of employment patterns. In particular, one would expect labour market 
participation rates (both of men and women, but of women in particular) to be 
comparatively low in those nations that are characterized by transfer-bias and passivity 
(see also hypotheses IV.4 and IV.5)
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Hypothesis 11.3: The administration of the main welfare institutions is expected to be 
controlled by private or semi-public organizations, supervised and subsidized by the 
state. Ideally one would anticipate a bi- or tripartite structure in the control of the main 
social security schemes.
Hypothesis II.4: The counterpart or complement of hypothesis II.3 concerning self- 
government is the presumption of self-responsibility: the major schemes ought to be 
financed by the categories involved themselves. More particularly, one would expect 
the social capitalist welfare regime to be insurance-biased with little or low state 
participation in the financing of the major social schemes. The bulk of the social 
security burden ought to be carried by the employers and the insured. The state only 
functions as a transfer-institution (Hypothesis U.l.a).
h i. Class and ft? Reproduction of Natural Inequality
The organic whole of society consisting of functionally differentiated members is 
conceived of as a natural order. By implication members of society are not equal, yet 
equally important for the societal body as a whole. Changing the societal order can 
only mean a violation of the natural order. Social justice, however, demands that each 
and every class gets what is its due. Redistribution of societal wealth is precisely 
limited by this formula. The differences between classes as well as conflicts of 
interests, however, should not lead to a class-war. The recognition and reproduction 
of difference is a precondition for the survival of the organism of society. The political 
pertinence of class, therefore, needs to be diluted, while class needs to be nourished.
Hypothesis m .l :  Social policy in social capitalist nations tends to reproduce rather 
than overcome class and status differences. Benefits tend to be eamings-or status- 
related, so that they preserve rather than supersede social difference.
Hypothesis 111.2: Social capitalist welfare regimes tend to be fragmented in a variety 
of separate schemes for a variety of occupational or status groups.
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Hypothesis 1U.3: Social policy is a means to establish cross-class support. Issues and 
societal risks not directly related to (the politics of) class, such as old age, can be 
expected to be high on the Christian Democratic political agenda.
IV. Family and the Position of Women
The theory of the just wage prescribes a money-income for a male worker which is 
sufficient to provide for his family. The man is the head of the family and the family 
is the cornerstone of society; it is the first institution to provide care. The role of a 
woman is to care for her husband and her children and possibly for other members of 
the (extended) family. She is not to be forced onto the labour market, for this would 
inhibit her natural function. A woman's labour ought to stay un-commodified 
(hypothesis 1.2). The state as a higher institution within the body of society is 
responsible for assisting families in case of need.
Hypothesis IV. 1: Income replacement benefits tend to be high under the assumption 
that they are to replace a family wage rather than an individual wage. As an unintended 
effect social capitalist welfare states tend to be as generous as the Social Democratic 
regime.
Hypothesis IV.2: Social security schemes in the social capitalist welfare regime tend 
to be family-biased in that the difference in net replacement of income between a 
family and an unmarried individual is generally greater under this regime than in other 
welfare state regime.
Hypothesis IV.3: The difference between after tax wages for families and those for 
unmarried individuals in social capitalist nations is greater than elsewhere, due to the 
tax-system which privileges the family.
Hypothesis IV.4: The tax-benefit system of social capitalist nations tends to disfavour 
the active participation in gainful employment of married women, especially married 
women with children.
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Hypothesis IV.5: Female labour participation rates will be substantially lower in social 
capitalist nations than anywhere else.
The Issue o f De-commodification 1: Spending, 'Need* and Political Intermediation
What is de-commodification? As a concept it addresses the commodity-form of labour 
power under capitalist market conditions. "The sovereignty of the market is in general 
a function of the degree to which workers behave as commodities'* (Esping-Andersen 
198S: 31). Commodification and de-commodification are "opposite ends of a 
continuum. Living standards distributed independently of market criteria are de­
commodified. Living standards distributed according to wage-eamer’s performance in 
the marketplace are commodified (...)" (Western 1989: 202). In other words, de­
commodification refers to "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a 
socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 37).
De-commodification understood as the relative market-independence of labour 
power in capitalist societies as a result of the introduction of a non-market logic -as 
shown in chapter 6- is commonly viewed as an exclusively Social Democratic social 
policy goal. A high level of de-commodification is then invariably contributed to Social 
Democratic power mobilization, because it is seen as a principal precondition for Social 
Democratic power mobilization as such (Esping-Andersen 1985a; Western 1989). The 
usual model holds that de-commodification is a linear function of Social Democratic 
party strength, trade union power, while controlling for socioeconomic conditions and 
demographic pressures.
Western operationalized the dependent variable ’de-commodification’ as a means 
to capture "level and coverage of consumption derived from non-market sources in 
relation to wage-based consumption” (Western 1989: 208). It is quite interesting to note 
that among the top 5 de-commodified nations Western reports, Belgium takes the first 
place, followed by Sweden (2), the Netherlands (3), Germany (4) and France (5). 
Given this ranking of nations, one would have to problematize the anticipated
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importance of Social Democratic Party incumbency, given the presence of the social 
capitalist countries in the top 53).
De-commodification may not be an exclusive property of Social Democratic 
politics. There may, however, exist various forms of de-commodification, one -the 
Social Democratic one- which attaches social rights to individuals as citizens and 
another -the Christian Democratic one- which ties social rights to other social units, 
particularly the family. The intent may not be identical, but the effect might very well 
be similar. This could give rise to the functional equivalence of Social Democracy and 
Christian Democracy. The thesis is that both Christian Democracy and Social 
Democracy might be equally de-commodifying forces (hypothesis 1.1), although they 
might differ in that they do not de-commodify analogous units (hypothesis 1.2). In other 
words, even if one finds the social capitalist nations among the top most de-com- 
modified welfare states together with the Social Democratic nations, it does not 
necessarily imply that the quality of de-commodification is similar.
How to measure de-commodification? First of all, it makes sense to look at 
expenditure. For although solely referring to social spending as a way of portraying 
attributes of welfare states may be misleading, it will certainly not be wholly 
uninformative either. Social expenditures tend to be determined by a variety of 
demographic, economic and political factors and may mean different things. At the 
same time, however, the granting of social rights (and therefore the extent of de­
commodification) will in one way or another be mirrored in social spending since 
rightfully claimed social rights necessarily lead to higher spending (Korpi 1989: 314).
The most frequently used measure of welfare state development and of the level of 
political rather than economic distribution concerns the social security expenditure of 
a nation. Table 1 gives the rank-order of countries in 1960 according to this indicator. 
It is immediately clear that the nations scoring highest in 1960 are those where 
Christian Democracy, but also Social Democracy are considerably strong political 
actors. Austria, Germany and Belgium, in fact, all score one standard deviation above 
average.
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3) Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 52) index of de-commodification shows a slightly different rank-order 
of nations. However, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands all score above average 
on his scale.
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Table 1. Expenditure of Social Security Schemes as Percentage
of GDP, 1960 (rank-order)
1. Austria 15.4 10. United Kingdom 10.8
2. Germany 15.4 11. Norway 9.4
3. Belgium 13.3 12. Ireland 9.3
4. France 13.2 13. Canada 9.2
5. Italy 11.7 14. Finland 8.8
6. New Zealand 11.5 15. Australia 7.7
7. Netherlands 11.1 16. Switzerland 7.5
8. Denmark 11.1 17. United States 6.8
9. Sweden 10.9 18. Japan 4.9
Average 10.4
St. Dev. 2.8
Source ILO, The Cost of Social Security, various years.
All of the nations assumed to exhibit features of social capitalism at this time (Austria, 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and to a certain extent, France as well) 
score above average, as do Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. What does this 
mean? First of all, prima vista it denotes that the traditional explanation of Social 
Democratic power mobilization cannot convince. At the same time, however, the only 
country with a strong Christian Democratic movement, but without a high level of 
social spending, is Switzerland, scoring one standard deviation below average.
These findings could be taken to suggest that Christian Democracy and Social 
Democracy were indeed functional equivalents in 1960 as far as spending is concerned. 
But perhaps we might actually observe a spurious relationship, because other variables 
such as age structure, unemployment rates or the wealth of a nation, would explain the 
observed levels of spending. The theoretically most satisfactory explanation, however, 
would be that -given other important factors such as an ageing population, economic 
wealth, and the level of unemployment and in addition to the functional equivalence of 
Christian Democracy and Social Democracy- social expenditure is particularly boosted 
under conditions of competition or interaction between Christian Democracy and Social 
Democracy (Castles and Mitchell 1990).
Recent research suggests that the demographic structure of a nation’s population 
tends to be the strongest predictor of social spending per se (Pampel and Williamson
1989). Older people simply need more care. However, it is not at all clear that they 
get the care they need because they need it. The question how such a need is translated 
into an effective social right before these programs were inaugurated or at a time that 
these schemes hardly had had the time to ’mature’ is left unanswered. In other words, 
the problem of the mechanisms actually fulfilling the need is posed. It is hard to image 
how ’need’ as such can explain its own fulfillment. The argument is that it is politics 
that has to intermediate between need and fulfillment, between societal pressure and 
social solution. It can be expected, then, that the demographic structure of a society is 
related to social expenditure (being the first measure of de-commodification), mainly 
in combination with political determinants, in particular the competition or interaction 
between Social Democracy and Christian Democracy.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation of a starting model4’ (column 2, model I) which 
states that Social Security Expenditure in 1960 (SSE60, as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product) is a linear function of Gross Domestic Product per Capita in 1960 
(GDPCAP60, at current prices and current exchange rates, in US dollars5’), the 
Unemployment Rate in 1960 (UERATE60, proportion of labour force unemployed), 
the Proportion Aged in a nation (AGE60, number of people 65 or older as a proportion 
of total population), Union Density in 1960 (UNION6O, number of union members as 
a proportion of total labour force) and a variable SDCD60, measuring the strength of 
the Left (LPS60, Left parliamentary seats as a proportion of total parliamentary seats, 
average 1945-1960), the strength of Christian Democracy (CPS60, parliamentary seats 
of Christian Democratic as a proportion of total parliamentary seats, average 1945-
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4) This model and all other regression models reported in this chapter were tested for violation of 
the regression assumptions, using the Interactive Simulation System (IAS), developed at the Institute for 
Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria (see Institute for Advanced Studies, 1990), which also contains an 
explanation of the mathematical properties of the tests. Tests for heteroskedasticity included the 
Goldfield-Quandt Test and the White Test; for normality the Jarque-Bera Test; for functional form a 
Regression Specification Error Test (reset); for structural change a mean shift outlier model Test as well 
as residual sensitivity analysis for influential data. All variables in each estimation reported in this 
chapter, except in the equation reported in table 18, are standardized.
5) Unfortunately, data on GDP per capita at current prices and US dollars using the Purchasing 
Power Parities were not available for 1960.
I9606’) plus the ’competition’ or interaction between the two, 1945-1960 (SDCD60: 
{[LPS60 + CPS60] 12} +[LPS60 * CPS60])7>. I also estimated various models with 
other (combinations of) the political variables, including for instance 1) only LPS60, 
which -in combination with the control variables- rendered insignificant results, 2) only 
CPS60, which was significant, and 3) an interaction between CPS60 and LPS60. The 
latter two did not perform as efficiently as SDCD60.
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable *
Social Security Expenditure, 1960
I II
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 GDPCAP60 00.08200 —
2 UERATE60 -0.05426 —
3 AGE60 00.40195* 1 00.43236“
4 UNION6O 00.01305 —
5 SDCD60 00.61566“ 2 00.56944“
R: (Adj.) .646 .686
F-tests:
Model 1: Ho: Model 2: Ho
B1 = B2=B4=0 B1=B2=0
F: 00.107 F: 20.
PR: 95.45 % PR: 00.1
Ho:
B3=B5=0 
F: 15.513
PR: 00.04%
C : significant at 0.1 -level; ~ : significant at 0.05 -level;
significant at 0.01 -level; F * F-statistic; PR = probability value)
6) I have decided to take parliamentary shares rather than weighted cabinet shares in order to 
introduce somewhat more variance for the Christian Democracy variable. Cabinet shares are of course 
theoretically more satisfactory. On the other hand, the zero-order correlation between LPS60 and 
weighted cabinet shares of left parties (LWCS60) is .73 and between CPS60 and Christian Democratic 
weighted cabinet shares (CWCS60) even .92. Estimation with the cabinet shares variables gave roughly 
comparable results and did not change the conclusions.
7) See appendix 1 for summary statistics of the variables used in the equations and the sources of 
the data.
The finding is that in the start equation the demographic and the political variable are 
statistically significant (Model I). The second model (column 3, model II), after 
dropping the insignificant variables, is clearly superior to and more parsimonious than 
the first model. In addition, the proposed hypothesis on the relevance of politics (in this 
case the functional equivalence of Social Democracy and Christian Democracy as well 
as the interaction between the two) in combination with demography cannot be rejected 
and seems plausible. Further second order testing of model II showed that there 
appeared to be no signs of problems with the main regression assumptions8’. The 
analysis of the (externally studentized) residuals, however, suggested -as could be 
expected- Switzerland to be an outlier. An outlier test, however, although indeed 
showing Switzerland as having the highest value, did not lead to a rejection of the null- 
hypothesis. Looking somewhat closer at the residuals of nations of current interest 
revealed that Germany had an unexpectedly high residual (1.38), Italy a negative 
residual (-.255), whereas the Netherlands performed as expected (-.01). This suggest 
that there is still variation within these nations of the social capitalist group. The 
overall conclusion, however, is that it is plausible to assume that in terms of social 
spending both Christian Democracy and Social Democracy might be equally de- 
commodifying forces (hypothesis 1.1), while -given a certain degree of demographic 
pressure- the ’competition’ or interaction between the two particularly boosts spending. 
The results of the analysis suggest, furthermore, that rather than accepting a functional 
explanation for social spending, a politically more sensitive account seems quite 
feasible.
De-commodification 2: Pensions
Pensions "constitute a central link between work and leisure, between earned income 
and redistribution, between individualism and solidarity, between the cash nexus and 
social rights" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 80) and in this sense can be seen as an important 
component of de-commodification. After the Second World War two types of state
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8) Jarque-Bera test: 0.217 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 89.7%; White’s test: 6.131 (Chi2, df 4), Pr : 18.96%; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 2.290 (F 7,7), P r: 14.83; Outlier-test: 2.336, critical value: 3.62 (5%), 4.48 (1 %). 
In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems.
pensions emerged, one with universal flat rate benefits at a certain minimum level to 
be supplemented by private, occupational schemes (the Beveridge-model), and another 
social insurance type, relating benefits to contributions and employment experience. 
Here, the following hypothesis can be advanced. Because the issue of age concerns a 
risk of life rather than a risk of class one would expect Christian Democracy initially 
to be particularly active in the field of old age provision. Social policy is a means to 
establish cross-class support without having to rely on the political salience of class 
(Hypothesis III.3).
Let me then first have a cursory look at the differences in pension systems among 
developed welfare states in 1960 in terms of spending. Table 3 summarizes pension 
expenditure as a proportion of total social spending in 1960 and gives the rank-order 
of 18 OECD nations according to this dimension. It is not surprising to find a 
comparable rank-order of nations as in Table 1 (Germany, Austria, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands all score above average, Sweden and Norway near the average and the 
Anglo-Saxon nations all below the average) since pensions account for the largest share 
of total social security spending.
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Table 3 Pension Expenditure as a % of Gross Domestic Product,
1960 (rank-order)
1. Germany 9.81 10. Belgium*1 4.35
2. Austria 9.61 11. United States 4.20
3. France 5.90 12. United Kingdom 4.08
4. Italy 5.46 13. Australia 3.37
5. Netherlands 5.22 14. Finland 3.32
6. Denmark 4.63 15. Canada 2.76
7. Sweden 4.45 16. Switzerland 2.30
8. Norway 4.39 17. Ireland 2.52
9. New Zealand 4.39 18. Japan 1.39
Average 4.56
St. Dev. 2.14
*' 1964
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure. 1960-1990. Problems of 
Growth and Control. Paris 1985, annex c, p. 79-97, own computations.
A comparable pattern emerges when one looks instead at Table 4, which displays net, 
after-tax, pensions as a percentage of average worker wage. This percentage was 
weighted by the take-up rate, because it is of course this information combined with 
expenditure which details the actual scope and quality of the pension regimes.
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Table 4. 1960-Rank-order of Selected OECD-countries according
to the net (after-tax) pension as a proportion of 
average worker wage, weighted by the take-up rate 
proportion of population > = 65 receiving a social 
security pension in 1960)
1. Netherlands .38 10. Finland .19
2. Austria .36 11. Australia .16
3. New Zealand .33 12. Switzerland .15
4. Italy .32 13. Canada .15
5. Belgium .28 14. Norway .14
6. Germany .27 15. United States .11
7. Denmark .25 16. Ireland .09
8. United Kingdom .21 17. Japan .02
9. Sweden .19 18. France —
Average .21
St. Dev. .10
Source: SSIB-data files9’, variables PTURAT65, PNERAVAL.
Again we see that nations such as Germany, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands (now 
joined by Belgium as well) tend to score above average when it comes to the 
functioning of the social security pension system in practice in 1960. And again, the 
Anglo-Saxon nations (Australia, Canada and the United States) are below average, 
whereas the United Kingdom is precisely on average. A clear Scandinavian, Social 
Democratic cluster with respect to pensions and pension coverage was apparently not 
yet present in 1960.
Theoretically, it seems difficult to maintain that such qualitative differences in 
pension spending might be explained exclusively by the need of the aged, for how
9) SSIB stands for ’Svensk Socialpolitik i International Belysning’. This very rich data-bank contains 
detailed information on institutional characteristics of 18 welfare states over the period 1933-1980 and 
was originally constructed at the Swedish Institute for Social Research. I am very grateful to the original 
compilers of this data bank, Gosta Esping-Andersen, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, for their 
generosity in letting me use the fruits of such time-consuming effort. It has saved me a year (at least). 
Joakim Palme seat me an update of the data-set.
could ’need’ explain coverage and replacement rates? Again, political intermediation 
would be necessary to translate needs or demands into rights on the basis of available 
resources. Table 5 summarizes a starting model (column 2, model I) which states that 
net (after-tax) pension as a proportion of average worker wage, weighted by the take- 
up rate (proportion of population aged 65 or older receiving a social security pension 
in I960)1® is a linear function of Gross Domestic Product per Capita in 1960 
(GDPCAP60, at current prices and current exchange rates, in US dollars), the 
Proportion Aged in a nation (AGE60, number of people 65 or older as a proportion of 
total population), Left (LPS60, Left parliamentary seats as a proportion of total 
parliamentary seats, average 1945-1960) and Christian Democratic Party strength 
(CPS60, parliamentary seats of Christian Democratic as a proportion of total 
parliamentary seats, average 1945-1960).
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10) Data for France had to be extrapolated from 1975, the first year information 
was available.
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Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable =
net (after-tax) pension as a proportion of average 
worker wage, weighted by the take-up rate, 1960
I II
Variable Estimated Estimate
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 GDPCAP60
2 AGE60
3 LPS60
4 CPS60
R1 (Adj.) 
F-tests:
00.38578
-0.10374
00.61007"
00.77826“
.495
00.34917
00.56361'
00.71707'
.521
Model 1: Ho:
B1 = B3 = B4=0 
F: 4.816
PR: 1.66%
Model 2: H*
B1=B2=B3=0 
F: 6.819
PR: 0.40%
Ho:
B2=
F:
PR:
0.229
64.0%
H»:
B1 =0 
F:
PR:
2.985
10.5%
(*: significant at 0.1 -level; **: significant at 0.05 -level;
“ : significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR = probability value)
The interesting finding is that the demographic variable is insignificant, once more 
information about the pension systems is incorporated in the analysis. Dropping this 
variable (in model II) improved the estimation, although the economic variable was 
found to be only significant at the 0.2 -level (t-value: 1.74; critical value, Pr. 0.05, df. 
14 : 1.761). The F-tests, including this variable, however, suggested the significance 
of the estimated parameters. Again, second order testing did not reveal severe 
violations of the regression assumptions10. Estimating similar models with LPS60 and 
CPS60 separately showed the Left variable insignificant, the Christian Democratic
11) Jarque-Bera test: 0.916 (Chi3, 2 df). Pr : 63.26; White’s test: 6.075 (Chi2, df 7), Pr : 53.10; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 3.274 (F 6,6), P r: 10.73; Outlier-test: 2.190, critical value: 3.65 (5%), 4.55 (1%). 
In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems.
variable significant, but rendering a lesser fit. The ’competition’ variable did not 
improve upon the regression results either. The conclusion is that the hypothesis 
privileging the relationship between Christian Democracy and pension regime as such 
cannot be sustained, for both Christian Democratic and Social Democratic strength are 
significantly related to the net (after tax) pensions as a proportion of the APW-wage, 
weighted by the coverage ratio. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for the 
Christian Democratic variable (.72) is higher than for the variable measuring Left 
strength (.56). The finding is that both political movements may be considered as 
functional equivalents, but Christian Democracy appears to have a greater effect.
There may, however, be several other reasons for the high levels of pension 
spending in the continental nations around 1960. First of all, Germany might score as 
high as it does because it is committed to pay pensions to war victims. A high level of 
pension expenditure may therefore partly reflect war experience. In addition, some 
nations, such as Germany and Austria, treat their government personnel generously in 
terms of pension rights, mainly as a means of rewarding their status as ’Beamte’. This 
may be due to the Etatist legacy in these nations (Esping-Andersen 1990: 122-12412’), 
but could perhaps also be explained in terms of status reproduction (hypotheses III. 1 
and III.2). The issue of old age protection might be an opportunity for introducing 
reforms without politicizing the issue of class, since all members of each class grow 
old. Upholding status or group positions after retirement-age via eamings-related 
benefits, then, -originally being the legacy of Etatism- might become a redefined non­
class issue taken up by Christian Democracy in the postwar period. Both in Germany 
and the Netherlands pension legislation or pension reform took place in the late 1950s 
under the leadership of Christian Democracy (Germany) or under an alliance between
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12) In this context, it is surprising to note that Esping-Andersen has found the Etatist bias in welfare 
states to be more strongly related to Catholic Party power than to Absolutism. This is surprising because 
- given the arguments in the first part of this thesis - Etatism is opposed to Subsidiarity and accordingly 
one would not expect these nations to be strongly Etatist. It may very well be that due to the early 
introduction of social insurance legislation in Germany and subsequent institutional inertia Etatism is still 
a force influencing the organization of the welfare state. One might theorize, however, that after the 
Second World war the social policy legacy was adapted, and perhaps was even in agreement with ideas 
on the importance of status reproduction or the ’giving to each class and group what is its due’. In 
chapter 9 I elaborate this thesis.
Social Democracy and Catholic political forces and backed by a broadly shared 
consensus (Netherlands), while in Italy important changes took place in the 1960s13).
It would be a mistake to infer from the high levels of expenditure that the social 
capitalist pension regimes in 1960 are remarkably generous systems in terms of both 
benefits and eligibility. Partly, the earnings-related, status-reproducing pension 
schemes, next to being expensive, have fairly tough conditions tied to eligibility. So, 
if one looks at the conditions for receiving a state pension in 1960 (contribution period 
and reference period), one clearly finds that there exist indeed two pension regimes that 
tend to coincide with the types identified above. The first regime has quite strong 
(Germany, Italy, Austria and France) or moderate (the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom) conditions attached to pension rights in terms of reference and 
contribution period14) and the second has no conditions in this respect. On the other 
hand, in 1960 pensioners in countries like New Zealand, Canada and Ireland had to 
submit to a means test before being eligible to a pension.
In the 1980s the social capitalist nations still score relatively high in terms of 
spending on pensions (Table 6).
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13) As I will show in the following chapters, the adopted pension systems in Germany and the 
Netherlands are qualitatively different due to the conditions under which the dominant political forces 
operated.
14) Computed by adding reference period and contribution period for state pensions (social security 
and goverament-employee pensions) in 1960 (source: SSIB-data files).
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Table 6. Public Pension Expenditure as % of GDP, 1980
(rank-order)
1. Austria 13.5 (2) 10. Norway 7.9 (8)
2. Germany 12.1 (I) 11. New Zealand 7.6 (9)
3. Italy 12.0 (4) 12. United States 6.9(11)
4. Belgium 11.9(10) 13. Finland 6.5 (14)
5. France 115 (3) 14. United Kingdom 6.3 (12)
6. Netherlands 11.0(5) 15. Australia 4.9 (13)
7. Sweden 10.9 (7) 16. Ireland 4.5 (17)
8. Denmark 9.1 (6) 17. Canada 4.4 (15)
9. Switzerland 8.0(16) 18. Japan 4.4 (18)
Average 8.5
St. Dev. 3.0
(Numbers between parentheses refer to the rank-order of 1960) 
Source: OECD (1988), Reforming Public Pensions. Table Cl (a).
Table 6 shows that pension expenditure is remarkably stable in the sense that the rank- 
order of countries in 1980 is considerably close to the rank-order in 1960. Austria took 
over the lead from Germany, which now comes in second. Italy, Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands score above average as do Sweden and Denmark. Again, the Anglo- 
Saxon countries all score below average, indicating that these nations strongly rely on 
the provision of private pensions (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 70).
In the 1980s, nations such as New Zealand and Australia have a 'basic' social 
security pensions scheme (conditional flat-rate benefits, financed from general 
revenues). All the Scandinavian countries now have a mixed system (a combination of 
basic, needs-based and eamings-related benefits) as do Canada, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. The social capitalist nations (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland) all have a conditional system, covering the employed, 
where benefits are related to employment and the system is primarily financed by 
contributions of the employed (OECD 1988: 17). This last issue is particularly 
interesting, because it shows that social rights are granted on the basis of past 
contributions and may temper the possible impression that the social capitalist nations 
as particularly beneficent to pensioners.
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Table 7. Financing of Pensions in the Social Capitalist Nations:
the Share of the Employees, 1960 and 1980 (rank-order)
1960 1980
1. Netherlands .84 I. Netherlands .80(1)
2. Switzerland .48 2. Switzerland 45 (2)
3. Austria .41 3. Germany .39 (4)
4. Germany .37 4. Belgium .38 (5)
5. Belgium .35 5. Austria .37 (3)
6. Italy .28 6. Italy •37 (6)
Source: SSIB-data files, variable PFININSR.
The only nations where the state completely financed pensions in 1960 were Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and the United States1S). Furthermore, the 
Netherlands is exceptional in that it is the only nation of the social capitalist regime 
which finances the public pension scheme mainly through contributions of the insured 
(10-12 per cent of gross earnings), while at the same time the benefit is flat-rate. In 
other words, although the financing is almost wholly done by the employees, the 
benefits are not eamings-related14>. All other nations present in Table 7 have 
eamings-related benefit schemes with (almost) universal coverage17).
The Issue o f De-commodification 3: Income Replacement
In order to understand better the quality of the welfare state regimes and the social 
capitalist regime in particular, I now focus on possible other measures of de­
commodification as perhaps the best yardstick for the extent to which social security 
systems emancipate individuals or families through state policies from the hardships of 
the market.
15) Source: SSIB-data files.
16) The peculiar conditions under which this scheme emerged are discussed in chapter 11.
17) By contrast, Finland, Norway and Sweden have Public two-tier schemes, combining flat-rate 
public pensions and eamings-related (supplementary or occupational) pensions.
Perhaps what really matters is the range and scope of social rights rather than the 
amount of money spent. De-commodification should be taken to refer to the extent to 
which an individual or a family can expect to preserve a level of income close to the 
level of the market wage in case of old age, sickness, accident or unemployment. The 
theoretically most satisfactory focus, then, would be the one on income replacement 
schemes for unemployment, sickness, disability and old age. I propose to operationalize 
a measure of de-commodification as the average net (after tax) replacement rates of the 
schemes for unemployment, disability, sickness and old age (average over the first 26 
weeks, after waiting days), weighted by the appropriate coverage ratio. Table 8 gives 
the rank-order of welfare states in 1960 according to this measure of de-com- 
modification.
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Table 8. De-commodification as weighted average net replacement
rates of major income replacement schemes, 1960
(rank-order)
1. Sweden .72 10. Italy .41
2. Netherlands .64 11. France .38
3. Austria .61 12. Canada .35
4. Germany .59 13. United States .34
5. Norway .55 14. Ireland .32
6. United Kingdom .54 15. Finland .31
7. Denmark .52 16. Japan .27
8. Belgium .51 17. New Zealand .23
9. Switzerland .44 18. Australia —
Average .45
St. Dev .14
Source: SSIB-data files, Variables GPRASWSI/FA U26NERSI/FA 
S26NERSI/FA A26NERSI/FA P/U/S/A-COVRATL.
In agreement with other studies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Western 1989) the finding is 
that the main social capitalist countries score above average on this measure of de­
commodification as do the main Scandinavian countries. The conclusion is that a clear 
difference between the Social Democratic cluster and the Christian Democratic cluster 
does not exist. Again, there seems to be some indication for the functional equivalence 
of Social Democracy and Christian Democracy and for the relevance of the com­
petition- or interaction-thesis. Using the information from Table 8 as well as the
information on spending as a more detailed measure of de-commodification than 
spending alone, I estimated the models as reported in Table 9, using the same variables 
as in the regression analysis reported in Table 2.
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Table 9. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable =
De-commodification (replacement-rates and expenditure), 
1960
I II
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 GDPCAP60 00.10857
2 UERATE60 -0.10869 -----
3 AGE60 00.41224“  1 00.52314“
4 UNION6O 00.13249 —
5 SDCD60 00.54840“  2 00.45805“
RJ (Adj.) .636 .670
F-tests:
Model 1: H«: Model 2: Ho
B1 = B2=B4=0 B1=B2=0
F: 00.508 F: 17.
PR: 68.37% PR: OO.i
H«:
B 3-B 5-0  
F: 13.316
PR: 00.07%
f  : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.0S -level;
“ : significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR = probability value)
The most interesting finding is the similarity between this model and the model as 
reported in Table 2. Again, the second estimated model (model II, column 3) with only 
AGE60 and SDCD60 as independent variables is clearly superior. Partly, the similarity 
between the two models results from the fact that both dependent variables use the 
same data on spending. Nevertheless, it shows that operationalizing de-commodification 
in a slightly different, but more precise way does not lead to a change in the 
conclusions. The null-hypothesis that the model is correct cannot be rejected. Further 
second order testing of model II showed that there appeared to be no signs of problems
with the main regression assumptions1®’. In addition, estimating the model with only 
LPS60 gave insignificant results for this political variable. The Christian Democratic 
variable performed better, but less than the ’competition’ variable, which provided the 
most parsimonious model.
What about the hypothesis concerning the relative de-commodification of families 
versus the de-commodification of individuals? One could of course simply look at the 
average net replacement rate for a family with two children as a proportion of the net 
replacement rate for an unmarried individual and one will find the surprising outcome 
that, first of all, some countries actually ’punish’ families with two children in the 
sense that the net replacement rate of the major income replacement schemes is actually 
lower for a family than for a single individual. In addition, one will not find any 
systematic pattern in the family-bias of income maintenance schemes, which would 
indicate a clear difference between the social capitalist nations and other regimes. The 
hypothesis regarding the possible pronounced de-commodification of the family through 
the social security system alone (1.2) would have to be rejected on the basis of this 
information19). However, it may be the case that the family-bias is already present in 
the wage-tax-structure of a nation, as a result of which differences in replacement rates 
between individuals and families in the social security system do not have to be 
reinforced in order to privilege the family. Table 10, then, shows the ratio between the 
Net Average Production Worker’s wage (NAPW) for a family with two children where 
the husband earns the APW and the NAPW of a single in 1960.
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18) Jarque-Bera test: 1.108 (Chi:, 2 df), Pr : 57.46; White’s test: 2.658 (Chi2, df 4), Pr : 61.65; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 0.902 (F 7,7), Pr : 55.24; Outlier-test: 1.974, critical value: 3.62 (5%), 4.48 (1 %). 
In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems, neither 
did the analysis on the externally studentized residuals.
19) Source: SSIB-data files.
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Table 10. Privileging of Families in Net Average Production
Worker's wage, 1960 (rank-order)
1. Italy 1.31 10. Germany 1.15
2. Austria 1.25 11. Sweden 1.13
3. United Kingdom 1.24 12. Switzerland 1.11
4. France 1.23 13. United States M l
5. Netherlands 1.20 14. Denmark 1.09
6. Norway 1.19 15. Ireland 1.09
7. Belgium 1.18 16. Australia 1.08
8. New Zealand 1.16 17. Canada 1.08
9. Finland 1.16 18. Japan 1.02
Average 1.15
St. Dev 0.07
Source: SSIB-data files, variables NETAPWFA, NETAPWSI
In all nations the NAPW is higher for a family than for a single. However, nations 
such as Denmark, Ireland, Australia, Canada and Japan are one (or close to one) 
standard deviation below average. Italy, Austria, France and the United Kingdom score 
more than a standard deviation above average, whereas the Netherlands and Belgium 
are above average as well. Germany appears to be an average case, while the case of 
Italy is exceptional; this nation is two standard deviations above average. There is, 
therefore, some confirmation for the thesis that the privileging of families is already 
present in the wage-tax structure of nations. And given the presence of the main social 
capitalist nations in the top of the table this seems to be -although certainly not an 
exclusively- social capitalist affair.
It is, of course, ultimately the interplay of taxation and social security that 
determines the actual distribution of income and the possible difference between 
individuals and families. It is difficult to find out precisely how the various public 
programs interact in terms of a final outcome. Moreover, there are severe data 
restraints with regard to the period around 1960. One way of getting some detail on 
these effects would be by looking at disposable income as a proportion of gross 
earnings of an Average Production Worker. Income tax (-), social security contribu­
tions (-) and transfers (+) are the determinants of disposable income. In order to 
examine the possible privileging of tax-benefit regimes I therefore looked at disposable
income as a percentage of gross earnings and at the difference in disposable income 
between a family with two children and a single. The measure I constructed is meant 
to cover both the absolute level of disposable income (as a proportion of gross 
earnings) and the relative position of a family vis k vis the single by multiplying the 
disposable income of a two child family by the ratio of their income to the disposable 
income of a single. The results (1976) are shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. The Privileging of Families in Disposable Income, 1976
(Rank-order)
1. France 120.1 10. Germany 91.9
2. Austria 117.6 11. United States 91.9
3. Belgium 110.4 12. United Kingdom 88.9
4. Italy 108.7 13. Norway 88.8
5. Australia 99.6 14. Finland 88.6
6. Canada 99.3 15. New Zealand 87.6
7. Japan 97.6 16. Netherlands 86.4
8. Ireland 96.7 17. Sweden 83.7
9. Switzerland 95.6 18. Denmark 82.3
Average 96.4
St. Dev. 11.2
Source: OECD 1978, Th« Tai/Renefit Pnaytinn nf Selected Income Groups 
in OECD Member Countries, p. 92, Table 2, own calculations.
The most intriguing aspect concerns both the top and the bottom of the rank-order. 
Denmark and Sweden score as low as they do because the disposable income of a 
family as a percentage of gross earnings (71.2 % and 71.8 %) is the lowest in the 
OECD-area. The bottom of the Table, therefore, also simply reflects the stern tax 
regimes in these nations. On the other hand, countries such as Australia, Canada and 
Japan are in the sub-top of the Table precisely because of their relatively lenient tax- 
regimes. However, the top of Table 11 is made up of nations that do not have a 
particularly tolerant tax regime, but still score more than one (Italy, Belgium and 
Austria) or even two (France) standard deviation(s) above average. The tax-benefit 
regimes of these nations apparently do favour the family over the single in a 
disproportional manner. The difference between disposable income of a family and a 
single is (in percentage points) 10.9 in Italy, 17. 2 in France, and 17.9 in Belgium and
Austria as, for instance, compared to 10.2 in Sweden, 9.9 in Norway, 9.6 in Denmark, 
and 5.3 in Japan. This has certainly to do with the fact that Italy, France, Belgium and 
Austria are the welfare states that most strongly rely on cash benefits to families. These 
are the only nations that score more chan one standard deviation above the average 
(5.16 % of gross earnings) of state transfers to families, with Belgium (13.0 %) 
leading, followed by Italy (9.6)2<\  France (9.2 %) and Austria (8.9)21).
Defining the dependent variable as the difference between the take-home pay plus 
cash transfers of a family with two children and the take-home pay plus cash transfers 
of a single (expressed as a percentage of gross eamings)22\  would give a measure of 
family-bias in the tax-benefit systems of advanced capitalist nations. The models I 
estimated are presented in Table 12B>.
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20) The gross transfer in Italy is subject to tax, while on the other hand cash allowances are also 
transferred to wives who are not engaged in gainful employment and who have no children.
21) Source: OECD 1978, The Tax Benefit Position, p. 98, Table 8.
22) Take-home pay *  gross earnings minus income tax and employee’s social security contributions. 
Source: OECD (1986), The Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers. 1981-1985. Paris, Table 4, p. 
53.
23) Jarque-Bera test: 0.946 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 62.51; White’s test: 0.446 (Chi2, df 2), Pr : 80.02; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 1.305 (F 8,8), P r: 35.76; Outlier-test; 1.884, critical value: 3.54 (5%), 4.34(1%). 
In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems.
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Table 12. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable
Family-Bias in Tax-Benefit Regimes, 1980
I II
Variable
Name
1 GDPCAP80
2 LPS80
3 CSP80
R2 (Adj.) 
F-tests:
Estimated
Coefficient
(Beta)
00.02629
00.20734
00.60981“
.310
Estimated
Coefficient
(Beta)
00.59233“
.351
Model 1: H«:
B1 = B2=0 
F: 00.941
PR: 61.98%
Model 2: H,
B1=0
F: 09.189
PR: 00.75%
H»:
B3 =0
F: 08.369
PR: 01.12%
(* : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.05 -level;
—: significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR “  probability value)
An effect of the strength of the Left could not be detected, whereas the Christian 
Democracy variable was found to be related to the family-bias in tax-benefit regimes. 
However, entering the ’competition* variable rather than the Christian Democratic 
variable gave an increase in the fit (R2 [Adj.]: .481) and an increase in the estimated 
coefficient (.69), suggesting that the presence of both political determinants in fact 
moderately adds to the explained variance in the family-bias241.
As to the measures of de-commodification and the hypotheses regarding the difference 
between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy with respect the de-com­
modification of individuals and families, the conclusion is that 1) both political
24) Jarque-Bera test: 0.973 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 61.48; White’s test: 0.122 (Chi2, df 2), Pr : 94.07; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 2.001 (F 8,8), P r : 17.31; Outlier-test: 2.087, critical value: 3.54 (5%), 4.34 (1 %). 
In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems.
movements appear to be functional equivalents; 2) the competition or interaction 
between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy adds to the level of de- 
commodification; 3) social capitalism appears to be beneficial to families in terms of 
de-commodification if one looks at the interplay of the tax, wage and benefits-system, 
while the interplay of the strength of the Left and of Christian Democracy adds to the 
privileging of families.
Subsidiarity 1: the Cash-Benefit-Bias of Social Capitalism and its Possible Effect on 
Labour Market Participation
Hypotheses II. 1.a and II. 1 .b state that social capitalist welfare tend to rely on cash- 
benefits rather than on benefits in kind in their social security schemes (a); and that 
social capitalism is characterized by passivity with respect to labour market policy (b).
The basic idea behind this focus on the cash-bias of welfare states is that there are 
differences in the role of the state in the redistribution of societal wealth and that these 
discrepancies account for distinct outcomes. Welfare regimes might redistribute equally 
large sums of money, but they may do so in fundamentally dissimilar ways. "Societies 
can be divided in those that distribute their resources primarily through cash transfers 
and those whose spending patterns are concentrated on the provision of services. The 
latter is labour intensive, whereas the former is not because the income transfers that 
needy families receive from the state are more likely to be spent for basic necessities 
than for social welfare services. A service state, by contrast, constrains consumption 
into precisely those services which also require a high level of employment (...)" (Rein 
1985: 96). These nations, then, have different logics as to how transfers are spent. "A 
transfer state is guided by the income principle of distribution (...). By contrast, the 
service state is more guided by a principle of rehabilitation to help individuals 
reintegrate themselves within society" (Rein 1985: 96). It would be incorrect to 
presume that a welfare regime would exclusively rely on the one or the other; the 
argument is one of bias: social capitalism is assumed to be biased in the direction of 
transfers.
182
In order to test hypothesis II. 1.a I operationalized the dependent variable CASH60 
as cash benefits as a proportion of total benefits of social security schemes, using ILO 
data. The OLS-results are summarized in Table 13.
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Table 13. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable
Cash benefit-bias in welfare states, 1960
I II
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beu) (Beu)
1 GDPCAP60 00.81821“  1 00.73965“
2 UERATE60 -0.18579 —
3 AGE60 -0.11351 —
4 CPS60 01.00069““ 2 00.89813“
RJ (Adj.) .733 .734
F-tests:
Model 1: Ho: Model 2: Ho
B2=>B3-0 oII(N00II*-4PÛ
F: 00.922 F: 23.922
PR: 39.55* PR: 00.00%
H«:
Bl = B4»0
F: 21.462
PR: 00.01%
f : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.05 -level;
mm*significant at 0.01I -level; F =» F-statistic; PR = probability value)
It shows a positive relationship between the dependence on cash benefits and Christian 
Democracy as well as the economic variable. This suggests the plausibility of 
hypothesis n. 1.a, the more so as estimation results of similar models with the Left 
political variable rendered insignificant results, even though the sign (-) of the Left 
variable was in the expected direction. Estimation with the ’competition’ variable 
reduced the fit of the model. Further second order testing of model n  showed that there 
appeared to be an outlier problem (Finland)251, but no other signs of problems with
25) Using different estimation techniques (both Least Absolute Deviation which minimizes the sum 
of absolute values of the residuals and Robust estimation, using 'Bi-weighted least squares’ [see Dietz
(continued...)
the main regression assumptions26'. Another interesting finding was that Germany and 
Italy had negative residuals (-1.122 and -.037 respectively), while the Netherlands had 
an unexpectedly large positive residual (1.535), suggesting that the latter’s regime 
relies even more on cash benefits than could be anticipated on the basis of the 
estimation.
Social capitalism might under certain conditions be described as a passive welfare 
state, especially with respect to labour market policy (hypothesis II. l.b). Some 
indication of this passivity was already found in the cash-benefit-bias of social 
capitalism. Unfortunately, there are no data available on the relative importance of 
active labour market measures in the 1960s. There are, however, data available for the 
1980s. Table 14 gives the rank-order of nations in 1987 according to the ratio of 
passive labour market expenditures (such as early retirement, income replacement) to 
active labour market expenditures (employment services, labour market training, 
measures for special groups).
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25) (...continued)
e.a. 1987: 384]) did not change the estimated parameters dramatically. As a result I decided to stay with 
OLS.
26) Jarque-Bera test : 3.107 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 21.15%; White’s test : 3.869 (Chi2, df 4), Pr : 
42.41%; Goldfield-Quandt: 0.557 (F 7,6), Pr : 77.06%; Outlier-test: 3.098, critical value: 3.62 (5%), 
4.48 (1 %). In addition, none of the various specifications of tests for functional form indicated problems.
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Table 14. Passivity of Welfare States (rank-order), 1987
The Ratio Passive to Active Labour Market Measures
1. Australia 3.78 (1) 10. United States 2.45 (10)
2. Denmark 3.41 (6) 11. Finland 2.14 (12)
3. France 3.15 (2) 12. United Kingdom 1.88 (13)
4. Belgium 2.95 (3) 13. Italy 1.76 (11)
5. Canada 2.94 (7) 14. New Zealand 1.64 (14)
6. Netherlands 2.68 (9) IS. Germany 1.36 (15)
7. Austria 2.61 (8) 16. Switzerland 1.35 (16)
8. Ireland 2.52 (5) 17. Norway 0.87 (17)
9. Japan 2.47 (9) 18. Sweden 0.43 (18)
Average 2.24
St. Dev. 0.89
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, sept. 1988, Table 3.1, p. 86. The numbers 
in parentheses refer to the rank-order of the nation when labour force 
participation rates are taken into account.
The evidence is mixed and the hypothesis on the passivity of social capitalist welfare 
states must be rejected. What is unmistakable is the ’activeness’ of Sweden and 
Norway, the only two countries spending more on active than on passive measures. 
The conclusion might be that social capitalist nations do not differ much from the 
Liberal regime type in terms of labour market policy. Moreover, if one takes into 
account the labour force participation of men and women27*, the pictures hardly 
changes at all. The only notable change is that Denmark drops to place 6 when the 
participation rates are taken into account.
Hypothesis U.2 states that different types of configurations of market, state and 
family create different types of employment patterns. The expectation was that labour 
market participation rates (both of men and women) would be comparatively low in 
those nations that are characterized by transfer-bias and passivity or in general, by the 
dominance of a traditional family ideology (hypothesis IV.5). Surely, the precise 
explanation of participation rates would be much more complex than I will and can 
argue here. The assumption, however, is that different welfare regimes pattern 
employment in different ways. The focus here is on the possible determinants of
27) I took the ratio of active to passive measures weighted by the labour market participation rates 
of men and women.
participation, which are assumed to be the effect of a particular regime, which -in turn­
are assumed to be politically determined. If this is the case and if my theoretical 
considerations are correct, one should find a fairly strong negative relationship between 
Christian Democratic power and participation rates of men and women as well as a 
fairly strong positive relationship between the power of labour (both party and union, 
i.e the number of union members as a proportion of total labour force) and par­
ticipation on the labour market, even if one controls for the unemployment rate and the 
wealth of a nation. Table IS.a summarizes the results of the regression analysis relating 
the participation rate of men and the participation rates of women in the 1980s to the 
economic and political variables of interest.
Table 15.a Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable=
Labour Force Participation of Men and Women, Around 1980
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1 11
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 GDPCAP80 00.31408“ 1 00.32977“
2 UERATE80 -0.28594“ 2 -0.25873"
3 UNION80 00.55364“ 3 00.51808“
4 LPS80 -0.07169 —
5 CPS80 -0.75682“ 4 -0.75375“
R2 (Adj.) .840 .849
F-tests:
Model 1: H*: Model 2: Ho
B4*0
F:
PR:
00.192
66.82%
B2=0
F:
PR:
05.389
03.69%
Ho:
B1 =B2=B3=B5= 
F: 21.271
PR: 00.00%
H,:
B1 = B2=B3=B4=0 
F: 24.660
PR: 00.00%
(* : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.05 -level;
“ : significant at 0.01 -level; F -  F-statistic; PR = probability value)
The analysis shows that it is not so much Left power, but rather the strength of 
organized labour which is positively related to the labour market participation of the
population. Estimating similar models excluding union strength still indicated the 
insignificance of the Left variable. In line with the expectations, Christian Democracy 
is negatively associated with labour market participation in a fairly strong way (a 
coefficient of .75). In addition, the rate of unemployment negatively influences 
participation, too. The fit of the model is -for a cross-sectional analysis- remarkably 
good. Further second order testing of model II, in turn, showed that there appeared to 
be no signs of problems with the main regression assumptions281. The residual 
analysis, however, uncovered that both Italy and Germany had positive residuals (.312 
and 1.557), while the Netherlands had a fairly large negative residual of -2.678, 
indicating that labour market participation in this nation is much lower than expected 
on the basis of the model.
Looking at the participation of women separately leads to comparable conclusions 
(Table 15.b). However, the unemployment rate was found to be insignificant and was 
excluded from the more parsimonious model II. Again, the fit is very good and the 
Christian Democratic variable performs in the expected direction. The residual analysis 
revealed again that Germany had a positive residual, while Italy and the Netherlands 
had negative residuals. Female participation on the labour market is unexpectedly low 
in these nations, especially in the Netherlands (-1.830)” .^
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28) Jarque-Beia test : 0.790 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 67.36%; White’s test : 7.914 (Chi2, df 11), Pr : 
72.10%; Goldfield-Quandt: 0.732 (F 5,5), Pr : 62.95%; Outlier-test: 2.691, critical value: 3.91 (5%), 
5.02 (1%). The various specifications of tests for functional form did not show any problems.
29) Further second order testing of model II, again, showed that there appeared to be no signs of 
problems with the main regression assumptions. Jarque-Bera test : 0.364 (Chi1, 2 df), Pr : 83.37%; 
White’s test: 6.590 (Chi2, df 7), Pr : 47.28%; Goldfield-Quandt: 0.527 (F 6,6), P r : 77.22%; Outlier- 
test : 2.312, critical value: 3.73 (5 %), 4.68 (1 %). The various specifications of tests for functional form 
did not show any problems.
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Table 15.b Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent
Variable = Labour Force Participation of Women, 
Around 1980
I II
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 GDPCAP80 00.37793"* 1 00.32977“"
2 UERATE80 -0.12000
3 UNION8O 00.51326“ 2 00.57380""
4 LPS80 -0.07965 —
5 CPS80 -0.56539*" 3 -0.56818“
R2 (Adj.) .850 .842
F-tests:
Model 1: H»:
B2=B4=0 
F: 01.418
PR: 27.72%
Model 2: Ho
B1 =0
F: 13.234
PR: 00.24%
Ho:
B1 =B3=B5 
F: 28.133
PR: 00.00%
H«:
B1 = B2=B3=0 
F: 30.826
PR: 00.00%
(* : significant at 0.1 -level; ” : significant at 0.05 -level;
—: significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR = probability value)
Subsidiarity 2: The Organization and Financing of a Welfare Regime
The administration of the main welfare institutions is expected to be controlled by 
private or semi-public organizations, supervised and subsidized by the state. Ideally, 
one would anticipate a bi- or tripartite structure in the control of the main social 
security schemes. As an operationalization of the dependent variable (B1TRI79301) one 
might look at the level of bi- or tri-partism in a nation. I have simply taken the number 
of central social security schemes (old-age, invalidity, and survivor programs; sickness
30) I have taken 1979 here because the expectation is that in this respect administrative, 
organizational characteristics show inertia in particular. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (1980), Social Security Programs Throughout the World. 1979.
and maternity; work-injury programs; unemployment benefit programs; family 
allowances) controlled by bi- or tri-partism as an indicator. It is important to note that 
this measure cannot be taken as referring to ’corporatism’ understood as a system of 
interest intermediation between the main societal interests. It may very well be the case 
that bi- or tri-partite control of the social security system coincides with corporatist 
interest intermediation, but there is no necessary link.
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Table 16. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable
Bi- Tripartism in Social Security Administration,
1979 (BITRI79)
I II
Variable Estimated Estimated
Name Coefficient Coefficient
(Beta) (Beta)
1 LPS80
2 CPS 80
R2 (Adj.) 
F-tests: 
Model 1:
00.17367
00.67621"
.443
H«:
BI =0 
F:
PR:
Model 2:
00.918
35.24%
00.66731*
.445
Ho
BI =0 
F:
PR:
13.648
00.18%
(* : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.05 -level;
significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR = probability value)
Table 16 shows that Christian Democratic strength is positively related to the number 
of social security schemes under bi-partite or tri-partite control, whereas Social 
Democracy is not related to this characteristic of welfare state regimes. Further second 
order testing of model II showed that there appeared to be no signs of problems with 
the main regression assumptions30. Estimating a similar model with union strength 
as an independent variable indicated the insignificance of the var iole. In the present
31) Jarque-Ben test: 1.403 (Chi2, 2 df). Pr : 49.59; White’s test: 2.076 (Chi2, df 2), Pr : 35.42; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 0.762 (F 8,8), P r : 64.51; Outlier-test: 2.576, critical value: 3.54 (5 %), 4.34 (1 %). 
Non of the null-hypotheses that the standard assumptions of the regression-model apply could be rejected 
on the basis of test for functional form.
context this is interpreted to signify that as far as the administration of social security 
schemes is concerned it is Christian Democracy that defines the cooperation between 
labour and capital (and the state). A speculation might be that unions, in turn, 
concentrate their efforts on economic bargaining in the market, an issue beyond the 
scope of this study. The most intriguing finding, however, came out of the analysis of 
the residuals. It revealed that France (2.298) and the Netherlands (2.576) had relatively 
large positive residuals, while Italy had a negative residual (-.527) and Germany a 
modest positive one (.354). The case of France could perhaps be explained by the fact 
that Christian Democracy (MRP), one of the major political forces of the Fourth 
Republic (1946-1958), disappeared in the fifth republic (1958-present). On the other 
hand, one might argue that Christian Democracy is still present as one of the currents 
of the centre and centre-right of French politics (Irving 1979: 222-231). My data may, 
then, perhaps underestimate the strength of Christian Democracy in France, given the 
institutional inertia of institutional arrangements set in place in the first decade or so 
after the Second World War. Performing a brief counterfactual exercise by assuming 
that Christian Democracy in France in 1980 had the momentum of the MRP in the 
1950s, indeed exhibited a marked improvement of the model and reduced the positive 
residual of France considerably. A comparable maneuver would not make sense with 
respect to the underestimation of the Netherlands. The explanation for this nation rather 
has to be sought in the exceptional system of ’pillarization’ and consociationalism, a 
theme to which I will turn in the chapter 11. The conclusion, taking into account these 
considerations, is that Christian Democratic strength does seem to be associated with 
bi- or tripartism in the system of social security and that hypothesis II.3 cannot be 
rejected.
When one looks at the role of the state in the financing of the main social security 
systems, a mixed picture emerges. ’STAT’ in Table 17 is the average share of state 
financing in the schemes for unemployment and pensions32). Australia and New 
Zealand are the only nations in which the state in 1960 completely financed the 
unemployment and pension schemes. At the same time, it is clear that the role of the 
state in some of the social capitalist nations is very modest, with Austria scoring only
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32) I have chosen these two schemes because of incomplete data on other schemes, notably sickness.
0.09, Italy . 12 and the Netherlands . 16, whereas others score above average (Belgium, 
France).
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Table 17. Financing of Social Security Schemes (Unemployment
and Pensions)» 1960 (Rank-order according to share of 
insured)
1 2 3 4
COUNTRY INSR EMPR ST AT IE/S
1. Switzerland .66 .21 .14 6.21 (4)
2. Netherlands .60 .24 .16 5.25 (5)
3. Austria .45 .45 .09 10.00(1)
4. Sweden .45 .00 .55 0.82(11)
5. Japan .44 .44 .12 7.33 (3)
6. Germany .42 .41 .18 4.61 (6)
7. Norway .40 .32 .29 2.48 (8)
8. United Kingdom .38 .38 .25 3.04 (7)
9. Finland .33 .19 .48 1.08 (10)
10. Denmark .30 .00 .. .71 0.42 (15)
11. United States .27 .74 .00 —
12. Belgium .26 .28 .46 1.17 (9)
13. Canada .21 .21 .58 0.72 (12)
14. Italy .14 .75 .12 7.42 (2)
IS. Ireland .14 .16 .71 0.42 (14)
16. France .13 .28 .60 0.68 (13)
17. Australia .00 .00 1.00 0.0 (16)
18. New Zealand .00 .00 1.00 0.0 (17)
Average .31 .28 .41 3.04
St. Dev. .19 .23 .31 3.15
Source: SSIB-dato files, variables U/PFININSR, U/PFINEMPR, 
U/PFINSTAT.
Looking at the share of the insured one sees that Switzerland and the Netherlands score 
more than one standard deviation above average, indicating that in these nations the 
social security schemes are for almost two thirds financed by the contributions of the 
insured themselves. However, what is of most interest here is the counterpart or 
complement of hypothesis II.2 concerning self-government, namely the presumption 
of self-responsibility. The expectation was that in nations where Christian Democracy 
is strong the major schemes of social security are primarily financed by the categories 
involved themselves. The bulk of the social security burden ought to be carried by the 
employers and the insured. One way of measuring this is by taking the ratio of the 
share of employers and insured to the share of the state (IE/S). Regressing this variable
on Christian Democratic strength gave the following bivariate result (excluding the 
United States):
IE/S = 0.53003 CPS60
(t=2.53) R2 (adj.) = .238
F: 6.377; Pr.: 2.25%
Second order testing of this model showed no signs of problems with the main 
regression assumptions33*, although -as could be expected- the large positive residual 
for Japan showed this nation to be a significant outlier. Estimating the same model, but 
excluding Japan from the analysis substantially improved the explained variation34*.
IE/S = 0.67401 CPS60
(t=3.53) R2 (adj.) = .454
F: 12.487; Pr.: 0.30%
The interesting finding was that Austria had a large positive residual (2.282) and 
Belgium a large negative residual (-2.499). This suggests that Belgium relies 
disproportionally on state contributions in the social security system, whereas for 
Austria the opposite holds. The Netherlands and Italy, moreover, had modest positive 
residuals, while Germany had a small negative residual. As a conclusion one might say 
that Christian Democracy is positively and significantly related to ’self-responsibility’ 
in the financing of the social security schemes. On the other hand, there appears to be 
quite some variation among the social capitalist nations themselves, which cannot be
33) Jarque-Bera test : 0.862 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 64.97; White’s test: 1.221 (Chi2, df 2), Pr : 54.05; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 1.223 (F 8,7), Pr : 40.19; Outlier-test: 2.526, critical value: 3.56 (5%), 4.38 (1 %). 
Various specifications of tests for functional form did not lead to the rejection of the null-hypothesis that 
the standard assumptions of the regression-model apply.
34) Jarque-Bera test: 0.093 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 95.46; LM-test (heteroskedasticity): 6.452 (Chi2, df 
1), Pr : 01.11 (failed); White’s test : 6.934 (Chi2, df 3), Pr : 7.40; Goldfield-Quandt: 0.658 (F 6,6), 
Pr : 68.81; Outlier-test: 2.545, critical value: 3.62 (5%), 4.48 (1 %). Various specifications of tests for 
functional form did not lead to the rejection of the null-hypothesis that the standard assumptions of the 
regression-model apply could be rejected. Residual analysis, however, showed a large positive residual 
for Japan.
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contributed to variation in the power of Christian Democracy. In addition, the results 
should be interpreted with care, since the United States and Japan were excluded from 
the analysis.
Status Reproduction and Fragmentation
Social policy in social capitalist nations tends to reproduce rather than overcome class 
and status differences (Hypothesis III. 1). Benefits under social capitalist conditions tend 
to be eamings-related rather than flat-rate, so that they preserve rather than supersede 
social difference. One way of looking at the reproduction of status differentials is by 
studying benefit differentials, that is, the ratio of the minimum benefit of a social 
insurance scheme to the maximum benefit (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 69-78). As a 
measure of benefit inequality I took the average benefit inequality over the schemes for 
pensions, unemployment, sickness and disability. The results are presented in Table 18.
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Tibie 18. Benefit Structure and Benefit Inequality of Welfare
States, 1960 (ranfc-order according to Benefit Inequality)0
1 2 3 4 5 6
Country Inequal­
ity*
Min Max Max
•Min
Average
Benefit
(Rank-order)
1. Germany .91 .08 .86 .78 (3)
2. Japan .91 .06 .68 .62 (7)
3. Switzerland .90 .06 .59 .53 (10)
4. France .89 .10 .91 .81 (1)
5. Netherlands .89 .09 .84 .75 a)
6. United States .85 .06 .40 .34 (15)
7. Finland .69 .22 ,71 .49 (4)
g. Denmark .67 .15 .47 .31 (13)
9. New 7ralanrt .64 .19 .55 .35 48)
10. Canaria .61 .18 .47 .28 <U)
11. Sweden .61 .23 .58 .35 (6)
12. A u s tr ia .57 .12 .28 .16 (16)
13. Norway .51 .21 .43 .22 (12)
14. Italy .41 .12 .21 .09 (17)
15. Ireland .26 .25 .34 .09 (14)
16. United Kingdom .16 .32 .38 .06 (9)
17. Belgium .05 .40 .42 .02 (5)
Average .62 .17 .54 .37
S t Dev. .27 .10 .21 .26
a) 'Inequality’ was computed na l-(min/max).
b) There were only incomplete data available for Austria.
Source: SSK-data files, variables GPRAMI/MX-SI/CO, GURAM1/MX-SI/FA, GSRAMI/MX-Sl/FA, GARAMI/MX-S1/FA
Benefit differentiation is clearly highest in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, France and 
the Netherlands, nations that all score one standard deviation above average (Table 18, 
column 2). The presence of some of the social capitalist nations of interest in the top 
of the rank-order gives some support to hypothesis III. 1. This hypothesis appears to 
be even more plausible when one takes into account that France, the Netherlands and 
Germany also have the highest average replacement rates. Accordingly, the difference 
between the maximum and minimum benefit is largest in these nations. However, the 
fact that Italy and Belgium score substantially below average complicates the picture 
considerably. For Italy, this may have to do with the fact that in this nation in 1960 the 
average benefit was the lowest of all nations included in Table 18. Given such low 
average replacement rates, differentiation becomes of course difficult. However, for 
Belgium such a story cannot be told and this is the only nation where benefit inequality 
is virtually absent. The data in Table 18, then, suggest a mixed conclusion. Not only 
the social capitalist nations are characterized by highly differentiated benefits and, what 
is more, not all social capitalist regimes can be identified by looking at the inequality 
of benefits.
Another way of looking at the reproduction of status differentials is studying the 
fragmentation of welfare regimes in terms of the number of special schemes for distinct 
groups in society. The measure I constructed consisted of the sum of special schemes 
within the major programs of Old Age, Invalidity and Death, Sickness and Maternity, 
Work Injury, Unemployment, and Family Allowances added to the number of 
occupationally distinct public pension schemes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 70). The 
question is whether fragmentation as a characteristic of social capitalism is related to 
Christian Democratic strength or not. A cursory look at the data suggested a high 
probability of an outlier, namely Japan. Therefore, it appeared to make sense to 
estimate the regression models, using a robust estimation technique, namely Least 
Absolute Deviation (LAD). The LAD-technique minimizes the sum of the absolute 
values of the residuals rather than the sum of the squared residuals. Obviously, LAD 
gives less weight to potentially influential outliers. The (non-standardized) results are 
presented in Table 19 and suggest that Christian Democracy is indeed significantly
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related to the fragmentation of the social security system. Hypothesis III.2 cannot be 
rejected35’.
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Table 19. Least Absolute Deviation Regression. Dependent Variable
Fragmentation in Social Security Systems, 1980
I II
Variable
Name
Estimated
Coefficient
(Beta)
Estimated
Coefficient
(Beta)
1 LPS80
2 CPS80
3 CONST.
DC
(Ra
00.01517
17.34711"
03.00266"
.578
.294
17.35250"
02.99479“
.578
.294)
Model 1: H„: Model 2: H„
B1=0 B1=0
P: -  F: 05.565
PR: -  PR: 03.14%
a) DC is analogous to R2 in OLS.
b) R2 is computed according to the OLS formula.
c) Test-statistic not computable.
(* : significant at 0.1 -level; “  : significant at 0.05 -level;
significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR =* probability value)
Estimating a comparable model with the OLS-technique, but including a dummy 
variable for Japan (taking the value 1 for this nation) gave roughly comparable results. 
This exercise was mainly done in order to be able have a look at the OLS-residuals of 
other nations. The analysis showed that Germany and the Netherlands had small 
negative residuals, while Italy had a notable positive residual, indicating that this 
nation’s social security system is more fragmentized than could be expected on the 
basis of the model. The reasons for this are discussed in chapter 10.
35) Because the second order tests assume normality of the residuals, second order testing of the 
model does not make sense. Normality is precisely what I expected to be violated because of Japan.
Social Capitalism and the Family
Above I already concluded on the basis of data regarding de-commodification that 
social capitalism appears to be beneficial to families in terms of de-commodification 
if one looks at the interplay of the tax, wage and benefits-system, while the interplay 
of the strength of the Left and of Christian Democracy adds to the privileging of 
families. In addition, the thesis that social capitalism is disfavourable to the com­
modification of female labour power was found to be plausible in the analysis of labour 
participation rates. In this sections I attempt to elaborate further the possible role of 
Christian Democracy in configuring the relationship between state, market and 
family36’.
Let me first look at the cash transfers to families as a percentage of gross earnings 
at the level of an average production worker (APW). If one looks at Table 20,
Table 20. Cash Transfers as a Percentage of Gross Earnings
of a Married Couple with Two Children, 
at the level of an APW, average 1972-1976 (Rank 
-Order)
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1. Belgium 13.3 10. Denmark 4.9
2. Italy 10.7 11. Switzerland 4.1
3. France 10.5 12. Finland 3.7
4. Austria 8.9 13. Canada 3.6
S. Sweden 7.3 14. United Kingdom 2.3
6. Netherlands 6.9 15. Ireland 2.2
7. Germany 6.0* 16. Australia 1.9
8. New Zealand 6.0 17. Japan 0.0
9. Norway 5.1 18. United States 0.0
Average 5.4
St. Dev. 3.7
Source: OECD 1978, The Tax/Benefit Positions of Selected
Income Groups in OECD Member Countries. 1972-1976. p. 98, Table 8,
own calculations
a) Only 1975 and 1976
36) This section will primarily focus on the period around 1980 because of lack of data for earlier 
years.
one can see that the gross wage of an average married production worker, whose 
spouse does not receive a salary, consisted of a considerable part of transfers in nations 
such as Austria, France, Italy and Belgium. These are the nations all scoring more than 
(or close to) one standard deviation above average. Germany and the Netherlands, as 
well as Sweden and New Zealand are above average as well, whereas the majority of 
the Anglo-Saxon nations are considerably below average. This gives some more 
support to the hypothesis that social capitalism is characterized by a transfer-bias in the 
social security system and that especially families with children tend to benefit from 
this in terms of cash transfers.
To have a closer look at the family-bias in the social systems of OECD-nations it 
makes sense to look again at the differences in disposable income between various 
household compositions. For disposable income is income after tax and social security 
contributions have been paid and transfers have been received. Table 21 gives 
disposable income as a percentage of gross earnings at the level of an APW in 1978, 
according to different household compositions.
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Table 21. Disposable Income as % of Grots Earnings at level of APW» 1978. Selected Household Compositions
1 2 3 4 5
Country Single Two Aduifc. Two Adulto. Two Aduhs, Two Aduhs.
One Income. Two Incomes*, One Income. Two Incomes*,
No Children No Children Two Children Two Children
1. Auatmlia 78 84 81 87 83
2. Auatria 76 78 78 93 87
3. Belgium 74 75 72 90 82
4. Canada 79 83 81 91 87
5. Denmark 61 67 64 71 66
6. Finland 68 71 71 80 77
7. France 71 86 83 98 89
S. Germany 67 74 70 79 73
9. Ireland 72 79 71 84 75
10. Italy 83 86 84 91 87
11. Japan 85 87 86 90 88
12. Netheftenii 65 67 66 75 71
13. New Zm W 72 74 75 80 77
14. Norway 68 74 70 80 75
15. Sweden 64 67 67 75 73
16. Switzerland 78 81 77 86 80
17. Uniled Kingdom 69 73 75 81 80
18. Unilad States 75 79 73 82 76
Average 73.1 76.9 74.7 84.1 79.2
S t Dev. 6.9 6.7 6.5 7.2 6.7
•) It ■ m m nrti that the spouse m u  66 % of die APW-wage so that total earamgt equal 166% of AFW-wage.
Source: OECD. 19(0. >r «¡T hM  1*111 *««»* I'*—« « <«» Trenfcrti Soc»uxd.j ^  m m  ftl~T nr D—  >■ P**« Manbrwdt
rOCDE. 1974-1978. TtMea 32-M, pp. 1J0-1J2
Looking at the first column it is clear that the disposable income for singles as a 
percentage of gross earnings in the Scandinavian countries is comparatively low. 
Germany and the Netherlands score relatively low as well (67 and 65 per cent 
respectively), that is about a standard deviation below average. Comparing the first and 
the second column shows that in all nations disposable income for a one-earner couple 
without children as a proportion of gross earnings is higher than for singles. A 
remarkable result appears when one compares the first and the third column, that is 
disposable income of a single and of a two-earner married couple without children. In 
most nations the disposable income of the latter as a percentage of gross earnings is 
higher than for singles, except in Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland. These nations, 
then, appear to disfavour household compositions where both spouses earn an income. 
In addition -comparing column 2 and 3- one notices that in most nations disposable 
income as a percentage of gross earning for a two-earner married couple without 
children is lower than for a comparable couple where only one income is earned. 
However, in some nations (Austria, Finland and Sweden) there is no difference, 
whereas in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom disposable income for a two- 
earner married couple as a percentage of gross earnings is actually higher than in the 
one-earner case. Furthermore, it is clear (from column 4) that disposable income is 
highest for a one-earner married couple with children, with France scoring an 
exceptional 98 per cent of gross earnings for a one-eamer married couple with 
children, Austria 93%, Italy 91% and Belgium 90% of gross earnings. At the same 
time, this is not exclusively a social capitalist attribute, with Canada scoring 91% and 
Japan 90% and the Netherlands (75%) and Germany (79%) being close to the 
Scandinavian countries. Finally, all nations appear to disfavour paid work for women 
with children (comparing columns 4 and 5).
Table 22 gives more detailed information on the relative position of various 
households in the tax-benefit structure of a welfare state.
198
199
Table 22. Percentage Change in Disposable Income as Percentage o •** 0 1
Earnings. Moving from One Household Composition to Another,
ai the Level of an APW. 1978
i 2 3 4 5 6
1. Australia 7.69 11.54 -3.57 -4 60 6.41 5.13
2. Austria 2.63 22.37 0.00 -6.45 14.47 7.19
3. Belgium 1.35 21.62 -4.00 •8.89 10.81 10.81
4. Canada 5.06 15.19 -2.4! -4.40 10.13 5.06
5. Denmark 9.84 16.39 -4 48 -7.04 8.20 8.19
6. Finland 4.41 17.65 0.00 -3.75 13.24 4.41
7. France 6.17 20.99 -3.49 -9.18 9.88 11.11
8. Germany 10.45 17.91 •5.41 -7.57 8.96 8 95
9 Ireland 9.72 16.67 -10.13 -10.71 4.17 12.50
10. Italy 3.61 9.64 -2.33 -4.40 4.82 4.82
11. Japan 2.35 5.88 -1.55 -2.22 3.53 2.35
12. Netherlands 3.08 15.38 -1.49 -5.33 9.23 6.15
13. New Zealand 2.78 11.11 1.35 *3.75 6.94 4.17
14. Norway 8.82 17.65 -5.41 6.25 10.29 7.36
15. Sweden 4.69 17.19 0.00 -2.67 14.06 3.13
16. Switzerland 3.85 10.26 -4.94 -6.98 2.56 7.70
17. United Kingdom 5.80 17.39 2.74 -1.23 15.94 1.45
18. United States 5.33 9.33 -7.59 -7.32 1.33 8.00
Average 5.42 15.23 -2.93 -5.71 8.61 6.62
St. Dev. 2.81 4.63 3.21 2.56 4.26 3.08
Source: OECD. 1980. U  SiniicM Am Rewrd it I'Iibp« <* 4«» T w fc r t i  Socinx 
-1-  r ****TT dc R ev«-» D «« to  P»v. Membra <te I QCDE. 1974-1978.
Tables 32 • 36. pp. 130 - 132. owi computations
The first column of Table 22 shows the increase in disposable income (as a percentage 
of the disposable income of a single man) as the household composition changes from 
a single man to marriage without children, where the wife has no income. It reveals 
that in Germany the positive change is the largest (10.45%), immediately followed by 
Denmark (9.84%) and Ireland (9.72%). The second column shows the increase in 
disposable income (as a percentage of the disposable income of a single man) as the 
household composition changes from a single man to marriage, with two children, 
where the wife has no income. All nations score positively, indicating that all tax- 
benefit systems do favour families with children. Austria (22.37%), Belgium (21.62%) 
and France (20.99%), being one standard deviation above average, do so dispropor- 
tionally, whereas Germany, Finland, Norway and Sweden are above average as well. 
Italy is the one social capitalist nation which appears not to favour families with 
children very strongly and is with 9.64% more in line with Japan and the United 
States.
Column 3 displays the effect (as a percentage of disposable income of a two person 
household where the wife has no income) on disposable income as the household
composition moves from a one to a two income household without children. 
Remarkable is that in most nations the effect is negative, that the largest negative effect 
takes place in Ireland (-10.13%) and that New Zealand and Britain show a moderate 
positive effect. In column 4. the most relevant for our purposes, the same effect is 
presented for the case of moving from a family with 2 children where the wife does 
not have an income to the situation where she does (as a percentage of the disposable 
income of a two child one earner family). The negative effect is largest in Belgium, 
France and Ireland (all one standard deviation under average), while Austria, Germany 
and Switzerland score above average, too, as do Denmark, Norway and the United 
States.
One could also look -as in column 5- at the ’jump’ from a single household to a 
situation where the household consists of two children and both spouses are earning an 
income. As can be expected, there is an increase in all nations of disposable income 
(as a percentage of the disposable income of a single man), with Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom clearly in the top. The changes are, however, less 
dramatic than in the case of the increase in disposable income (as a percentage of the 
disposable income of a single man) as the household composition changes from a single 
man to marriage, with two children, where the wife has no income. To give an idea 
of the effect of the fact that a married wife earns an income, too, I calculated the 
difference between column 2 and column 5 as displayed in column 6. The smaller the 
number the less difference it makes whether a married wife with children earns an 
income or not in terms of disposable income. The larger the number, the more 
difference it makes and the less disposable income as a percentage of a single man 
remains. This number, then, can be interpreted as the relative disadvantageing of 
women with children as a result of the tax-benefit structure of a welfare regime. Again, 
the finding is that Belgium, France and Ireland appear to be especially disadvantageous 
for married women, in particular when they have children. Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the United States score relatively high, too. Italy 
and the Netherlands are the social capitalist countries that do not appear to disadvantage 
women (or benefit the family) in this sense.
Looking at Table 23, which makes use of the information from Table 22 (column 
4), shows that both the strength of the Left and of Christian Democracy are related to
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the effect on disposable income of a working wife with two children, but in different 
directions. Christian Democracy appears to enhance the negative impact on total 
disposable income when a married mother of two children enters the labour market, 
while the variable representing Left strength tends to diminish this effect37*. The 
information form the residuals showed that the nations of interest all had negative 
residuals, which in this case indicates that in these countries the negative impact of 
Christian democracy and the positive impact of the Left variable was less than 
anticipated.
Tabic 23. Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Dependent Variable =
Absolute Values of Column 4, Table 22
201
Variable Estimated
Name Coefficient
(Beta)
1 LPS80 -0.37868* Ho: Ho:
2 CPS80 00.48941“ Bi =0 Bl =B2=0
F: 3.827 F: 5.377
PR: 6.81% PR: 1.64%
R2 (Adj.) .365
C : significant at 0.1 -level; ~ : significant at 0.05 -level;
***: significant at 0.01 -level; F = F-statistic; PR = probability value)
Concluding Remarks
The overall conclusion is that on most indicators I constructed to test hypotheses on the 
distinctiveness of social capitalism as a welfare state regime and the relative impact of 
Christian Democracy on this regime, the specified hypotheses could not be rejected. 
The central thesis seems plausible. Nevertheless, considerable variation among the 
social capitalist nations themselves was found by looking at the residuals of the 
estimations and at the rank-order of nations according to various indicators.
37) Jarque-Bera test: 0.535 (Chi2, 2 df), Pr : 76.53; White’s test: 2.368 (Chi2, df 4), Pr : 66.84; 
Goldfield-Quandt: 0.857 (F 7,7), P r : 57.78; Outlier-test: 2.260, critical values 3.62 (5%), 4.48 (1%). 
Various specifications of tests for function*] form did not lead to die rejection of the null-hypothesis that 
the standard assumptions of the regression model apply.
Thus, as far as cash benefits were concerned, the finding was that the Dutch 
configuration of state, market and family relied more on these benefits than the Italian 
and German varieties. Looking at the labour force participation of the population -and 
of the female population in particular- showed that the German welfare state did not 
appear to be as disadvantageous for women as the Dutch regime. In general, Christian 
Democracy does not favour gainful employment of married women with children. The 
management of the social security schemes under bi- or tri-partism was unexpectedly 
pronounced in the Netherlands in comparison to the Italian and the German way of 
administering the systems. The insurance-bias of social capitalism was spotted as more 
articulate in Italy and the Netherlands than in Germany. Benefit differentials and 
benefit inequality was low in Italy, but the average replacement rates in this nation was 
also low. The German and Dutch versions of social capitalism performed as expected 
as to differentiation in the benefit structure. Finally, the fragmentation of social 
security systems in terms of occupationally separate schemes was quite articulate in 
Italy and less so in Germany and the Netherlands. These considerations justify a more 
detailed analysis of the conditions under which both social capitalism and Christian 
Democracy emerged in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
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Appendix Is
Sources and Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Regression Equations (in order of appearance in text)»
1. Expenditure of Social Security Schesres as Percentage of Gross Doaestic 
Product, 1960
Source: ILO, The Cost of Social Security, Basic Tables, various years
Arithmetic Mean * 10.55556 Geometric Mean * 10.13500Variance - 8.37914 Standard Dev. * 2.89467
Minimum * 4.90000 Maximum * 15.40000Number of values * 18
2. Gross Dosrastic Per Capita at Current Prices and Current Exchange Rates inUS Dollars, 1960
Source: OECD, National Accounts, various years
Arithmetic Mean * 1366.94446 Geometric Mean * 1256.67395
Variance * 307710.59400 Standard Dev. * 554.71667
Minimum * 477.00000 Maximum * 2841.00000Number of values * 18
3. UneaployMnt as Percentage of Total Labour Force, 1960 
Sourca: OECD) Historical Statistics
Arithmetic Mean * 2.41667 Geometric Mean * 1.81210
Variance - 3.55250 Standard Dev. » 1.88481
Minimum * 0.40000 Maximum * 6.40000
Number of values * 18
4. Proportion of Aged (* 65 or Older) as a Proportion of Total Population,
1960
Source: SSIB-date files
Arithmetic Mean * 0.09889 Geometric Mean * 0.09685
Variance * 0.00037 Standard Dev. * 0.01912
Minimum - 0.06000 Maximum - 0.12000
Number of values * 18
5. Muaber of Union Meabers as a Proportion of the Total Labour Force, 1960 
Source: SSIB-data files
Arithmetic Mean * 0.39222 Geometric Mean * 0.36841
Variance * 0.01854 Standard Dev. * 0.13616
Minimum * 0.17000 Maximum * 0.66000
Number of values * 18
6. 'Competition9 or Interaction between Social Democracy and Christian
Des»cracy, 1960
Source: see LPS60 and CPS60
Arithmetic Mean * 6.28062 Geometric Mean * 1.14034
Variance * 58.56137 Standard Dev. * 7.65254
Minimum * 0.00420 Maximum * 23.24758
Number of values - 18
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7. Hat (After Tax) Pension as a Proportion of Average Worker Wage, Weighted by the Take-Up Rate (Proportion of Population 65 or Older Receiving a Social Security Pension), 1960
Source: SSIB-date files
Arithmetic Mean = 0.21722 Geometric Mean = 0.18494
Variance = 0.00961 Standard Dev. * 0.09803
Minimum * 0.02000 Maximum - 0.38000Number of values * 18
8. Left Parliamentary Seats as a Proportion of Total Parliamentary Seats, Average 1946 (or Nearest Year) - 1960
Source: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose (1991), The International Almanac of Electoral History (Fully Revised Third Edition), Houndsmill (MacMillan)
Arithmetic Mean * 0.36549 Geometric Mean * 0.29024
Variance * 0.02155 Standard Dev. = 0.14679
Minimum ■ 0.00840 Maximum * 0.52240Number of values ■ 18
9. Parliamentary Seats of Christian Democracy as a Proportion of Total Parliamentary Seats, Average 1946 (or Nearest Year)- 1960
Source: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose (1991), The International Almanac 
of Electoral History (Fully Revised Third Edition), Houndsmill (MacMillan)
Arithmetic Mean = 0.16739 Geometric Mean * 0.76680
Variance * 0.03709 Standard Dev. * 0.19258
Minimum * 0.00000 Maximum = 0.48120
Number of values * 18
10. De-commodification as Weighted Average Het Replacement Rates of Major 
Income Replacement Schemes, Weighted by Social Security Expenditure, 1960
Source: SSIB-data files and ILO (see variable 1)
Arithmetic Mean * 4.86806 Geometric Mean * 4.16468
Variance » 6.24616 Standard Dev. = 2.49923
Minimum * 1.30900 Maximum * 9.33300
Number of values * 18
11. The difference between the take-home pay plus cash transfers of a family 
with two children and the take-home pay plus cash transfers of a single 
(expressed as a percentage of gross earnings)in 1981 (Take-home paysgross 
earnings minus income tax and employee's social security contributions);
Source: OECD (1986), The Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers, 1981- 
1985, Paris, Table 4, p. 53.
Arithmetic Mean * 11.67222 Geometric Mean * 11.25271
Variance * 9.75312 Standard Dev. * 3.12300
Minimum * 5.60000 Maximum * 18.20000
Number of values = 18
12. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita at Current Prices and at Current
Purchasing Power Parities, 1980
Source: OECD, National Accounts, Various Years
Arithmetic Mean * 8597.66699 Geometric Mean * 8465.00977
Variance * 2170398.50000 Standard Dev. * 1473.22729
Minimum « 4978.00000 Maximum * 11794.00000
Number of values * 18
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13 » Cash benefits as a proportion of total benefits of social security schemes, 1960
Source: ILO (1964), The Cost of Social Security. 1958-1960
Arithmetic Mean * 
Variance * 
Minimum *
Number of values
0.75389 
0.00730 
0.53000 
18
Geometric Mean Standard Dev. a 
Maximum ■
14. Labour Force Participation (%) of Wossn, 1960
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics
Arithmetic Mean a Variance * Minimum »
Number of values
58.31111132.6721037.20000
18
Geometric Mean Standard Dev. a Maximum »
15. Labour Force Participation (%) of Men, 1960
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics
Arithmetic Mean » 
Variance * 
Minimum *
Number of values
83.3333419.32999
75.40000
18
Geometric Mean Standard Dev. » 
Maximum *
0.74867
0.08545
0.87000
57.1332011.51834
78.30000
83.215214.39659
89.40000
16. Unemployment as Percentage of Total Labour Force, 1960 
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics
Arithmetic Mean * 4.71111 Geometric Mean * 3.63588
Variance * 6.02432 Standard Dev. - 2.45445
Minimum * 0.20000 Maximum * 7.70000
Number of values * 18
17. Number of Union Members as a Proportion of the Total Labour Force, 1960 
Source: SSIB-data files
Arithmetic Mean * 0.45500 Geometric Mean * 0.41984
Variance * 0.03251 Standard Dev. « 0.18032
Minimum * 0.20000 Maximum * 0.81000
Number of values * 18
18. Number of central social security schemes (old-age, invalidity, and 
survivor programs; sickness and maternity; work-injury programs; unemployment 
benefit programs; fasd,ly allowances) controlled by bi- or tri-partism, 1979
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1980), Social Security 
Throughout the World. 1979. Research Report 54
Arithmetic Mean * 1.22222 Geometric Mean * 0.74246
Variance * 1.61728 Standard Dev. * 1.27172
Minimum * 0.00000 Maximum * 4.00000
Number of values * 18
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19. Share of Financing of Social Security Schemes (Unemployment and Pensions) of Insured Plus Employers as a Proportion of the Share of the State, 1960
Source: SSIB-date files
Arithmetic Mean = Variance *
Minimum *
Number of values =
3.01471 Geometric Mean 9.47633 Standard Dev. ■ 
0.00000 Maximum =17
0.729573.07836
10.00000
20. Fragmentation as the sum of special schemes within the major programs of 
Old Age, Invalidity and Death, Sickness and Maternity, Work Injury, 
Unemployment, and Family Allowances added to the number of occupationally 
distinct public pension schemes, Around 1980
Source: SSIB-data files; Esping-Andersen (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. Cambridge (Polity), p. 70.
Arithmetic Mean = Variance ■ Minimum *
Number of values
6.27778 Geometric Mean 20.75617 Standard Dev. »
1.00000 Maximum =
18
4.69086
4.55589
15.00000
21« The change in disposable income moving from a family with 2 children where 
the wife does not have an income to the situation where she does (as a 
percentage of the disposable income of a two child one earner family): column 
4 of table 22
Source: OECD, 1980, La Situation Au Regard de l'Impôt et des TransfertsSociaux de Certains Groupes de Revenue Dans les Pavs Membres de l'OCDE. 1974- 
1978. Tables 32 - 36, pp. 130 - 132
Arithmetic Mean * -5.70778 Geometric Mean = 5.05645
Variance * 6.18944 Standard Dev. = 2.48786
Minimum = -10.71000 Maximum = -1.23000
Number of values * 18

PART III 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCES

CHAPTER 8
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETIES: 
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CAPITALISM 
IN GERMANY, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS

The main rationale for concentrating on Germany, Italy and the Netherlands as 
appropriate cases of Christian Democratic power and social capitalism is given by the 
conclusions of the preceding chapter. The thesis on the distinctiveness of social 
capitalism and its political determinant in general was found to be plausible. 
Nevertheless, there existed considerable variation among the nations of interest.
The most satisfactory method for inquiring into the reasons for these differences 
would consist in an analysis of the conditions under which post-war Christian 
Democracy came to power and the extent to which these conditions explain the 
heterogeneity of social capitalism in these nations. Dealing with Christian Democracy, 
the focus on structural and contingent conditions assumes a specific meaning. For it is 
my own claim (in Chapter 2) that the distinguishing features of Christian Democracy 
imply that the movement is always in principle (by virtue and by necessity of the self 
imposed political position) ’bipolar’ (or rather ’multi-dimensional’), ’flexible’ and in 
possession of a highly developed capacity to adapt in its attempt to formulate a 
compromise of antagonistic interests through the model of social capitalism. Christian 
Democracy -I argued- represents the embodiment of societal accommodation, which 
makes it quite complicated if not impossible to express any definite statement a priori 
as to any precise historical compromise. In other words, an analysis of conditions is 
vital for understanding the specific historical character of a Christian Democratic 
movement and therefore of any historically specific variant of social capitalism.
The choice for the countries was furthermore defended (in Chapter 1) by 
arguing that Italy -in contrast to Germany and the Netherlands- is a nation where 
Catholicism constituted the religion of the majority of the population. Christian 
Democracy has largely depended on the existence of an integrated Catholic subculture. 
In Germany and the Netherlands Catholicism has been the religion of a considerable 
minority of the population. The intriguing problem for the latter two nations is why 
Christian Democracy emerged as a cross-Confessional union of forces in Germany, 
while in the Netherlands segmented confessional blocs reappeared. A concern is 
whether the recognition of these differences in the character of Christian Democracy 
advances the understanding of the diverging developments in social capitalism. The 
major proposition of the following chapters, however, is to view the differences 
between the nations under scrutiny as effects of their digressing historical experiences.
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The establishment of Christian Democracy and social capitalism in Germany and 
-to a lesser extent- in Italy cannot be properly appreciated but by reference to their 
respective burdens of Fascist totalitarianism and warfare. If anywhere, it was in these 
nations that the terms of a new social contract (Rosanvallon 1981) had to be negotiated.
Granted, the actual conditions of Italy and Germany immediately after the 
termination of the hostilities differed considerably. Germany was in complete disarray 
after its effort of total war and its conditional surrender to the allied forces. Italy’s war 
experience was unique and ambiguous. Ultimately, the Italian anti-Fascist resistance 
had been able to take up arms and participate in the liberation of the nonhem part of 
the country from Mussolini’s Fascists and the German armies. In Germany the 
economic infrastructure was thoroughly cracked; major cities were ruined by ruthless 
and undirected bombing; and the population was demoralized and dislocated at an 
immense scale. The devastation of the Italian economy, on the other hand, turned out 
to be much less severe than feared. The bank of Italy calculated the damage of industry 
at a mere 8 percent, large parts of the nation had survived the war relatively 
untouched, while the refugee problem was not in any sense comparable to the German 
tragedy.
Yet, the similarity in the nations’ starting position is undoubtedly notable. Both 
nations faced the huge task of substituting the all-embracing and penetrating totalitarian 
state by a revitalized civil society. Political forces had to be re-established or newly 
founded. An entirely new political-administrative constitution had to be designed in 
which built-in safeguards against despotic threats were to be incorporated. Moreover, 
in both nations a state-edifice had to be erected if not from scratch than at least from 
the remnants of what still represented the civilized world of pre-Fascist democracy. 
The decisions taken in the first decade after the war were therefore in many ways 
foundational: they determined and demarcated the very settlement of state and civil 
society. And what is more, this was done under and went parallel with the growth of 
Christian Democratic power. In Germany, Social Democrats were excluded from 
government until late 1966. Democracy Italian Style (LaPalombara 1987) excluded the 
Communists in 1947 from power at the national power to which they have not been 
allowed back yet.
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In historical retrospective, the Second World War provided much less of a break 
in the Netherlands. The re-appearance of the pre-war ’pillarized’ social and political 
structures and with it the surfacing of Confessional politics might indicate a clear 
tendency towards restoration in this nation. The threat to democracy had come from 
outside and as a result no societal reordering in this respect was necessary. A 
restoration would suffice. The defeat of the German armies ushered in the immediate 
de-Nazification of Dutch society and the trial of traitors. Two years after the liberation 
the Netherlands looked very much like the pre-war society, except for the horrendous 
fact, that the Dutch Jewish population had been massacred by the Nazi holocaust0.
However, some important changes had taken place at the political level. An 
attempt to redesign and modernize Dutch society in the immediate post-war years had 
been effective in two central aspects: a substantial conversion of Dutch Social 
Democracy and the construction of a coalition between this renewed movement and 
social Catholicism. Unlike in Germany and Italy, the Left participated in power until 
the Social Democrats were expelled from government in the late 1950s. The peculiar 
Dutch generous version of social capitalism must largely be explained against this 
background of an alliance between Social Democratic and Catholic reformism in the 
first decade or so after the war.
In the subsequent chapters on Germany, Italy and the Netherlands I focus on 
nationally specific developments. Thus, for Germany I analyze the establishment of 
Christian Democracy, the Basic Law and the ’social market economy’ in terms of the 
mobilization of bias towards the reconstruction of capitalism as the context within 
which to interpret the failed attempt to introduce social reforms and the gradual return 
to traditional forms of social policy, culminating in the Pension reform of 1957. For 
Italy, I look at the debate around the Constitution and at the conditions of Christian 
Democratic dominance as the background against which to view the rise of institutional 
clientelism and the particularistic welfare state, that is so characteristic for this nation. 
With respect to the Netherlands, the condition of ’pillarization’ and its tenacity form 
the relevant contextual elements for an account of the dominance of confessional 
politics and the emergence of a curiously generous form of social capitalism.
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1) The sad estimation is that of the 140,000 people that the Nazi’s had ’classified’ as ’Volljuden’,
100,000 did not survive the concentration camps.

CHAPTER 9 
GERMANY

In Germany, Christian Democracy (Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU; Christlich- 
Soziale Union, CSU) emerged as a new alliance of political forces and became one of 
the leading actors actively involved in the process of reconstruction. After twelve years 
of Nazi-dictatorship and 6 years of warfare the conditions of the first phase appeared 
to provide unique prospects for a fresh start. Constraints, however, on the possible 
configuration of societal power relations were set, not merely by the prevailing internal 
conditions, but above all by the presence of a coalition of foreign powers occupying 
the country.
The ’Weichenstellungen’ for the reconstruction of politics and society were set in 
the period 1945-1950 under the leadership of Christian Democracy. Christian 
Democracy not only managed to formulate a relatively consistent plan for the 
reconstruction and reformation of society, but -within and in line with the exceptional 
structural constraints of the period- proved to a large extent to be capable of 
implementing the German version of social capitalism: the social market economy (’die 
soziale Markwirtschaft’), a combination of neo-Liberal economic policies and 
traditional social policies.
The main questions structuring this chapter are: 1) what are the characteristics of 
Christian Democracy in Germany; 2) why did the neo-liberal model of the ’social 
market economy’ become dominant and what was the role of Christian Democracy; 3) 
what establishes the ’social’ element of this model in terms of social policy?
Christian Democracy in Germany: Integration and Pluralism
Perhaps even more than in Italy or the Netherlands ’integration’ is the key for 
understanding the history of Christian Democracy in Germany in the immediate 
postwar phase. The centre-right movements of German politics, in particular, 
reorganized in unity through Christian Democracy in the conviction that "their old 
party traditions were either inadequate or completely inviable. This held true 
particularly of the Liberal and Protestant-conservative groups, who had little confidence 
that much of their original following had survived the twelve years of ideological 
remoulding" (Heidenheimer 1960: 31). In fact, it is crucial to understand that 
"Christian Democracy has been the vehicle through which German conservatives have
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come to accept liberal democracy" (Irving 1979: 163). This fact already may clarify 
a fundamental conservative disposition of German Christian Democracy. Since only the 
pre-war Catholic party, the ’Zentrum’, to a certain extent had been able to resist "the 
trend towards ideological disintegration which dogged the German party system" 
(Heidenheimer 1960: 40), the leading role of Catholics in the foundation of Christian 
Democracy was particularly conspicuous, in spite of the fact that the ’Zentrum’, too, 
had voted in favour of the Enabling Act that had brought Nazism to power in 1933.
The main ideological and integrative theme present from the beginning, then, 
concerned the stressing of general Christian values, both as a moral rejection of the 
atheist, immoral and materialistic Nazism and as a manner of distinction vis d vis 
Social Democracy. The thrust of the Christian Democratic argument was that politics 
in Germany "would be based on Christianity in contrast to the inhumanity and moral 
degradation of Fascism" (Mintzel 1982: 133). A ’moral recovery’ was argued to be a 
prerequisite for any social and economic recuperation. It was imperative to concede the 
importance of "the human and social values of Christianity after the interregnum of a 
brutal atheist regime" (Heidenheimer 1960: 32/33). Politics in the name of God, 
however, met resistance. First of all, because the German army had fought under the 
banner of ’Gott sei mit uns’ against a military force that equally had claimed Divine 
protection. Orthodox Lutheran theologians, moreover, accepting the doctrine of the 
’two realms’, argued that "it was not appropriate for Christ’s name to be associated 
with a necessarily morally imperfect political movement" (Heidenheimer 1960: 33). 
Catholics, by contrast, given their established involvement in politics, had little or no 
objections and "their leaders and program writers had no difficulty in padding the new 
party’s frame with concepts taken over from the social encyclicals and earlier 
’Zentrum’ programs" (Heidenheimer 1960: 33), thus introducing notions with a definite 
integrative faculty.
With regard to party-politics the Christian Democratic attempt of integration aimed 
at attracting a differentiated electorate from various groups: the pre-war supporters of 
the ’Zentrum’ and the highly fragmented former Protestant-conservative voters as well 
as other groups (see Ute Schmidt 1983: 515; 1987). Integration showed itself, too, in 
the attempt to create an inter-Confessional organization, in the endeavor to overcome 
the Confessional cleavage completely and in the self-identification of Christian
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Democracy as fundamentally a people’s party in the sense of cross-cutting class 
divisions (Pridham 1977: 26-28).
The inter-Confessional and cross-class character of German Christian Democracy 
must initially be interpreted as an effect of the experiences in Weimar Germany, where 
the Confessional as well as the class-based political cleavages had effectively blocked 
a possibly robust anti-Hitler coalition of the political centre and the non-Fascist right. 
Early Christian Democracy was therefore ardently and emotionally anti-Fascist. 
"Christian Democracy claimed to offer a fresh start and to be a completely new 
movement untainted by Nazism or any involvement with the discredited parties of the 
Weimar Republic" (Mintzel 1982: 132). The strength of inter-Confessionalism is 
largely an effect of the Nazi-experience, when Christians of all denominations found 
out that in the face of such brutality they at least had a shared Christian morality. In 
addition, the de facto separation of Germany in western and an eastern zone changed 
the balance of denominations in favour of Catholicism, which consequently reduced the 
anxiety within this subculture for Protestant domination (Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 115).
From the outset Christian Democracy in Germany was characterized by pluralism, 
both socially and religiously. Its inclination was towards the Right of the political 
spectrum, partly because of Christian Democracy being the only suitable and acceptable 
realliance of the centre-right and partly -as I argue below- as a result of the temperance 
of the ideological influence of the union wing of the movement and of the Dominican, 
traditionally Thomist, social Catholics of the so-called circle of Walberberg (Uertz 
1981; see also Ute Schmidt 1983: 516f).
The ideological disposition to a reform-minded neo-liberalism, however, did not 
prevent German Christian Democracy from becoming genuinely cross-class and inter- 
Confessional (Irving 1979: 113). Various societal and religious groups could easily 
identify with a Christian Democratic Union0. This pluralism, based upon a more or
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1) "Catholics could regard it as the political arm of their network of religious and lay organizations 
and as the protector of Catholic social and cultural interests. Practicing Protestants viewed it as a symbol 
of a worthwhile alliance with the stronger Catholics, and as the protector of common values against the 
atheistic left. Liberals could accept it as embodying basic Liberal values within the supporting framework 
of a non-sectarian interpretation of the Western cultural tradition. Bourgeois elements could accept it for 
its avoidance of any mention of socialism. Those attracted to concepts of social solidarity, whether 
Catholic trade unionists or Prussian conservatives, could accept it in terms of a movement seeking to 
encompass, and reconcile, the claims of all social groups and classes” (Heidenheimer 1960: 3S/36). The 
word *Union’, incidently, was chosen out of disgust of the discredited word Tarty*.
less abstracted and generalized faith in the values of Christianity, contributed to the 
establishment of the pivotal religious-secular cleavage of postwar German politics. As 
a result, both religion and class were important determinants of voting behaviour and 
what is more, these cleavages have remained relatively stable over time (Pappi 1984). 
Three characteristics of German electoral behaviour are fairly well established: 
Catholics are strongly in favour of the Christian Democratic Union, workers tend to 
vote Social Democracy (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and Protestants 
have a preference for the SPD. What is essential, however, is the extent to which 
religion overdetermines class voting. Linz (1967: 290) has shown that "the crosscutting 
of class and religious cleavages plays a decisive role in keeping many workers from 
the SPD (...)". 67% of male Protestant members of the working class voted for the 
SPD in 1953 against 47% of the male Catholics from the same class. 36% of Catholic 
workers voted Christian Democracy against only 16% of their Protestant counterparts. 
Only 28% of Catholic working-class women voted SPD; they voted in majority (54%) 
for Christian Democracy. The advantage of Christian Democracy among the Catholic 
working class in comparison with the Protestant working class comes for 21% from 
women and for 17% from men (Linz 1967: 291).
Catholicism, therefore, has been a strong cross-cutting factor in the working class 
but overdetermines voting-pattems of other classes as well. Table 1 shows that among 
Catholics Christian Democracy gained a plurality of votes from most classes and a 
majority from the salaried class and the farmers. From this information one can infer 
that, on average over the various classes, Catholics are over-represented in the 
Christian Democratic vote for about 20.5% and Protestants are over-represented in the 
SPD-vote for about 5%.
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Table 1. Party Preferences of Protestants and Catholics by
Occupation, 1953 (%); (p = Protestant; c = Catholic)
workers
P c
salaried
P c
indep.
P c
total
middle
P c
farmers
P c
total
P c
SPD 43 29 22 17 14 10 19 14 5 1 28 19
ZENT. - 3 ~ 1 1 6 1 3 — 2 — 3
CDU 14 31 31 52 24 44 29 49 34 60 23 42
FDP 4 3 13 5 19 11 15 8 12 3 10 4
BP 1 2 1 3 1 5 4 3 6 13 1 5
DP 3 1 3 3 5 2 ~ 3 11 — 4 2
OTH. 3 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 2 3 3 2
BHE 5 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 5 — 4 4
NONE 27 23 24 18 28 18 25 15 26 18 27 20
(N) 730 779 429 353 245 276 674 629 209 204 1681 1649
(Source: Linz 1967: 302)
What about class distinctiveness? Looking at Table 2 and Table 3 one can get an 
impression of the class-distinctiveness of Social Democracy, Christian Democracy and 
Liberalism in Germany in 1953. Assuming that an equal distribution over all column 
categories of Table 2 would result, if voting were independent of class (i.e. all cells 
would contain roughly 25% of the vote of a class), an index of over- (+) respectively 
under- (-) representation of classes in party-vote (Table 3) can be constructed (a ’O’ 
would indicate no over- or under-representation). It is clear that the SPD dispropor- 
tionally depends on the working class vote (+11), whereas Christian Democracy 
clearly relies on the middle class vote (+12). However, what is crucial and should be 
stressed here is that Christian Democracy’s difficulty of attracting voters from the 
working class is much less critical (-2) than Social Democracy’s inability to get 
proportionate middle class support (-8). An index of distinctiveness (D-index, Table 
3, computed as the average of the absolute under- and over-representation of class in 
voting), furthermore, shows that Christian Democracy is the least class distinct (8.75), 
Liberalism the most class distinct (19.5), whereas Social Democracy appears to be 
somewhere in between (11.0) in terms of class distinctiveness.
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Table 2. Class (of head of household) and Political Preference, 
1953 (%)
SPD CDU/
CSU
FDP OTHER/
NONE
Skilled Workers 39 23 3 35
Semiskilled Workers 36 26 3 35
Unskilled Workers 32 23 2 43
Subtotal Workers 36 23 3 38
Lower White Collar 23 38 8 31
Upper White Collar 14 42 11 33
Civil Servants 20 41 9 30
Businessman 13 29 16 42
Artisans 12 36 13 39
Free professions 5 47 18 30
Subtotal Middle Class 17 37 11 65
Farmers 4 46 8 42
Farm Workers 21 25 - 46
Total 24 32 7 37
(Source: Linz 1967: 287)
Table 3 Index of Class Distinctivetiess 
of SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, 1953
SPD CDU/
CSU
FDP
Workers + 11 -2 -22
Middle Class - 8 4-12 -14
Farmers -21 +21 -17
Farm Workers -4 0 -25
D-index 11.0 8.75 19.5
(computed from Table 2)
Recent research (e.g. Pappi 1984; Padgett and Burkett 1986) has suggested that these 
patterns of class and religious voting have been relatively stable over the whole postwar 
period. Padgett and Burkett (1986: 285), for instance, conclude that "the two main 
cleavages in the West German electorate run firstly along occupational lines, and 
secondly along Confessional, or religious/secular lines". They identified five voting 
'blocs’: 1) secular or Protestant manual (urban) workers (SPD); 2) secular white collar 
workers (SPD); 3) traditional middle class (CDU/CSU); 4) religiously (Catholic)
219
oriented manual workers (CDU/CSU); 5) self-employed (CDU/CSU). In terms of 
class, Christian Democracy’s hard core consists of the support of the ’Mittlestand’, 
whereas the bulk of the Social Democratic backing comes from the working class. 
Religion, however, moderates Christian Democracy’s ’Mittlestands’-character 
substantially through the incorporation of segments of the Catholic workers.
The conclusion, then, is that Christian Democracy has been largely successful in 
winning both cross-class and inter-Confessional support already quite soon after its 
foundation and managed to keep its pluralist character during the decades following its 
establishment. This integrative capacity of Christian Democracy has been an important 
precondition for the ascendancy of Christian Democracy in Germany (see extensively 
on integration: Ute Schmidt 1983; 1987).
Basic Law, the Postulate o f the Social State and the Social Market Economy
The West German ’Basic Law’ (’Grundgesetz’) of 1949 pictures the Federal Republic 
of Germany as a democratic and federal social state (article 20, 1)2). This article is 
known as the postulate of the social state (’Sozialstaatspostulat’, Hartwich 1970). One 
of the crucial conditions for the development of the post-war German political economy 
concerned the fact that the postulate of the social state was deliberately formulated in 
an open, undetermined way (Seifert 1989: 44). The concrete materialization of laws 
shaping the edifice of the social state was thus made contingent upon the evolving 
political power structure rather than immediately pre-determined (Alber 1989: 59). The 
various competing models of the social state could therefore never claim to possess an 
exclusive or ’correct’ interpretation of the postulate of the social state as formulated in 
the Basic Law.
Two models in fact competed for hegemony in the immediate postwar period: the 
Christian Democratic model of social capitalism and the model of Democratic 
Socialism as represented by Social Democracy (Hartwich 1970; Welteke 1976; 
Ambrosius 1977;). A model of the social state (’Sozialstaatsmodell’) focuses on the 
main contents, directions and principles of the basic social and economic relationships.
2) See for an adapted version of the Basic law: Hancock 1989: 157-178 and Conradt (1989:247-266).
The models up for competition in the 1949 elections represented real alternatives for 
charging the postulate of the social state with real content. These rival models, 
however, should not be conflated with the programs of the parties around 1949. More 
important are the concepts with which the main actors worked during the constitutional 
discussion. The difference between the competing concepts concerned primarily the 
question of the fundamental construction of the societal status quo in terms of property 
relations and the role and scope of state intervention.
The Christian Democratic model of social capitalism -in CDU/CSU-terms, the 
social market economy (’soziale Marktwirtschaft’)- was first fully formulated in the so- 
called ’Düsseldorfer Leitsätze’ of july 1949 (Hartwich 1970: 54-57; Rimlinger 1971: 
140-148; Pütz 1976: 92-93; Ambrosius 1977: 195-213; Buchhaas 1981: 164-171; 
Leaman 1988: 50-58; Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 191-209). It projected a reconciliation 
of a pro-capitalist, or rather, pro-market stance and a positive belief in the moderating 
capacity of social and economic policy (Rimlinger 1971: 141). It is both directed 
against the laissez-faire doctrine and the doctrine of the controlled or planned 
economy3’.
The Neo-Liberal bias in the theoretical concept of the social market economy 
originated in the theoretical debates among the members of the so-called liberal ’Ordo- 
Kreis’ (see Peacock and Willgerodt 1989). In this sense the economic policy proposed 
by the Christian Democrats was barely distinct from the manifestos of the republican 
middle class in the Weimar Republic except for the stress on monopoly control. 
Monopoly control, motivated by the conviction of the necessity of free competition, has
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3) In the words of one of the founders of German social capitalism, Alfred Muller-Armack (1989: 
82/83, originally 1956): ’The idea behind the social market economy is that market freedom is combined 
with social balance (...). Competition is to be safeguarded by a clear structural framework if it is to be 
the main instrument of organizations in mass societies (...). The advocates of a social market economy 
share with Neo-Liberalism the conviction that while the functional importance of competition was 
recognized under the ’Old Liberalism’, nevertheless insufficient attention was paid to social and 
sociological problems. In contrast to ’Old Liberals’, Neo-liberals do not wish to restore a laissez-faire 
economy; their goals is a new kind of synthesis. The concept of a social market economy differs just as 
widely from an interventionist economic policy. This kind of policy mixes elements of central control 
with elements of the market economy to a point at which contradictory factors block each other and 
hamper economic performance (...). The concept of a social market economy may therefore be defined 
as a regulative policy which aims to combine, on the basis of a competitive economy, free initiative and 
social progress*.
been an important element in the doctrine of the social market economy, although much 
less so in the practice of economic policy (Leaman 1988: 51).
According to the ’Leitsätze’ -echoing the Neo-Liberalism of the Ordo-intellectuals- 
the new socio-economic order of the Federal Republic would consist of a "socially 
bound constitution of the commercial economy, in which the endeavours of free and 
able people are set in an order which yields a maximum of economic advantage and 
social justice for all. This order is created by freedom and obligation, which in the 
’social market economy’ express themselves through genuine competition and 
independent monopoly control (cited in Leaman 1988: 52). Competition had to be 
guaranteed, the monetary system was to be placed under central control and prices 
were to be freely determined. In addition, wage and price moderation was called for 
as a swift and lasting road to economic recovery. Private property would constitute the 
basis of the economic system and the spread of private property was encouraged as a 
means to overcome the demand for nationalization. Economic management should 
primarily consist of credit and monetary policy, although public investment was not 
excluded. Workers’ participation in management was to be recommended (see Leaman 
1988: 52/53; see also Ute Schmidt 1983: 536f).
With respect to social policy the CDU aspired a new societal order on the basis of 
social justice, socially responsible freedom and real human dignity. A comprehensive 
social policy for all economically and socially dependent groups was needed. The 
family was to be protected and the value of the working person was confirmed as well 
as the right to co-determination. A reorganization of the system of social security and 
social assistance was called for. In addition, there existed a right to work, both for men 
and women, although a woman ought not to be forced into a type of job that did not 
correspond to her female nature (’Wesensart’, see Ute Schmidt 1983: 538). There was 
to be freedom of choice for occupation, fair and equal pay, a six day working week, 
safety protection, and a special program of aid to and compensation for war victims (as 
a duty of the people as a whole: ’Lastenausgeleich’). Displaced Germans and refugees 
were to be integrated in society, and a special program for social housing was 
considered to be necessary.
Social policy was conceived of as fundamentally subordinate and secondary to 
economic policy. The social market economy was essentially a liberal ordering of
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economic relations, a kind of socially reformed capitalism (’sozialreformierter 
Kapitalismus’, Ambrosius 1977: 207), in which the only problematic issue concerned 
the extent to which social reparations would have to be allowed. "The economy was 
not to be integrated into, controlled by and made more democratic through the social 
realm, but should be left to itself. Competition would be the factual organizing 
principle" (Ambrosius 1977:207, my translation). In this context some important social 
policy implications of the essentially neo-liberal social market economy could already 
be discerned. Social policy within this idea of reformed capitalism would typically be 
passive, reactive and compensatory in nature, since its chief aim would be repair rather 
than prevention (Rimlinger 1971: 143)4). On the account of the Neo-Liberal wing of 
Christian Democracy the ideal social policy was to be founded in a sound and ’healthy’ 
economic policy.
A further implication of the social market economy concerned the inherent 
ambiguity as to specific social policy measures. The predicament here is that the pure 
Neo-Liberal model in its ultimate theoretical implications would inhibit the expansion 
of the domain of collective social security, whereas at the same time the practice would 
(and in fact did) allow quite different developments. In one sense, this ambiguity 
produces certain ideological advantages. "The explicit goal of a social order which 
offers security, freedom, and social justice not only broadens the appeal of the social 
market economy but also makes it more effective as an ideological weapon in the hands 
of those who have adopted it" (Rimlinger 1971: 144)5).
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4) The ’embodiment’ of the social market economy and the ’Wirtschaftswunder’, Ludwig Erhard, 
was quite clear in this respect: "If (...) social policy aims at granting a man complete security from the 
hour of birth, and protecting him absolutely from the hazards of life, then it cannot be expected that 
people will develop that full measure of energy, effort, enterprise and other human virtues which are 
vital to the life and future of the nation, and which, moreover, are the prerequisites of a social market 
economy based on individual initiative. The dose link between economic and social policy must be 
stressed; in fact, the more successful economic policy can be made the fewer measures of social policy 
will be necessary* (as cited in Rimlinger 1971: 143).
5) In another sense, the ambiguity also leaves room for a critique of too active a social policy or too 
expansionist a welfare state in general. The Ordo-Liberal Walter Hamm (1989, originally 1981), for 
instance, applies the same Neo-Liberal perspective of the late 1940s in his analysis of the contemporary 
welfare state of the Federal Republic. He affirms that 'it is absolutely essential that there should be some 
community provision against risks that are not privately insurable. Furthermore, it must be ensured that 
every individual is provided with basic provisions for sickness, old age and invalidity which will prevent 
his becoming a charge on the general public. What must be rejected are the exaggerations of the welfare 
state, perfectionist collective provisions against each and everything, without regard for the fact that a
(continued...)
Anti-monopolism is argued to have been the only original ’social’ cornerstone of 
the dominant Neo-Liberal wing of Christian Democracy in Germany (Welteke 1976: 
37f). Anti-monopolism, however, has been largely unsuccessful, since "state inactivity 
has allowed capital concentration to proceed as if there were no countervailing 
legislation, let alone a commitment to anti-monopolism" (Leaman 1988: 74, original 
emphasis; see also Welteke 1976: 37-42). The argument is that it was only as a result 
of the failure of anti-monopolism that Christian Democracy started to emphasize social 
policy as the real social attribute of the market economy.
There are two reasons why this may be an inaccurate interpretation. The first 
concerns the need to make a clear distinction between the Neo-Liberal rhetoric of the 
main advocates and the economic and sociopolitical practice of the successive 
governments dominated by Christian Democracy. But even if one would focus on the 
development of the idea of the social market, the interpretation would be deceptive, 
since it discards the very real ’social influences’ (Hallet 1973: 21-24) on the social 
market economy. The philosophy of the model of the social state held by Christian 
Democracy in West Germany was simply not solely derived from classical Liberal 
doctrine. On the contrary, even in the very formulation of the Neo-Liberal point of 
view in the various manifestos promoting the social market economy one can detect 
typical social Catholic elements of economic thought. Time and again the vital role of 
’small groups’ in society is emphasized. Neo-Liberalism in its Anglo-Saxon version, 
by contrast, would rather underscore the crucial role of the individual, the firm and the 
state as the main actors in the economy. The leading ’Ordo’-intellectual Alexander 
Riistow, furthermore, argued that the state had to protect capitalism from the capitalists 
(Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 207). And Wilhelm Ropke’s point was that capitalism was 
not at all incompatible with the ’natural order of society’. The free market economy 
"cannot float freely in a social, political, and moral vacuum, but must be maintained 
and protected by a strong social, political and moral framework. Justice, the state, 
traditions and morals, firm standards and values (...) are part of this framework as are 
the economic, social, and fiscal policies which, outside the market sphere, balance
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5) (...continued)
substantially increased prosperity makes possible less, not more, collective provision* (Hamm 1989: 
182).
interests, protect the weak, restrain the immoderate, cut down excesses, limit power, 
set the rules of the game and guard their observance (...). The free market is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a free, happy, wealthy, just, and orderly 
society" (as cited in Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 208).
The view that Christian Democracy started to emphasize social policy as the real 
social attribute of the market economy only after the failure of anti-monopolism seems 
implausible for yet another reason, namely on the basis of the observation that the 
Christian Democratically led governments of the 1950s were relatively active in the 
realm of social policy6'. If anywhere the theoretical and ideological claims of the Neo- 
Liberal wing do not match the actual practice of German Christian Democracy in 
power, it is precisely in the field of social policy.
If too great an emphasis is placed on the Neo-Liberal economics of the social 
market economy -which certainly was present in the various publications of the 
advocates of the social market economy, in the party programs of Christian Democracy 
(starting from the ’Düsseldorfer Leitsätze’), and in the practice of the CDU/CSU 
dominated governments since 1949- one might easily underestimate or wrongly evaluate 
the importance of the ’social’ side of social capitalism. The proper way of understan­
ding social capitalism as the Christian ¡Democratic model of political economy starts 
from the recognition that the social market economy has been a model in the strict 
sense, competing for hegemony in the period before 1948/1949, as well as a practice 
in the period since the foundation of the Federal Republic.
Social Capitalism and the Preconditions o f Christian Democratic Power
The CDU/CSU gained a plurality of the vote in the elections of 1949 with social 
capitalism as its program. What were the conditions for this victory and what enabled 
the Christian Democrats to win these elections and make a start with the implemen­
tation of their version of social capitalism? One answer could be that the German Basic 
Law was already heavily biased towards the mix of Neo-Liberalism and social policy
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6) This activity has led one student of the history of the German welfare state even to conclude that 
"the nearly universal coverage of employed persons and the relatively high levels of contributions and 
pensions clearly indicate that in spite of its Neo-Liberal leanings, the social market economy is in reality 
an advanced welfare state” (Rimlinger 1971: 184).
of the CDU/CSU-model. The provisional Constitution did not serve as the guiding 
force for social and economic policy, because "the results of the compromise over the 
Basic Law are above all the neutrality in economic policy and the openness of the Basic 
Law" (Seifert 1989: 44, my translation). There is therefore little reason to accept the 
view that the gist of the Neo-Liberal social market economy was already inaugurated 
in the Basic law.
The postulate of the social state and in particular the openness of its formulation 
may illustrate why. Both Christian Democracy and Social Democracy -uncertain as to 
the actual balance of power in post-occupied Germany- had an interest in an open 
formulation of the Basic Law and its social postulate in particular. Neither movement 
wanted to see its own model blocked in advance by constitutional constraints. Both the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD hoped to win the first post-war elections (1949) in order to be 
able to implement their own model of the social state. Reference to a CDU/CSU-bias 
in the Basic Law is not only incorrect, but, more importantly, tends to generate 
inadequate accounts of the post-war political struggle over the reconstruction of the 
German economy and polity and the success of Christian Democracy in the process.
Additionally, one could argue that even if it were the case that the Basic Law was 
formulated in such a way that it strongly favoured the CDU/CSU-model of the social 
state, this fact would still require explanation. Rather than looking at the Basic Law as 
the generator of bias and power one would have to look at the extra-constitutional 
constraints in occupied Germany that were advantageous for the Christian Democratic 
model and restricted the possibilities for Democratic Socialism.
The influence of the American occupying power (later in conjunction with Britain 
in the ’Bizone’), the dominant role of Christian Democrats in the Economic Council 
in the occupied zones and a range of institutional measures taken in the period 
preceding the constitution of the Federal Republic and the elections of 1949, 
determined a gradual shift towards an extra-constitutional bias in favour of the model 
of social capitalism. In this sense the institutionalization of social capitalism in 
Germany was pre-determined before Christian Democracy got hold of the legitimate 
power in the Federal Republic in the first coalition-govemment with the Liberals. In 
addition to this, the systematic integration of the western occupation zones into the 
Marshall plan, the linkage to the OEEC and the European monetary union, and the
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increasing importance of the conflict between East and West resulting in the Cold War, 
are other momentous catalysts of this development (Hartwich 1970; Welteke 1976: 18f; 
Widmaier 1976: 3If; Ambrosius 1977; Abelshauser 1983; Bark and Gress 1989, 1).
Three ’internal’ developments in the British and American zones were crucial for 
the establishment of capitalism in West Germany: 1) the hegemony of the forces of the 
United States; 2) the position and composition of the Economic Council (’Wirtschafts- 
rat’); and 3) the money reform of 1948.
The American dominance on the European continent expressed itself in the leading 
role of the United States and their real economic presence in the form of the economic 
recovery plan for Europe, the Marshall Plan. The hegemony of the United States 
became firmly established after the formation of the Bizone. The fusion of the British 
with the American occupation zones was economically decisive since the British zone 
included Germany’s main industrial areas of the Ruhr, Lower Saxony, Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein.
The politics of the American occupying forces has been accurately described as the 
politics of prejudicing through the prohibition of all prejudicing ("Politik der 
Präjudizierung durch Verbot aller Präjudizierungen", Hartwich 1970: 66). This policy 
was especially clear in the commands and decrees of the American military governor. 
These directives basically precipitated the preservation of the status quo and effectively 
blocked possible other models not principally committed to a restoration of the 
capitalist economy from becoming viable alternatives (see Welteke 1976: 25-28; 
Berghahn 1987: 177f).
The American military government promised that no measures would be taken that 
would deprive the German people of a real choice between a free and a Socialist 
economy (Welteke 1976: 26). The United States did not wish "to impose its own 
historically developed forms of democracy and social organization on Germany and 
believes equally firmly that no other external forms should be imposed” (cited in 
Hartwich 1970: 68). On the strictest interpretation, any attempt to change the status 
quo, for instance in a Democratic Socialist direction, would be an ’external form’ being 
imposed on Germany. It was in this way that American foreign policy managed to 
organize a bias towards a free capitalistic market economy, without literally imposing 
their preferred economic order. This successful mobilization of bias in the years
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preceding the elections of 1949 substantiated the American policy of allowing the final 
decision over the economic and social order to be taken through free elections in the 
certainty of the right outcome (see Hartwich 1970: 68).
In practice, the United States were able to influence the economic policy of the 
Bizone substantially on the basis of their large resources. In effect, the Americans 
controlled the ’Joint Export-Import Agency’ as well as the ’Foreign Exchange Agency’ 
for the simple reason that voting power was linked to the financial efforts of the 
participants. The completion of the development towards American hegemony in the 
western zones of occupied Germany consisted in the expansion of the Marshall aid and 
its effects on the increasing integration of Germany into the Western European 
capitalist economic system. The motivation of these policies was fueled by the 
American foreign policy conviction that economic nationalism had caused the collapse 
of the system of international relations. "This nationalism was to be replaced once and 
for all by a multilateral world trading system based on the principle of the Open Door 
(...). There was no question that a liberal representative constitution was deemed to be 
the political system most compatible with the Open Door" (Berghahn 1987: IBS)7'.
The Economic Council of the united British and American zones functioned in 
favour of the Christian Democratic model of social capitalism. The legislation of this 
Council converged with the opinion of the Americans on economic structure and 
policy. In addition, the Economic Council was reorganized between 1947 and 1949 and 
came under Christian Democratic domination (Hartwich 1970: 95-101; Ambrosius 
1977: 1480* Although the SPD and the CDU/CSU both had 20 seats, the combination
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7) The American dominance over the British in the Bizone could perhaps best be exemplified by the 
issue of socialization and nationalization of elementary industries, the anti-monopoly program, the 
establishment of the freedom of choice for career, place of work and profession, and the establishment 
of the co-determination in the mining industry. Of these only the last can be seen as the British 
contribution to the structuring of the German economy and society. Union leaders had demanded (and 
were granted) parity co-determination in the iron and coal industries in the British zone in 1947. 'This 
innovation, which provided for the equal representation of labour and shareholders on company 
supervisory boards, institutionalized shared responsibility (and hence authority) for decisions affecting 
production, investments, and personnel policy in the firms in question)* (Hancock 1989: 77). Although 
the co-determination was not implanted in the Basic Law, the principle of co-determination did accord 
an extra social dimension to the market economy (Widmaier 1976: 33). Parity co-determination was 
extended to other industries in 1951. The introduction of forms of co-determination and workers’ control 
can be seen as compensating the thwarted nationalization and in this sense a 'victory' of British politics. 
The German Union Federation and its leaders, too, 'partly in return for rights of co-determination (...) 
have tabled any serious discussion of nationalization in favour of cooperation (...) on behalf of economic 
recovery and growth* (Hancock 1989: 78).
of the Christian Democratic seats with the 4 seats of the Liberals and the German Party 
(Deutsche partei, DP) procured an effective majority, even if the SPD would have 
cooperated with the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) that 
had 3 seats. In addition, the SPD immediately maneuvered itself out of power by 
rejecting a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats (Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 
189).
The American hegemony in the western part of Germany and the Christian 
Democratic control of the Economic Council together explain another important factor 
that reinforced the bias towards social capitalism: the money reform. It was quite clear 
that the relationship between the quantity of money and the supply of goods was out 
of all proportions, causing a deplorable work-ethic, flourishing black markets and even 
hoarding (Abelshauser 1983: 46). The money reform, carried out by the Allied forces 
in the western zones, as well as other accompanying measures of the Economic Council 
restored the basic structures of the capitalist economy in the western part of Germany. 
Among the main measures were the creation of a stable currency, the reform of tax 
laws (including investment incentives through tax relief), and the decentralization of 
the banking system. These measures founded the primacy of the economy in Germany 
(Widmaier 1976: 34). The money reform consisted of the introduction of a new 
currency, the Deutsche Mark, an exchange of 60 old Reichsmarks at a ratio of 1:1, 
while credits were exchanged at a rate of 10:1, but large accounts at a ratio of 100 RM 
to 6,5 DM. Wages, pensions and rents were converted at a 1:1 ratio (Abelshauser 
1983:50). The effect was immediate. The reform normalized economic transactions 
rapidly and restored the relationship between the value and quantity of money. The 
money reform, however, left property untouched (Abelshauser 1983: 50).
The American theory of a freedom for the German people in the choice for the 
proper economic and social order, therefore, was based upon the myth of historical 
contingency®’. These reflections make plausible how in the period before the elections 
of 1949 and the inauguration of the Basic Law a bias was mobilized. The bias 
regulated the restoration of capitalist economic relations and inhibited from the outset
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8) "If for the moment the economic privileges of the occupation-policy were to remain in tact after 
the formation of a freely elected German government, then this would imply that such a freely elected 
government to a large extent would have to follow the already delineated route* (Hartwich 1970: 116, 
my translation).
any radical experiment that drew upon propositions of societal transformation. It 
explains to a large extent the vitality of the Neo-Liberal side of the social capitalist 
model of German Christian Democracy, too.
A significant further development -which is often overlooked but which I 
understand as vitally important for the establishment of the model of social capitalism 
in West Germany- concerns the fragmentary incorporation and in part elimination of 
the demands of the Left, laborite and Dominican wing of the Christian Democratic 
movement. Initially these groups had articulated a vehemently anti-capitalist reformist 
ideology.
A group, consisting of the old Christian labour movement leaders and members of 
the resistance-circle of members of the Dominican order (’Walberberger Kreis im 
Wiederstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus’, Uertz 1981: 23f), mainly operative in the 
British zone, had formulated a social and political social Christian program for post­
war Germany. This plan was partly based on the pre-Nazi designs and strategies of the 
Christian unions and partly on a revitalization of Thomist social philosophy. The 
Walberberger circle, in fact, founded the first post-war Christian Democratic ’party’ 
in occupied Germany. The societal concept adhered to by members of the circle 
became rapidly known as ’Christian Socialism’. For the Christian Socialists the 
economy should be based on the self-government of labour and capital. Among the 
goals of this group were a wider diffusion of private property among workers, a just 
tax system, a fair distribution of material wealth, and comprehensive social legislation. 
The Christian Socialists determined the party-political developments of Christian 
Democracy in the British zone at least until 1947/1948 (Uertz 1981), even if the 
concept of Christian Socialism had already evaporated by that time?\
The tendency within this group of Christian Democrats to opt for a merger with 
other progressive forces in society to constitute a broadly based ’Labour Party’ is 
strikingly similar to the ’breakthrough’ movement existing in the Netherlands in the 
immediate postwar period (see Chapter 11). The Christian Socialists, then, "tried to 
equip Catholics -Protestants entered into this tendency only marginally- to meet the 
challenge of the social and political upheaval by making explicit to them the large
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9) The interesting detail is that the term did not disappear as a result of an increasing surrender to 
capitalist economic principles but as a consequence of ideological disputes.
amount of ground they held in common with Socialists with whom they would have to 
cooperate to fashion the new social order" (Heidenheimer 1960: 46). Christian 
Socialism was to be the vehicle for a massive realignment of the Left to which other 
social layers previously hesitant to be associated with Socialism could enter.
Almost immediately, Christian Socialists were attacked on the argument that 
Christianity and Socialism were antithetic, for in Quadragesimo Anno (1931) Christian 
Socialism was defined as a contradiction in itself. The definitive blow, however, came 
from the organizing Neo-Liberal wing and Adenauer’s attempt to strike a deal between 
this wing and the Christian Socialists.
Adenauer primarily countervailed the ’Socialist agitation’ from within his own 
ranks by formulating cautious compromises. It turned out that he was not able to win 
sufficient support for the more Liberal economic recovery program in the British zone 
in 1946, but by incorporating demands from the Socialist Christian wing10>. The 
compromises on socialization and the manner in which the laborite demands were 
converted into a new social manifesto (the Ahlen-program) moderated if not rendered 
harmless the Christian Socialist influence. The new program, however, was mainly 
designed to camouflage the near-schism of the party into a group in favour of a 
program of socialization and a faction urging for a moderate reordering of large 
industries.
This is the background against which the renowned Ahlen-program must be 
interpreted, a program -in rhetoric at least- anti-capitalist, but already interlarded with 
Neo-Liberal elements as a result of which both Neo-Liberals and Christian Socialists 
could identify with the program (Uertz 1981: 103). Adenauer succeeded in integrating 
the labour wing into the party and thus tried to prevented the potential defection of 
workers to the Socialist camp (see Bark and Gress 1989, 1: 197)U).
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10) Adenauer's tactical skills were enormous and his political pragmatism unmatched. In this sense, 
the political leader of the CDU and of Germany’s resurrection was strikingly similar to his counterpart 
in Italy, the leader of the ’Democrazia Cristiana’, Alcide De Gasperi (see for a comparative study on 
both: Corsini and Repgen 1979; for a biography of Adenauer, Schwarz 1986).
11) It is intriguing to note that the Christian Democratic Left was so firmly convinced of the real 
substance of the compromise, that the union leader Zimmerman said: "It is almost embarrassing to say 
that the political adversaries of the CDU once argued that Adenauer was a reactionary, so absurd are 
these reproaches. They have never had any influence whatsoever on the Christian workers. (...) 
Everything has become clear: Adenauer is not only the acknowledged leader of the CDU as a whole, 
but of the Christian workers in particular (...)” (as cited in Uertz 1981: 188, my translation).
It is conceivable that the mobilization of bias towards the restoration of capitalism 
through the money reform and similar economic reforms facilitated the eventual 
downfall of the more positively reformist forces within German Christian Democracy. 
The money reform in particular accorded the Neo-Liberal wing an advantage in the 
internal political struggle. The novel compromise between the increasingly strong Neo- 
Liberal forces and the social reformist wing consisted primarily in affirming the Ahlen- 
program as the determinant of the ’social’ face of capitalism, whereas economic policy 
would be based upon the Neo-Liberal theory of the benefits of a free market economy. 
The developments in the period from the Ahlen-program to the incorporation of the 
theory of the social market economy in the ’Düsseldorfer Leitsätze’ illustrates the shift 
from the pre-dominantly social reformist Christian Democracy to a movement that 
embraced free market capitalism as the secure and inevitable foundation of social 
justice. Gradually, even the former adherents of Christian Socialism, like for instance 
Jakob Kaiser, committed themselves to Erhardt’s liberal economic policies, provoking 
the demise of Christian Socialism within the CDU (Uertz 1981). Perhaps another way 
of putting it is that for social capitalism to take effect capitalism had to be established 
first.
A third element in the account of the road to power of the model of social 
capitalism may be found in the socio-structural effects of the division of Germany, 
which significantly favoured Christian Democracy and provided a handicap for Social 
Democratic power mobilization. The political development in the western zones and 
the emerging dominant position of Christian Democracy was to a certain extent pre­
determined by a transformation of the social structure. The ratio of Catholics and 
Protestants in the German Empire (1925) was 32.4 : 64.1, whereas this ratio in the 
Federal Republic (1950) amounted to 45.8 : 50.5 (Mintzel 1984: 27; see also Mintzel 
1982: 133). The division of Germany cut off the Soviet zone with its traditionally 
Social Democratic and Communist strongholds. The predominantly Catholic areas of 
Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate and North-Rhine-Westphalia gained prominence as a 
result.
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Further Conditions o f Power
The organized bias towards the reconstruction of capitalist economic relations 
constituted a notable power resource for Christian Democracy in that the model of the 
social market economy flawlessly concurred with the constraints of the period. The 
complement of this development was the failure of German Social Democracy to 
mobilize a bias towards the model of Democratic Socialism or at least to formulate its 
own ’flexible response’ to the changing circumstances. Such a move would have 
enabled Social Democracy to play a more distinguished role in the first years after the 
war than it did. The Social Democratic model of a socialist market economy was 
hopelessly anachronistic given the structural bias towards private market capitalism. 
The SPD was extremely slow in adjusting to the emanating new socio-structural 
configuration in (West) Germany. The Social Democrats found it particularly difficult 
to find a feasible answer to the challenge of Christian Democracy, especially since this 
new political movement managed to attract support from the working class as well. The 
1946 program still relied predominantly on such notions as nationalization and central 
planning, all dogmatically formulated in the typical pre-Nazi style of class struggle. It 
took the Social Democrats until 1954 to get adjusted to the evolving and partly already 
institutionalized new power relations. The SPD’s position on foreign security policy 
complicated matters further. It consisted of an attempt to establish a united Germany 
as a strong neutral state on the European continent, balancing the systems struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union (see Drummond 1982). Finally, the 
personal antagonism between Adenauer and the leader of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, 
inhibited an opening to an already thwarted cooperation between the Christian 
Democrats and the Socialists12’. In the Action Program of 1954 the SPD broadened 
its appeal to the people of the Federal Republic as a whole rather than to the working 
class alone. Under conditions of Christian Democratic hegemony Social Democracy 
increasingly accepted -or had to accept- the competitive market as a regulating and 
organizing principle of the economy and consequently started to downplay central
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12) For an interesting, almost hilarious, account of the relationship between the two leaders, see 
Crawley (1973, especially pp. 118-132).
planning, culminating in the slogan of the 1954 Action Program: competition as far as 
possible, planning as far as necessary.
The final step in this slow process of adaptation, which resulted in the revised party 
program of 1959, was also inspired and most likely accelerated by the sweeping 
electoral triumph of Christian Democracy in 1957. The change of policy of German 
Social Democracy in the mid-fifties on the one hand may be interpreted as a belated 
development towards a modernized type of Social Democratic people’s party, in line 
with developments elsewhere in Europe, notably in Sweden. However, one must be 
careful with such an account, because it tends to underrate the fact that German 
Socialism was forced into this metamorphosis under conditions of Christian Democratic 
dominance. The movement faced such a powerful opponent that it would be sheer 
suicide not to move into the direction of political power. In this sense, Social 
Democracy’s transformation was not only a historical adjustment in line with 
developments elsewhere, but above all a necessary response to the accumulation of 
power in the hands of Christian Democrats13'.
It would be an exaggeration to appreciate the evolution of Social Democracy in 
Germany as a form of ’Christian Democratization’; yet, it is not simply a process of 
’embourgeoisement’ either. Perhaps one overstates the case if the argument is that the 
Social Democrats accepted and updated the idea of the social market economy (Hallett 
1973: 17). The more realistic view would hold that the main political parties have 
approached each other in terms of ideology and policies, moderating both ardent Neo- 
Liberalism and stubborn pre-war Socialism14’.
The first elections after twelve years of dictatorship and almost four of occupation 
focused upon the choice between the social capitalist model of Christian Democracy 
and Social Democracy’s alternative of Democratic Socialism. It is precisely as 
Adenauer himself put it: "Critical for the upcoming elections is the question: plan
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13) See on the history of German Social Democracy Miller and Potthoff (1986).
14) Christian Democracy may have shifted to the left with regard to economic and social policy, 
whereas Social Democracy has approached Christian Democracy on the issues of religion, foreign policy 
and (inter-) national security. As a consequence (as argued in chapter 2) the ideological convergence of 
the major parties has generally shifted the very nexus of politics to the left. In general, the ’embou­
rgeoisement’ of the Social Democratic movements has been matched by the Social Democratization of 
the Bourgeois parties (Manfred G. Schmidt 1985).
economy or market economy" (cited in Uertz 1981: 201, my translation). This remark, 
to be sure, was immediately corrected by one of the leaders of the labour wing, who 
argued that it was of course not merely the market economy but the social market 
economy which was up for competition with the Social Democratic model.
Christian Democracy acquired 31.0% of the vote in the 1949 Bundestag elections, 
whereas Social Democracy gained 29.2%. Yet, in 19S3 Christian Democracy managed 
to win 45.2% against the 28.8% for the SPD. And in 1957 Christian Democracy 
triumphed with 50.2% of the vote, although the Social Democrats succeeded in gaining 
an additional 3% (31.8%). The Christian Democratic model of social capitalism, 
therefore, had achieved clear legitimacy in the first three Bundestag elections, a fact 
of which the political significance could hardly be overestimated. Germany was again 
among the respectable and democratic nations and the Christian Democratic movement 
could claim to have led the nation there by activating the model of social capitalism in 
practice.
The prestige, legitimacy, and consequently the weight of social capitalism as 
Christian Democracy’s accomplishment was reinforced by the model’s subsequent and 
unmatched economic success. Christian Democrats, again, could claim that their 
policies generated Germany’s miraculous economic recovery (the ’Wirtschafts- 
wunder’),S). Whether the economic miracle of West Germany was the result of the 
implementation of a coherent economic doctrine and a balanced long-term strategy of 
economic policy, or rather the effect of the competitive advantages of West German 
capital and its export-orientation16), is irrelevant for the present argument. What 
matters is that the social market economy appeared to do very well and that Christian 
Democracy was its main architect.
In addition, the social market was clearly superior to the Socialist model as 
practiced in East Germany. The ’system competition’ was won by the model of social 
capitalism. Moreover, Christian Democrats claimed that Christian values were
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15) Real GNP rose at an average of 8% per year between 1951 and 1960, industrial production by 
9.6% per year. Real per capita nation product increased by an average of 5.6% per year between 1950 
and 1965, compared with 2.0% for the USA, 2.3% for Britain, 3.7% for France and 2.6% for Sweden 
(Abelshauser 1983: 101).
16) Welteke (1976: 46) argues the latter to be the case.
systematically violated in the DDR. An effect of the ’system competition’ on all fronts 
(with Berlin as the shop-window of western capitalism) was that it was increasingly 
difficult for the Social Democrats to continue to make use of the very term ’Socialism’, 
which -given the experiences in the GDR- was subject to a dwindling respectability.
The Reconstruction of German Social Policy: Failed Reforml7>
Von Beyme has argued that in the period leading up to 1965 "the economy was largely 
left unregulated, but in social welfare policies Germany was in the lead, and only later 
fell behind" and the social policy achievements appear to "justify Harold Wilensky’s 
hint (...) at the unjustified bias of a certain type of literature which ascribes all great 
achievements in welfare policies exclusively to Social Democratic rule. Some Christian 
Democrats even suspected that their own party went too far in a Socialist direction in 
the field of social welfare, thus creating a habit among all citizens of being taken care 
of by the state and thus weakening their own efforts to provide for social security" 
(Von Beyme 1985b: 5).
Between the various social and political actors actively engaged in the formulation 
of the Basic Law and the postulate of the social state basic agreement had existed on 
two fundamental points. First, the first freely elected democratic government of the 
Federal Republic would have a special obligation to initiate a reconstruction program 
for solving the immense social and economic problems of the immediate post-war 
period, among which were the acute needs of the mass of refugees, war victims and 
the so called ’displaced persons’ (former slave labourers, prisoners and inmates of 
concentration camps18)) as well as the problems of the damaged cities and industrial 
plants, the shortage of houses, and the task of reconstruction through investment, 
employment policy and food supply. Second, the configuration of political power was
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17) This section is mainly based on the outstanding study by Hockerts (1980) on social policy in 
Germany in the period 1945-1957. In addition, I consulted Hockerts (1981); Hentschel (1983); Baldwin 
(1990).
18) 'According to Allied estimates there were at least 1.5 million Russian displaced persons, 1.2 
million Frenchmen, 600,000 Poles, 350,000 Italians, 400,000 Dutch and Belgians, 100,000 Yugoslavs 
and »hnnsanri« of nationals form other countries. All in all, probably some 25 million people were away 
from their former residences (...)’ (Bergbahn 1987: 179).
such that it gradually generated consent (not consensus) as to a basic commitment to 
the tradition of German social policy, resulting in a return to traditional social laws 
(Hockerts 1980: 21-106; Hentschel 1983: 145-159; Abelshauser 1983: 72; Alber 1989: 
58-67). Perhaps one can speak of ’restorative social policy’ (Widmaier 1976: 23) in the 
sense that instruments of social policy of the Weimar Republic were implanted in the 
Federal Republic. Yet, "the complete defeat of the German Empire in the second 
World War opened up (...) considerable possibilities for a fresh start in social policy. 
Once again, however, it is confirmed that once established institutions have their own 
logic which resists attempts to fundamental reform" (Alber 1989: 66, my translation).
Nevertheless, institutional inertia as an explanation for failed reform appears to 
underestimate the importance of political struggles over social reform in the post-war 
period. The German social policy tradition is but one element in an account of a failed 
Allied attempt to force quasi-Beveridgean reforms upon occupied Germany.
The Allied Control Council’s Manpower Directorate coordinated the four plans of 
social reform that had been formulated by the occupation authorities. All designs turned 
out to be quite similar, since they were all largely based on the leading reformism of 
the unions, the Social Democrats and the Communists as well as on recommendations 
of German social security experts who were highly critical of the fragmented traditional 
German system (Hockerts 1980: 23). A common design was therefore easily drafted 
and was presented in December 1946.
The Allied blueprint comprised a radical break with the German social policy 
tradition. It made provision for the unification of the schemes for sickness, accident 
and invalidity (to be administered at the level of the ’Lander’), eliminating the 
fragmentation of the sickness scheme in a multiplicity of separate funds. The status- 
related differential between workers and employees was to be cancelled (Hockerts 
1980: 26-27). The unemployment insurance remained organizationally independent. 
Perhaps the single most important departure from the German tradition concerned the 
extension of compulsory insurance to all wage-eamers, including the employees, the 
’Beamte’ and the self-employed, creating an ’Einheitsversicherung’. Hockerts (1980: 
28-32) catalogues four reasons for the implied universalism: 1) the introduction of 
comparable reforms in Berlin and the eastern zone; 2) the affinity between the Allied 
reformists and the German labour movement; 3) the attempt to subscribe to the
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reformist views elsewhere (Britain); 4) the conviction that fundamental reform would 
lead to rationalization and -most importantly- to economization1” .
This latter aspect of austerity also fueled the proposal to decrease the benefits and 
to emphasize the insurance character of reforms. The aim was to abolish state 
contributions in order to release funds for the reconstruction of the economy. The 
lowering of benefits aimed at equalizing the replacement rates at the level of workers, 
which was in contrast to the policy of the Socialists and the unions who wanted to 
equalize benefits at the (higher) level of employees.
The Allied design aroused considerable resistance from various groups for 
diverging reasons. "The blueprint assaulted the traditional propertied classes 
(’Besitzstände’), utterly offended particularist interests and at the same time failed to 
satisfy long-cherished aspirations and emphatically augmented demands of other interest 
groups" (Hentschel 1983: 148, my translation). The unions’ reaction was mixed. The 
organizational unification of the schemes was in line with their demands and in their 
interest: they would get hold of a majority in the administration and the elimination of 
fragmentation and separatism enhanced the possibility of incorporating all wage-eamers 
into one union (Hockerts 1980: 37). The unions resisted the discontinuation of state 
contributions, the increase in contributions and the reduction of benefits as obviously 
detrimental to their members’ interests.
The outright opponents of reform were those organizations that existentially 
depended on the continuation of the traditional system such as private insurance 
companies, the sickness funds and the medical estate at large. The self-employed 
refused to give up their identity of independence by having to associate with workers 
in a compulsory scheme and feared, moreover, that they would not benefit from it, but 
rather bear a heavy burden. The organizations of employers primarily wanted to keep 
control over the accident funds and also feared an increase in their compulsory 
premiums. Employees had a stake in upholding their status as employees in the social 
security scheme. At the political party level the differences in appreciation of the Allied 
reformism was accurately mirrored (Hockerts 1980:50). The Social Democrats largely
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19) Baldwin (1990: 190-191) rejects all but the last reason, arguing that the first is self-defeating, 
because the Berlin reforms would still need explanation, while 'the second is undoubtedly true, but is 
contradicted (...) by the fourth. It is precisely the reason why the unions and the left could not support 
the Allied plans that is interesting. The third reason is superficial (...)".
agreed with the labour movement whereas the Christian Democrats (and the Liberals) 
opted for a return to the traditional system and opposed universalism. Christian 
Democracy particularly contested the idea of an ’Einheitsversicherung’ on the 
conjecture that such a system would shift the balance of power in the direction of the 
unions and the Social Democratic party (Hockerts 1980: SO).
Such was the configuration of forces with regard to Allied reformism. The question 
is how these various constraints articulated into an effective obstacle to fundamental 
reform and what the role of Christian Democracy was in the process of restoring the 
traditional edifice of social policy.
Reforms along the line of the original Allied proposals were implemented in the 
Russian zone early 1947. A year later, the Americans voted against implementation. 
The Soviet representation in the Control Council was terminated as a protest against 
the London conference of the Western allies, marking the momentum of the Cold War 
and the division of Germany. As a result social reform and social policy in the western 
zones became the topic of the bizonal Economic Council, in which the opposition 
against reform had a majority and which simultaneously was preparing the constitu­
tional reform. Again, one sees here the relevance of the politics of prejudicing through 
the prohibition of all prejudicing. Structural revision was excluded, because "such 
fundamental decisions were to be reserved to the parliament of the new West German 
state (...)" (Hockerts 1981: 320). Social policy should be provisional until the 
Constitution was drafted and the elections had decided on the actual balance of 
parliamentary power. The same argument as with regard to the economic structure 
would seem plausible, namely that, again, all parties had an interest in avoiding the 
pre-determination of social policy in their hope of winning the first elections.
Provisional arrangements therefore designated the de facto restoration of traditional 
structures*” while attention was relocated to improving the performance of the system 
through the Social Security Adjustment Act (’Sozialversicherungs-Anpassungsgesetz’, 
Hockerts 1980: 85-106). The benefits were improved to cope with pressing needs of 
important segments of the population, particularly pensioners, who were suffering the
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20) They were therefore not simply the result of 'structural intertia’.
effects of the money reform, because although their pensions were exchanged at a 1:1 
rate, they were not price-indexed, nor particularly generous.
The final defeat of a potentially radical reform in the structure of the social system 
came with the victory of Christian Democracy in the 1949 elections. The social policy 
of the coalition between the Liberals and the Christian Democrats basically consisted 
in removing the structural reform from the political agenda, modifying the Nazi- 
legislation, restoring the traditional structure of social security, introducing special 
measures for Germany’s immense social problems (e.g. the ’Lastenausgleichsgesetz’ 
of 1952) and preparing a reform of the pension system.
What accounts for the attachment of the Christian Democrats to the traditional 
organizational form of social security? In general, the heritage of a long tradition was 
"virtually the only one with which Germany, defeated in war and deformed by National 
Socialism, could still identify, which it could still refer to and be ’proud’ of' (Hockerts 
1981: 318). Affinity with a respectable legacy was therefore also a matter of prestige 
and of reinforcing independence from the Allied occupation.
More important, however, was the Christian Democratic emphasis on the 
significance of subsidiarity for social policy. The principles of insurance, earning- 
related contributions and benefits, and the minimal role of the state in administering 
the schemes as embodied in the social policy proposals concurred flawlessly with this 
foundational notion of Christian Democracy and called for a restoration of the former 
Weimar institutions that had these characteristics. Subsidiarity gained even more 
prominence in the ideological struggle against the competing proposals of Social 
Democracy as formulated in the SPD’s ’Social Plan’ (1952) which had strong 
Beveridgean connotations in its universalism and its tax-financing (Rimlinger 1971: 
158f; Hockerts 1981: 324f). Moreover, the Christian Democrats recognized the 
potentially negative feedbacks from their middle class and employee constituencies if 
they were to opt for unification of separate schemes and universalism.
Nevertheless, the second Adenauer legislation period (1953-1957) started off with 
an attempt to comprehensive reform (Hockerts 1980: 242f), an attempt that failed but 
in its wake produced the pension reform of 1957. The coalition government failed to 
take rapid action as a result of conflicts over objectives and inter-departmental rivalries 
(Hockerts 1980: 246-279). The internal struggle within Christian Democracy between
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the employers’ wing and the union wing was mirrored in the conflict between the 
Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Labour. The failed personal attempt of Adenauer 
to break the stalemate in 195S led to a substantial temperance of the implied 
’radicalism’ of goals and to a provisional proposal of a pension reform. The aim of this 
reform was to link the pensions to the development of wages, to increase benefits, and 
to introduce preventive measures against early invalidity (Hockerts 1980: 320-362). It 
was not until the Social Democrats submitted their own pension reform plans to 
Parliament, however, that the actual government bill was presented. For the present 
purposes the pivotal element of the reform was that -in contrast to the reform in the 
Netherlands at approximately the same time- pensions were not to be flat-rate but 
eamings-related and dependent on former (eamings-related) contributions, while 
separate schemes for blue-collar workers and employees were preserved. The pension 
system thus "projected the differentiation of earnings, and with it the distributive 
effects of market mechanisms, into pension as well. It was consequently a non-levelling 
system, but one which put a premium on achievement and maintained individual status” 
(Hockerts 1980: 330).
The pension reform was the main basis for the unparalleled electoral victory of 
Christian Democracy in 1957. "The reform not only had a material and socio- 
psychological effect on recipients of superannuation, disability and widow’s pension, 
but also on the attitudes and expectations of those still working, since it promised to 
prolong the benefits of economic growth into the retirement period and to provide more 
equitable norms for the distribution of the national product between generations 
(Hockerts 1980: 329). In spite of the failed reform, therefore, Christian Democracy 
was rewarded for the introduction of the pension reform just prior to the elections20.
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21) As Hockerts suggests (1981: 332) principal social reforms were frequently enacted just prior to 
general elections. (Lessmann’s study 1985) on electoral politics as determinants of policy output in West 
Germany has shown that electoral business cycles exist mainly in the domain of subsidies and social 
expenditures. The existence of a so-called 'transfer cycle* indicates that "governments prefer increases 
in transfers not only because they improve voters’ economic well-being at the right time -compared to 
fiscal or monetary policies with uncertain time lags- but also because many types of transfers go to 
important interest groups in Germany, like the veterans and the retired” (Lessmann 1985: 238).
The first social policy measures of the postwar Christian Democracy-led governments were taken 
"because of the necessity to integrate the West German population and to compete with the Socialist part 
of the country. Social policy was in the centre of state activity as compensation for the lack of national 
legitimation of the West German rump state. Later additional efforts, like those of 1957 were an
(continued...)
Continuity, Expansion and Strategic Failure: Some Considerations
The 1957 pension reform is the hallmark of social capitalism in Germany. It provided 
an alternative for the Liberal, strictly market-oriented model of the FDP and for the 
Social Democratic universalist model. It embodied in every sense the uniquely 
Christian Democratic formula of accommodating conflicting societal interests with 
respect to social policy. It mixed stem eligibility criteria with benefit improvement by 
introducing a ’dynamic pension’ that followed the general wage development in the 
private economy. In this sense, the pension reform represented a Christian Democratic 
’middle way’ between Social Democratic reformism and Liberal residualism (Manfred 
G. Schmidt 1987; 1988; 75). The ’middle way’ found its foremost expression in the 
distributional intent and outcome of the scheme. The reform improved the material 
position of pensioners who until that time hardly had seen their rightful claims 
conceded. At the same time, strict eligibility and built-in differentials prevented large 
scale redistribution of societal wealth from one social group to another, while still 
recognizing their various claims. Existing status relations and inequality were 
reproduced through the scheme into retirement life. Redistribution, therefore, 
became an inter- rather than intra-generational affair (Manfred G. Schmidt 1988; 75); 
it came to represent a contract between generations and as such addressed the general 
risk of age instead of class (Baldwin 1990: 205). In terms of expansion, the scheme’s 
potential was considerable. The introduction of the dynamical element changed the 
political logic of development into a demographic and economic one. It established a 
link between the changing composition of the German population, the growth of 
economic resources and social spending.
The fate of German Christian Democracy is associated with the pension reform in 
two diverging ways. In the short run, as argued, it contributed to the unparalleled 
electoral victory of the CDU/CSU. Christian Democracy cleverly used the pension
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21) (...continued)
instrument to counteract the declining popularity of Adenauer’s government (...). Adenauer used the 
surplus of economic growth for mobilizing the poorer strata of the population, a calculation which proved 
to be successful* (Von Beyme 1985b: 6). Research has confirmed the accusation that pensions have been 
used as electoral gifts: "electoral tactics take precedence over an overall welfare strategy for the 
improvement of life in old age (...)" (Lessmann 1985: 238).
reform as a major weapon in the electoral battle with the Social Democrats, who, by 
contrast, focused on foreign policy issues (Michalsky 1984: 137). The 1957 elections 
were the first not to be overdetermined by hotly debated foreign policy issues (Baker 
et al. 1981: 167). In the long run, however, my hypothesis is that Christian Democratic 
self-complacency about the reform and the subsequent electoral victory has led to a 
negligence of the potential for further power mobilization through social reform. It 
immediately caused a certain relaxation of further social policy innovations (Alber 
1989: 61). A series of strategic errors inhibited a further institutionalization of the 
Christian Democratic presence in the field of social policy and made the movement - 
unlike for instance its Italian counterpart- more dependent on contingent electoral 
behaviour. These considerations are important in understanding the failure of Christian 
Democracy to continue to be the hegemonic force in German politics, as exemplified 
by the Erhard-interlude (1963-1966), the unsuccessful coalition with the Social 
Democrats (1966-1969) and culminating in the long period of opposition (1969-1982). 
The interesting problem is whether social capitalism was substantially moderated during 
the period of Social Democratic incumbency.
The renewed coalition between Liberals and Christian Democrats, formed after the 
elections of 1957, paradoxically opened with an austere warning as to further social 
reforms. Adenauer, 81 years old, at the height of his prestige and increasingly 
autocratic in his political style (see Balfour 1982: 193-95), translated the electoral 
slogan ’no experiments’ into an attack on the dangers of encompassing social policy. 
The argument was that social reforms ought not to suffocate the possibilities of self- 
help and private initiative. Wage-eamers were to be educated via social policy to 
behave as responsible citizens. The government would try to inhibit the drifting 
towards a ’total caring state’ (’totalen Versorgungsstaat’) (Manfred G. Schmidt 1988: 
78; Alber 1989: 271). Although perhaps in line with the leading principles of social 
capitalism, such criticism appeared to be ill-timed, for not only did it contradict the 
preceding reform efforts of Christian Democracy, but it also tended to repudiate the 
subsidiary role of the state in areas where innovation was still needed. The Christian 
Democratic position on social policy ran the risk of exhausting the potential for societal 
accommodation by stressing too much the responsibility of the family and individuals 
to help themselves. In this sense, the Neo-Liberal leanings of the social market
242
economy inhibited a fully developed social capitalism in Germany and contributed to 
growing problems of Christian Democracy to maintain power.
The best illustration of this concerns the failure to appease and regulate the 
conflictual forces that were articulating around the issue of the sickness insurance (see 
Alber 1989: 271-74; Manfred G. Schmidt 1988: 78-79; Michalsky 1984; Hentschel 
1983: 184-91). The proposed legislation coupled improvements of benefits to a 
decreasing public commitment to transfers. Patients were partly to pay directly for the 
services of doctors, who, in tum, would be remunerated on the basis of the number of 
patients they treated. The latter would accord patients a stronger control over the 
medical services. The monopoly of the medical estate would be further moderated by 
the introduction of a state advisory council or service. One of the main goals was to 
free funds for the long-term ill and to reinforce the responsibility of the temporary 
sick. According to Alber (1989: 272), the package deal was deliberately formulated so 
as to neutralize opposing interests.
The design of a new sickness legislation and its accommodating intent failed 
completely as a result of a particular coalition of opposing interests. In favour of the 
new law were only the employers’ organizations and the private insurance companies. 
The organizations of the medical estate were divided over the issues of self-respon­
sibility of patients, but thoroughly agreed that the introduction of an advisory council 
would limit the control over their own affairs. In order to defend their privileged 
status, the medical estate organized politically and even threatened with a ’strike’ 
(Alber 1989: 273). The unions opposed the new legislation because of the potential 
detrimental effects on the financial position of their members and because of the 
outspoken moralizing aspect that wage-eamers were to be educated as responsible 
citizens. This moral component and the financial threat facilitated a considerable 
readiness on the side of organized labour to act in resistance. The labour wing of 
Christian Democracy and the Social Democrats represented the view of the unions in 
parliament. The former were only ready to accept the proposals of direct financial 
efforts on the condition that wages for the sick would be fully replaced. The Social 
Democrats opposed the very idea of ’self-responsibility’.
The logic of electoral competition with regard to social policy took an intriguing 
tum. According to Alber (1989: 275) the SPD -supported by the extra-parliamentary
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coalition of unions and the medical estate- attempted to delay the actual passing of the 
bill until just prior to the elections of 1961. It did so successfully and the government’s 
reaction was to withdraw the proposal in the same year and to replace it with a 
supplementary act that provided benefit improvements in line with the demands of the 
unions, the SPD and the labour wing of Christian Democracy.
In the elections of 1961 Christian Democracy lost its parliamentary majority. The 
position of the Liberals was considerably strenghtened; they jumped from 7.7 percent 
in 1957 to 12.8 percent in 1961. The refurbished coalition between Christian 
Democrats and Liberals offered another attempt to reform the sickness insurance, by 
formulating a package deal between the reform, a proposal of wage continuation in 
case of sickness and a compensation for employers in the form of a transfer of the 
burdens for family allowances from the employers to the federal state. Again, however, 
it turned out to be impossible to accommodate the conflicting interests and the package 
deal disappeared from the agenda. In its stead came an improvement of family 
allowances, catering the Catholic clientele in particular, and yet another supplementary 
act on sickness insurance.
The example of the sickness insurance illustrates the declining capacity of Christian 
Democracy in Germany to provide feasible accommodations of societal conflicts 
through social capitalist reformism immediately following the pension reform. A 
specific problem that Christian Democracy in Germany faced concerned the absence 
of a Christian Democratic labour union, which had the odd effect that the labour wing 
of the Union parties in parliament attempted to represent the DGB (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund), whose demands were also channeled through the Social 
Democratic party. At the same time, Christian Democracy had to integrate the demands 
of the organizations of white collar workers (Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, 
DAG) and the civil service union (Deutscher Beamtenbund, DBB) (Childs and Johnson 
1981: 67-71). The fact that unions were divided along status rather than confessional 
and ideological cleavages shows a vital difference between Germany on the one hand 
and Italy and the Netherlands on the other, where organized labour was split into a 
Christian Democratic and a Left movement and where Christian Democracy found it 
consequently easier to integrate labour demands within its own ranks, at least until the 
early 1970s. The reason for this was that class and status in the latter nations were
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already overdetermined by the force of religion, which weakened class and status as 
a basis for political articulation and facilitated cross-class integration through policy.
The period preceding the Grand Coalition was characterized by an attempt to 
contain rather than integrate the growing strength of the labour movement. Christian 
Democracy faced a dual challenge in the first half of the 1960s. Social Democracy had 
finally adapted to the presence of Christian Democracy and had modernized its 
programmatic outlook. As a result, and under conditions of -perhaps still hesitant but 
not irrelevant- secularization22*, the SPD became an acceptable alternative for 
religiously motivated workers, too (Baker et al. 1981: 239-42). Besides, since the Bad 
Godesberg Program the SPD recognized Christian ethics as one of its sources of 
inspiration (Paterson 1976: 227). Christian Democratic ideologues recognized the new 
emerging dilemma, but failed to formulate an alternative that would have had the 
disposition of a continued appeal to workers (Ute Schmidt 1983). Moreover, Erhard, 
who took over in 1963, lacked the charisma of Adenauer and could therefore not 
provide the necessary integrative component.
A strategic miscalculation of Christian Democracy in the 1960s in Germany 
concerned the tendency to stress autocratic solutions as an alternative for this loss of 
integrative capacity. The ideological innovation was based on a misunderstanding of 
the power base of Christian Democracy. Rather than a stress on the importance of the 
free ’market’, the plurality of societal forces, and the compensatory social side of the 
social market economy, the concept of the ’formierte Gesellschaft’ was launched by 
Erhard in 1965 as an alternative for the social market economy. The ’formierte 
Gesellschaft’ provided what was understood as the Christian Democratic blueprint of 
a society that represented the third phase of the development of the non-Communist, 
industrialized world. In such a society, class, status and religious cleavages would have 
lost their political meaning and particularist interests would not be able to constrain 
economic and state performance. It contained a critique of the welfare state that tended 
to develop an interest in itself: "the bureaucracy of the welfare services had a clear 
interest in expanding social spending, since that meant more jobs in that bureaucracy,
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22) Regular church attendance among Catholics declined from 60 percent in 1953 to 48 percent in 
1969 and among Protestants from 19 percent in 1953 to 7 percent in 1969 (Padgett and Burkett 1986: 
274).
and more power for its officials. The bureaucracies were strong enough to push 
through the increases in spending, because the politicians had become to too weak to 
resist such claims, even if, as a consequence of political battles, they objectively 
harmed society by adversely affecting incentive, and diverting funds from other areas" 
(Bark and Gress 1989, 2: 39).
The ’formierte Gesellschaft’ epitomized a peculiar mixture of free market 
Liberalism and autocratic antipluralism, or in the words of Ute Schmidt (1983: 548, 
my translation): "an authoritarian variant of the social market economy” and tended to 
turn the basic tenets of social capitalism on its head. Societal pluralism, rather than as 
a possibly rich source for Christian Democratic power mobilization and as a guarantee 
for plural democracy, was interpreted as a hindrance to economic prosperity and 
effective state policies. Christian Democracy appeared to offer an anti-democratic 
stance precisely at the moment that new (and old) social movements coming out of the 
Adenauer era longed for more rather than less democracy. In this sense, German 
Christian Democracy was badly equipped to face the new challenges and conditions of 
the second half of the 1960s, where democratization was connected with every 
conceivable sociopolitical issue.
Nevertheless, the elections of 1965 did not immediately reveal the weakened 
position of Christian Democracy. Its main results pertained to the growing attrac­
tiveness of Social Democracy and the substantial loss of the Liberals. Two conditions 
of the year after the elections were crucial for the political history of West Germany 
and for the fate of Christian Democracy and social capitalism in particular. The first 
is the economic recession with rising inflation and unemployment, that eroded not only 
the trust in the steadfastness of the social market economy and the miraculousness of 
the economic miracle, but also put the coalition between the weakened Liberals and the 
Christian Democrats under pressure. The electoral gift in the form of a tax reduction, 
granted just prior to the 1965 elections, made itself instantly felt through budgetary 
problems. The FDP opposed attempts to balance the budget by raising taxes, whereas 
the Christian Democrats impeded a cut in public spending. A political crisis, the second 
condition, provoked by the Christian Democratic representatives in Parliament, forced 
Erhard to resign and a renewal of the Liberal-Christian Democratic coalition had thus 
become troublesome. Besides, such a construction would again have had to rely on a
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narrow parliamentary majority, which was unstable because of the uncertainty as to the 
loyalty of the FDP’s right wing (Balfour 1982: 216).
The Christian Democrats viewed a coalition with the SPD as a possibility for 
staying in office, maintaining power at the governmental level and for recovering from 
the political problems of the Erhard period. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, 
interpreted the changing conditions as an opportunity to become a legitimate party of 
government. They were preparing their way out of the opposition ghetto. In 
retrospective, the ’Grand Coalition’ ended Christian Democratic domination and 
eventually pushed the CDU/CSU into opposition. Initially, social policy provided the 
main source of consensus between the former opponents, whereas the enthusiasm of 
the Christian Democratic labour wing in particular cemented the new alliance of 
political forces. Paradoxically, social policy sealed the fate of the Grand Coalition, too, 
when the balance of power within the CDU/CSU gradually shifted in favour of the 
representatives of business economic interests between 1966 and 1969 (Michalsky 
1984: 138).
Contrary to the rising expectations with regard to Social Democratic government 
participation and due to conditions of economic pressure and of increasing ’extra- 
parliamentary opposition’, social policy opted for austerity measures rather than for 
reforms. The pension system was in financial trouble and the government’s answer 
consisted in a reduction of public contributions and an increase of the premiums for the 
insured. An important innovation, however, concerned ’technical’ reforms that de facto 
reduced the differentials between workers and employees (Schmidt 1988: 80; Alber 
1989: 62). A further moderation of the privileged position of employees came about 
when workers, too, obtained the right to wage continuation of six weeks in case of 
sickness. "Until the accession to office of the Grand Coalition the employees had been 
able to defend their privileged status quite successfully. Within parliament and 
government the FDP and the CDU/CSU had been kindly disposed towards this status 
group. As a result of the resignation of the FDP from the coalition with the CDU and 
the CSU and the entry of the SPD into the government in Bonn, the relations of 
political power shifted. The employees could not unequivocally expect protection from 
Bonn anymore. From this moment on the government rather included employees in a 
social package, which entailed considerable redistribution between large groups of
247
wage-eamers. In this sense, it complied with a part of the aspirations that had 
committed the labour wing of the Christian Democratic Union and the politicians of the 
SPD to the Grand Coalition: the higher appraisement of the labour wing of the Union 
and of workers’ interests at the level of governmental policies" (Manfred G. Schmidt 
1988: 81, my translation). These developments may illustrate that the -moderate, yet 
crucial- ’Social Democratization’ of the German social system was largely an effect of 
piecemeal engineering. The transformation of some of the particularist features of 
social capitalism were therefore not caused by a grand design of Social Democratic 
reformism, but by gradual policy changes under conditions of declining Christian 
Democratic hegemony.
The initiative in social policy gradually went over into the hands of the Social 
Democrats. The integrative capacity of Christian Democracy was further eroded during 
the period of the Grand Coalition, as exemplified in the electoral results of 1969 and 
1972. The main problem for Christian Democracy consisted in the inability to attract 
voters from the increasingly important new middle class and to maintain at the same 
time the secularizing Catholic workers within its own ranks. The support of the 
Catholic workers for Christian Democracy declined from 58 percent in 1965 to 52 
percent in 1969 and a mere 39 percent in 1972 (Padgett and Burkett 1986: 261). 
Simultaneously, the middle class support of Christian Democracy declined from 54 
percent in 1965 to 37 percent in 1972, whereas the Social Democrats managed to 
increase the integration of substantial parts of this class (48 percent in 1972) (Padgett 
and Burkett 1986: 265)23).
A coalition between the FDP and the SPD was facilitated by a growing consensus 
between the two political movements around foreign policy issues (e.g. the recognition 
of the GDR), the ’new politics’ (Baker et al. 1981) of democratization, and by the 
’cultural revolution’ of the late 1960s. Such a coalition was formed in the autumn of 
1969 and moved the Christian Democrats in opposition until the ’Machtwechsel’ of 
1982. It offered a break in the political history of Germany in that the ’social-liberal’ 
alliance proved the possibility -absent in the Netherlands and Italy- of excluding
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23) Christian Democracy recaptured some of its Catholic worker support in the 1976 elections. The 
background of this was a revitalization of the religious dimension, mainly due to the controversial 
legislation on divorce and abortion of the 'social-LiberaT coalition.
Christian Democracy from national power. The Brandt-govemment, with its 
introduction of the concept of ’internal reforms’, initially operated under favourable 
economic conditions and offered a mixture of Social Democratic and Liberal social 
policy. The traditional Social Democratic goals of universalism were expressed in the 
plan of a people’s insurance, but could only be partly materialized in the pension 
reform of 1972. The considerable financial possibilities of the late 1960s24’ offered 
the opportunity to correct the pension scheme. The Christian Democrats in opposition 
wished to use the increased resources to improve benefits. The Social Democrats, 
however, proposed a ’flexible retirement age’. Because of the immense popularity of 
the latter proposal, the Union parties adopted it quickly (Hentschel 1983: 179). The 
pension reform of 1972, furthermore, opened the scheme for independents and made 
entitlements partly independent of contributions. The main reforms of the SPD- 
dominated governments were supported by all parties in parliament and social spending 
was boosted by what Manfred G. Schmidt (1988: 84) has called the ’social policy race’ 
under conditions of economic prosperity. Again, the implied universalism was not the 
result of a grand reform but an effect of gradual improvements.
The positive electoral effect of the reform of 1972 for Social Democracy was 
comparable to the one in 1957 for Christian Democracy, but was further augmented 
by the SPD’s success in foreign policy. Both coalition partners gained in support and 
the SPD surpassed the Christian Democrats for the first time in electoral strength. The 
SPD now attempted to translate the electoral victory into a reinforcement of social 
reformism. Modem social policy was to create more social justice and to expand real 
freedom (Michalsky 1984: 139). The conditions for such a novel stress on social 
reformism within the Social Democratic movement were given by a drastic change of 
attention from foreign policy to ’internal reforms’, such as co-determination and tax 
reform, and by the radicalization of a new generation of Socialists and the rising 
demands for reform from societal organizations (the unions, the students). Prominent 
Liberals, however, had already declared that there would be Liberal tax reform and 
Liberal legislation on co-determination or no reforms at all (Michalsky 1984: 139),
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24) The growth rate of the German economy in 1968 and 1968 was a high 7-8 percent, inflation a 
low 1.5 percent. The Federal budget had a surplus of 1.5 billion DM when the social-liberal coalition 
was instiriled and unemployment had dramatically declined. In fact, labour shortage intensified the 
presence of migrant labour in Germany (Bark and Gress 1989, 2: 86-7).
which, of course, precisely clashed with the radicalization within the Social Democratic 
camp. The reformist potential, therefore, was immediately obstructed by the declining 
willingness of the FDP to cooperate and became increasingly difficult as a result of the 
rapidly declining margins for expansive social policy under conditions of declining 
economic prosperity after oil crisis and the recession of 1974.
Concluding Remarks
The clue for understanding the origins and initial success of social capitalism and 
Christian Democracy in Germany lies in the period 1945-1950. In this period a bias 
was mobilized which led to the restoration of capitalism in West Germany. At the same 
time, a political struggle took place within the Christian Democratic movement between 
the defenders of Christian Socialism and those forces which fundamentally tried to 
adjust ideology, program and strategy to the conditions increasingly dictated by the 
American hegemony. In other words, the Neo-Liberal forces initially disposed of the 
most ’flexible response’ to the rapidly changing conditions in the western zones. The 
process of flexible adjustment, however, could never have been so successful if the 
Neo-Liberal wing would not have made concessions to the Left wing of Christian 
Democracy. The outcome of this conflict involved the mixture of commitment to free 
market capitalism and social responsibility.
The analysis of the post-war settlements suggests that 1) the hegemony of the 
United States in the western occupation zones, 2) the role and composition of the 
Economic Council, 3) the Marshall Aid and economic integration, 4) the money reform 
and subsequent economic measures, 5) the growing intensity of the Cold war and the 
socio-structural effects of the division of Germany, 6) the outcome of the elections of 
1949, 7) the integrative capacity of Christian Democracy, 8) the ’doomed’ Socialism 
of the SPD and the party’s failure to adjust, and 9) the unprecedented economic success 
of the social market economy have all contributed to original Christian Democracy’s 
success in implementing a peculiar "ideological synthesis of the two strands of Neo- 
Liberalism and social Catholicism" which "found concrete expression in the social 
legislation of the period of CDU-CSU hegemony (...)" (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 
1984: 190).
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The analysis beyond the post-war settlements shows that Christian Democracy 
gradually lost its grip on social policy after the pension reform of 1957. A slackening 
of social reformism coupled with the inability of viewing social policy as a medium of 
power mobilization, made Christian Democratic strength increasingly contingent upon 
electoral returns and therefore on structural changes within the electorate. Christian 
Democracy failed to invest power resources in the social policy realm. The movement 
lost its integrative capacity at a moment that the Social Democrats successfully adjusted 
to the changing circumstances, such as class structural transformations. Social 
capitalism, however, was not revolutionized as a result of Social Democratic reformism 
per se, but rather as an only partially intended effect of increasing inclusion of 
formerly excluded groups into the edifice of social security and of the financial 
equalization through ’technical’ alterations of formerly distinguished status groups. 
Finally, a more daring Social Democratic reformism came at a time that both political 
and economic conditions could block a fundamental change in the relations of social 
security in Germany. The analysis suggests that the structural characteristics of social 
capitalism did provide the ’raw material’ for sociopolitical struggles, but that their 
endurance and transformation are largely explained by historical and political factors 
rather than by ’inertia’.
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CHAPTER 10 
ITALY

No single party in any western democracy has been able to become so politically 
dominant in the first decades after the Second World War as the ’Democrazia 
Cristiana’ (DC), Italy’s Christian Democracy. It has been the largest party in every 
election since the Second World War, polling an average of about 41 percent between 
1946 and 1963; it has played the dominant role in every postwar cabinet (majority of 
cabinet seats); the post of Prime Minister went to the DC in all but 4 (Spadolini 1 and 
2, Craxi 1 and 2) of Italy’s 51 post-war cabinets (May 1991); it has been the initiator, 
producer and main profiteer of the ’sottogovemo’: the colonization of the institutions 
of the state and the public corporations by party loyalists, resulting in clientelism and 
large scale political patronage and corruption1’. (Sub-) titles of studies of the DC are 
typically ’The Occupation of Power’ (Orfei 1976), ’The Anatomy of Power’ (Cazzola, 
ed. 1979), ’The Christian Democratic Iceberg’ (Tamburrano 1974), ’Masters of 
Survival’ (Wertman 1981), or most recently ’The Politics of Dominance’ (Leonardi and 
Wertman 1989).
Three questions structure this chapter on Christian Democracy and social 
capitalism in Italy: 1) what accounts for the unparalleled strength of Christian 
Democracy in the immediate period after the Second World War; 2) what were the 
structural and contingent conditions for the unique electoral victory of the DC in 1948 
(48.5 percent of the total vote) and the establishment of social capitalism; 3) what were 
the main stages of development and characteristics of social policy in the first 15 years 
after the conclusion of the war?
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1) Political corruption is certainly not a phenomenon that only touches Chr2commuistian Democracy. 
A recent empirical study by Cazzola (1988) revealed that the major parties (DC, PSI and PCI) all were 
mixed up with incidents of corruption. Putting the total number of cases of corruption analyzed to 100, 
Cazzola computed that the DC was associated with corruption in 64 %, the PSI in 50 % and the PCI 
in 20 % of the cases (The numbers do not total to 100 because in many cases more than one party was 
mixed up). He furthermore found considerable regional variation in corruption, with Communists corrupt 
in the centre north, the Christian Democrats in the north west, the centre, the south and on Sicily, and 
the Socialists in the north west and the centre north of the country. The study, however, clearly shows 
Democracy to be the most corrupt party of Italy, but also exposes the PSI and PCI -although 
to a tniif h lesser extent- as often involved in grubby business, too. Corruption is a feature of Italian 
society rather than an ’invention’ of Christian Democracy.
The Preconditions of Power Mobilization
The Christian Democratic story of success begins during the resistance against the 
Fascist regime and the Nazi occupation. The DC was founded during the war by 
members of the old party elite of the Catholic Popular Party of the Sicilian priest Don 
Luigi Sturzo (Partito Populare Italiana, PPI, see De Rosa 1988; Molony 1977) and a 
group of Catholic anti-Fascists around Pietro Malvestiti (Ginsborg 1989: 60)^, later 
joined by Catholic intellectuals as Giulio Andreotti and Aldo Moro from the Catholic 
University in Milan. Alcide De Gasperi, the last Secretary of the PPI and librarian in 
the Vatican during the war, soon became the undisputed leader3’ of the new party. 
Under the influence of the ’neo-Guelf movement’ (see Galli 1978: 23f) the DC 
formulated its early moderate social capitalist program, consisting of the ack­
nowledgement of the importance of private property, its social function, consumer 
protection and monopoly control. The real innovative side of the Milan-manifesto was 
probably found in the proposals on social policy which were later partly to be 
incorporated in the Constitution, concerning "the social function of property, the 
promotion of individual initiative, the abolition of corporatist bureaucracy, the 
safeguarding of individual and social rights" (Leonardi and Wertman 1989: 30).
As in the case of Germany -mainly as a reaction to Fascist perversity- Christian 
Democracy initially emphasized Christian morality as a constitutional foundation of 
politics. Christian Democracy was "the application of Christian morality to political 
and social life" (Einaudi and Goguel 1952: 28). De Gasperi, addressing a provincial 
congress of the party in Rome (June 18, 1945), answered the question why the word 
’Christian* had to be part of the name of the new party, jointly with the concept of 
democracy, in an unmistakable manner. Christianity referred to a source, to " (...) 
Christian civilization, which in Italy has its testimonials and has left deep traces; and 
we, who are in favour of freedom and tolerance of all movements, have the task of 
demonstrating that without the Christian civilization it is impossible to solve the
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2) The pamphlet ’Il Programma di Milano della Democrazia Crisdana* of the (neo-)Guelf movement 
(1942) can be considered as the starting point.
3) In Italian political parlance, there is no Italian word for ’leader’ or ’leadership’. In bet, the 
English words are used. The term ’duce’, of course, has come to mean something completely different.
problems of Italy. This is why we call ourselves Christians and democrats" (cited in 
Orfei 1976: 29, my translation).
From the start Italian Christian Democracy was characterized by an integrative, 
interclassist ideology and the search for the third way between capitalism/Liberalism 
and Socialism/Communism. "The Christian basis of the party was strongly and 
unremittingly stressed. Christian Democracy was to collaborate with representatives of 
idealist or materialistic philosophies in the solution of concrete social problems. It was 
to walk hand in hand with Socialism and Communism in the achievements of the most 
daring reforms. But it would not in any way confuse itself with ideologies and 
conceptions of life which either fight, or prescind from, Christian precepts. The Party 
was not to seek the creation of a Christian state (...) but it was not to forget that the 
history of Italy was part and parcel of the history of the development of Christian 
ideals" (Einaudi and Goguel 1952: 29).
A pre-condition for gaining the full support of the Church partly consisted in this 
appreciation of the central role of Catholicism and the Church in Italian society. A 
cluster of interrelated values and beliefs concerning private property, the vital function 
of the patriarchical family with its pater familias and subordinate -yet highly esteemed- 
woman as mother, the idealization of rural life, the importance of obedience and the 
acceptance of one’s station in life, constituted Italy’s popular religion (Prandi 1983; 
Allum 1990). It had been precisely the lacking of the acknowledgment of the 
sociocultural and ethical role of Catholicism and its institutions in the political program 
of the pre-war Popular Party that had made the relationship between party and Church 
strained. Ultimately, however, "the PPI’s failure to stress the temporal claims of the 
Church and to demand a solution to the problem of Church-state relations was one of 
the major reasons for the Vatican’s eventual abandonment of the Populari in favour of 
the Fascists" (Irving 1979: 5). The DC needed the Church, but tried to retain some 
distance as well. As an effect, the Christian Democratic politics of state and Church 
were often contradictory. It defended both the Church’s accumulated rights and was at 
the same time ready to acknowledge freedom of religion.
The early organization of the party was to a large extent dependent on the 
existence of the lay organizations of the Roman Catholic infrastructure (Azione
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Cattolica4)), which had been permitted by Fascism. "As one of the few organizations 
which Fascism could not destroy, Catholic Action became one of the centres of muted 
opposition to the dictatorship. Even by doing nothing, and this is what it did for the 
most part, it was anti-Fascist by reason of the simple fact of not being Fascist. In 
preserving the Party’s cadres, Catholic action played an immense role (...)" (Einaudi 
and Goguel 19S2: 26). The nonecclesiastical Catholic organizations were of crucial 
importance for the road to power of Christian Democracy in Italy after the war. These 
provided the new party not only with a ready available organizational network, but also 
with a pool of party activists and party leaders. The Catholic network, moreover, 
functioned as a steady mobilizer of electoral support for the DC (Leonardi and 
Wertman 1989: 193).
It was, however, the direct support of the Church that turned Christian Democracy 
from a discussion club into a mass party (Ginsborg 1989: 62), for the Church 
controlled Catholic Action. It is certainly no exaggeration to argue that the or­
ganizational presence of the Catholic church contributed massively to the Christian 
Democratic power in the early years after the war. The role of the Church, therefore, 
deserves some more detailed attention.
The Catholic Church had made two important improvements in its position and 
status during the Fascist period: one materially, through the Lateran Treaty and the 
Concordat of 1929 (see Settembrini 1977: 37-40; Spataro 1969: 177-191) and one -a 
paradox perhaps- morally, by improving her moral standing in Italian society (Poggi 
1972). One of the ’achievements’ during the twenty years of Fascism was that "the 
Church had managed to avoid to become utterly identified with the regime; it had lent 
its support as if from outside, and it was enjoying the benefits it was receiving, again, 
as if from outside (...). It was able to keep itself (...) relatively disengaged, relatively 
uninvolved (...)" (Poggi 1972: 137/138). Moreover, from the start of the Second 
World War onwards the Church had succeeded in disengaging herself increasingly from 
the Fascist regime.
The position of the Church at the end of the period of Fascist totalitarianism and 
war appeared one of strength rather than of weakness. There were few forces striving
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4) See for a detailed history of the Catholic movement in Italy: Candeloro (1982), De Antonellis 
(1987) and Poggi (1967); for the early period after the war: Casella (1987).
for making "the Church pay for its complicity in the rise to power of Fascism (...)" 
(Poggi 1972: 140) and there were reasons to expect that the Church would in fact be 
able to retain her strengthened position5*. The Church could rely on the religious 
organizational resources that Fascism had left almost untouched (the hierarchy), the lay 
organizational resources (Catholic Action), the Catholic intellectuals (Catholic 
University) and politicians, an elaborate body of social doctrine, and, most vitally, the 
active presence of Allied forces that would certainly have intervened in case of a 
Communist insurrection (Poggi 1972).
The Church pursued a strategy of maximum involvement and maximum 
commitment. The former consisted of a "general mobilization of all available 
resources, on a sustained, not a provisional basis" (Poggi 1972: 147), the latter of the 
deployment of these resources for the attainment of one goal: "the launching and 
support (and control) of a mass political party, which had as its main endowment the 
Church’s backing and the principle of the ’political unity of Catholics’, and which yet 
operated formally as a non-confessional party and was committed to working within 
the broad rules of the democratic political game" (Poggi 1972: 147).
In addition to the direct role of the Church a crucial condition for the initial 
success of the DC was based on the persisting political salience of the north-south 
division of the Italian nation and society. The Second World War had not altered in any 
substantive way the relationship between the two geographical areas. Italy continued 
to be a geographical expression rather than a nation. In effect, the different war 
experiences of the north and the south contributed to a deepening of the question. 
Whereas the south was liberated in 1943 with relatively little war damage (both 
materially and in terms of human losses), the north experienced a two year long war 
effort as well as an armed struggle of the Italian resistance. As a result, the or­
ganization of the Christian Democratic party in the north differed considerably from
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5) The Communists -under the leadership of Togiiatti who returned to Italy from Moscow in 1944- 
not only followed a strategy of postponing their anti-monarchism, but also tried to organize a broad 
coalition of anti-Fascist forces. In particular, they wanted the Christian Democrats to be part of this 
coalition for the time of the war and possibly also for the reconstruction period (Ginsborg 1989: 51- 59). 
A strong anti-clerical position was considered to be politically inopportune under die circumstances. 
According to De Grand (1989: 89-90) Togiiatti attempted to increase die Vatican’s respect for the PCI. 
And 'what began as a series of concessions by Togiiatti to the Catholics, led ultimately to Communist 
acceptance of the entire Latenn Treaty as part of the republican constitution in 1947*.
the one in the south. Yet, the progress of the DC in the southern provinces was as such 
an important new political fact, because the PPI had never really managed to obtain a 
foothold in the region6*. Crucial in this respect was the entrance of the old ruling elites 
into the DC, giving it -at least in the south- a weighty conservative character7*.
Now, if one might define one of the perennial principles of southern politics until 
the arrival of the DC as "one must belong to the groups or parties which control, or 
have access to, the government and state machinery, in order to preserve and advance 
one’s own privileges" (Allum 1972: 113), then one of the consequences of the 
’infiltration’ of the southern notables in the DC was the reconstitution of the southern 
system within the boundaries of the Christian Democratic movement itself. In other 
words, what occurred in the very early history of the DC is the integration of the old 
ruling class of southern Italy into the movement and with it the southern system of 
clientelism and patronage, crucial to the -be it debauched- political power in this much 
plagued region.
Another element in the account of the effective power mobilization of Italian 
Christian Democracy before the first general elections concerns the presence of a 
strong Left, but above all, Communist movement. A most consequential fact for the 
particularity of Italian Christian Democracy -and for Italian democracy for that matter- 
pertains to this condition of having to compete with one of the strongest Communist 
movements of Western Europe. Anti-Communism, of course, has played a significant 
role in Italian politics, especially around the elections of 1948 where Christian 
Democracy (and the Catholic Church) phrased the voter’s option in terms of a choice 
between Christ and Communism. But already before 1948 anti-Communism played a 
determining role in Italian politics. For instance, the day before the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly (june 2, 1946), Pope Pius XII addressed the Italian people, 
drumming into the voter's mind that the choice was between materialism and 
Christianity (Kogan 1983: 25). Communist strength also automatically rendered 
Christian Democracy as the most acceptable force to the United States and the United
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6) The PPI mainly had its stronghold among the Catholic workers in die North.
7) In 1951 this conservative current clearly emerged to the surface in the form of the ’Vespa'-factioo 
which was hostile to the agrarian reforms proposed by the governments dominated by Christian 
Democracy in the early 1950s (Allum 1972: 114).
Kingdom8*. The Communist movement consisted of two currents, the political one 
opting for a ’progressive democracy’, and a social movement of revolutionary forces, 
mainly originating in the resistance. The Communist strategy reflected this duality by 
on the one hand presenting itself as a party that recognized the status quo and accepted 
parliamentary democracy, but on the other hand retaining its revolutionary potential 
among the (armed) forces of the resistance (see Spriano 1978, especially Chapter 19; 
Di Loreto 1991).
The integrative, interclassist ideology and political stance of Christian Democracy, 
finally, contributed to the successful attempt to appeal to and gain the support of a 
cross-section of society in a considerably less distinctive manner (in terms of region, 
class, sex) than any of the other political movements. Christian Democracy attracted 
conservatives, moderate progressives, and anti-Communists alike. Decisive was the 
Christian Democratic capacity to make inroads into the groups of small farmers, the 
farm workers and the (Catholic or at least anti-Communist) working class (see Catalano 
1972: 63). The mass base of the DC was founded upon the anti-Communist and anti- 
Socialist ’classe media’, that is artisans, self-employed, merchants, shop keepers, 
employees, state officials and small businessmen. This class had constituted -according 
to Ginsborg (1989: 97)- the backbone of the former support of Mussolini, a class left 
disoriented after the destruction of the Fascist values of nation and party. The program 
of Christian Democracy promised to safeguard the middle class values of private 
property and private initiative in the economic realm. In addition, it sought to limit 
monopoly power and to protect the consumer and the small producers (Ginsborg 1989: 
98). Moreover, it was Christian Democracy that tried to restore the traditional values 
of the family, which were ravished by Fascism and during the war. The emphasis on 
the family and its problems helped to dilute the salience of class further and appealed 
to women in particular (Ginsborg, 1989: 99). This last detail is particularly relevant, 
given the fact that after the war for the first time in the history of Italy women were 
given the right to vote. The Women’s organizations of Catholic Action (’Gioventù 
Femminile di Azione Cattolica’, ’Centro Italiano Femminile’ and ’Unione Donne di 
Azione Cattolica’) laboriously worked to mobilize the Christian Democratic vote. Pope
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8) The Soviet Union was excluded from the armistice in Italy.
Pius XII had given the Women’s organizations of Catholic action their ’magna carta 
della donna’ by urging them to become active in public life, but warning too zealous 
women not to enter the male domain of power and politics (Casella 1987, especially 
pp. 247-66).
The DC gained a plurality of the vote (35.2 %) in the elections for the Constituent 
Assembly (June 2, 1946). This Assembly was to prepare the Constitution of a new 
republic9*. If one thing was clear from the results of the first elections, it was the 
geographical distinctiveness of all parties except Christian Democracy10* (see Table 
1).
Table 1. The Geography of Elections in 1946 (%)
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North Centre South Islands
Christian
Democrats 37.3 30.0 34.9 35.2
Socialists 28.5 17.7 10.0 11.5
Communists 22.4 24.7 10.9 8.8
(Source: Mammarella 1985: 82)
Christian Democracy was especially strong, however, in the North East (50.8 %) "the 
area where the Catholic subculture had its strongest roots and where the DC’s 
predecessor, the Popular Party, had done by far best in the 1919 and 1921 elections" 
(Leonardi and Wert man 1989: 162).
Christian Democracy was to a considerable extent sex-distinct in the sense that the 
average female proportion of the Christian Democratic electorate between 1947 and 
1960 roughly amounted to 64 per cent (Leonardi and Wertman 1989: 166). Religion,
9) It was to be a republican constitution, since at the same date a referendum was held which showed 
a narrow republican majority of 12,717,923 votes (54.26 %) against 10,719,204 (45.74 %) for the 
monarchy.
10) Geographically quite distinct, however, were the results of the referendum, which dramatically 
exposed the political gap between the north and the south. Only in Basilicata more than 40 percent of 
the electorate was in favour of the republic, whereas -for example in Naples- about 80 percent of the 
electorate voted for the monarchy (Ginsborg 1989: 129).
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the traditional view on the family and the massive mobilization of women through 
Catholic Action were the key factors in effecting this sex-distinctiveness of the 
Christian Democratic support.
There is, unfortunately, little data available on the early elections in Italy. The first 
reliable electoral surveys were held in 1968 and in 1972. One has to rely on these data 
sets to study the cross-class appeal and class-distinctiveness of Christian Democracy. 
Table 2 clearly reveals that Christian Democracy was the least class distinct political 
party of the elections of 1972 with roughly obtaining an equal percentage among all 
status groups.
Table 2. Party Preference and Class (Family Status of Respondent, 1972
Class DC PCI PSI PSDI PRI PLI MSI
Industrialists/
Professionals 29.6 1.2 7.4 2.5 3.7 12.3 6.2
White
Collar 34.9 7.3 6.5 4.6 4.6 2.7 4.6
Small Business* 
men/ Artisans 33.5 12.3 9.9 4.9 3.2 2.1 5.3
Skilled
Workers 24.8 16.4 11.8 2.5 1.0 0.2 2.7
Small
Farmers 53.9 8.7 5.3 1.0 1.5 0.0 1.9
Peasants 25.7 31.4 5.7 1.9 1.0 1.0 3.8
Unskilled
W orkers 27.7 23.2 6.6 3.1 0.3 1.0 1.7
Missing 39.6 10.1 8.7 1.9 1.0 0.5 3.4
(Source: Wertman 1974: 163)
Although over-represented among the small farmers and under-represented among the 
skilled workers, the conclusion is that "(...) the class composition of the DC electorate 
makes it clear that the Christian Democratic voters have a profile which is very similar
to the entire electorate and is more like the entire electorate than any other Italian party 
(...). For 1968, the composition of the DC electorate is even more like that of the 
entire electorate; no class group differs by more than 3.0% (from the composition of 
the entire electorate)" (Wertman 1974: 164). Other operationalizations of socio­
economic status (income, social origins) basically show the same pattern: the cross­
class appeal of Christian Democracy and the absence of class-distinctiveness.
Religion has been an important conditioning factor of the working-class vote in 
Italy. Members of the working class are more likely to vote for Christian Democracy 
if they are embedded in the Catholic organizational infrastructure, if their religiosity 
expresses itself not just in a proclaimed membership, but in church attendance in 
particular and if they come from regions where the Catholic subculture is strongly 
developed (Wertman 1974: 176). The organizational ties -membership of the Catholic 
trade-union and other Catholic organizations- were the determining factor. In the first 
decade after the war, there was nearly unrestricted backing for Christian Democracy 
by the Church and the Catholic subculture, consisting of Catholic Action, the Catholic 
Trade Union Federation (Confederazione Italiana di Sindacati Liberi, CISL), the 
organization of small farmers (Coldiretti) and the association of Catholic workers 
(Associazione Cristiana di Lavoratori Italiani, ACLI) (Leonardi and Wertman 1989: 
209-210; Kogan 1983: 59).
Given these preliminary considerations the next question concerns the structural 
and contingent conditions of the unique electoral victory of the DC in 1948, the 
establishment of the Christian Democratic hold of power of the state and the state 
apparatuses10 and the establishment of social capitalism.
The Conditions o f Domination
The elections for the Constituent Assembly had given Christian Democracy 207 seats 
out of a total of 556 seats. The Communists (Partito Communista Italiano, PCI) had 
won 104 and the Socialists (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) 115 seats. Alcide De
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11) Christian Democracy is "a party which tends to identify itself with state institutions, thus 
investing itself with an authority properly that of the state. It is no accident that in common parlance la 
democrazia often means la Democrazia Cristiana' (Donolo 1980: 169).
Gasperi -as leader of the largest party of the Assembly- was to make a government 
coalition with as its main assignments the preparation of the Constitution of the 
republic, the negotiations of the peace treaty and the commencement of the economic 
and social reconstruction of Italy. A four party coalition, including the Communists, 
the Socialists and the Republicans (Partito Repubblicano Italiano, PRI) was the result.
The Constitution and the Choice for the Economic Structure
The general view of Christian Democracy concerning the structure of the economy was 
very much in line with the Christian Democratic ideas elsewhere in Europe. Typical 
elements were the subordination of economic life to spiritual life, economic freedom 
conditioned by social justice and the reconciliation of capital and labour. The social 
function of private property was probably the clearest social capitalist proposal present 
during the time of the drafting of the Constitution. Paolo Emilio Taviani, a prominent 
Catholic anti-Fascist, gave the clearest definition: "In order to guarantee the freedom 
and affirmation of the human person, private property is recognized and guaranteed. 
In order to guarantee the personal and social functions of private property and the 
possibility for all to gain it through work and savings, the law will determine the norms 
regulating its purchase and transfer, its limits and its enjoyment. When required by the 
exigencies of the common good and in order to avoid private privilege or monopolistic 
positions and to obtain a more equitable and convenient rendering of services and 
distribution of production, the law can reserve to the collective ownership of the State 
(...)" (as cited in Einaudi and Goguel 1952: 36). The Christian Democrats, therefore, 
did leave ample room for substantial state intervention, interestingly enough also with 
respect to expropriation.
The initial phase of the political struggle over the Constitution was determined by 
the question whether the pre-Fascist bourgeois liberal order had to be restored or 
whether a social order ought to be constructed in which there was room for the 
granting of social rights in addition to political liberty (Vercellone 1972: 123). The 
central issue involved the extent of state intervention and social rights. The Left opted 
for a ’Socialist’ constitution and proposed radical change of the societal order. Such 
a document was perhaps not to be a Socialist blueprint but should at least facilitate the
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transition to Socialism (De Grand 1989:109). The DC demanded change according to 
the social capitalist doctrine of gradual change and the 'social embeddedness of private 
property’.
The result of the political struggle around the Constitution was a -sometimes 
contradictory- compromise, in which on a majority of items Christian Democracy 
nevertheless was able to impose its views (Einaudi and Goguel 1952: 39). The nucleus 
of the compromise consisted of formulations that did not exclude drastic change, but 
did not demand the immediate transformation of society either. Both Christian 
Democracy and the Left -strikingly similar to comparable developments in Germany- 
had an interest in a relatively open formulation of the important social and economic 
clauses, in the hope of future strength. The republican Constitution "left all options and 
solutions open: the ultimate decision was to be left to the political will of the groups 
which would prevail in Parliament (...)" (Vercellone 1972: 126). A telling change 
concerned the compromise on the first article, from: "Italy is a workers’ republic"; to: 
"Italy is a democratic republic founded on labour". The Christian Democratic influence 
is clearly discemable in articles 41, which limits private enterprise by the concept of 
social utility, and 42, which defines the right to limit private property according to 
social function. Perhaps a similar assessment might be possible for the formulation of 
article 36 which states that "a worker is entitled to a remuneration in proportion to the 
quantity and quality of his work, and in all cases this should be sufficient to ensure a 
free and dignified existence for himself and his family" (as cited in Vercellone 1972: 
130).
Most influential and successful were the Christian Democrats in reinforcing the 
strengthened position of the Church in the republican Constitution. Here the 
Constitution is most contradictory, since, on the one hand it recognizes that all 
religions are equally free before the law (article 8), but on the other hand it 
incorporates the Lateran Treaties of 1929, which privilege Catholicism (article 
7l2))(Vercellone 1972: 125,3)). The intriguing aspect of the political game around
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12) Article 7 reads: ’The state and the Catholic church are, each in its own sphere, independent and 
sovereign. Their relationships are regulated by the Lateran Treaties. Modifications of the Treaties, 
accepted by both parties, do not require the procedure of constitutional amendment" (As cited in Einaudi 
and Goguel 19S2: 39/40).
this issue and -as I argue below- vitally important in the Christian Democratic power 
play concerns the fact that the DC managed to defend the position of the Church with 
Communist authorization.
Economic Recovery and Social and Economic Policy
For social capitalism to take shape in Italy capitalism itself had to be reorganized and 
incited first. The government had two main objectives: the continuation of economic 
reconstruction and the restoration of the public order. These aims were closely related, 
for restoring the public order implied "limiting strikes -especially those of a political 
disposition-, stabilizing the discipline in the factories, eliminating the atmosphere of 
psychological pressure which the masses organized by extremist parties exercised on 
the well-to-do classes, reinforcing the state’s authority and enable the state to control 
and contain any street action" (Mammarella 1985: 99, my translation). De Gasperi’s 
policy in the coalition government (DC, PCI, PSI, PRI) was clearly to accord priority 
to economic recovery at the expense of social policies. Economic construction was 
based on a mixed strategy of capital accumulation on the basis of low wages, 
deflationary monetary policy, unemployment and the attempt to obtain and secure 
economic aid from the United States.
Economic recovery went surprisingly fast. By 1948 the 1938 level of manufac­
turing was reached, by 1950 agricultural output yielded its prewar level, while per 
capita income followed in 1951. The conditions of recovery were relatively favourable 
since the war damage turned out to be much less dramatic than in, for instance, 
Germany. In addition, a cheap and -chiefly as a result of demobilization- considerably 
mobile labour force was available (King 1987: 42).
The main obstacle was galloping inflation, which was partly due to the drastic 
decrease of production, but also caused by the presence of an exorbitant quantity of 
money. The deflationary policy (credit control) of Luigi Einaudi, who had a "mystical 
hatred of inflation" (De Cecco 1972: 175), was entirely grounded in an "almost 
religious belief in liberalism" (De Cecco 1972: 161), but was successful in that it
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13) (...continued)
13) See comprehensively Settembrini (1977: 130 - 185), who analyzes the formula of the religions 
or confessions being ’ugualmente libere ma non uguali’.
deflation«! the economy considerably. An immediate negative impact of this policy, 
however, was that it caused a recession with increasing unemployment, while 
production actually declined. According to De Cecco the deflationary policy pursued 
prior to the decisive elections of 1948 can only be explained in political terms: "The 
government coalition decided to seek the favour of the middle classes and of the 
peasants who, employed in what was eminently a subsistence agriculture, would not 
have felt the consequences of the deflation (...). Moreover, the middle classes had 
suffered because of the depreciation of their savings and would give their confidence 
only to a government that would dramatically put a halt to the uninterrupted rise of 
prices" (De Cecco 1972: 174).
American Support, the Expulsion of the Communists and the Elections of 1948
In the first elections under the new Constitution (1948) the DC won 48.5 percent of the 
total which gave the party the absolute majority in Parliament, that is 305 of a total of 
574 seats. What were the conditions of this extraordinary electoral triumph? Einaudi 
and Goguel (1952) point to the preliminary achievements of the DC. The Christian 
Democrats had developed a political program appealing to a cross-section of society. 
It could boast of a good Constitution, on which it had had momentous influence and 
for which it claimed recognition and credits. Moreover, the DC had shown remarkable 
political skills in letting Liberals push through impopular deflationary politics, so that 
the party would not have to do the dirty work, while still being able to profit form its 
stabilizing effects14’.
Other catalysts of the electoral victory concerned: a) anti-Communism; b) Marshall 
aid; c) the intervention of the Church. In a specific sense they all worked in one 
direction: the isolation of Italy’s Left and the establishment of Christian Democracy in 
the centre of power. The isolation of the Italian Left (both Socialism and Communism)
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14) The judgement of Einaudi and Goguel, writing in 19S2, is more positive: "By turning over the 
management of economic affairs in the spring of 1947 to non-Christian Democratic hands, it showed that 
party politics and prestige were not placed above the welfare of the nation. The economic policies 
followed since May 1947 and for which the Christian Democratic government assumed responsibility did 
much to create the framework of stability within which a meaningful discussion of future policy could 
be carried out* (Einaudi and Goguel 19S2: 51).
found its origins, however, already in the beginning of 1947 when a Socialist group 
(led by Saragat), which opposed the continuation of cooperation with the Communists, 
left the party. This happened when De Gasperi had travelled to the United States in 
order to secure American economic aid. The Socialist schism and the resulting political 
crisis appeared to provide a unique opportunity for the increasingly anti-Communist 
Christian Democracy to provoke an end to the government participation of the 
Communists and Socialists. Upon his return in January form the United States, De 
Gasperi handed in the resignation of the government, yet, the Left was not immediately 
expelled from governmental power.
De Gasperi’s journey to the US had been extremely successful. He brought with 
him to Italy a loan of $100 million, a financial compensation of about $50 million, 
financial prospects for Italian industries, and the release of Italian assets in the US 
(Harper 1986: 108-116). There is some disagreement among students of Italian political 
history about the question whether the Americans made the financial assistance directly 
contingent upon the expulsion of the Left from the government or not. According to 
one observer the Americans had demanded precisely this and De Gasperi is reported 
to have confirmed the American pressure (Mammarella 1985: 107). Another historian 
(Ginsborg 1989), however, -while recognizing the fact that De Gasperi was quite ready 
to dispose of the Communists and the Socialists- claims that this hypothesis is 
implausible and belongs to the mythology of the Cold War. The relationship between 
the USA and the DC was not (or not yet) one of command and obedience. There was 
still vehement struggle between the various state departments in the US, US foreign 
policy was in transition and the Truman-doctrine was not yet formulated. The 
American policy was defensive and concerned the problem how to contain the 
Communist advance rather than when to terminate a government coalition in Italy.
On the other hand, it seems also quite implausible that the whole matter of 
Communist government participation in Italy was not raised at all during De Gasperi’s 
visit. In fact, the Italian Ambassador to Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, recalls in his 
memoirs that"(...) in order to obtain sufficient support for our adequate recovery, for 
our necessary military preparation and for our effective participation in international 
conclaves (...) the Italian government needed to be homogeneous, efficient and 
explicitly dedicated to a policy which combined dignity and independence with loyalty
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to the common aims so often proclaimed with our friends abroad, but kept quiet about 
at home" (cited in Warner 1972: 52). In the then prevailing political discourse, this was 
hardly a message that could have been misunderstood.
De Gasperi probably was looking for a way to get rid of the Communists and the 
American foreign policy makers did utilize their financial resources for exerting 
pressure on the leader of the DC. Given these considerations, the intriguing question 
becomes why the Communists were not immediately forced out of the new coalition 
that was formed after the crisis provoked by the Socialist schism. There are several 
reasons for this. First of all, in order to form another coalition the DC had to find 
other partners. This was not easy since the small parties on the democratic Left refused 
to cooperate (Mammarella 1985: 107-108). A Christian Democratic minority cabinet, 
furthermore, would likely stir up tensions in the nation which, in turn, might interfere 
with the concluding phase of the negotiations over the Constitution. At the time there 
was not yet agreement on the precarious and for the DC vital article 7 (the Lateran 
treaties), for which the Communist vote was indispensable. Finally, there was still the 
peace treaty to sign and the DC leadership deemed it politically dangerous to bear the 
sole responsibility for the expected unfavourable political aftermath of the treaty 
(Mammarella 1985: 108).
The third De Gasperi cabinet can best be interpreted as a Christian Democratic 
attempt to gain time for the preparation of a government without the Left (Mammarella 
1985: 109). The Communist strategy, on the other hand, was fueled by the conviction 
that continued collaboration with the DC would be politically favourable. The 
Communists hoped that their support for article 7 would be rewarded by prolonged 
government participation15*. In effect, the opposite was true: the safeguarding of the 
interests of the Church in the Constitution reduced the Christian Democratic 
dependence on the PCI and consequently intensified the anti-Communist factions within 
the DC.
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15) The PCI pursued a short-term and long-term strategy of alliances. "In a move that helped shape 
the political system for the next two decades, Togliatti instructed his party to vote for the inclusion of 
the Lateran Treaty in the Constitution of the Republic. This choice (...) was (...) guided by Togliatti’s 
long-term strategy, rather than by short-term considerations. He understood that the days of the coalition 
were numbered, but he wanted to maintain a privileged relationship with the Catholic church and the 
Christian Democrats. There was no question in his mind that the PCI and the Christian Democrats (...) 
would have to reach a compromise” (De Grand 1989: 109).
A worsening of the economic and social situation in Italy (inflation of 50 per cent, 
strikes), increasing disparities between the PCI and the DC with regard to state 
intervention, the declining popularity of the DCI6), and the deterioration of the 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in this period added to the 
pressure to compel the Communists out of the govemmentl7). In addition, there was 
insistence form large industry and the employers’ organization ’Confindustria’ "(...) 
to orient economic policies in the direction of favouring the reconstitution of existing 
economic infrastructures -i.e. the large economic concentrations to the detriment, if not 
exclusion, of the small- and medium-sized industries that had been foreseen in the post­
war model of economic reform (...)" (Leonardi and Wertman 1989: 57; see extensively 
Salvati 1982). Finally, the right wing of the DC urged De Gasperi to end the 
collaboration with the Communists.
On 12 May 1947 the historical anti-Fascist coalition of Christian Democracy and 
the Left cracked, culminating in a political crisis decisive for post-war Italian politics. 
The Italian political system was turned into a system of a ’bipartitismo imperfetto’ 
(Galli 1984)U). The DC formed a minority government (’monocolore’). An im­
mediate effect of the exclusion of the Left and the formation of the single party 
government consisted of a swing to the right of the DC itself. The government was 
supported by the Liberals and the Right (Monarchists and ’Uomo Qualunque’) and the 
DC appeared to suspend its program of moderate reform, that is the social side of 
capitalism. "For the vast part of the country, which -while objecting to the program 
and ideology of the extreme Left- acknowledged the need of renewal and progress, the 
solution of the political crisis of May 1947 was a costly victory" (Mammarella 1985: 
113, my translation). Another immediate effect of the expulsion of the Communists and 
the growing atmosphere of anti-Communism was a boosting polarization, which forced
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16) In the Sicilian regional elections of april 20-21 1947 the DC crumpled from 33.6 % to 20.5 %. 
In the cities the loss was dramatic. In Catania the votes dropped from 33.9 % to 9.8 % (Ginsborg 1989: 
146).
17) In March 1947 the Truman doctrine was formulated and the Americans made it clear that the 
DC should break with the PCI (Ginsborg 1989: 147).
18) This imperfect two-party system concerns the coincidence of a pluralist political system in which 
two major parties dominate (the PCI and the DC), but of which only one (the DC) can assume power 
at the governmental level.
other political movements to choose between the two camps. The DC profited from 
these conditions by broadening the base of the government, constructing a coalition of 
four parties: the new formula of the ’quadripartito’.
Under these circumstances the elections of 1948 were held, which witnessed a 
desperate attempt of the Left to counter Christian Democratic power. The PCI and the 
PSI combined their forces on one list, which had at least the unintended effect of 
highlighting the contrast between the Left and the DC and added to the fear for a 
Communist take-over. This fear was blatantly exploited by the DC. The Communist 
coup d'état in Czechoslovakia augmented the salience of the anti-Communist issue and 
functioned as a formidable electoral catalyst for the DC vote. The keynote of the 
election campaign quickly condensated into a choice between (Christian) democracy 
and Communism.
To this theme of the elections was added the religious factor. The political struggle 
was transformed into one of "apocalyptic proportions, and the vote was depicted as a 
telling climax in the battle between Christ and Antichrist, between Rome and Moscow” 
(Kogan 1983: 39). The Church intervened politically at all levels of the hierarchy. It 
was proclaimed a mortal sin not to vote or to vote for those candidates who did not 
respect the rights of God and the church. Parish priest directly summoned to vote the 
DC. Finally, the so-called 'civic committees’, the nucleus of which was formed by the 
various branches of Catholic Action, performed critical political tasks. These parochial 
committees (numbering about 20.000 and organizing approximately 30.000 members) 
were to persuade and to instruct hesitating, ill and even illiterate voters to elect 
Christian Democratic candidates. The central organization was sponsored by the Banca 
Vaticana, the American embassy, and the employers’ organization ’Confindustria’ 
(Ginsborg 1989: 154-155; Settembrini 1977: 209-210). Finally, the ’apocalyptic 
proportions’ of the campaign virtually bestowed a devout aura on the efforts of 
religious women within the organizations to canvass for votes.
The American government not only intervened by assisting the democratic parties 
financially and even mobilizing the Americans of Italian descent (Kogan 1983: 39) to 
instruct their kin in the home country, but also made the Marshall Aid to Italy 
contingent upon the election results (Mammarella 1985: 140). Referring to the 1948- 
elections the press officer of the US State Department said (March 1948) that "if the
270
Communists should win (...) there would be no further question of assistance from the 
United States" (cited in Warner 1972: 53). And the role of the United States and their 
funds were neatly integrated into the electoral campaign of the DC, as witnessed by the 
text of the following DC-pamphlet of 1948: "Coi discorsi di Togliatti non si condisce 
la pastasciutta. Perciò le persone intelligenti votano per De Gasperi che ha attenuto 
gratis dall’Americani la farina per gli spaghetti e anche il condimento" (DC-election 
pamphlet 1948, cited in Ginsborg 1989: 155,9)).
Centrism and Social Policy: the Obstacles to Reforms (1948-1953)
Four days after the elections, De Gasperi announced that "the people wait for the battle 
against unemployment, the amelioration of work, agricultural reforms. All this will be 
done" (as cited in Ginsborg 1989: 157, my translation). The government formula to 
start these reforms consisted of a four party coalition of the centre-right. It was a 
precarious balance between reformist and conservative political forces and was the 
result of a necessity: there was no alternative (Mammarella 1985: 150). The coalition 
was sealed mainly as a consequence of shared anti-Communism and much effort had 
to be put in trying to keep the parties together (Kogan 1983: 59). In addition, De 
Gasperi had to employ all his political skills and authority in order to keep the various 
’correnti’ (factions) within the Christian Democratic party itself together. These 
factions ranged from the right (monarchists, allies of business and landowners’ 
interests, clericalists), via the centre (supporters of De Gasperi’s centrist policies), to 
the Left (adherents of Gronchi, trade unionists, the group around Dossetti -later 
Fanfani- and the ’Cronache Sociali’)2®.
What is of special interest here is the government’s program of reforms and what 
came of it under these delicate political conditions. The land reform, which was one 
of the Christian Democratic promises during the election campaign, is certainly the
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19) "With the speeches of Togliatti one cannot flavor the pastasciutta. That is why intelligent persons 
vote for De Gasperi who not only obtained from the Americans the flour for the spaghetti for free, but 
also the spices*.
20) See on factions and Italian Christian Democracy: Belloni (1972); Belloni and Beller (1978); and 
Zuckerman (1979).
most crucial of all. The agrarian issue became particularly pressing when in the end 
of 1949 peasants grew increasingly discontent and started to occupy lands in Sicily and 
other areas in the south. They claimed ownership of lots, which in many cases they 
were already cultivating. These actions provoked harsh repression by the police and - 
what caused even more bitterness- by the hirelings of the landowners. After the tragedy 
of Melissa (in Calabria), where three people got killed and fifteen wounded (Ginsborg 
1989: 164-165) and Modena, where six workers were killed by the police (Galli 1978: 
129) and the protests this inflamed throughout the nation, the DC was finally instigated 
to action.
In favour of agrarian reform within the DC were the Left-wing faction around 
Dossetti (Galli 1978: 132f), and some important industrialists who feared that 
disruption of social stability would interfere with their own interests. Three subsequent 
laws were passed that authorized expropriations of land and its redistribution to day 
labourers, sharecropping farmers or small farmers2”. In addition, technical and 
financial assistance was offered for land improvement.
In the Christian Democratic view of power mobilization the land reform was to 
serve an economic and a political goal (Mammarella 1985: 170). Economically, the 
land reform was expected to lead to an increase in agrarian production, which it did 
not because the whole operation was of too small a scope and not adjusted to the 
demands of modem farming. Politically, it was to disengage large segments of the rural 
population from political extremism, which it did not do either. The beneficiaries of 
the reform hardly changed their opinions at all.
One intriguing aspect concerns the paternalistic approach of the land reform 
(Grindrod 1977: 203). Where traditional feudal bonds between landowners and day 
labourers were broken, "rigid obligations to the reform’s administrators" (King 1987: 
158) took their place. An aspect where social capitalist notions clearly came to the fore 
pertained to the aim that land reform had to generate a class of small owner-farmers, 
whereas "even within the reform districts, the small and medium borghesia, who still 
draw part of their income parasitically from the renting out of land, have been left
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21) For more detailed analyses: King 1973; Grindrod 1977: 200-203; Mammarella 1985: 167-168; 
Ginsborg 1989: 175-183.
untouched" (King 1987: 158/159). Expropriation, therefore, was meant to recreate 
private property and not to transfer it to public authority.
Land reform also tended to reinforce existing clientelistic ties. The amount of land 
falling under the reform bills was not sufficient to satisfy the needs of impoverished 
peasants. The scarcity of lands to be allocated and the weakness of impartial 
distributive mechanisms reinforced "the network of patron-client relationships, creating 
ritual ties between peasants and aspiring beneficiaries on the one hand and local 
political leaders and reform agency bureaucrats on the other. Since the reform was a 
DC policy, it certainly favoured peasants belonging to that party, as well as 
strengthening the government's electoral base in rural areas, stemming the Communist 
advance (...)" (King 1987: 157).
Land reform must be viewed in close association with other attempts to adjust the 
regional social and economic imbalance in Italy. The ’Cassa per opere straordinarie di 
pubblico interesse per il Mezzogiomo’ (1950) represented the first attempt for a long­
term development policy for the south (Allum 1972: 119). Its main goal was to 
improve the infrastructural context of production (both agricultural and industrial) in 
the backward areas through public works. A somewhat effective employment policy 
was initiated in the form of a reforestation plan and the INA-Casa plan. In addition to 
providing employment the latter plan was meant to attack the housing problem and 
construct low priced ’case populari’. These years also witnessed the first attempt to 
introduce in Italy a modem taxation system, of which it was hoped that it would reduce 
the huge tax evasion. The tax reform failed entirely.
The assessment of the social policy of the first legislature is largely negative 
(Mammarella 1985: 187-188). The reforms that were carried through were the result 
of too many compromises, as a result of which they were inefficient, and therefore did 
not precipitate the necessary profound changes. Other social problems, like education 
and unemployment, were not confronted directly at all.
In sum, the balance between reformist forces (Social Democrats, the moderate and 
Left wing of the DC) and conservatives was so precarious that it effectively blocked 
a constructive social policy. The price paid by the DC (and by Italian society) for the 
successful manoeuvering between the extremes was that "the party’s constituencies 
tended at times to checkmate one another to the point where agreement on policies was
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almost impossible to achieve. The original promises of social reforms had bit by bit to 
be abandoned" (Spotts and Wieser 1986: 24). More energy and political skill was 
wasted by the political need to keep the coalition together than actually was used for 
undertaking imperative reforms.
Immobilism and Power Politics (1953-1958)
Three factors contributed to growing political and social tension and critique of the DC 
towards the end of the first legislature and aggravated the political tensions during the 
second legislation period: 1) the accumulation of power by the DC and the growth of 
’sottogovemo,22); 2) the attempt of the DC to change the electoral law in its own 
interest; 3) the excessive influence of the Church on Christian Democratic politics.
Sottogoverno. The Christian Democrats used their power to expand their position 
throughout the state apparatus and the state-controlled corporations and banks. The DC 
annexed the state economic sector, a policy perfected during the second legislature. 
Rather than as a means for the accumulation of personal power, the colonization of the 
(semi-) public sector -at least in the beginning- must be interpreted as a method for 
constructing new power resources and as a clever manner for appeasing intra-party 
struggles among factions. Such a strategy would secure the DC a relatively autonomous 
position from the Church and other Catholic organizations, upon which the initial 
prosperity of the DC had depended so much, but for which a remuneration in terms of 
direct political control was now claimed.
The ’Swindle Law'. A modification of the electoral law was drafted by the DC in 
order to guarantee the government parties a workable majority in parliament. This 
’swindle law’, as it became instantaneously known, would accord 65 percent of the 
parliamentary seats to the combination of parties that would realize 50.01 percent of 
the vote. This Machiavellian manoeuver provoked fierce political reactions for its 
undemocratic implications and was compared to the Acerbo Law of 1923 which had
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22) The phrase 'sottogoverno* dates from these years.
provided the Fascists their first ’majority’. The law played a major role in the election 
campaign of 1953. The unseemly attempt to assure a parliamentary majority in such 
a way -next to the lesser role played by anti-communism and foreign policy in the 
electoral campaign- contributed to the notable electoral loss of the DC in 1953 (from
48.5 % to 40.1 %). More importantly and somewhat ironically, the governing parties 
gained only 49.85 percent of the vote, rendering the ’Swindle Law’ ineffective in its 
anticipated consequences and locating the problem of finding a workable majority again 
in the centre of politics.
The Political Role of the Church. According to Kogan (1983: 59) the Church and 
Catholic Action "became increasingly aggressive in public life". Settembrini (1977: 
458-491) provides an -although incomplete, but most telling- list of political 
interventions by the Church in the period until 1962 (the first centre-Left government): 
114 electoral interventions, 78 interventions against the ’apertura alia sinistra’ (the 
opening to the Left), 82 various political interventions, 21 interventions against 
freedom of speech and of the press, 22 interventions demanding confessional education, 
18 interventions involving pressure on the government, and 18 interventions against 
non-Catholic beliefs. Furthermore, in the summer of 1949 Pope Pius XII had 
excommunicated (or threatened to do so) members and adherents of the PCI and the 
Civic Committees of Catholic Action, which had been instrumental in the victory of 
1948, put severe constraints on the room to manoeuvre of the DC (Settembrini 1977: 
242-253), thus adding to the urgency of the Christian Democratic search for a more 
independent power basis in the ’sottogovemo’.
The period 1953-1958 is one of the most complex phases of Italian politics. The 
outcome of the elections impeded a smooth return of a four party coalition and blocked 
what was left of the reformist zeal. "The reformist urge that had marked the early 
years of the preceding legislature was further diluted by the energy absorbed in finding 
majorities that would then collapse and have to be re-created" (Kogan 1983: 68). The 
minority cabinets of the DC continuously needed the support of the Right, which 
rendered reforms recurrently difficult and generally impossible. This constituted the 
kernel of immobilism of politics at the level of state policies. Nevertheless, party
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politics flourished (Mammarella 1985: 206), both in the sense that attempts were made 
within the DC to prepare a future deal with the Socialists as a way out of the partisan 
deadlock and in the sense of strengthening the power of the party in the state and the 
semi-public agencies.
Yet, initiatives of social policy and social reforms were taken during this period, 
of which the most important were the ’Ten-Year Plan for the Development of 
Employment and Income" of the Christian Democratic Budget Minister Vanoni and the 
extension of pensions to farmers23’. The Vanoni-plan represented the first shot at 
systematical intervention in the economy. Its principal aims were to increase 
investments, to stimulate economic growth, to raise the level of consumption, to create 
employment, and to redistribute wealth (regionally, sectorally and socially) (Mammare­
lla 1985: 222-223; Kogan 1983: 81-82). Although the plan was approved in Parliament 
and despite its moderate inclination, the politics of parliamentary immobilism 
subsequently stripped it of its main -potentially effective (Mammarella 1985: 223)- 
elements until nothing was left but "a series of projections of future economic 
developments” (Kogan 1983: 81).
The Power o f Christian Democracy, Institutional Clientelism and the Particularist 
Welfare State
The immobilism of the period predominantly existed at the surface of party politics. 
Simultaneously, Christian Democracy managed to build a new system of power in the 
state, establishing a new consensus in Italian society (Ginsborg 1989: 193). It is the 
penetration of party, state and the semi-public sector by DC loyalists that has come to 
characterize the welfare state in Italy and consequently has accorded social capitalism 
its élan à la Italy.
Nevertheless, this pattern of state organization was not simply the outcome of 
Christian Democratic power politics. The state that Christian Democracy inherited from 
the Liberal and Fascist period could already be identified as a centralized, inefficient,
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23) 'Motives other than reform were behind its passage: it was an instrument for consolidating the 
control of the Christian Democratic farm federation, the Coltivatori Diretti, over peasant proprietors* 
(Kogan 1983: 80/81).
clientelistic state, which had a disproportionate number of employees recruited from 
the south, and which was surrounded by a labyrinth of parallel bureaucracies of state 
corporations and other public agencies (Ginsborg 1989: 193-196). These features of the 
’archipelago’ were transplanted into the new republic and subsequently were modified 
and exploited by Christian Democracy. They produced what Donolo (1980) has called 
a peculiar form of latent corporatism.
The doctrine of subsidiarity and comparable notions facilitated and sanctioned the 
assimilation of the parallel bureaucracies and public agencies (’enti pubblici’). And 
there was quite an array of agencies to absorb. In 1947, for instance, there existed 
already 841 of such agencies. The main sectors comprised, first of all, the railroads, 
post and telecommunications, as well as the state monopolies (tobacco, salt); secondly, 
the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istitutoper la Ricostruzione Industriale, IRI: 
the state’s nationalized industrial sector24’), employing 216,000 persons in 1948; 
thirdly, the local governments; and fourthly, the entire social welfare sector.
The Fascist Heritage and the Failed Reform
The ’enti pubblici’ of the welfare state have their origins in the Fascist period. These 
institutions comprise the ’National Institute for Social Security’ (Istituto Nazionale della 
Previdenza Sociale, INPS) for old age, invalidity, unemployment, family allowances 
and tuberculosis; the ’National Institute for Occupational Accidents Insurance’ (Istituto 
Nazionale per le Assicurazioni contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro, INAIL) for invalidity; 
and the ’National Institute for Sickness Insurance’ (Istituto Nazionale per l’Assicura- 
zione contro le Malattie, INAM) for sickness. Fascism had accorded a preeminent 
position to social policy as an instrument of social consensus, parallel to its corporatist 
design (Paci 1989a: 84; Ascoli 1984b: 28). Fascism, however, had left the insurance 
bias of the Italian system intact and had given it a corporatist twirl. In spite of massive 
state intervention, the Fascist calculating strategy had been incapable of breaking the 
strength of Catholic action in the social assistance sector, the traditional bulwark of the
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24) The IRI-construction involves the public ownership of private firms and has established a 
powerful interpenetration of political and economic interests. It grew eventually into a brood-cell of *a 
new ruling class of public managers promoted by and supporting the emerging groups of DC politicians* 
(Bianchi 1987: 287).
Church. On the contrary, the Concordat of 1929 even implied a reinforcement the 
control of Catholicism in this dominion (David 1984: 189).
The Italian republic, then, inherited from Fascism a social welfare system, which 
was characterized by a corporatist social security system, a para-statal organization of 
social security administration and a predominant position of the Church in social 
assistance (Paci 1989a: 85). In particular, the structuration of the administration of the 
welfare state through ’enti’ prepared the road for the insertion of the welfare system 
into the emerging party and faction system of post-war Italian politics (Ascoli 1984b: 
29).
Immediately after the war social policy reform gained a prominent place on the 
political agenda (Ferrera 1984: 36). In april 1947 a parliamentary Commission, chaired 
by Ludovico D’Aragona, was installed in order to prepare a reform of the social 
security system (Cherubini 1977: 365-372). A year later, but just before the new 
Constitution went into operation, the Committee presented its report. In this way the 
government demonstrated its intention to profoundly recast the Fascist heritage (Paci 
1989a: 85).
The report’s projected main innovations were 1) institutional centralization, 
unification and therefore simplification, according to every risk only one scheme; 2) 
extension of social security to all employees and self-employed for sickness, old age, 
invalidity, accident, and to all employees for unemployment; 3) the introduction of a 
general old age pension system for employees, providing for a minimum pension to be 
complemented by private provisions; 4) the linking of benefits and income (Ferrera 
1984: 36-37; Paci 1989a: 86). Perhaps not an Italian Beveridge-plan, the D’Aragona- 
blueprint would have implied a significant innovation of the highly fragmented and 
differentiated social security system of Italy (Ferrera 1984: 37). ’Would have’, because 
none of the proposals made it during the period of "Christian Democratic hegemony" 
and the "permanent suspension" (Cherubini 1977: 372) after the elections of 1948. 
Christian Democracy, in the course of two legislatures, managed to live up to one 
principle with respect to reform: to give in as little and as late as possible and only 
when compelled by the logic of parliamentary majorities (Cherubini 1977: 390).
The Fascist particularist heritage of social policy was adopted by the centrist 
governments and made subordinate to the ’politics of consensus’ of Christian
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Democracy in an attempt to substantiate and reinforce its middle class support. Social 
policy improvements concerned extensions to small farmers, artisans, and shop-keepers 
and merchants (’commercianti’). The development of social security was largely 
incremental, and particularly the number of ’enti’ multiplied, the main guiding 
principle being "un’ente per ogni categoría di soggetti" (Ascoli 1984b: 31), i.e. a 
further fragmentation of the system through occupational differentiation. In contrast to 
Germany, Christian Democracy hardly produced any social policy innovations. 
Whereas the German Christian Democrats not only successfully resisted Allied attempts 
to break with the particularist social security tradition in Germany, the Italian Christian 
Democracy did not have to mobilize its resources to block universalist reforms in any 
comparable way, but -on the contrary- used the social security heritage to further its 
own power resources.
Clientelism. the Welfare State and Christian Democracy
Italian social scientists have come to view the Italian welfare state as a peculiar mixture 
of particularism and clientelism (Ascoli 1984b; Ferrera 1984; Paci 1984; 1989a; 
1989b). The particularism of the Italian system is first of all present at the institutional 
level where "benefits are conferred primarily on the basis of occupational status of the 
beneficiary. The distributive principles that inspire it are sectoral solidarity and a 
correspondence between care offered and work performed (or contributions paid)" 
(Paci 1989b: 217). This particularism however, is not only prevailing in the labyrinth 
of differentiated schemes and benefits, but also in the manner of financing of social 
security, where certain groups (public employees, self-employed) benefit dispropor- 
tionally (Paci 1984: 307). Pensions, however, are a peculiar case. Of the developed 
capitalist democracies, Italy had (in 1980) the largest number of occupationally distinct 
public pension schemes in combination with the lowest spending on private pensions 
(about 2 percent of total pension spending) (Esping-Andersen 1990: 70). Even the 
Italian expert on pensions, Castelino (1976) found it difficult to construct an inventory 
of the numerous ’enti’, institutions, ’casse’, etc. that make up the maze of the pension 
system. "To whom, for instance, must one turn", he complains, "(...) to get 
information about this ’Social Security Fund for Supervisors of Bookshops in Railway
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Stations’ that around 1960 counted (...) around 200 insured" (Castelino 1976: 10, my 
translation).
Selectivity, status reproduction and representation of sectoral interests do not 
necessary lead to the distortion of impartial administrative principles. On the contrary, 
"The existence of strong sectoral representation, with financial and administrative 
autonomy and with regulatory powers, reduces the risk of ’slippage’ from the 
’particularistic-meritocratic’ type of welfare, to the ’assistential-clientelistic’ type, 
which instead characterizes the Italian situation" (Paci 1989b: 219). It is the "extensive 
clientelistic character that the provision of services has taken on, in both its ’corporate’ 
and its ’assistance’ components" (Paci 1989: 222), which makes the Italian welfare 
state peculiar.
Now, what actually is meant by ’clientelism’? I propose to adopt here Walston’s 
(1988) definition of interventionist state clientelism, which precisely emphasizes the 
role of state agencies in the political pathology of the Italian system. This type of 
clientelism -as in contrast to notable clientelism-"(...) works in a society which has a 
bureaucratic form but a personalistic substance; clientelism flourishes where part of the 
state structure is inadequate (...). State resources due to the citizen may not be 
forthcoming so that there is the need for a patron, or the division of resources can be 
influenced by patrons. Either way the official procedures do not function properly" 
(Walston 1988: 8). Two criteria need to be fulfilled: 1) it must concern a public 
resource "to which, in theory, every citizen has an equal right" and 2) "the exchange 
itself must be in conflict with the official morality" (Walston 1988: 28).
Clientelism with respect to the welfare state, then, refers to the distribution of 
benefits and services based on an exchange between a patron in the welfare agency and 
a client under conditions of failing state bureaucracies. The principles of distribution 
are political and personal and are not part of "the official set of values; since the 
controllers and mediators of public resources are the members of the bureaucracy 
and/or of representative institutions both of whom depend upon and are in contact with 
the whole of society, this type of clientelism is a mass phenomenon" (Walston 1988:
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23). The patron gets repaid for his ’service’ in money or in a remuneration that is 
political. The political compensation may be a vote or a financial gift to the party25'.
This is the quintessence of the clientelism of the Italian welfare state. It clarifies 
the critical position of the public agencies in the system and conjectures their failure 
as a pre-condition for welfare clientelism. The welfare agencies were quickly 
recognized by Christian Democrats as potentially rich sources for political power 
(Cazzola 1979). It was through the establishment and the diffusion of clientelistic 
relationships that Christian Democracy created a power base of its own in the semi­
public welfare sector. Social security benefits were and are an important if not the main 
income source for many. Pensions have been the main object of clientelistic exchanges, 
simply because of the number of people involved. In 1955 3.5 million pensions were 
paid, summing up to an expenditure of 496 billion lire (= 3.3 % of GDP) (Ferrera 
1984).
The welfare agencies were also turned into an important ’job machine’ where 
thousands of jobs are distributed to party loyalists. Spotts and Wieser (1986: 144) 
conclude their analysis of the ’sottogovemo’ and the Italian welfare state by stating that 
"in Italy the political-selection process was extended from the top to the bottom of the 
government and then spread in the public agencies, where it influenced virtually every 
appointment, including secretaries, messengers, and clerks. In this way the ’sottogove- 
mo’, with its thousands of public entities and hundreds of thousands of jobs, was 
transformed by the Christian Democrats into the biggest pool of patronage in any 
democratic state. This is how the party card became almost as important in Italy as in 
Communist countries".
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25) It is not immediately obvious bow (secret) votes can be rewards in return for a welfare favour 
of 'padroni*. For how would a patron be able to control whether his client actually fulfills his side of 
the bargain in the act of voting? The answer lies in the peculiar Italian system of preference voting, 
where the voter has several votes and the order of preferences matters. Local party bosses have become 
quite sophisticated in dictating their various clients different combinations of preferences. On the basis 
of a careful study of the combinations of names they can tell with almost mathematical precision who 
and who did not adhere to the agreement. As a result, the Italian political system of voting, which was 
originally meant to allow for a maximum of choice on the side of the electorate, was turned into a 
perverse system of control of the political class over the voters, especially in the big cities in the south 
(A. Panebianco in the Corriere della Sera, June 3, 1991). The outcome of the recent referendum (june 
1991) abolishes the system of plural preferences and is bound to change the logic of clientelistic electoral 
behaviour.
Some Considerations on (he Tenacity o f Christian Democracy
The political history of Italy in the 1960s is primarily characterized by the transfor­
mation of the centrist formula of government and the gradual development towards and 
realization of an alliance between Christian Democracy and Socialism. This realliance 
of political actors would in principle have been able to broaden the possibilities for 
social reformism. In reality, however, the period witnessed an almost complete 
standstill of sociopolitical efficacy. The political stalemate was only briefly broken by 
the unsurpassed mass mobilization of students and workers in the late 1960s26). At 
the same time, Christian Democracy managed to expand its power outside the strictly 
electoral realm, whereas the Socialists eventually were seized by the power virus, too, 
and demanded (and collected) their share of political resources.
A number of political and social changes provided the pre-conditions for the 
’apertura alia sinistra’ on the side of the Christian Democrats and the increasing 
legitimacy of the Socialists as a party of government. At the local level (Florence, 
Milan, Genoa, Venice) experiments with the new centre-Left formula had already 
proven their viability before 1962. At the international level, with the Democratic 
president Kennedy in the White House, US resistance against the inclusion of the 
Socialists not only rapidly declined (Ginsborg 1989: 350), but was even transformed 
into support for the construction. The PSI, on its turn, renounced its anti-Atlanticism 
in early 1962, started to support NATO as a defensive alliance and thus removed a 
major obstacle for the centre-Left experiment27’.
An unanticipated, yet vital change concerned the metamorphosis of Vatican policy 
towards Italian politics. Pope Pius XII, who had so often directly intervened in Italian 
politics, died in 1958 and was succeeded by John XXIII. The church had been against 
any experiment with the a coalition between Christian Democracy and Socialism and 
had not hesitated to make this point of view well-known. The Church’s position was 
moderated in 1961. The opposition against the cooperation between Catholics and 
Socialists withered away. The DC thus obtained more room to manoeuver (Mammare-
282
26) See for an extensive accounts of the events, their origins and meaning, Lumley (1990).
27) The Socialist leader, Pietro Nenni, published an article in the American Journal Foreign Affairs 
defending the changed position of the PSI (Platt and Leonard! 1979).
11a 1985 : 271) in its search for a workable and productive parliamentary majority. 
More important, however, was the fact that the ecclesiastic hierarchy decided to cancel 
the practice of continuous and direct intervention in political matters. The ’civic 
committees’ of Catholic Action, which had been so instrumental in channeling the 
Vatican political message to the people and had constituted the bulwark of Catholic 
Conservatism, gradually lost their political significance and almost instantaneously 
vanished (Ginsborg 1989: 352). The Vatican urged Catholic Action to concentrate on 
spiritual matters only. The publication of ’Mater et Magister’ (1961) marked a break 
in official Vatican ideology and further undermined Conservative Catholic resistance 
against the ’apertura’. "The encyclical’s broad endorsement of a mixed economy, its 
rejection of the uncontrolled market, its call to bring the disinherited into the social and 
political order, its emphasis on social justice and economic development, could be 
legitimately deduced in its application to Italy as backing for the direction being 
pursued by Moro and Fanfani (at the time the main protagonists of the ’apertura’) and 
as a rejection of the policies advocated by Catholic Action" (Kogan 1983: 166-7). The 
Second Vatican Council and the publication of ’Pacem in Terris’2** facilitated a 
beginning rapprochement of Catholics and Marxists (Ginsborg 1989: 353).
Another obstacle for the centre-Left was removed when big business (Fiat, Pirelli, 
Olivetti) and the corporations of the public sector started to support the idea of 
Christian-Socialist cooperation (Ginsborg 1989: 357). Planning at the national level was 
thought to be in their economic interest and the incorporation of Socialists in the 
government was expected to have a moderating effect on labour unrest. ’Confi- 
ndustria’, however, opposed a possible realliance at the political level vehemently, for 
a centre-Left government threatened to nationalize the electric-power industries, whose 
interests it in fact mainly represented. Christian Democrats supported the plan for 
nationalization also because of the expected political effect of weakening ’Confi- 
ndustria’, which since the second half of the 1950s had started to back the Liberals 
politically and financially (Kogan 1983: 175).
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28) ’The significance of the document was universal; its consequences for Italian life were apparent 
in three of its fundamental characteristics. First, it was addressed to ’all men of good will’, not just to 
Catholics. Second, it gave major emphasis to the principle of freedom of conscience. Third, it endorsed 
the possibility and rightness of collaboration for peace and social justice between men who differed on 
ideological grounds* (Kogan 1983: 180).
There were three distinctive reformist forces actively engaged in the construction 
of the centre-Left alliance (Ginsborg 1989: 359-62). There were those within the DC 
(Saraceno, Fanfani) and outside the party (La Malfa, the leader of the PRI) who 
represented social capitalist ideas most clearly. They opted for socio-political 
corrections of the failure of the market, especially with respect to the southern 
question, agriculture, and the large scale drift from the land and the accompanying, 
uncontrolled urbanization. Such reforms would also have to serve the purpose of 
increasing the efficiency of the state bureaucracies and diminishing corruption. The 
Socialists (and the Communists) opted for structural reforms in agriculture, education, 
and construction. Substantial alterations of the structure of were to facilitate the 
transition towards Socialism. Rather than to correct the market system, these forces 
opted for its transformation. Finally, there were those within the Christian Democratic 
movement, described by Ginsborg (1989: 362) as minimalists, who were most 
interested in keeping the unity of the party and who wanted to use reforms strategically 
for power maintenance.
The first centre-Left government (1962) consisted of the DC, the Republicans and 
the Social Democrats, and still excluded the Socialists. The government presented an 
extensive reform program (Mammarella 1985: 291-2; Kogan 1983: 172), of which the 
main elements were the nationalization of the electric-power industry, school-reform, 
agricultural innovation (abolition of the sharecropping-phenomenon), urban reforms, 
and the installment of regional governments for which the Constitution had already 
made the provisions. The Socialists, hampered by the anarcho-syndicalist ’carristi’ 
(Kogan 1983: 173), abstained rather than supported the government and made their 
future support contingent upon the successful nationalization of the electric-power 
industry, the reform of the schools (unified ’scuola media'), and the creation of regions 
with substantial executive authority (Ginsborg 1989: 362).
The government stayed in power for about a year and was to a certain extent 
effective in carrying out some of the proposals (Mammarella 1985: 293). This in spite 
of unfavourable conditions, such as the election of the rightist and anti-reformist 
Christian Democrat, Antonio Segni, as president of the Republic, and the commotion 
within business circles and the press that predicted economic catastrophe. The five 
monopolies of the electric-power industry were united under state control in the
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National Electric Power Agency (Ente Nazionale di Energia Elettrica, ENEL), while 
substantial financial compensations were offered. The economic motives for 
nationalization pertained to the stabilization of prices, the control over investments and 
the development of the south (Ginsborg 1989:263-4; Kogan 1983: 175). The political 
rationale was to destroy the hard core of conservative resistance against reforms, 
concentrated in this part of the monopoly sector of Italian capitalism. The creation of 
the ENEL was immediately used by the DC to enlarge its influence by stationing party 
members in the top positions of the ENEL. The ’unequal’ distribution of posts 
contributed to the tensions between the DC and the PSI (Kogan 1983: 177).
The reformist zeal, although still successful with regard to education (unification 
of the scuola media, an elongation of compulsory education), was interrupted by 
increasing economic problems, which were partly caused by scarcity of labour power 
and rising labour costs, and partly by political sabotage through investment strikes. 
Within the DC Fanfani lost ground for his reformism and the ’minimalists’ argued that 
the DC risked loosing the backing of the ’classe media’. Both the introduction of the 
regional governments (which would have allowed the Socialists and Communists to 
govern the ’red belt’ of Italy) and urban planning perished as a result of the 
’minimalist’ power play.
The first centre-Left experiment, in spite of its moderateness, had aroused 
resistance from all sides. The right accused the Christian Democrats of undermining 
the traditional values (for instance private property), whereas the Communists 
denounced the Socialists for betraying the working class by supporting the DC. The 
elections of 1963 put the DC for the first time under the 40 percent (38.3), while the 
PSI lost slightly, too. Both the Liberals and the Communists gained in strength. These 
results were taken as a sign that first experiment had failed. A return to centrism, 
however, had become difficult, if not impossible and a renovation of the centre-Left 
formula by including the Socialists in government remained as the only feasible 
solution.
The centre-Left governments under Aldo Moro (1963-1968) -with direct Socialist 
participation- retained a rhetoric of reformist commitment, but gradually returned to 
an almost complete immobilism in the domain of social policy in practice. The 
Socialists lost a part of their Left wing as a result of government participation (1964),
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but temporarily reunited with the Social Democrats (1966). Economic conditions 
declined (inflation, unemployment) which led to Moro’s strategy of ’due tempi’: 
stabilization first, reforms later (Ginsborg 1989: 377). The Socialists consented to the 
postponement of reforms as the best guarantee to stay in power and to provide a 
counter-weight against reactionary forces. The latter had become urgent since the 
coalition and in fact Italian democracy were threatened by right wing attempts to 
prepare a ’colpo di stato’ under the leadership of De Lorenzo, the head of the para­
military Carabinieri.
Few reforms, then, were carried out and the ones that could pass the barrier of 
immobilism were formulated in such a way that their potential was mitigated. The 
overall achievements of the period of centre-Left coalitions is substandard. The 
nationalization of the electric-power industry had been carried out, but was accom­
panied by a compensation that allowed the former monopolies to maintain much of 
their immense financial power. The absence of necessary urban planning did not only 
lead to unconstrained and chaotic expansion of major cities, but was also largely 
responsible for the disastrous effects of the floods of Florence and Venice in 1966. 
Legislation in general had been contradictory and was usually delayed and finally 
rendered ineffective. The extension of compulsory primary education had indeed been 
an accomplishment, but secondary and higher education had been left untouched. A 
readjustment of the tax system had not even been attempted and the rationalization of 
the bureaucracy, although hody debated, had not been able to claim a firm place on the 
political agenda. The transfer of power to the regions was blocked (see Ginsborg 1989: 
380) and had to wait until the early 1970s before it could be effectuated. In terms of 
the struggle between the three currents of reformism, the ’minimalist’ power-searching 
direction had therefore clearly won the battle.
According to Ginsborg (1989: 381) the isolation of the gradualist reformers within 
Christian Democracy and the Socialist movement, the refusal of the Communists to 
support gradual change, the transformation of Socialist power politics and the 
incorporation of the Socialists into the system of clientelist distribution of power, the 
incapacity of large industries to counter-balance ’Confindustria’ and the financial power 
of the former monopolies, and the economic sabotage of small industry (capital flight,
286
investment strike) were the elements that explain this incapacity to perform a more 
effective social and political correction of capitalism in Italy.
Nevertheless, the fate of Christian Democracy as the hegemonic actor in Italian 
politics was linked with the success of the minimalist strategy. On the one hand 
minimalism in social policy inhibited the full development of social capitalism in Italy, 
but on the other hand did lead to a further institutionalization of Christian Democratic 
power. The semi-public sector (IRI) was made instrumental for power accumulation 
and faction politics. The consequence was that its initial efficiency was completely 
eroded by the appointment of politicians who were not necessarily selected on the basis 
of their managerial competence. Besides, "public management was explicitly chosen, 
and required by government, to pursue conflicting goals; political pressures determined 
career patterns and investment choices. This link with political power gave legitimacy 
to public firms to act primarily in the domestic economy, creating financial giants 
which had huge diversified national structures, but with poor international links" 
(Bianchi 1987: 279). The absence of bureaucratic reform led to a paralysis of public 
administration (Ginsborg 1989: 386).
Special attention should perhaps be paid to the systematic refinement -especially 
in the south- of the system of clientelism, which hopelessly perverted the actual 
attempts to develop the region. This renewed clientelism was particularly beneficial to 
a new generation of Christian Democratic leaders, who -affiliated with leaders of the 
older generation- in this way prepared their careers on the national level. Four 
resources were unscrupulously exploited for the accumulation of power: the 
construction boom, the southern development fund, the financial resources of the local 
’enti’ and those funds that derived immediately from the national government and 
national legislation. As already argued, pensions have been a major currency in 
clientelistic exchanges, as exemplified by their distorted distribution between the north 
and south in comparison with the number of inhabitants of the respective regions. In 
1975 the region received approximately twice the amount of pensions that it should 
have received on the basis of its labour force (Ginsborg 1989: 392).
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Concluding Remarks
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Writing about the success and prosperity of Christian Democracy and social capitalism 
in Italy is delicate business. The ambivalence stems from the combination of 
unparalleled power mobilization at the level of the state apparatuses and the 
’archipelago’ of para-statal agencies, in combination with an almost paralyzing 
constellation of power at the governmental plane. The social capitalist ingredients of 
Italian welfare statism has been more an effect of an incapacity to act than the result 
of intentional sociopolitical intervention. The restoration of the traditional framework 
of social policy with its ’latent corporatism’ as inherited form Fascism has to be 
interpreted against this background.
Christian Democracy’s phenomenal integrative faculty, the resolute advocacy of 
the Church, and the permeating presence of the Roman Catholic infrastructural network 
cemented by anti-Communism largely account for the velocity of the early success of 
the DC. American insistence if not pressure, moreover, helped to bolster the peculiar 
conditions under which the elections of 1948 were won. The popular mandate 
facilitated the subsequent seclusion of the Left from legal political authority and 
secured Christian Democracy in the centre of power. Although parliamentary politics 
entered an era of unabridged immobilism, which was only partially interrupted by the 
first centre-Left government, Christian Democracy employed the continuous mandate 
to create and substantiate a power base of its own. The agrarian reform, social policy 
measures and the reconstruction of the fragmented, particularistic social security system 
have all tended to work in one direction: the cultivation of clientelism and the 
’sottogovemo’. These, in turn, have greatly favoured the Christian Democratic 
electoral return, with which a vicious (in both meanings of the word) was set in 
motion. The dominance of the minimalist reformist strategy was mainly an attempt to 
secure Christian Democratic unity and hegemony under conditions of increasing 
competition from the Socialists and later (in the 1970s) the Communists.
It was eventually the extra-parliamentary pressure of societal revolt and the 
pressure from the organizations affiliated with the DC (ACLI, CISL) which temporary 
forced the Christian Democratic minimalists to take action in the field of social policy. 
It was only in 1969 that under pressure of the mass mobilization of the labour
movement that the pension system was altered and a ’social pension’ was introduced 
for all Italian citizens older than 65, independent of prior contributions, although still 
means tested (Castellino 1976: 9). Other reforms in the 1970s comprised the transfer 
of authority to the regions (see Leonardi et al. 1987), the alteration of the divorce law, 
and the introduction of the referendum.
The outcome of the referendum on the divorce law, which meant a defeat for 
traditional Catholicism and for the DC, nor the bad results of the elections of 1975, 
where Christian Democracy dropped to 35.5 percent, have decisively afflicted the 
power of the DC. Unlike Christian Democracy in Germany, the DC is much less 
sensitive to electoral fluctuations, partly because the movement has managed to control 
electoral outcomes to some extent. In a recent, brilliant paper, Sidney Tarrow (1990) 
has posed the intriguing question why Christian Democracy in Italy managed to survive 
a series of crises that in other nations most likely would have decomposed a political 
movement completely. The clue for the tenacity of Christian Democratic power, for 
its immense capacity for survival even under conditions of serious challenges, lies in 
the fact that the movement is ’softly hegemonic’. It never dominated society completely 
and its power was based on a variety of resources, such as the Catholic subculture, 
cross-class support, political patronage, anti-communism, American support, and the 
establishment of independent power moments in the para-statal organizations. Soft 
hegemony has greatly enhanced the capacity to adapt. ’Hard’ hegemony would have 
excluded what I have earlier defined as a flexible response to changing conditions. 
Christian Democracy’s strength and survival has always depended on it being able to 
rely on a plurality of power resources in the course of continuous crises. I could 
therefore not agree more with Tarrow (1990: 328) when he concludes that "It is not 
enough to point to anticommunism, which lost its electoral appeal with the end of the 
cold war, or to the religious basis of the vote, which began to decline long before the 
DC vote did. It was soft hegemony - the DC’s basic strategic decision to govern from 
the centre, to share power, and to balance support for business with service to its other 
constituency groups - that continued through all these changes and allowed the party 
to adapt to changes in society and in the political situation". In the present context one 
must add that the phenomenal success of Italian Christian Democracy has been matched 
by a distressing incapacity to produce tolerable outcomes in the realm of social policy.
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CHAPTER 11 
THE NETHERLANDS

This chapter on Christian Democracy and social capitalism in the Netherlands must 
start with the puzzling observation that until the second half of the 1970s there was no 
Christian Democracy in this nation, at least not in the sense of an equivalent to the 
Protestant-Catholic combination of Christian Democratic forces in Germany. Instead, 
there existed three major ’Confessional’ or denominational political movements, which 
Irving (1979: 193) appropriately has depicted as "embryo Christian Democratic" 
parties.
Both the Dutch Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP) and - 
although to a somewhat lesser extent- the Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti- 
Revolutionaire Partij, ARP) have had considerable cross-class appeal. Nevertheless, 
where the Anti-Revolutionaries had their stronghold among the Protestant lower middle 
class of shopkeepers, self-employed, artisans, and the like, the Catholic party up to a 
point managed to secure a substantial working class backing, too. In the Netherlands 
it has been primarily the Catholic Party that has represented the tradition of social 
capitalism mainly through its labour wing, while the Protestant parties initially had no 
systematic view on social reforms whatsoever0. Moreover, it was the ARP that 
largely had been responsible for the detrimental crisis policy in the 1930s. The Anti- 
Revolutionary attempt to cope with the economic crisis was permeated by dogmatic 
Liberalism and "lacked the broader values of Christian neigbourly love and social 
justice that one would have expected from the Confessional parties" (Scholten et al. 
1968: 59), while the post-war state intervention conflicted with the traditional anti- 
statism of the ARP. Finally, political Catholicism has been the prime motor behind the 
establishment of the cross-Confessional Christian Democracy (Christen Democratisch 
Appfcl, CDA) in the Netherlands in the mid-seventies. It was not until the Catholic 
party started to lose its working class support (both electorally and organizationally
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1) Woldring and Kuiper (1980: 40-51), in their study on the ’Reformed critique’ of society, judge 
the contribution of the leader of the ARP, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), to the solution of the ’social 
question’ 'disappointing*. Kuyper developed the concept of ’Sovereignty in one’s own circle' as a means 
to secure the autonomy of lower societal organs from the state. All authority derived from God: *(...) 
the highest authority in any circle has nothing above itself but God, and the state cannot intervene and 
cannot command on the basis of its own power* (Kuyper, 1898: 79). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Kuyper frequently voted against social legislation and as Prime-Minister failed to develop social policy 
(Van Putten 1985:175).
with the de-Confessionalization of the Catholic labour movement in the late 1960s2)) 
that it took the initiative to establish a cross-class and cross-Confessional Christian 
Democratic movement3’.
There are two main conditions that account for the ’absence’ of Christian 
Democracy and the re-emergence of religiously-based but denominationally divided 
parties after World War II. The first factor pertains to the peculiarity of Dutch political 
history and the ’pillarization’ of society, a process which for the moment could be 
roughly described as the evolution of highly organized, but separated religious and 
ideological subcultures with political representation of cooperating elites at the top of 
the pillars. The second element concerns the structural tenacity of ’pillarization’, which 
-in combination with other rather more contingent catalysts- prevented the refurbishing 
of the political structure in the Netherlands after the Second World War. The 
persistence of ’pillarization’ and its organizational pattern has probably encouraged the 
relatively underdeveloped anti-religious and anti-clerical disposition of Liberalism and 
Socialism in the Netherlands. The Dutch polity is entirely permeated by religion (Van 
Doom 1989: 46), while "the critical spirit, the contradiction -the spirit of the Left if 
you like-, which in a free democratic society ought to represent not an opponent but 
a safeguard of societal order, has a religious, national and humanist tradition in the 
Netherlands" (Zahn 1989: 33). Moreover, the very term ’conservative’ is 
conspicuously absent in Dutch political discourse (Von der Dunk 1982).
The Second World war has provided much less of a political rupture in the 
Netherlands than it did in Italy and Germany. It is partly the persistence of the unique 
conditions of Dutch politics that explain the particularity of religiously-based politics. 
As I will argue below, these conditions play an important role in the clarification of 
the manner in which social capitalism -as represented by Dutch Catholicism- was 
coupled to a moderate form of Social Democratic reformism. It is this combination of 
Social Democratic reformism and Catholic social capitalism which is the main cause 
of the idiosyncratic mixture of universalism, generosity and particularism that
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2) See for the history of the relationship between the Catholic labour movement and the eventual 
merger with the Social Democratic union federation. Roe* 1985.
3) See on the theme of political change in the Netherlands Daalder and Irwin (1989).
characterizes the Dutch welfare state and which has given rise to Dutch 
’exceptionalism’ (Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988; Van Kersbergen 1990).
Pillarization and the Origins o f the Political System
Although the Netherlands is often characterized as a thoroughly Calvinist nation, some 
of the main characteristics of the political system have to be accounted for by reference 
to the presence of a large Catholic minority, concentrated in the southern provinces*’. 
Between 1815 and 1960 Catholics roughly comprised between 35 and 40 percent of the 
total population. Within the Protestant nation Catholics formed a discriminated 
minority. One interpretation of ’pillarization’, therefore, stresses the role of Catholic 
emancipation and protection against subcultural threats as the root cause of 
’pillarization’. A comparable thesis exists for the ’pillarization’ of the orthodox- 
protestant part of the population, that sought to defend itself against "the humanist, 
anti-clerical doctrines of the French Revolution" (Irving 1979: 196). That is what the 
term anti-revolutionary means: "Anti-Revolutionary spokesmen sought to make a 
distinction between 'counterrevolutionaries’ who would wish to reverse history and 
’antirevolutionaries’ who, while rejecting the entire spirit of 1789, would yet recognize 
change" (Daalder 1966: 199, fn 27). Marxist theory has rejected the thesis of 
emancipation, mainly arguing that Catholic and Protestant factions of the ruling class 
attempted to block the emancipation of workers (and women) by fragmentation through 
’pillarization’. "Only the existence of pillars enabled the organization of more than half 
of the working class and the major part of the farmers and urban middle classes under 
the domination of factions of the ruling class. Pillarization was a specifically Dutch 
form of bourgeois hegemony" (Stuurman 1983: 60, my translation).
Another account, however, emphasizes strategies of social and political control, 
where the subcultural masses are willing instruments in the power accumulation of 
political elites or where political elites are argued to have recognized the danger of a 
divided nation and cooperated at the top to accommodate societal conflict. The seminal 
work of Lijphart (1975, originally 1968) is to be placed in this tradition and has
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4) See for a study of Dutch Catholicism and political power Balcvis (1981).
strongly influenced the manner in which Dutch politics is interpreted along the lines 
of what Lijphart called a consociational democracy5’. "Dutch politics is a politics of 
accommodation" (Lijphart 1975: 103), where four segments of society -Catholic, 
Protestant, Socialist and Liberal- compete and cooperate in what appears a paradoxical 
situation: extreme segmentation and stable democracy. The politics of accommodation 
is based on "a high degree of self-containment and mutual isolation of the four blocs 
with overarching contact among the blocs limited to the elite level. The success of this 
system depends to a large extent on the leaders’ joint efforts at peace-keeping and 
peaceful change" (Lijphart 1975: 112). The political elites (unlike the mass) in the 
Netherlands obey an unwritten set of rules of the accommodation game6’ (Lijphart 
1975: 122-138), which facilitate democratic stability and societal segmentation.
One of the main problems of Lijphart’s account of Dutch politics is the lack of 
historical dynamics7*. Another, more satisfactory, interpretation -brilliantly represented 
by the Dutch political scientist H. Daalder- is historically more sensitive and may be 
labelled the historical-pluralist view. This account underscores a) the long tradition of 
pluralism in the Dutch history of nation-building; b) the early appreciation of a 
plurality of religions, which implied that "once definitely discriminated minorities were 
increasingly free to organize openly" (Daalder 1990: 39); c) the development of 
parliamentarism before the modernization of society, which d) conditioned the 
formation of mass political movements, giving these a traditional leadership structure 
of accommodating elites and an internally division between radicalism and 
conservatism; e) ’pillarization’ as a slow and piecemeal process, as a result of which 
traditional structures of decision-making were reproduced rather than destroyed in the 
course of modernization; 0 the different pace at which the various religious subcultures
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5) See the collection of articles published in a special volume of the Dutch Political Science Journal 
edited by Van Schendelen (1984). This collection contains an overview and analysis of the debate on 
consociationalism and reveals both the weakness and the strength of Lijphart's analysis of Dutch politics.
6) These rule are: 1) politics as business; 2) an agreement to disagree; 3) summit diplomacy; 4) 
proportionality; 5) depoliticization; 6) secrecy; 7) the government's right to govern.
7) Lijphart’s study is not a study in Dutch politics as such. Its main aim was to amend pluralist 
theory on the basis of a case that within this paradigm could theoretically not exist. The analysis of the 
problem of stability, however, is contradictory, because on the one hand the argument is that cleavages 
threaten stability, whereas as at the same time the Dutch population is said to be extraordinary passive 
and obedient.
entered the process of subcultural condensation, stressing that the Catholic 
’pillarization’ as emancipation was ’introvert’, amassing force around the church rather 
than in organized political power; g) the ’pillar’-type of organization as a model which 
forced the Liberals and especially the Socialists to adopt it if they were to compete with 
the religious pillars at all.
’Pillarization’ as "the division of society into several organizational complexes 
which are highly isolated from one another and based on religious or ideological 
grounds" (Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988: 480®'), then, is interpreted as the manner 
in which "an older pluralist world developed in a more modem world of associational 
politics” (Daalder 1989: 15). ’Pillarization’ as a dynamic organizational process refers 
to the "concurrence of a Catholic emancipation movement, a petty bourgeois (mainly 
Protestant) resistance against the early industrialization and of a general principally 
Christian protest against the ’spirit’ of the revolutions of the late eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries" (Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988: 481).
The various social and political agents explicitly articulated in the beginning of the 
century around the issues of financial equalization of state and religious education, the 
extension of the franchise and the integration of the working class into the Dutch 
nation. These issues caused the politicization of religions in the Netherlands and 
determined the political salience of denominational organizations in the period between 
1880 and 1917.
The question of the state financing of religious education produced a religious-non- 
religious cleavage in Dutch politics. The Anti-Revolutionary leader A. Kuyper 
developed his ’anti-thesis’, asserting the central line of division as one between belief 
and unbelief rather than between creeds. This coincided with the growing Catholic 
distrust of Liberalism^. As a result, Protestants and Catholics entered a coalition,
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8) There are many rival definitions of ’pillarization’, mainly depending on which interpretation it 
is to serve. Pennings (1991: 21) offers a good descriptive definition of 'pillarizatioa' as a process 
whereby ‘Catholics, Orthodox-Protestants, and Social Democrats since 1880 increasingly came to 
institutionalize their mutual differences*. ’Pillarizatioa’ as a societal structure, then, refers to the mutual 
acknowledgment of the right to exist and the presence of consultation between the political elites of the 
’pillars’.
9) The anti-liberal encyclical letter of Pope Pius IX ’Quanta Cura’ dates from 1864 and was
with the 'Syllabus Eirorum’, which contained an overview of liberal errors.
culminating in the ’Pacification’ of 1917: the financial equalization of state and 
religious education and the extension of the franchise. The solution to the question of 
financing education provided the financial and organizational paragon for the 
’pillarization’ of virtually every other social sector: unions, the organizations of 
employers, political parties, occupational associations, the media, socio-cultural 
organizations, as well hospitals and social welfare institutions. If one takes the concept 
literally, then the conclusion must be that only the Confessional movements in the 
Netherlands can be properly called ’pillars’, for the Social Democrats typically lacked 
the density of institutions of the religious organizational network. In particular, they 
never managed to gain the same impact on education, and -most importantly- they had 
of course no equivalent to the Protestant and Catholic churches10*.
Rather than going deeper into the debate on the origins of ’pillarization’10, it is 
sufficient to keep in mind the organizational momentum of ’pillarization’ and its 
political consequences. The political salience and the organizational importance of 
religious cleavages made a cross-Confessional political movement impossible. The 
presence of social and economic cleavages, on the other hand, urged the Confessional 
blocs to cooperate in their mutual aversion towards the non-religious blocs of Social 
Democracy and Liberalism. The Dutch political structure developed into a three-bloc 
system of co-existing minorities (Daalder 1989: 11), consisting of 1) a Protestant- 
Orthodox cluster, divided politically in the moderate Anti-Revolutionary and the 
conservative Christian Historian (Christelijk-Historische Unie, CHU) wing; 2) a highly 
integrated Catholic bloc, headed by a united political party; and 3) a rest category of 
secular segments, divided along class rather than any other cleavage, of which only the 
Socialists -as opposed to the Liberals- showed signs of ’pillarization’. The conclusion 
is that Dutch politics was characterized by the dominance of religion in the absence of 
a dominant religious political movement.
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10) Pennings* recent study, however, shows that even the supposed all-embracing and monolithic 
nature of ’pillarization’ of the religious blocs is an exaggeration. There has been considerable variation 
at the local level. The Social Democratic ’pillar’, moreover, was rather a pillarizing movement than a 
pillar (Pennings 1991).
11) See for a moderation of the thesis of 'pillarization’ as a uniquely Dutch phenom enon the work 
of the Dutch historian H. Righart (1986). He studies comparable processes in Austria, Switzerland and 
Belgium and interprets ’pillarization' mainly as a Catholic strategy against secularization.
The Failed Attempt o f Political Innovation and the Re-establishment of Confessional 
Dominance after World War II
As mentioned, the experience of the second World War and the Nazi-occupation did 
not bring the political reformation that other nations, notably Germany and Italy, 
witnessed. Yet, in the Netherlands, too, there was an attempt of innovation in order 
to block the restoration of pre-war pillar dominated elite politics. Surely, politics in the 
Netherlands had not been severely contaminated by Fascism; the Dutch Fascist party 
(Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, NSB), in spite of its success in the early years of 
the economic crisis of the 1930s, for instance, had attracted not more than 3 percent 
of the vote at the time the German armies invaded the Netherlands in May 1940. In 
addition, part of the traditional political system (the government as well as the Queen) 
had escaped the country and was in a sense transferred to London, where it continued 
to represent legal political authority. It was preparing its return and from this side 
hardly any innovative aspirations could have been expected.
The forces opting for political reform were to be found in the Netherlands where 
they organized during the German occupation. One line starts from the Dutch Union 
(Nederlandse Unie), a movement which attempted to institutionalize the adaptation of 
the Dutch population to the ’new European order’ of Fascism1®. This line partly 
represented an autocratic critique on the malfunctioning of the pre-war democracy (i.e. 
the ’pillarization’-nature of consociationalism), partly provided an alternative for the 
Dutch treacherous Fascists, partly was pro-German, but mainly was a mix of safe 
protest and ’harmless’ collaborationl3).
The more promising line -not discredited by the shadow of collaboration- was 
found among the former leaders of political and social organizations, who were held
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12) The historian J. C. H. Blom (1982: 67) has called this type of ’adaptation’ ’aggressive 
accommodation’, in contrast to the ’passive accommodation* of the majority of the Dutch population 
during the five years of foreign rule.
13) The Dutch Union (founded in july 1940, i.e. two months after the invasion) was extremely 
successful; within a month it reached a membership o f400.000, gradually increasing it to about a million 
until the movement was prohibited in december 1941. An interesting detail and illustration of 
unparalleled ’accommodation’ concerns the fact that one of the leaders of the Dutch Union, J. de Quay, 
mmnhff of the Catholic People’s Party, became Prime Minister of the Netherlands in 19S9 (see for a 
furious, uncompromising, but fascinating account of bow this was possible Rogier 1980)
hostage in a prison camp in Sint Michielsgestel. To a large extent, the progressive 
movement originated as an affair of intellectuals without a solid mass base. What 
contributed to the willingness among the imprisoned intellectuals to discuss political 
reform was the common enemy and the recognition of the marginality of many of the 
differences that had separated them in the pre-war period.
Immediately after the liberation a new political movement was launched, which had 
as its main objective the ’breakthrough’ (doorbraak) of the old ’pillarized’ political 
system. The main driving force behind the new Dutch People’s Movement 
(Nederlandse Volksbeweging, NVBU)) consisted of the elite of the Social Democratic 
Workers Party (Social Democratische Arbeiderspartij, SDAP) that wished to get rid off 
its Marxist heritage and sought to transform itself through the NVB into a broader 
people’s party. In addition, the strive for renewal was backed by left wing liberals and 
Catholic groups united around an equivocal longing for unity of the Dutch people. The 
cement of this blend of miscellaneous political currents was found in a set of 
ideological concepts, labelled ’Personalistic Socialism', which was an odd mixture of 
Social Democratic, Liberal, and Catholic-corporatist conceptions, inspired by general 
doctrines of Socialism, Humanism and Christianity19. The shared conservative 
element consisted of "(...) a return to Christian norms, emphasis on the family as the 
natural basis of society, the idea of community instead of pluralism” (Von der Dunk 
1982: 197), while the progressive legacy was embodied in an ideal of a classless 
society and the nationalization of crucial means of production. The Personalist element 
can be seen as "a Christian-Social variant of the old Liberal individualism, in which 
human dignity occupied a central place" (Von der Dunk 1982: 197).
Interpreted within the current framework, ’Personalistic Socialism’ shares quite a 
number of characteristics with social capitalism, albeit that the Socialist element was 
much stronger present. Personalism was interpreted as "the unfolding of the human 
personality at the service of (...) a solid and just and inspired community. The concept 
implied a critique of the ’collectivistic ideologies’ of National Socialism as well as of
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14) See for a complete historical account of this movement Bank (1978), De Keizer (1979), and -on 
the origins of the PvdA- Ruitenbeelc (19SS).
15) The ideological roots of this personalism are to be found in the communitarian Socialism of 
French Catholics, mainly organized around the journals ’Esprit’ and TOrdre Noveau’ (see Rauch 1972).
Marxist-Leninism. It could be a formula to denounce class attachment and class 
struggle. In connection with the notion of ’Socialism’ it was understood as the quest 
for a just society, for a 'radical social policy on the basis of communitarianism’ (...); 
no class struggle and no classless society either, but regulation of the capitalist market 
economy and the foundation of labour relations in the legal order" (Bank 1978: 20, my 
translation).
The formulation of this ideology was mainly furnished by Social Democratic 
reformism and Catholic social capitalist notions. Among the reform-minded political 
groups there was broad agreement on an ethical principle concerning the need for a 
change in popular mentality in Christian-humanist direction and on the demolition of 
the old political system. Disagreement existed as to the role of the state and the 
institutionalization of social and economic relations (Bohl 1981: 36), the latter being 
the main conflict between Socialist collectivism and Catholic corporatism.
The ’breakthrough’-movement was only a partial success. It was a failure in the 
sense, that -on three major exceptions- the pre-war political and social system of 
’pillarization’ was restored in very much its traditional outlook. The failure of the 
’ breakthrough’16) must first of all be sought in the tenacity of the system of 
’pillarization’. Apparently, historically deep-rooted subcultural differences and their 
structural condensation are not that easily vanquished, not even by war and foreign 
rule. In addition, the course of the war was such that the southern, predominantly 
Catholic part of the Netherlands was liberated in the autumn of 1944, half a year 
before the rest of the country. This led the Catholic conservatives ample room for the 
restoration of their traditional networks. In addition, the Social Democratic reformists 
feared that political renewal in the south would almost certainly be dominated by 
Catholics. They decided to postpone the foundation of the NVB and subsequently 
reintroduced their pre-war party. The implication of it was that at the time of the 
establishment of the NVB, the Catholics were already safe within their own ’pillar’,
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16) This is mainly the view of the ’official’ historiography of the Netherlands as represented by Blom 
(1977; 1982) and Bosnians (1982). This view is criticized for its stress on continuity, which appears to 
underestimate political and social conflict around the ’breakthrough’. An alternative view is provided by 
Bohl (1981) and Bohl and Van Meershoek (1989) in their local study of Amsterdam in the first 
tempestuous period after the liberation. The study is tellingly subtitled ’A struggle of power and 
morality’.
(Bosmans 1982: 272) and the ’breakthrough’-movement, still possessing the Christian- 
Humanist ideology of Personalist-Socialism, became an almost exclusively Social 
Democratic affair.
The three main achievements of the ’breakthrough’, then, involved the foundation 
of a modem Social Democratic party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) with a Personalist- 
Socialist and social-Christian character17*, the modernization of the Catholic party, 
according it a reformist disposition, and the construction of a government coalition 
between the two which established a more open-minded and effective variant of social 
capitalism in the Netherlands. This systematized the basis on which a passive social 
democratic welfare state was erected and which lies at the heart of the Dutch enigma. 
The course events took, moreover, shows that Dutch Social Democracy has been 
thoroughly influenced by religion, too, adding to the already considerable zealous 
religious nature of Dutch politics. The main ideologue of the PvdA and of Personalist 
Socialism, for instance, was the latitudinarian Protestant, W. Banning, who 
"transformed the Socialist movement into an ethic-religious elite community, 
characterized by elements of moral re-armament" (Rogier 1980: 103, my translation).
The partial restoration of the Dutch political system came clearly to the fore in the 
first elections in 1946. The main pre-war parties returned to the stage at more or less 
the same strength as before the war. The Catholic People’s Party gained 30.8 percent, 
The Anti-Revolutionary Party 12.9 percent, the Christian-Historical Union 7.8 percent, 
whereas the ’breakthrough’ torchbearer PvdA only managed to attract a disappointing 
28.3 percent of the vote. The renewal of the Dutch system appeared to be slimmed 
down to an ideological innovation of Social Democracy, without having it hardly any 
effect on electoral behaviour. In fact, the PvdA came out of the first elections a little 
weaker than its pre-war Socialist ancestor. This was probably also due to the prestige 
that the Communists had attained in the resistance movement, who won a one-time
10.6 percent of the vote in 1946. The elections between 1946 and 1963 time and again 
revealed the dominance of Confessionalism in Dutch politics. The three major
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17) Within the PvdA 'Catholic workshops’ were founded by Catholics still faithful to the 
'breakthrough’-ideal.
Confessional parties managed to attract roughly 49-53 percent of the total vote in this 
period18’.
Until the mid-sixties voting behaviour in the Netherlands was strikingly stable. 
Party-choice depended on religion or -if not religious- on class (Table 1).
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Table 1. Voting, Religion, Social Class, 1956
Christian
Democracy
Social
Democracy
Liberals Other
Roman
Catholics 95 2 0 3
Reformed
(Hervormd) 63 23 5 9
Reformed II 
(Gereformeerd) 93 1 0 5
Secular 
Working Class 17 68 5 10
Secular 
Middle Class 19 44 32 6
a) = KVP+ARP+CHU
(Source: Andeweg 1989: 86)
Voting behaviour was therefore utterly predictable. It was "an almost faultless product 
of the matrix of pillarization" (Andeweg 1989: 84) and in 1956 one could account for 
72 percent of the party preference of voters by applying this ’matrix’.
Until the late 1960s the most important determinants of voting behaviour were 
church affiliation, church attendance, and social class, whereas -at least for 1956- 
education, geographical variables, age and sex, were unimportant, that is when the 
central variables were controlled for (Lijphart 1974: 257). The determinants of voting 
in the Netherlands in the 1950s could be summarized as in figure 1.
18) See Daalder and Irwin 1989: 159; for a short description of the parties in post-war elections, 
see Irwin 1989: 154-158.
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Figure 1.
Religious Practice Religion Party Preference
Roman Catholic KVP
Practicing Dutch Reformed CHU
Orthodox Reformed ARP
Nonpracticing
Secular
Lower Class PvdA
Secular
Middle Class W D
Source: Lijphart 1974: 257
In terms of class the three major Christian parties were the least distinctive in 1956 
(see Table 2). Unfortunately, the definition of 'class’ used in the 1956 survey was not 
particularly precise and simply scaled from highest (A) to lowest (B) socioeconomic 
status as assessed by the interviewer. Still, it is safe to conclude that the secular parties 
were class-distinct parties whereas the Confessional parties were not.
Table 2. Class and Party Preference, 1956 (%)
KVP ARP CHU PVDA W D OTHER
A 39 7 6 24 18 6
B 30 14 15 22 15 4
C 31 13 10 35 4 6
D 27 14 6 41 1 10
Total 30 14 10 32 7 7
(Source: Lijphut 1974: 243)
Data on working class vote in 1972 and 1977 (Table 3) clearly suggest that the Social 
Democrats are dispoportionally supported by the working class, the Liberals lack 
substantial support of this class, and the Christian Democrats are the least distinct in 
this sense.
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Tabic 3. Working Class Support for Parties, 1971 and 1977 
(Percentage Point Difference between Party Support and Entire Electorate)
1971 1977
Social Democracy +22 + 17
Christian Democracy -3 -2
Liberals -34 -32
(Source: Van der Eijk and Van Praag 1990: 161)
Given these data on class and class-distinctiveness one might easily agree with Lijphart 
(1974: 263), that while the existence of two major Protestant parties in the Netherlands 
is a truly exceptional phenomenon, "the two Dutch Protestant parties may be 
considered to form a kind of Christian Democratic grouping of parties together with 
the KVP". However, in the first decade after the Second World War there existed 
considerable disagreement between the Protestant parties on the one hand and the 
Catholic party on the other concerning the relationship between state, market and 
family. It was the ARP that refused to accept increasing state intervention. In fact, 
1948 electoral pamphlets of the ARP rejected both the ’state-Socialism’ of the Socialists 
and the idea of subsidiarity of Catholicism and opted for something very near the neo- 
Liberalism of the German CDU in economic policy. The central ideological concept 
of the ’sovereignty in one’s own circle’, that is the ’freedom and autonomy of 
communities’ contained a much more restricted view than the Catholic theory of 
subsidiarity. Whereas Catholics could formulate intervention in a positive sense as the 
duty of the state to assist lower societal organs to assist themselves, the Orthodox- 
Protestants could only do so (from the state’s point of view) negatively as the state’s 
duty of non-interference with the ’life circles’1*.
19) See extensively on the Christian Democratic view on the role of state intervention in the 
Netherlands: Van Wissen (1982); on the 'Reformed* critique of society: Woldring and Kuiper (1980).
The ’Roman-Red’ Coalitions, 1946-1958: the Preconditions o f Consensus
The precondition for the establishment of the progressive variant of social capitalism 
consisted of a coalition between Catholic and Social Democratic reformist forces and 
the exclusion of anti-interventionist orthodox Protestantism and free market Liberalism. 
On my interpretation it was the fundamental agreement between political Catholicism 
and Social Democracy over the need for social policy as a means to ’ease’ the pain of 
reconstruction, which functioned as the cement of the ’Roman-Red’ coalitions in the 
first decade after the war.
The likelihood of such a construction was greatly increased by a number of 
historical events and intra-political developments. First of all, the resistance of the 
Catholic hierarchy against Catholic-Socialist cooperation, dating from the early 1920s, 
was tempered as a result of the evolution of Dutch Socialism into a Christian-Humanist 
version of Personalist Social Democracy. Until 1939, when Socialists were admitted 
to an emergency Cabinet20*, Catholic politics was characterized by the doctrine of 
’utter necessity’. Collaboration with Socialists was excluded except in the case of ’utter 
necessity’20. This necessity had presented itself with the experience of Fascism and 
war and was again present as a result of the disruption of the war and occupation. 
Secondly, during the economic crisis in the 1930s Catholic and Socialist socio­
economic policy-proposals rapidly converged. The cataclysmic laissez faire policy 
under the ruling Anti-Revolutionary prime-minister Colijn had met increasing resistance 
from its partner in government, the Catholic party29. One of the main conflicts over 
social and economic period in this period concerned the Catholic demand to expand the
304
20) Socialists bad already participated in local administration.
21) Daudt (1980) argues that Catholics in fact never gave up this theory of ’utter necessity* and were 
ready to smash the coalition with the PvdA when a 'normal’ period arrived in the end of the 1950s. 
Visser’s (1986) study contests this view.
22) The economic historian Klein (1980: 5) remarks: "The very poor performance of the Dutch 
economy during the thirties was partly the result of wrong economic policy. The monetary policy 
especially was at fault, as the government stubbornly refused to abandon the gold standard. It did so 
against all economic reason and just for the sake of prestige (...). The government (...) just insisted on 
economizing in the confident belief that a further adaptation and adjustment to the severity of times was 
the best way out. Some day better times would arrive. It was a passive and uninspiring course to take. 
Its traumatic experience left a deep and lasting impression, that to a large extent conditioned the firm 
determination after the war to tackle things differently".
budget for employment policy. While the Catholic party tended to embrace pseudo- 
Keynesian ideas on demand management as unemployment policy23*, its ’natural’ 
coalition partner refused to consider any augmentation of state intervention. Finally, 
by the late 1940s the political projects of Catholicism and Social Democracy had 
considerably converged on two major areas: global Keynesian demand management and 
family policy, sealed by a broadly shared anti-communism. Both the KVP and the 
PvdA, moreover, saw the family as the ’cornerstone’ of society and attempted to shape 
the whole complex of incomes policies (taxation, social security, wages, prices) as far 
as possible according to this notion (Ter Heide 1986).
An Explanation o f the Enigmatic Dutch Welfare State24)
As mentioned in the preceding chapters and illustrated in chapter 7, the Dutch welfare 
state has posed a puzzle for comparative political sociology, the main mystery 
pertaining to the simultaneity of the dominance of Confessional politics and generous 
social policy. As may be clear, my main argument for the solution of this enigma 
consists of the appreciation that 1) social capitalism does not a priori exclude extensive 
social policy (a general argument in favour of the thesis on the ’Christian 
democratization’ of capitalism); 2) the unique circumstance of a coalition between an 
almost religiously inclined reformist Social Democracy25* and a Catholic social and 
political movement unconstrained by Protestant anti-interventionism and -in principle- 
no less reformist. This concurrence of factors is largely responsible for an unparalleled 
consensus on social policy that emerged after the second World War except on one 
crucial point.
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23) However, in a typical manner these policies were passive rather than active and comprised such 
measures as shorter work time, preventing women to enter the labour market, forcing married women 
(Blok 1978) to ’retire’ and constraints on labour saving techniques (De Rooy 1979).
24) This section partly draws on earlier work done in collaboration with Uwe Becker (Becker and 
Van Kersbergen 1986; Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988; Van Kersbergen 1990).
25) The German observer of Dutch society and politics, Ernst Zahn (1989), meaningly heads his 
chapters on Socialism and Social Democracy with titles like "Socialism as the Gospel and the party as 
church" (154), "The reformed legacy in Dutch Socialism; 'Calvinism without a God’" (160), "The Red 
Clergymen" and "The Theologians in welfare" (166)
1. Initial Conflicts
Serious conflicts between Social Democracy and political Catholicism in the 
Netherlands, however, did arise over the issue of the forms of organization of social 
policy (Janssen and Berben 1982; Roebroek et al. 1986). Subsidiarity and the remnants 
of corporatist notions on the Catholic side generated what Roebroek et al. (1986) 
properly have analyzed as the opposite of Bismarckian social policy, namely the 
attempt to obstruct the attachment of workers to the state. The goal of social policy was 
to secure the existence of the subculture, not its transformation. It makes sense, 
therefore, to shortly analyze the conditions under which this issue was eventually 
settled.
The Dutch govemment-in-exile in London had followed the example of Beveridge 
and had appointed a committee for the preparation of a renovation of social policy. The 
Dutch version of the Beveridge-report opted for a universal system of social security, 
largely administered by the state, that would not be confined to wage-eamers. The legal 
ground for this novelty was drafted in the following formula: "The community, 
organized in the state, is responsible for the social security and freedom from want of 
all its residents, on the conditions that the residents will do everything within their 
reach to provide themselves with social security and freedom form want" (Commissie- 
Van Rhijn 1945-46: 10, my translation).
The future social security system was to be a mixture of insurance-based legislation 
and direct state participation. A complete flat-rate benefit system, however, was 
rejected on the grounds that such a system completely denies existing income 
differentials. Benefits were confined by a maximum. In addition, the lowest benefits 
were to be linked to a minimum wage. The reforms as proposed by the Van Rhijn- 
committee, therefore, represented an attempt to preserve the eamings-related benefits 
and to introduce universalism in the sense of an extension of coverage and risks.
Employers’ organizations as well as the unions -represented in the ’Foundation of 
Labour’ (Stichting van de Arbeid, StvdA)- contested the proposed increasing control 
of the state over social security. The Catholic and Christian unions demanded a far- 
reaching decentralization of administration in line with the leading theories of 
subsidiarity and sovereignty. The employers' organizations feared the projected state
intervention for obvious reasons (see Hulsman 1981; Janssen and Berben 1982). The 
question was eventually settled in 1952 through a compromise that consisted of 1) the 
administration of the major insurance schemes by industrial associations 
fbedrijfsverenigingen’); 2) the control of the universal ’people’s insurance schemes’ 
by public institutions and private funds; and 3) the execution of social assistance by 
local government26’.
Meanwhile, several other plans competed for a top place on the political agenda in 
the immediate postwar period and some revisions of the social system had already 
taken place during the period of occupation. First of all, the Nazi’s had initiated -partly 
for reasons of propaganda and partly to synchronize social policy between occupied 
territory and Germany- several measures that were improvements compared with the 
existing Dutch situation (Asselberghs 1982, Mannoury and Asscher-Vonk 1987; 
Veldkamp 1978). Some of the changes were accepted in the postwar legislation, as for 
example the sickness insurance and modifications of the accident insurance (Mannoury 
and Asscher-Vonk 1987: 58). As a reaction to these activities of the Nazi’s the Dutch 
government in exile had already started to broadcast its promises for social policy after 
liberation in what might be called an ideological warfare (Mannoury 1985; Mannourry 
and Asscher-Vonk 1987; Van den Tempel 1946).
Civil servants, moreover, had kept the state bureaucracy running during the war 
and some of them cooperated willingly with the Nazis, particularly with regard to 
social policy. There was considerable resentment among the civil servants as to the 
policies pursued during the crisis of the 1930s, a resentment that contributed to 
autocratic views on the role of politics in social policy. The German proposals, 
therefore, hardly met opposition. The resistance movement, on the other hand, had 
already initiated negotiations over the postwar structure of labour relations in the 
Netherlands. Unions and Employers’ organizations agreed to opt for a bipartite 
institution (the Foundation of Labour) that was to play an important role in the 
formulation and effectuation of socioeconomic policy (see Windmuller 1969). Conflicts 
between Social Democratic central planning conceptions and Catholic corporatist 
proposals after the war culminated in the foundation of the Social Economic Council
307
26) See for description of the Dutch social system: Braakman et al. 1984; Mannoury and Asscher- 
Vonk 1987; Veldkamp 1978.
(Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER), which is both a tripartite bargaining institution and 
a advisory body of the government on socioeconomic policies. Remaining hopes of 
Socialist planning in the form of the Central Planning Bureau (Centraal Planbureau, 
CPB) were thwarted when Catholics got hold of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(Wolinetz 1989: 82) as a result of which the planning agency was to be "’exclusively 
a technical aid’ for government policy and business life", while "great efforts were 
made to neutralize and depoliticize planning as a concept" (Griffiths 1980: 137). The 
eventual bargain between labour and capital and between Social Democracy and the 
Catholic movement consisted of full employment and the expansion of social policy in 
exchange for labour quiescence and wage restraint.
3. The Conditions of Consensus
Two main social policy innovations characterize the first period after the war. The first 
is the introduction of the Unemployment Act of 1949 and the second the introduction 
of the first so-called ’people’s insurance’ for Old Age in 1957, which was preceded by 
an emergency act in 1947. Both, in a sense, illustrate the peculiar mixture of social 
capitalist and Social Democratic reformism. The Unemployment Act for all wage- 
eamers combined a relatively generous replacement rate of 80 percent with a typical 
element of differentiation. The 80 percent replacement rate holds exclusively for what 
in Dutch sociopolitical parlance is called the ’breadwinner’ (kostwinner), that is a 
dependent worker earning a family wage. Other categories were entitled to 70 percent 
(other persons older than 18 year who were not the ’breadwinner’) or 60 percent 
(others). Social Democrats opposed this differentiation, apparently not because it would 
disproportionally disadvantage women, but because it was not in concordance with the 
idea of an insurance. The government argued that cancelling the distinction between 
replacement rates would necessitate the general curtailment of generosity. This met the 
resistance of the Catholic party, because 80 percent was considered an indispensable 
rate for replacing a family wage27*. The KVP, therefore, supported the plans for 
differentiation as a means to secure family income.
308
27) In 1964 the differentiation was removed from the Unemployment Act.
The General Old Age Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet, AOW) was the first law that 
transcended the idea of social insurance for wage-eamers. This universal ’people’s 
insurance’ of 1957 came very close to the original proposals of the Van Rhijn- 
committee. It introduced a flat-rate minimum pension for all residents. The scheme, 
however, is not funded via taxation, but financed by all residents between 15 and 65 
who contribute a certain percentage of their income up to a maximum. The benefits 
were linked to the general wage-index. The most intriguing aspect of the AOW 
concerns the fact that married women had no independent right to a benefit at the age 
of 65. Their entitlement was made contingent upon the retirement of their husband, to 
which it was actually paid, thus clearly reflecting the traditional family conceptions of 
both the Catholic and the Social Democratic policy-makers. This explains the following 
severe judgement of the politics of the Dutch welfare state by Therbom (1989: 216): 
"Dutch Confessionalism has always been patriarchically sexist, a legacy which has 
spread to Dutch Social Democracy as well. The compromise on old age pensions had 
a remarkable sexist slant to it. All old persons got a right to a pension, except married 
women. Married couples did get more than singles, but this all went to the husband, 
in contrast to Sweden where it was always self-evident that half of the pension of a 
married couple should be paid to the wife. The Dutch bill was actually written and 
presented by a Labour party Social Minister. Only in 1985, under intense European 
Community pressure, was the sexist pension clause done away with"2i).
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28) The counter argument against the influence of Confessionalism in the Netherlands, once made 
to me during a seminar presentation, that Social Democracy was the real motor behind social legislation 
in the Netherlands, cannot convince. Although the Ministry of Social Affairs was headed by a Social 
Democrat, no social policy legislation would have been possible without support of at least the Catholic 
movement. Arguing, furthermore, that Dutch Ministries are relatively autonomous and policies therefore 
can be formulated without the consent of other members of the Cabinet is absurd. Such an account would 
have great difficulties in explaining why Dutch government coalitions take so long to be formed, why 
so much time is spent on the formulation of a coalition contract (which is binding for the Ministers) and 
how government crises would be possible at all. Until 1971, the average duration of Cabinet formation 
was 63 days. The formation of the coalition between Confessional forces and Social Democracy in 
1972/73 (with its self-proclaimed aim of structural reform and redistribution objectives) not only took 
five and a half months, but was eventually broken by the withdrawal of Confessional support. The 
(failed) attempt to construe a renewed Christian Democratic-Social Democratic coalition and the resulting 
coalition between the Liberal party and Christian Democracy in 1977 even took an unprecedented seven 
months (Van den Berg 1989: 220).
Although there existed some political conflicts over precise formulations of social 
legislation and around the issues of the organizational forms of social policy, 
fundamental commitment to welfare statism did not generate insurmountable political 
controversy between the dominant forces of Catholicism and Social Democracy. The 
relative consensus over the need of increasing social welfare effort in the first decade 
or so after the war is remarkable. What conditions were conducive in this process of 
sociopolitical consensus-building?
First of all, the experience of crisis, war and Fascist oppression contributed to a - 
perhaps temporary- radicalization of societal forces, which, in tum, facilitated reforms. 
However, this radicalization -illustrated by the initial success of the Communist 
movement that had gained considerable prestige as a resistance movement during the 
war- must not be exaggerated. As argued above, the renewal of Dutch politics was only 
a partial success. If radicalization did not have an immediate effect on the reformist 
inclination, it fueled at least anti-Communism in the Dutch context, particularly of the 
Catholic labour movement, consequently consolidating the construction of a ’Roman- 
Red’ coalition29*.
Anti-Communism, strongly present within the Social Democratic movement as 
well, probably accelerated social policy as a means to cut the grass from under the feet 
of societal discontent fostered by the Communist labour movement and party. It is 
difficult to assess the effect of anti-Communism on social policy, but is was not 
uncommon that demands for social policy reforms were accompanied by anti­
communist ’instruction’. An example is the polemical pamphlet that was distributed 
in 1948 at the entrance of Catholic churches by activists of the Catholic labour 
movement: "Communism in our nations does not stand any chance (...), that is when 
the necessary moral, economic and social conditions are established (...)• The 
Communist support is partly an effect of the inexcusable social and economic evils of 
the past. To help confront these evils by a conscious, radical, progressive reform 
policy founded on the great encyclical letters of the Popes is the task of every Catholic
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29) The historian Righait (1985: 89-90) has shown that the Catholic labour movement had even 
developed a secret plan to combat Communism, the idea being that "every Communist strike has to be 
broken at all costs* (as cited in Righart 1985: 89). In fact, the Catholic Labour Movement (Katholieke 
Arbeidersbeweging, KAB) demanded that Communism be prohibited.
worker, of which one can only acquit oneself within the Catholic Labour Movement" 
(De Volkskrant30*, March 3, 1948).
Anti-Communism functioned as a convenient catalyst in the reconstruction of 
Catholic unity and the solidity of the Catholic cross-class pillar. In itself, ideological 
warfare at the level of mass politics has been an important element of the politics of 
’pillarization’, where the reinforcement of ideological difference of the ’pillars’ 
corresponded to an accommodation at the top. This phenomenon has been analyzed in 
terms of deference and accommodation (Lijphart 1975) or deference and indifference 
(Daalder 1966). What is crucial is oligarchical control in combination with mass 
obedience. The churches have been an active force in this process. The hierarchical 
structure of the Catholic church assured the spread of the organical social doctrine 
throughout the Catholic segment of society. The clerical leadership frequently published 
pastoral letters, explaining the rights and duties of labour and capital and the need of 
organization within the Catholic subculture. Such an ideological offensive did not only 
concern the Catholic workers but -and Dutch Catholicism did not deviate much from 
official Vatican teaching here- equally addressed the Catholic petty bourgeoisie and the 
employers. The demand upon the latter, for instance, concerned the duty of social 
justice and Christian solidarity. Thus, the bishop of Haarlem, addressing a meeting of 
Catholic employers in 1948, argued: "Contemporary politics is determined by a desire 
for justice and the effort cannot cease before this is accomplished, either violently or 
peacefully. If it happens peacefully, then everything can be resolved in a good and 
fortunate manner. To this end the employers have to cooperate. It is their duty to give, 
to abstain. This is indispensable, just and it must be done. Without it society will not 
settle down (..). If one analyzes how in the past century the relationship between 
capital and labour has evolved, then it is unmistakable that much has changed. It is 
fortunate that some men already have introduced considerable reforms in their own 
firms, which would have been inconceivable some fourty years ago. The Christian 
principles are very much alive and stimulate a vitality which nowhere else can be found 
(...). The time has come to take action and the employers are aware of it. Actions 
speak louder than words; other social strata are looking forward to what the employers
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30) 'De Volkskrant’ was the daily newspaper of the Catholic pillar.
will assume. The example of the employers will result in the strongest Catholic action 
that one can imagine. If you, like Christ, will make a sacrifice, the results cannot be 
but magnificent (...). I hope that the Catholic employers will be faithful to the Catholic 
morality" (De Volkskrant 3 february, 1948).
The Catholic People’s Party employed social capitalist conceptions, emphasizing 
the emancipation of Catholic workers in particular. The reformist zeal of Catholic 
politics in the early period after the war was such, that the Catholic right wing feared 
the evolution of the party and the movement into a quasi-Socialist crusade. Catholic 
leaders had to defend their conduct, arguing that "those who think that by now we have 
reached the limits of desired reforms (...) fail to recognize or fail to appreciate the 
ideal of a Christian society; the ideal of a socioeconomic élan vital, which is 
determined by ethical standards that derive from Natural Law and Natural Ethics (...). 
Social justice and social love demand the creation of a social and judicial order which 
will reshape the entire socioeconomic community. This compels us to apply quite 
different standards than merely the making of profit. One should not fumble at the 
seamy side of life, while a radical reform is called for" (Volkskrant 28 June, 1948). 
The influence of social capitalist conceptions was not merely confined to the Catholic 
’pillar’, but reached -for instance via the Catholic Workshops- to the Social Democratic 
party as well. I would argue that only against this background one can understand why 
in 1951 Social Democrats praised the encyclical letters ’Rerum Novarum’ and 
’Quadragesimo Anno’ at a meeting organized by the Catholic Labour movement to 
commemorate these social documents of Roman Catholicism.
The Context o f Industrialization
Social policy in the first decade after the war must be placed in the context of the 
comprehensive attempt to stimulate industrial development in a predominantly rural and 
trading society (Bôhl 1981; Fortuyn 1980; 1983; Ter Heide 1986; Wolff and Driehuis
1980) and to reconstruct Dutch labour relation in democratic corporatist fashion 
(Windmuller 1969). The latter part, too, largely consisted of a Catholic-Social 
Democratic compromise of corporatist reorganization and the introduction of global 
planning. Socioeconomic policy of the ’Roman-Red* coalitions (until 1958) was
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dominated by one predominant goal: export-led recovery (Wolff and Driehuis 1980: 
37). The conditions for the export orientation of the Dutch economy were found in 
economic integration, tax relief for entrepreneurs, a restrictive wage policy, the 
improvement of the infrastructure and an extensive regulatory socioeconomic 
framework (Van Eijk 1980; Ter Heide 1986).
By 1950 the tripartite institution of the Social Economic Council (Sociaal- 
Economische Raad, SER) formulated the five goals of economic policy that were to 
guide state intervention until the mid-1960s: full employment, economic growth, a 
reasonable income distribution, an equilibrium on the balance of payments, and price 
stability. Between the Catholic and Social Democratic forces agreement was reached 
on global steering of the economy. Catholicism had moderated considerably its 
corporatist heritage and Social Democracy temperated its plan-socialism.
The export-oriented socioeconomic policy of industrialization originated in a 
"Dutch conception of underdevelopment" (Therbom 1989: 209) activated by the 
demographic pressure of a fast growing population and the international pressure to 
decolonize Holland’s largest overseas colony, Indonesia. The (expected) economic loss 
of the Dutch Indies was feared to deprive Dutch capital of an important investment 
possibility. Released funds had to be reallocated and export-led industrialization would 
provide an outlet by the opening up of new markets. At the same time, labour 
quiescence and wage restraint were seen as preconditions for profitable investment and 
a successful industrialization strategy.
A tight income policy until the early 1960s kept wages low and improved the 
international competitiveness of the Dutch economy. Wage increases could only be 
justified by gains in productivity or by the need to adjust for unwanted differentials. 
Since labour was cheap employment increased steadily, particularly in the industrial 
and service sector. Both the Christian and the Socialist unions accepted the restriction 
on wage development, mainly because of its favourable effect on employment, but also 
in exchange for the extension of social security. Under these circumstances generous 
replacement rates could be demanded to be included into the social security legislation, 
since they were to replace quite moderate wages anyway. In addition, full employment 
kept the cost of social security low. Yet, given the generous structure of benefits, 
social spending would rise rapidly under less favourable conditions, a major
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explanation for the high levels of spending the Dutch welfare state would reach in the 
late 1960s.
The goal of full employment can be properly defined as a secondary target, the 
theory being that an export-led growth founded on wage restriction in combination with 
global measures would automatically lead to an optimal allocation of labour power. 
There has been virtually no discussion on labour market policy and no instruments 
were developed in this direction. The effect was a policy-mix that can be properly 
identified as ’export-oriented Keynesianism’ (Zimmerman 1984), where no 
unconditional commitment to full employment (Therbom 1986) existed at the political 
and institutional level. This, in turn, boosted social spending even more in the 1970s, 
when stagflation caused unemployment to rise to pre-war crisis levels. The absence of 
active labour market policies constrained the Dutch welfare state to respond with 
massive transfers and passive measures such as early retirement30.
Does the predominance of ’export-oriented Keynesianism’ also indicate a defeat of 
Social Democratic reformism in the Dutch context? This partly seems to be the case, 
since between 1945 and the early 1950s the Dutch Social Democrats had to alter their 
conception of active Keynesianism substantially under Confessional pressure. Within 
the constellation of forces too much emphasis on ’plan-Socialist’ policies ran the risk 
of directly confronting the -perhaps still precarious- consensus between Social 
Democracy and Catholic politics. It has to be remembered that it was the first time in 
the Social Democratic history that the movement enjoyed real governmental power and 
that within the Dutch political system of co-existing minorities the Catholic party had 
always the opportunity to change coalition partners and shift the balance of power 
considerably to the right. Possibly this constraint on Social Democratic reformism has 
led to a more passive orientation on global demand management and social policy, also 
within the PvdA. On the other hand, unconstrained Social Democratic reformism in the 
Netherlands probably would never have fostered a Scandinavian version of welfare 
capitalism. The main reason for this was discussed above. The predominance of 
Personalist Socialism had converted the PvdA into a movement which was qualitatively
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31) See for an excellent account of the absence of political and institutional framework of labour 
market policy as the root cause of mass unemployment in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, Braun 
(1988).
very different from Swedish Social Democracy. As a result, the PvdA had little 
difficulty in consolidating its power in the field of incomes policy and social security. 
Moreover, the apparent achievements of global steering and incomes policy (full 
employment), and the achievements in social policy could be assumed as a Social 
Democratic success.
A clear defeat of Dutch Social Democracy and corresponding victory of social 
capitalism, however, concerned the methodical dismantling of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, a department that was in the hands of the Social Democrats. As already noted 
the KVP and the PvdA fundamentally agreed on the institution of the family as the 
’cornerstone’ of society. Socioeconomic policy, and industrial policy in particular, 
corresponded to an attempt to prepare the population for industrial society without 
undermining the traditional family (see Bohl 1981: 239-273). The Catholics, however, 
were particularly active on issues concerning family policy. In the ’pillarized’ 
organization of social work the Catholic organizations had been traditionally strong. 
The public intervention in this area, however, resorted under the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. The period between roughly 1946 and 1952 showed the successful attempt of 
Catholic politics to dissociate social work from this Ministry and to relocate it to a new 
department of social work in 1952. This department has become the embodiment of 
subsidiarity in the Netherlands in the sense that it decentralized as far as possible the 
execution of policy to religious institutions and the ’private initiative’32’. The 
predominance of a traditional ideology on the role of the family as a fundamental 
constituent of society has -in combination with the already noted family-bias in social 
security measures (the principle of the ’breadwinner’ and the refusal to grant married 
women individual pension rights)* has come to symbolize Dutch social capitalism. It 
has reinforced the existing traditional patriarchical structure of Dutch society as 
exemplified by the strikingly low participation of women on the labour market.
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32) See on the concept of 'private initiative* Brenton (1982).
Some Considerations on the Conditions o f Expansion
Under conditions of increasing pressure from economic Liberalism -both from the 
Liberal party and the right wing of the Confessional bloc- to withdraw from 
intervention in wage determination, social policy remained virtually the only theme of 
fundamental consensus between the Social Democrats and the Catholics (Van Lier 
1981; Ter Heide 1986). Social policy had increasingly become an integral part of 
Keynesian demand management and had clearly proven its feasibility. The favourable 
economic conditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the near full employment, 
however, placed the strict wage policy of the ’Roman-Red’ coalitions under pressure. 
Given the tight labour market, employers had already started to pay higher wages than 
were strictly permitted. One of the reasons for the fall of the historical coalition 
between Catholicism and Social Democracy was that the latter stubbornly refused to 
give up wage policy as the last bastion of interventionism, while the former had started 
giving in on the demands of the employers and their representatives within the party 
to ease the control. The system broke down in 1964, under one of the Confessional- 
Liberal coalitions that ruled the Netherlands from 1958-1972.
Intervention in the wage determination, however, had become routine, which 
explains why immediately after its termination -under political insistence of the 
Catholic Minister of Social Affairs, G. M. J. Veldkamp- a minimum wage was agreed 
upon by unions and employers. When in 1965 agreement could not be reached during 
the central wage bargaining, the Catholic Minister intervened and one-sidedly 
determined the level. This set the stage for the introduction of the statutory minimum 
wage by law in 1968.
The loosening of the wage restriction in the late 1950s and its eventual abolishment 
contributed to an economic boom in the 1960s which, in turn, resulted in a large scale 
reconstruction of the economy. Sudden, shock-wise wage increases caused a 
rationalization of the labour intensive industries. Employers started to invest in labour 
saving techniques and massive lay-offs followed. The generous accident insurance, 
introduced in 1966 as a hallmark of Catholic social policy, provided the employers with 
a convenient opportunity to ease the pain of rationalization for their workers. Rather 
than becoming unemployed, many older and less ’functional’ workers would claim a
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right to a disability benefit, which would secure them 80 percent of their earnings for 
a longer period than the unemployment scheme would. Releasing personnel via the 
disability scheme created a considerable pool of hidden unemployment which was 
accepted by workers and unions in exchange for the generosity of the scheme. This 
dramatically illustrates the passiveness of a transfer-oriented welfare system, which 
basically lacked any institutionalized setup of active labour market policy. Spending on 
disability benefits increased steadily from a mere 5.5 percent of total social security 
spending in 1960 to 15.5 percent in 1980. In the same period old age pension spending 
declined from 40.2 percent in 1960 to 31.0 percent in 1980, while unemployment 
benefits amounted to 6.6 percent in 1980 (Braakman et al 1984: 159).
The Netherlands could afford generosity to its workers partly as a result of 
favourable economic conditions, but also because the nation reached a semi-OPEC 
status in the 1960s as a result of the discovery and profitable exploitation of natural gas 
resources in the northern province of Groningen (Lubbers and Lemckert 1980).
The expansion of the welfare state mainly took place under Christian Democratic- 
Liberal hegemony in the 1960s, which makes the Dutch case perhaps even more 
enigmatic. The puzzle not only concerns the simultaneity of generous social spending 
and Confessional dominance, but above all the fact that expansion took place, while 
Social Democracy was in opposition. Major improvements concerned the substitution 
of the Poor Law of 1854 in 1964, additional schemes for unemployment (in 1964), and 
the introduction of the already mentioned accident insurance in 1966. The replacement 
of the archaic Poor Law, the General Assistance Act, (Algemene Bijstandswet, ABW) 
grew out to be the general safety-net for citizens who are not entitled (anymore) to any 
of the other social security provisions. In addition, a compulsory minimum wage was 
introduced in 1968, to which the lowest benefits (most importantly, the public pension) 
of all other schemes were linked. The minimum wage amounted to about 80 percent 
of the average wage. The net-net-linkage of benefits to the minimum wage guaranteed 
that no person would fall under the bottom of what was considered to be a socially 
acceptable minimum. Ultimately, it accorded to the Dutch welfare state its generous 
outfit at all levels.
Next to the factors already noted, two other conditions appear to have been critical 
for expansion, one of which is political and one economic, but in effect cannot be
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viewed separately. These conditions concern the unparalleled economic growth and 
prosperity of the Dutch economy in the 1960s and the initially gradual, but in the end 
quite sudden structural changes of society in the form of ’de-pillarization’, de- 
Confessionalization, eventually culminating in a progressive political and cultural 
’conjuncture' (Braun/Van Kersbergen 1986). Confessional politics did not escape the 
effects of ’de-pillarization’ and de-Confessionalizadon, mainly exemplified by the 
radicalization of Anti-Revolutionary politics and the gradual ’Social Democratization’ 
of the Catholic labour movement. The Catholic party was forced to adopt more radical 
social policy demands in order not to loose its labour wing (or their votes) altogether, 
which in the early 1970s facilitated the return of Social Democratic and Catholic 
cooperation.
In 1973, a coalition between Social Democracy and Confessional forces was 
constructed, which had the parliamentary support of the PvdA and smaller radical 
parties, but which was merely tolerated by the KVP and the ARP. The CHU opposed 
the construction (Vis 1973). In spite of the fragile parliamentary base the government 
expanded the social system considerably. Main events were the increase in the level of 
the minimum wage (and therefore of the benefits linked to it), and the introduction of 
a statutory minimum wage for young people.
The question is whether this allows for the conclusion that Social Democracy had 
a lasting influence on the Dutch welfare state after all? I do not think so, for the logic 
of the parliamentary formation made social policy innovation contingent upon 
majorities that had to include (parts of) the Confessional bloc. Moreover, the Minister 
responsible for social policy was the Anti-Revolutionary, former Christian Union 
leader, Boersma. Major expansionary policies were already initiated during the period 
of Confessional-Liberal hegemony and Social Democracy simply followed the agenda 
set by the Confessionals. Finally, real radical changes proposed by the Cabinet 
dominated by Social Democracy (income redistribution, housing policy, profit sharing) 
time and again were blocked by Confessional-cum-Liberal voting alliances in the 
Parliament and finally sealed the downfall of the government in 1977.
The short period of renewed Confessional-Social Democratic cooperation was 
crucial for the construction of a cross-Confessional Christian Democracy and the 
mobilization of power for the movement. Both the Christian movements and the
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Catholic movement showed increasing signs of decomposition as a result of the 
fragmentation of infrastructural power. Secularization and de-pillarization tended to 
work in one direction: the disintegration of the traditional structure of political power 
in the Netherlands. The Catholic search for a realliance of Christian forces was not 
only increased by the dwindling control over the organizations of (Catholic) workers 
and the waning capacity to attract voters, but also by the lesser need for ’emancipation’ 
of the subculture and by the changes within Catholicism at large after the Second 
Vatican Council.
Growing tensions between the Catholic party and the Social Democratic party and 
successful experiments with cross-confessional cooperation at the local level (Kuiper 
1988) prepared the way for the first joint electoral list in 1977. The Social Democrats 
won 10 seats in the parliament and the new Christian Democratic alliance managed to 
stabilize its electoral strength and gained even one seat. A combination of Social 
Democratic strategic errors and Christian Democratic power play led to an exclusion 
of the PvdA from the government. The Christian Democrats entered a coalition with 
the populist Liberals and used the period until the 1980s to consolidate the reformation 
of Christian inspired politics. These events reveal a considerable capacity to adapt on 
the side of the Catholic party in particular. However, the loss of the labour wing and 
the inclusion of Christian conservative forces has effected a Christian Democracy in 
the Netherlands that is more conservative than the Catholic movement in the 1950s and 
1960s, especially with respect to social policy. The structuring of societal conflicts 
within the movement has become much more based on the demands of the new middle 
class and the employers than on the attempt to integrate workers. Crucial, however, 
was that a reorganization of Confessional politics at the governmental level not only 
strongly enhanced the competitive position of Christian Democracy vis-à-vis Social 
Democracy, but also resulted in a continued capacity to stay in power. The CDA has 
taken up the centre of the political system and -as long as a Social Democratic-Liberal 
coalition is excluded- the logic of parliamentary majorities determines further 
possibilities of Christian Democratic power mobilization.
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Concluding Remarks
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The main foundation for the idiosyncratic mixture of universalism, generosity and 
differentiation that characterizes the Dutch welfare state and which has given rise to 
Dutch ’exceptionalism’ is found in the concurrence of Social Democratic reformism 
and Catholic social capitalism in the first decade after the Second World War. The 
construction was made viable through the barring of anti-interventionist orthodox 
Protestantism and free market Liberalism in the ’Roman-Red’ coalitions that dominated 
Dutch politics until the late 1950s. The renewal of Dutch Social Democracy as one of 
the main achievements of the ’breakthrough’-movement and the presence of a 
religiously inclined ’Personalist’-Socialist doctrine facilitated a broadly shared pact on 
social policy.
The period of Liberal-Confessional dominance radically changed economic policy, 
but -under the leadership of Catholicism- not only kept the edifice of social policy in 
tact, but considerably expanded its scope and performance in the 1960s. Once in place, 
the system gained momentum and developed its own logic of expansion. In his 
convincing analysis of the Dutch welfare state in comparison with the Swedish 
experience, Therbom (1989) has argued that Confessionalism in social policy has an 
inherent expansionary potential under favourable conditions. Corporatism in 
combination with a pillarized structuring of labour relations expedited expansion in that 
it tended to generate a need for all organizations do develop their own designs for 
improvements. As argued above, the fundamental agreement over the family as the 
nucleus of social life necessitated the generosity in replacement rates of the income of 
a ’breadwinner’. The prevailing high benefits later -under conditions of 
individualization of society and the analogous decline of family ideology- became the 
norm when differentiation in the schemes was eliminated. Moreover, "the Liberal 
emphasis on economic incentives which, as far as social security is concerned, means 
disincentives to social generosity, is alien to Confessional social thought" (Therbom 
1989: 212-13). The result was that the Catholic-Social Democratic majority effectively 
outweighed the resistance of Liberalism and Anti-Revolutionary autonomy claims. 
Finally, the stress on ’private initiative’, self-government and subsidiarity not only 
opted for a fundamentally transfer character of state intervention, but was "financially
open-ended" (Therbom 1989: 213), so that "once the expansionary potential of 
Confessionalism had got started, it acquired a momentum which Confessional politics 
was singularly inept at reining in" (Therbom 1989: 215). The logic of expansion was 
given momentum because once established, relatively generous replacement rates of the 
major schemes were claimed as institutionalized social rights.
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION

If Christian Democracy can be argued to represent a middle way between capitalism 
and Socialism, between a blunt commitment to the market and a confident trust in the 
possibilities of politics, one must still acknowledge that such a stance is founded upon 
a set of foundational concepts and on a specific sociopolitical practice and performance. 
Christian Democracy is a distinctive political phenomenon that nourishes and nurtures 
a distinctive welfare state regime. The study of Christian Democratic ’vagueness’ in 
terms of political program and ideology leads to the conclusion that distinctiveness 
arises out of the indeterminacy as to the concrete profile of the central political 
concepts of pluralism, accommodation and reconciliation. Christian Democracy appears 
to be more about method than about substance. Nevertheless, the continuous attempt 
to harmonize conflicting interests has given rise to a specific policy mix that mitigates 
the political salience of cleavages but does not aim at a transcendence of their social 
reality.
Christian Democracy’s seemingly open-ended ideology has yielded a formidable 
capacity to adapt. Its central concepts precisely mirror and facilitate this unique 
capacity. Christian Democracy is therefore defined as fundamentally the embodiment 
of societal accommodation. Religion or religious appeal was identified as the 
mechanism for producing cross-cleavage appeal. Integration of a plurality of societal 
interests is not only a basic feature of the movement, it is its reason for existence.
The recognition of class differences and the supposition of class and cleavage 
reconciliation induces the necessity to reproduce the salience of class and other social 
cleavages and deny their political thrust at the same time. Social capitalism can be 
interpreted as the common core and solution of the eternal search for what is in this 
specific sense a ’middle way’. Social capitalism aims at the perpetuation of societal 
differences and transformation of their political effect. Social capitalism is indeed both 
capitalist and social. It allows virtually every class and social status group to organize 
and to exist without allowing conflicts among them to become politically dominant and 
threaten the stability of the construction. Christian Democracy interferes when 
fundamental social units fail to secure their own existence, whether this be the family, 
vocational entities or the market itself.
A corollary of this type of distinctiveness is that the precise configurations of 
social capitalism become historically contingent, although societal accommodation and
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the integration of demands of the working class are always the heart of the package. 
There is no predetermined plan, there is only a predetermined mechanism. That is why 
social capitalist nations vary among themselves and yet, taken as a cluster, can be 
distinguished from other models of affiliating the market, the state and the family. It 
has mainly been the Catholic tradition which has accorded social capitalism its unity 
around the specific theory of state intervention. Subsidiarity’s peculiarity lies not only 
in the prominence it accords to the lower social organs, but also in the emphasis on the 
duty of the state to act as a subsidizer of inadequacy, both of the market and of the 
family. The state steps in to abet and to restore self-responsibility and the capacity of 
lower members of the body politic to help themselves. While social misery was 
originally the effect of the failure on the side of the rich to perform their duties of 
charity, persisting poverty would now be the failure of the duty of the state to provide 
relief. Public authority on the Christian Democratic account has largely taken over the 
failing psychological mechanism of salvation panic.
I have identified two ways of viewing the relationship between Protestantism and 
welfare statism. The first stresses the Protestant revolution of religion as a major step 
towards secularization. In those nations in which the Reformation had a lasting impact 
and in which an intimate state-church relationship gradually developed, the conditions 
for the collectivization and nationalization of welfare services were most favourable. 
Protestant secularization prepared in a sense the way for Social Democratic welfare 
statism. The second interpretation does not accord any direct relationship between 
Protestantism and social capitalism either. On my account, Protestant social movements 
have had little to do with the development of this regime. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, it was the exclusion of the anti-interventionist Protestant politics that was 
crucial for a Catholic-Socialist coalition. In Germany, Protestant Liberalism became 
an integral part of Christian Democracy, which, in turn, facilitated an alliance with the 
secular Liberals. In Italy, Protestantism did not play any role for the obvious reason 
that in this nation the Reformation had little impact on popular religion.
The idea of historical contingency and the theory of structural dependence have 
allowed for the appreciation of three variants of social capitalism and Christian 
Democracy and for divergence in the historical fate of social capitalism and Christian 
Democracy. In Germany Christian Democracy relied more on an accommodation of
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the centre and the moderate Right without having to disengage itself from working 
class support. Nevertheless, founded upon unique historical conditions and constraints, 
the balance of forces within society and within the movement accorded German 
Christian Democracy a more Conservative silhouette. Compared with the Netherlands 
social capitalism in this nation is accordingly less generous and more particularist. 
German political discourse hardly allows for the ’wohlfahrtsstaat’, but nourishes the 
’Sozialstaat’. In the Netherlands the exceptional conditions of an alliance between 
Social Democratic reformism and social Catholic ’correctivism’ under the exclusion of 
anti-interventionist Protestantism yielded an exceptional form of generous, yet passive 
interventionism. Nevertheless, the dominance of traditional structures and ideologies - 
particularly with respect to the role of the family- has made the Dutch opt for sexual 
particularism. The welfare regime in this nation mirrors this facet in that the state 
almost became a pater societas. The Dutch accordingly speak of a ’verzorgingsstaat’, 
that is a ’caring state’ which not only transfers cash benefits, but has a heart for its 
people, too. Italian Christian Democracy has allowed its integrative capacity to pervert 
social capitalism into a form of unparalleled power accumulation. The effect of the 
peculiar conditions in this nation in the early period after the war was parliamentary 
inertness and sociopolitical incrementalism. In Italy, too, pre-war structures were 
reinstalled, but largely because nothing was done to prevent it. In a bizarre manner, 
the presence of church in the nation produced a formidable support for the Christian 
Democratic movement, which ultimately led to a search for alternative power 
resources. The historical legacy of a plurality of semi-statal institutions provided an 
opportunity to build a momentous double public power: the authority of the state and 
an intermediary level where Christian Democracy rules. In Italy, Christian Democracy 
does not appear to constitute societal accommodation, but the capacious field of semi­
public institutions appears to facilitate the reconciliation of dissension within the 
movement. The Italians would rather use the term ’stato assistenziale’ or ’stato 
previdenziale’ (i.e. the ’assisting state’, or ’providing state’), although it remains 
utterly unclear who assists who and who provides what.
In all three nations social policy has constituted a resource for power mobiliza­
tion. Christian Democracies have managed to establish cross-cleavage cooperation 
without diluting social status and identities. In the course, they have moderated the
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political salience of class and have forced the Left in a defensive position. In the 
Netherlands, Social Democracy was quick to adapt and consequently enjoyed the power 
to govern for a decade or so after the war. German Social Democracy was much 
slower in understanding the political presence and effect of an immensely integrative 
Christian inspired cross-Confessional movement. As a result, Social Democratic 
reformism had to wait until conditions changed and a modernization of the movement 
itself had taken place. The Communists in Italy may perhaps enter future governments 
now that they have even dropped the word ’Communist’ and have turned into a quasi* 
Social Democratic movement that seeks to establish cross-class support. However, 
governmental power in Italy matters less than in the other nations and conflicts are 
likely to occur in the ’sottogovemo’, if a historical compromise were feasible at all. 
The task for the former Communists is to resist the temptations of power in the 
’sottogovemo’ and turn this nation into a real democracy.
The historical fate of Christian Democracy is associated with the development 
of social capitalism. Failure to provide feasible accommodations for conflicting 
interests endangers the survival of Christian Democracy. Difficulties in providing 
cross-cleavage appeasement tends to reinforce class as a basis for political articulation 
and consequently weakens the appeal to workers through the vehicle of religion. In 
addition, the reliance on electoral appeal alone tends to threaten the possibilities for 
power mobilization. German Christian Democracy is the example of a movement which 
failed to become the embodiment of societal accommodation in the 1960s and which 
consequently lost the initiative in societal consensus building. The Dutch Christian 
Democracy successfully surmounted the Confessional differences under pressure of 
electoral and infrastructural disintegration. Only because it managed to re-ally forces 
in a renewed attempt to provide an integration of interests (including those of workers) 
did it manage to survive and increase in strength. Italian Christian Democracy has been 
most successful in investing power resources. It has created a plurality of resources that 
it employs not only to accommodate societal difference, but also to provide an outlet 
for intra-party rivalry. The difference between Italy on the one hand and Germany and 
the Netherlands on the other lies in the fact that in the former nation the method of 
reconciliation has become the goal of power. The structural characteristics of social 
capitalism in these nations have facilitated or rendered problematic the continued
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reproduction of the power of Christian Democracy. Social capitalism may continue to 
provide a medium and outcome of Christian Democratic power under the condition that 
the movement manages to compose a plurality of resources throughout society and the 
state, continues to foster cleavages in the social realm and dilute their political salience 
through accommodation at the same time, and gradually replaces an outspoken religious 
appeal with a more soft-spoken and general enchantment of Christian morality.
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